Published in „Siegrunen“ Magazine - Volume 6, Number 3, Whole Number 33, January – March 1984
By Richard Landwehr
The Formation of SS-Kampfgruppe 1
(SS-Panzergrenadier Brigade 49)
On 3 November 1943 the Führer Directive #51 commanded the three branches of the Wehrmacht to organize units from the „homeland” forces that could be sent quickly to the west in the case of an Allied invasion. Similar orders were received by the Reichsführer-SS, with instructions to prepare assorted training, convalescent and replacement elements for possible mobilization.
The Waffen-SS plans along these lines were turned into the Führer HQ on 15 November 1943 and were promptly approved for implementation. So, on 17 November, the SS Main Office issued formation directives for the SS-Kampfgruppen 1, 2, and 3. At first very little transpired outside of the paperwork stage, but in February 1944, when massive enemy troop build-ups were reported in southern England, things suddenly began to kick into high gear.
The Waffen-SS concept called for the assembly of the battle- groups (each of at least regimental size) from previously activated „emergency” or „alarm” units at assorted SS NCO schools and replacement detachments. The first „Alarm” Battalions were constructed from the SS Panzergrenadier Training and Replacement Btl. 9 at Stralsund under Hstuf. Hillig and from members of the 9th, 10th and 12th NCO training classes at SS NCO School ‘Radolfzell’ (to graduate on 15 August 1944). This battalion came under Hstuf. Burzlaff. The partially non-Germanic SS-Waffen und Unterführerschule at Lauenburg, Pomerania, also formed several ungrouped „alarm” companies from NCO candidates who had arrived at the school in 1943.
In late April 1944, the 2nd SS NCO Training Co. from Lauenburg was dispatched to Laibach to become part of a third SS „alarm” battalion along with two companies from the SS NCO School at Posen-Treskau near Laibach. The result was the following unit:
SS Btl. „Leuthen’VSS-Unterführerschule Laibach
Commander: SS-Hstuf. Hans Schittenheim
Btl. Adjutant: SS-Ustuf. Alois Macherhammer
Ordnance Officer: SS-Ustuf. Frist Lust
5th Company (Posen-Treskau): SS-Ostuf. Richard Broenner
6th Company (Posen-Treskau): SS-Ostuf. Walter Matz
7th Company (Lauenburg): SS-Ostuf. Heinz Dronske
Of the above companies the command breakdown for 7th Company is also known and it looked like this:
Company Commander: SS-Ostuf. Heinz Dronske
Staff Sgt.: SS-Uscha. (later Oscha.) Rust
Company Troop Commander: SS-Uscha. Gottfried Harry
1st Platoon: SS-Standartenoberjunker Franz Schmeiduch
2nd Platoon: SS-Hscha. Baecker. later replaced by SS-St.Oju. Mennekas
3rd Platoon: SS-Hscha. Gessner, later replaced by SS-Hscha. Schueller
4th Platoon: SS-Hscha. Friedrich Stieler (or Stiehler)
Inspection at the SS Motor Transport/Technical school in Vienna. The school commander, Oberfhr. Neblich, is saluting.
Even as the new battalion was organized, NCO training continued on non-stop. On 6 June 1944, with the Allied landings at Normandy, the SS Main Office sent the following radio message to the Higher SS and Police Leader in Laibach: „Operation Leuthen to be carried out!” This meant that the battalion was to prepare for action.
The message arrived in Laibach at 1920 hours and SS-Rttfhr. Hetzemann, a motorcycle messenger was sent off to take it to the SS NCO school at Posen-Treskau. At 2115, he delivered the message to the school adjutant, SS-Ustuf. Ignaz Enengl who in turn passed on the orders to the companies of SS-Btl. „Leuthen” with the added directive that all members of the companies should be fully alerted by 0515 on 7 June at the latest.
SS-Ustuf. Schmeiduch the leader of 1st Platoon/7th Co. had to take charge of the entire company since the usual CO, Ostuf. Dronske was on leave. Telegrams were immediately dispatched to all members of the battalion who were on leave ordering them to report back as soon as possible. The NCO school’s 4th Co., stationed in St. Veith, was instructed to place its vehicles and drivers at the disposal of the battalion.
The school’s supply officer, Hstuf. Witte, began distributing equipment and items of camouflage clothing to the mobilized companies. The men also received entrenching tools, ammunition and first aid kits. The school doctor fitted out the battalion with medical supplies and a well-equipped ambulance.
By 0700 on 7 June, the three companies of SS Btl. „Leuthen” were fully assembled and two hours later the school commandant, SS-Stubaf. Schimmelpfennig reported to the SS Main Office that the battalion was „march ready” and that transport orders were awaited. Between 1000 and 1330 the battalion CO inspected his staff and the three Panzergrenadier companies. At 1815 the schedule for the troop transport trains was received and at 2000 hours, Stubaf. Schimmelpfennig took his leave of 5th Co. which subsequently left on the first train from Laibach at 030 on 8 June. Sixth Co. followed at 1200 hours, and 7th Co. left at 1500. Travelling over the Brenner Pass and through Regensburg, Hof and Dresden, the troop trains reached their destination at Koenigsbrueck before midday on 10 June without encountering any special difficulties.
One day earlier, Regimental Orders #1 had been issued by the SS-Kampfgruppe 1 staff at the SS Troop Training Grounds „Koenigsbrueck” which simply announced that the formation of the Kampfgruppe was now underway at the direction of the RF-SS. The designated KGr. commander was Stubaf. Markus Faulhaber. At 0830 on 10 June, Hstuf. Schittenheim reported in to Stubaf. Faulhaber to receive quartering assignments for his men.
SS Btl. „Leuthen” was now redesignated l./SS-KGr. 1 and the 5th. 6th and 7th Companies were renumbered 1, 2, and 3. In the evening of 10 June, the battalion was joined by an antitank platoon and two infantry gun platoons from the Waffen- Unterführerschule at Lauenburg, Pomerania; a total of 81 men in all, who arrived without equipment. These soldiers were to be used as the basis for a new 4th Company. Ustuf. Oskar Schuse. who was in charge of one of the 1G platoons, was named company commander On the following day (11 June) orders arrived from the KGr. staff officially terminating the NCO training period for members of the battalion and at the same time promoting all of them to the rank of Unterscharführer.
In addition to I. Btl., the SS-KGr. 1 incorporated the following elements into its ranks:
• HQ Staff from the SS-Junkerschule „Toelz“ with the following top officers:
Stubaf. Faulhaber (KGr. CO)
Hstuf. Erich Rehder (Adjutant)
Ustuf. Wolfgang Hettwar (Ordnance Officer)
Hstuf. Fritz Griephan (CO of the Staff Co.)
• One battalion from the Polizei-Waffenschule 1 in Dresden, with the members still wearing gray-green Polizei uniforms. This became II. Btl. in the Kampfgruppe. The commander was Hauptmann der Schutzpolizei Hoellwegen.
• The „Alarm” Battalion from SS NCO School „Radolfzell” under Hstuf. Burzlaff with four companies. This was designated the III. Btl. of the Kampfgruppe. The battalion’s 4th Heavy Weapons Co. was composed mostly of Estonian volunteers along with German supervisory personnel. It was further reinforced in transit to Koenigsbrueck by about 20 men from the 6th NCO Training Co. at Radolfzell.
• The I. Training Detachment from the SS Artillery School II at Beneschau under Ostuf. Guse, which arrived on 7 June.
• Assorted motorcyclists from the SS Armored Recce Training and Replacement Detachment at Ellwangen, who were to form a motorcycle platoon for the KGr. staff.
• Some radiomen with their equipment under Ustuf. Wiedemann from the SS Signals T & R Rgt. at Nuremberg, who were to be used in the formation of a staff signals platoon.
• A 3.7 cm Flak company from the SS Flak T & R Rgt. in Munich under the command of Ostuf. Martin Krenkel.
• A combat engineer company from the SS Engineer T & R Btl. 1 in Dresden led by Ostuf. Fabry.
• A motor transport company from the SS Motor Transport Driver’s School I in Vienna.
On the evening of 10 June, SS-KGr. 1 had the following composition with unit field post numbers and radio code names which were in use from 12 to 14 June:
Regimental Staff with Staff Company but without an antitank platoon: 00 078 — „Cockatoo”
I. Btl. with 1-4 Companies: 06044A-E — „Beaver”
II. Btl. with 5-8 Companies: 13 223A-E — „Lion”
III. Btl. with 9-12 Companies: 02 498A-E — „Elephant”
1. Artillery Detachment with 1-3 Batteries: 09 610A-D — „Rhinoceros”
Flak Company (14.Co.): 00534 — „Lark”
Engineer Co. (15.Co ): 12 556 „Otter”
Transport Co : unknown FP number — „Mule”
Medical/Ambulance Platoon: unknown FP number — „Dove”
Squad „Russy” from 6th Co./SS Training Rgt. „Prag” in September 1942.
Command Roster of SS-KGr. 1 (on 10 June 1944)
Commander: Stubaf. Markus Faulhaber
Acting Commander or 2nd in Command: Hstuf. Hans Schittenhelm
Adjutant: Hstuf. Erich Rehder
Ordnance Officer: Ustuf. Wolfgang Hettwar
Detachment lb: Ostuf. Ernst
Administrative Officer: Ostuf. Benesch
Transport Officer: Ustuf. Heutsch (?)
Kamfgruppe Medical Officer: Dr. Krunfuhs
Staff Co.: Hstuf. Fritz Griephan
Signals Platoon: Ustuf. Heinz Wiedemann
Motorcycle Platoon: ?
I Btl.: Hstuf. Hans Schittenhelm
Adjutant: Ustuf. Alois Macherhammer
Ordnance Officer: Ustuf. Fritz Lust
Btl. Doctor: Hstuf. Dr. Muthig
Transport Officer: Stubaf. Hans Adam Gaertner
Administrative Officer: Ustuf. Bucher
1st Co.: Ostuf. Richard Broenner
2nd Co.: Ostuf. Walter Matz
3rd Co.: Ostuf. Heinz Dronske
4th Co.: Ustuf. Oskar Schuss (temporary)
II. Btl.: Hauptmann der Schutzpolizei Hoellwegen
Staff officers: not known
5th Co.: Hptm. Zieschang
6th Co.: Hptm. Dietrich
7th Co.: Hptm. Robens
8th Co.: Hptm. Christian
III. Btl.: Hstuf. Arthur Burzlaff
Adjutant: Ustuf. Rudolf Krause (?)
Ordnance Officer: Ustuf. Hermann Schellhaas
Other staff officers: not known
9th Co.: not known.
10th Co.: not known
11th Co.: Hstuf. Helmut Engelmann
12th Co.: Hstuf. Herbert Harbel
14th Co. (3.7cm Flak): Ostuf. Martin Krenkel
15th Co. (Engineer): Ostuf. Georg Fabry
Transport Co.: Ustuf. (Ostuf.) Gerhard Schuett
Ambulance Platoon: not known
1. Artillery Abteilung: Hstuf. Karl Guse
Adjutant: Ustuf. Berle (?)
Ordnance Officer: not known
Abt. Doctor: Ostuf. (?) Dr. Hans Hanf
1st Battery: Ostuf. Michael Schmitt
2nd Battery: Ostuf. Hubert Nagler
3rd Battery: Ostuf. Georg Bartl
Sixth Co./SS Training Rgt. „Prag” during field exercises in September 1942. The CO, Hstuf. Tuschhoff is in the leather coat in the center.
II. and III. Platoons/6th Co./SS Training Rgt. „Prag” under Hstuf. Tuschhoff, after marching through the streets of Prague.
While at the Koenigsbrueck Training Camp the Kampfgruppe elements were quartered in these areas:
Staff, Staff Co., Artillery Det., Eng. Co., Ambulance PI., all at the „New Camp.”
I. Battalion in the vicinity of Lausnitz-Hoekendorf.
II. Battalion in the vicinity of Cracow.
III. Battalion around Schmortau, Meisbach, Graefenheim, Reicherau.
14th Company in the vicinity of Borasch.
Transport Co. in the vicinity of Zochau.
Most of the Kampfgruppe members spent their time from 9 to 12 June in their assigned quarters taking care of their weapons and equipment. From the beginning, no one knew how long they would remain at Koenigsbrueck and relocation orders were anticipated at any time. So everything had to be kept at „march readiness.” No one was allowed off the base and no leaves were granted.
The expected orders actually arrived late on 10 June and beginning on 11 June the first Kampfgruppe elements began embarking on troop trains for a destination to be revealed en-route. I. Battalion, having been the last to arrive was also the last battalion to leave on 13 June. To say the least this was a very trying time for the Kampfgruppe staff, as no sooner had the unit been hastily assembled than it was off again with all its supplies and equipment.
It was learned that the next stop would be Denmark where SS- KGr. 1 would assume security duties and also be trained and assembled as the nucleus for a proposed panzer division which ultimately turned out to be the SS-Panzergrenadier Brigade 49.
Strengths of the Panzergrenadier battalions (as of 10 June 1944)
I. /SS-KGr.1: 14 officers / 114 NCOs / 778 men = Total: 906
II. /SS-KGr.1: 13 officers / 125 NCOs / 738 men = Total: 876
III. /SS-KGr.1: 14 officers / 120 NCOs / 680 men = Total: 814
The SS-Panzergrenadier Brigade 49 in Denmark
At the time of its transfer to Denmark, SS-KGr. 1 had the following heavy weapons assigned to it:
8 anti-tank rifles 12 machine guns 42 (heavy)
55 MGs 42 (light)
2 MGs 34 (light)
18 medium mortars (8 cm)
10 Sturmgewehre 41 (automatic assault rifles)
4 light infantry guns (IG 18)
3 7.5cm PAK 40s (anti-tank guns)
12 field howitzers (I FH 18)
Most of the above heavy weapons were assigned to the 4th, 8th and 12th Companies of the Panzergrenadier battalions with the exception of the 12 howitzers which belonged to the artillery detachment. The light machine guns also saw some distribution throughout the rifle companies (1-3, 5-7, 9-11).
The SS Training Rgt. „Prag” marching through Prague on 9 November 1942. Shown is the I.Bn. under Hstuf. Bartelt.
The battalions also started out with a lot of motor vehicles, but in general they were of a very mixed quality and of all possible varieties. I. Battalion alone had vehicles that had been manufactured by some three dozen different firms (including Ford, Studebaker, Skoda, Renault, Bedford, Triumph, GMC, Mercedes, etc.). All of them were in varying states of repair/ disrepair. One can only sympathize with the spare parts problems facing the mechanics! In addition, most of the best vehicles were „loaners” from the SS-NCO schools and were expected to be returned.
I. Battalion started out with the following number of vehicles:
32 motorcycles
13 motorcycles with sidecars
40 automobiles
74 trucks
159 vehicles in sum total
The first three companies in I. Btl. each had the following number of vehicles assigned to them:
1 motorcycle
3 motorcycles with sidecars
2 personal cars
3 trucks
Fourth Co. (heavy weapons) was slightly more fortunate having:
4 motorcycles
3 motorcycles with sidecars 9 assorted trucks of different weights
III. Battalion had a similar quantity of vehicles, mostly of English and Soviet manufacture. Only II. Btl. really had it made as far as motor transport was concerned. This unit had been able to draw on the motor vehicle park at the Police School II in Dresden and as a result it was outfitted with a sizeable quantity of brand new Steyr and Peugeot model trucks and cars. The vehicle breakdown for II. Battalion’s companies was as follows:
Staff: 39 vehicles
5th Co.: 30 vehicles
6th Co.: 31 vehicles
7th Co.: 36 vehicles
8th Co.: 42 vehicles
Total motorized vehicles: 178
At the same time, 15th Engineer Co. reported having the following vehicles:
13 motorcycles including nine with sidecars
6 personal cars
17 trucks and 1 trailer
On 12 June 1944 at 10:30. I. Btl. assembled on the meadow near the junction of the Hoeckendorf-Koenigsbrueck-Laumitz roads. Ostuf. Matz reported to Hstuf. Schittenhelm that the companies were drawn up for inspection. The battalion CO then addressed his men. reminding them of their duty and what would be expected of them in the Kampfgruppe’s future missions.
In the meantime. 5th Co./II.Btl., had already left Koenigs- brueck for a new destination at 2127 hrs. on 11 June. It was followed by the rest of the Kampfgruppe on 12 and 13 June, with the Transport Co. under Hscha. Gruener being the last KGr. element to leave at 0132 hrs. on 14 June. Once the troop trains were fully underway it was learned that the destination would be the southern part of the Jutland peninsula in Denmark.
On their way to Denmark, the trains traveled through Wittenberg, Magdeburg, Neumuenster, Rendsburg and Flensburg. Disembarkation took place at Danish railroad stations from Rodekro to Vojens. The artillery detachment got off in Vojens on 14 June and then began a motorized „march” through southern Denmark to the west coast of Jutland.
After its units arrived in Denmark from 14 to 16 June, the SS- KGr. I received oral orders from the Wehrmacht commander-inchief for Denmark that stated that the unit’s mission was the „defense of south Jutland on a broad front.” Other than that it was to be held in a high state of combat readiness as a mobile reserve in case of an „Allied” landing somewhere else in the country.
The training personnel from 6th Co./SS NCO School „Laibach” under Ostuf. Heinrich Jung (fourth from right, first row).
Specifically, SS-KGr.l was to take over the coastal defense duties of the 363rd Inf. Div. which had been transferred to France, between the towns of Bramming and Ballum. Outside of a few Navy guard posts right along the coasts, there wasn’t any German troops left in the area after the 363rd ID had departed. In fact, there wasn’t much of anything to speak of in the whole of southern Denmark. Between the southern boundary of the SS-KGr.l sector and the German border were the following odds and ends:
In Hjerpsted: A coast guard post from the Coast Guard Det. in Ribe, with 1 NCO and 9 men.
In Ballum: Another 10 man coast guard post.
In Hoejer: The same.
In Soelstedt: A Navy air observation post with 1 NCO and 6 men.
In Burgstedt: The same, only 1 NCO and 4 men.
In Tinglev: The same, with 1 NCO and 6 men. Also, the 2nd Co./Security Btl. 953 with a strength of 1 officer/’ll NCOs/142 men, plus a radio listening party from 4./Luftwaffe Signals Rgt. 202 with a net strength of 1 NCO and 2 men.
In Tondern: The Grenadier Replacement Btl. 209 with a strength of 8/136/381. Also an anti-tank replacement company with 1/39/121, a maintenance troop with 0/1/3 and a Luftwaffe „gas” station with 1 NCO and 1 other ranks assigned to it.
In Gelling: The liaison staff of 4./Luftwaffe Signals Rgt. 10 with 0/7/53.
In Biglum: A Wehrmacht supervisory/control post with 1 officer/1 NCO/7 men.
The entire sector had a total defense strength of: 11 officers/ 203 NCOs/753 men!
A few days after SS-KGr.l arrived in Denmark, the SS-KGr.3 (later the 51st SS Bgde.) led by Stubaf. Joeckel, also turned up to take up security positions on Jutland’s southeast coast between Haderslev and Kolding. It had been hurriedly put together at the Grossen-Born training grounds. (This unit will be covered in a future SIEGRUNEN.)
The SS-KGr.l staff first situated itself around Gredstedbro, then relocated to Seem on 16 June along with the staff company and the medic/ambulance platoon. 1 Battalion was sent to Skaerbaek while II. Btl. was placed in the vicinity of Ribe. Ill Battalion was temporarily located around Bramming (14 to 16 June) and then was moved to the area on both sides of Gram.
The top-secret telegram that activated the SS-Kampfgruppe 1/ SS-Pz.Gr. Bde. 49.
Each battalion was instructed to dispatch small contingents to garrison the little villages in their sectors. During daylight hours the numerous small woodlots and thick tree groves were used to provide cover for the motor vehicles from air attack. The other SS-KGr. 1 units were initially deployed as follows:
Engineer Co. in Obbekaer
Transport Co. in Horn
Artillery Detachment in Ribe with 1st Bttry. in Kaerboel, 2nd Bttry. in Hillerup and 3rd Bttry. in Vedstedt (3rd Bttry. had been quartered in the school at Semm until 15 June).
By 17:30 on 16 June, all Kampfgruppe units were in place in their assigned areas. Towards evening, Ostuf. Dronske and 20 NCOs and men who had been on leave from the SS NCO School in Laibach, reported in to I. Battalion. Dronske immediately reassumed command of 3rd Company. Since the beginning of the invasion of Normandy, all troops in Denmark, including SS-KGr.
1. were kept at „Stage 1 Alert,“ which meant that all soldiers had to be ready to move at a moment’s notice and that all vehicles, equipment and weapons had to be maintained for imminent use.
Effective 18 June 1944, SS-KGr. 1 was retitled the SS-Panzer- grenadier Brigade 49 by the SS Main Office. For a tactical/ID sign the new brigade adopted an anchor emblem, which was soon displayed on various directional signs. Whether or not it was ever applied to vehicles is not known. The illustration shows the brigade emblem in use on a directional sign for I. Battalion.
Tactical sign for l./SS Pz.Gr.Bde. 49.
The Defensive Mission of SS-PzGr. Bgde. 49
The brigade’s assigned defensive sector stretched from the mouth of the small Sneum River where it ran into the ocean at the northwest part of Bramming to a line in the south that went through the southern parts of Ballum, Dostrup and Arrild. The land in this area was favorable for defensive fighting, or for throwing back a seaborne landing attempt. It was flat, laced with canals and ditches, and provided clear viewing in all directions. Coastal embankments hindered the view of the land by any potential enemy invasion force approaching from the open sea.
The numerous scattered villages and settlements made a „strongpoint“ defensive strategy possible all along the coast. The terrain was not particularly good for the deployment of motorized troops in the brigade sector unless they stuck to the roads. Fortunately there were plenty of designated secondary roads on the maps that were well maintained and useable. They allowed for a rapid shifting of troops from all directions towards a common specified goal. But other than some tree clumps all along the road, there wasn’t much cover from potential aerial attacks. The brigade was given one main directive for the defensive fighting and that was to utilize all available weapons against the enemy before and during any landing attempt. The embankments facing the Fano and Romo Bays were to be the main battle lines.
III. Battalion under Hstuf. Burzlaff was held as a motorized reserve around Roedding, Gram, Arnum and Toftlund. On the brigade right (north) was II.Btl. (Police Hauptmann Hoellwegen) with I.Btl. (Hstuf. Schittenhelm) on the left (south). The two battalions’ defensive sectors were divided by a line that ran from the south part of Vr.Vepstedt to the southern portions of Lustrup and Obbekaer. This changed a day later (17 June) to a line running from Rejsby to the north part of Roager. The island of Mando was occupied by a reinforced platoon from II. Battalion.
Following Kampfgruppe orders issued at 1400 hours on 16 June, the detached SS battlegroup units were to build up strong- points in their occupied villages for a „roundabout“ defense. To supervise these tasks. Ostuf. Fabry, CO of the 15th Engineer Co., was appointed fortifications construction officer for the brigade. Part of his job involved figuring out where best to place minefields. Ostuf. Krenkel’s 14th Flak Co. oversaw the air defense efforts in the brigade’s zone of operations. Attached to this company to provide additional support were the following platoons:
III./1st Co. under Unterscharführer Josdis with two NCOs and 36 men.
II. /Staff Co./I.Btl.
I. /Artillery Detachment SS-KGr. 1 under Ostuf. Drexler.
The artillery detachment took up firing positions between Vilslev and Ribe that were directed to support the defensive efforts of I. and II. Battalions. In addition, an artillery observer (spotters) commando was set up in the I.Btl. sector.
The Defensive Assignment of I. Battalion
After inspecting the terrain in I.Btl’s sector, Hstuf. Schittenhelm divided the area up into three smaller defensive zones, designated A, B and C. In the course of several command conferences the exact troop disposition was determined. In case of an enemy landing the key point of the defense would be the town of Skae- baek. It was here that Hstuf. Schittenhelm wanted to concentrate the bulk of his infantry along with most of the heavy weapons from 4th Company. The town itself was declared a „fortified place.“
In the course of 16/17 June, the battalion’s companies built up their positions in the defensive zones west of the Ribe- Dostrup road. The smallest elements of the defense were designated „resistance nests.” The breakdown for these went as follows:
Defense Zone A (3rd Co.)
Resistance Nests
1. Rahede, Hviding. Hoegsbro
2. Rejsby, Or-Aboelling
3. Vaabolling, Havervad
Defense Zone B (1st Co.)
Resistance Nests
4. Brons
5. Astrup
6. Skaerbaek
7. Ballumschleuse Defense Zone C (2nd Co.)
Resistance Nests
8. Ottersboel
9. Mjolden
10. Ballum
11. Dostrup
The defensive zone commandants were as follows:
Zone A: Ostuf. Dronske
Zone B: Ostuf. Broenner
Zone C: Ostuf. Matz
The company HQ were in Brons (3rd Co.), Skaerbaek (1st Co.) and Dostrup (2nd Co.). Fourth Company’s HQ was in Astrup. The transport staff generally kept their vehicles camouflaged outside of the towns. The following elements were picked for the defense of the „fortified” town of Skaerbaek by Hstuf. Schittenhelm:
I.Btl. Staff
1st Company
One platoon of infantry guns
An anti-tank platoon led by Hauptscharführer Kurt Moesner in reserve.
Each of the Panzergrenadier companies had their engineer squads detached and these were combined and formed into a special combat engineer platoon under Hscha. Titz (formerly the platoon leader of III./1st Company). This new element had a strength of six NCOs and 42 men and was held at readiness for the disposal of the battalion in Ullerop. In the following days it was put to work fortifying positions. Hscha. Titz was succeeded as platoon leader of III./I by Oberscharführer Wohlfahrt. The Flak platoon assigned to the battalion was placed east of Skaerbaek at Barsbol. It was carefully positioned between the strong-points at Skaerbaek and Dostrup so that it could be used both for ground fighting and for the air defense of Skaerbaek.
In his orders for 20 June, Hstuf. Schittenhelm specifically forbade any withdrawal east of the Ribe-Dostrup road without his approval. East of this road was the battalion reserve, which maintained a strongpoint defense of Dostrup and Or-Aboeling.
Standing scouting parties were maintained in Berkelev (a platoon from 3rd Co.) and in Or.Gasse (I./l under Ustuf. Knoll). They were responsible for guarding the area east of Vodder (3rd Co.) and the eastern part of a forest about 10 km southeast of the Skaerbaek-Arrild road. A scout party from 2nd Co. watched over the Mjolden-Dostrup road and the battalion’s open left flank. In addition, the units stationed in Skaerbaek sent out a daily bicycle patrol consisting of two NCOs and four men, that travelled through Skaerbaek, Brons, Rejsby, Arrild, Dostrup and Ballum checking up on the state of things. Responsibility for manning the patrol rotated among the battalion units.
In the days that followed, emphasis was placed on building up the strongpoint and resistance nest positions with the assistance of the combat engineers. Obstacles, mines and other obstructions were put out around the positions. Elsewhere the 4th Co. readied primary and temporary (mobile) positions for the infantry gun platoon, the artillery observers and the mortar platoon (led by Oscha. Robert Bloechinger) in the Astrup and Ot- tersbol strongpoints. The Flak platoon built temporary positions in Brons and Roager.
The construction of I. Battalion’s defensive positions was supervised by Ustuf. Hannemann, who would take over command of 5th Co./II.Btl. on 20 July. The companies also synchronized their „alert” schedules and firing plans, so that if worse came to worse, all available weapons in the battalion sector would be in action during the initial stage of any defensive fighting. Likewise, the signals platoon developed its own scheme (see illustration) for an all-unit communications link-up coordinated from the battalion HQ in Skaerbaek.
On 20 June, the battalion adjutant made a useful discovery at the coast guard barracks at Ballum-Schleuse. He found an abandoned engineer camp there which still contained large quantities of mines and explosives left behind by an engineer unit that had been transferred to France. Needless to say this „find” was quickly appropriated for the brigade’s use! On the same day, Ustuf. Leu from the SS and Waffen NCO School at Lauenburg joined I.Btl. and he was charged by Hstuf. Schittenhelm with the formation of the still undeveloped 4th Company.
Initial sketches of the SS-KGr. 1 identification flag, sign post and battalion pennant.
SS-Stubaf. Markus Faulhaber, 49th SS Brigade commander.
Second Battery/SS Artillery Detachment 49 under Ostuf. Nagler (fifth from left, front row).
On 19 June, the brigade HQ had issued directives stating that commencing 22 June, following the fortifying of all positions, intensive combat training was to begin. The emphasis was to be placed on combatting an invasion force. During training periods, each unit had to keep part of its force standing by, ready for action at all times. In his Training Orders Nr. 1 for I./49, issued on 19 June 1944, Hstuf. Schittenhelm emphasized the following: „Each officer, NCO and man must realize that success is only possible through hard and intensive training work. What is important is the fighting spirit, not the tactical form ...”
He continued: „I expect all officers and NCOs to be aware that through solid, fundamental training a certain amount of losses in lives and blood will be spared.”
The training of the brigade would concentrate on three facets over the next several weeks: officer’s training, NCO training and joint unit training. The brigade commander personally supervised the tactical schooling of the officer’s corps. Emphasis was placed on terrain analysis and deployment, planning and basic instruction. All company and battery officers along with the engineer and Flak platoon leaders were involved in the program.
The first instructional conference for the officer’s corps took place at 1800 hours on 22 June in Ribe. Hauptmann Hoellwegen (II./49), lectured on questions pertaining to positional warfare and how they would apply to conditions in the brigade sector. Following this, Ostuf. Fabry (Engineer Co.), discussed new combat engineer techniques and close-range anti-tank weapons. On 26 June, Hstuf. Schittenhelm spoke to the assembled officers about the deployment of an artillery detachment and the use of engineer troops. The lecture series concluded on 3 July with an instructional period devoted to discussing lessons learned from the infantry fighting to that date in Normandy.
In officer’s planning sessions on 6, 11, 17, 24 and 28 July, different alternatives to defensive actions by the brigade against an enemy coastal landing attempt were discussed and „war gamed.” In addition, assorted exercises were plotted out for the battalions and detachments. The training program developed for the artillery detachment ran as follows:
24 June: Terrain orientation led by Hstuf. Guse.
30 June: Exercise mission:
The deployment of an artillery detachment of a reinforced Panzergrenadier regiment during march assembly and on the march under the threat of enemy air attack.
Mission leader: Ostuf. Bartel
7 July: Exercise mission:
Deployment of an artillery detachment of a reinforced Pz.Gr. Rgt. to „secure the peace.” Exactly what that involved was not spelled out!
Mission leader: Ostuf. Boehnel
14 July: Exercise mission:
Deployment of an artillery battery in an advance detachment against air landed enemy troops in a rear area.
Mission leader: Ostuf. Schmitt
21 July: Exercise mission:
Deployment of an artillery battery in readiness positions for use against air landed troops in a neighboring sector.
Mission leader: Ostuf. Jung
28 July: Exercise mission:
Deployment of an artillery battery in a strongpoint defense against air landed enemy troops in the rear and attacking enemy forces from the sea.
Mission leader: Ostuf. Nagler
4 August: Exercise mission:
Deployment of an artillery detachment of a reinforced Pz.Gr. Rgt. during the clearance of towns of an entrenched enemy.
Mission leader: Ostuf. Bartl
Along with tactical schooling, the officer corps and everyone else in the brigade underwent extensive training with machine- pistols, automatic weapons and portable anti-tank weapons. It was considered important for the officers in particular to know exactly how the weapons functioned so that they would be able to deploy them to best advantage in combat.
NCO Training and Supplementary Instruction
The company and battery officers had to see to it first of all that all of their NCOs had attained maximum proficiency in weapons training. With this determined, specific tactical training for the NCOs was carried out in small unit (reinforced platoon) sized exercises involving the „strongpoint” or „resistance nest” defense system. All possible enemy offensive operations were considered during the course of the training missions. A special premium was placed on the functions of the signals and motorcycle messenger troops. During field exercises these elements were essential in maintaining unit contacts.
In addition to field training, much instruction of the „class room” variety was provided to the brigade members. This ran the gamut from political lectures to studies of tactical and technical natures, along with a certain amount of sand-table „wargaming” and marksmanship practice. Some of the supplementary courses given to the soldiers of the 49th SS Bgde. were as follows:
„Learning the Duties of an SS Man”
„Anti-sabotage and Counterespionage”
„The Voluntary Jurisdictional Areas of Company Commanders”
“The Mission of Staff Transport Officers“
„The Battlefield Handling of a Motorized Grenadier Company in Different Positions and Combat Dispositions”
„Traffic Regulation Duties”
„Technical Services”
„Elimination of Disruptive Sabotage”
„Procedures for NCOs and Drivers During Vehicle Shortages”
On 23 June 1944, the Army command in Denmark launched a Stage I Test Alert beginning at midnight. Of course, no one in the units affected were supposed to know it was a „test.” The alert affected the entire brigade sector until 15:30 on 24 June. All units had to prepare for action, load up their vehicles with munitions and supplies, and stay at combat readiness until the alert was called off. A number of false radio reports were made to various units indicating that enemy actions were underway, either as a prelude to an invasion or just general sabotage. Units receiving the reports were instructed to prepare countermeasures. The alert seemed so authentic that no one quite knew whether it was real or not. At one time in the early morning of 24 June, communications between I.Btl. and the brigade staff were abruptly interrupted. Fearing the worst, Hstuf. Schittenhelm immediately called a more serious Stage II alert for his own defensive sector at 02:52. Other than this one foul-up, the „probing exercise” seems to have worked well.
General Training Activities
I. Battalion successfully conducted its first large-scale exercises on 27/28 June. On 25 June at the Hillerup school (the quarters for 2./Art.Det.49), an anti-chemical (gas) warfare class was conducted by the brigade officer responsible for this area. The artillery detachment began a three-week leadership course for NCOs designed to give them the background to move up a grade (to gun commander or observation post supervisor, or infantry leader), if necessary in the course of action. In addition a general training program for the artillery detachment was formulated in eight parts as follows:
I. Artillery Training
a. General artillery theory
b. Aiming/Target instruction and practice
c. Shooting instruction
d. Surveying measurements to determine range, etc.
e. Map usage
f. Battery troop training
g. Anti-’’gassing” measures
h. Artillery exercises in the field
II. General Troop Duties
a. Drill and calisthenics
b. Shooting/Target practice
c. Weapons maintenance
d. Standard operational duties
III. Chemical Warfare Training
IV. NCO Instruction
V. Soldier’s Duties (unspecified, but the usual routine)
VI. Standard Instructions, Inspections, etc.
VII. Group Singing
VIII. Sports Activities
In early July 1944, news reached the brigade about an increasing amount of striking and civil unrest in certain parts of Denmark. The general strike called in Copenhagen on 4 July was taken quite seriously by the German authorities in Denmark and as a result the 49th SS Bgde. had to beef up its patrolling and enlarge its guard posts. The SS Panzergrenadier companies were also put on a little higher state of alert, even though nothing exceptional ever happened in the brigade sector. The Danish civilians in this area were particularly cooperative and peaceful minded.
On 6 July, the Wehrmacht C-in-C Denmark, General-of-the- Infantry von Hanneken, made his first visit to the 49th SS Brigade. He arrived at the brigade HQ in Ribe and spent much of the day studying the unit’s operational plans that were designed to meet various contingencies. In the evening he was the guest of the brigade’s officer’s mess.
Some more prominent visitors paid a call on the brigade on 14 July: the Higher SS and Police Leader in Copenhagen, SS- Obergruppenführer Pahnke and the Inspector of SS Artillery from the SS Main Office in Berlin, SS-Ogruf. Gutberlit. After their arrival in Bramming, they visited the positions of 6th Co. and the firing positions of 2nd Battery before going on to inspect the troop quarters in Ribe. During the afternoon the pair of VIP’s closely observed a field exercise carried out by members of I.Btl., which featured the attack and breakthrough of „enemy” positions by grenadiers supported by infantry guns and mortars.
Because of the generally peaceful situation in Denmark it soon became possible to make needed personnel changes and exchanges between units. Initially this was only done on a limited basis, but with Brigade Orders Nr. 9 of 20 July, some extensive transfers were carried out. On this day, 9th and 5th Companies exchanged 96 men between them, 2nd and 6th Companies swapped 47 men as did 7th and 11th Companies, while 4th and 8th Companies traded 15 men.
In addition, a number of command changes were made in the course of July. These were as follows:
1. Ostuf. Lust, the Ordnance Officer of I./49 took command of 10th Co. on 7 July then left to take charge of 7th Co. on 20 July.
2. The former CO of 7th Co., Hptm. Robens replaced Hstuf. Griephan as CO of the staff company.
3. Hstuf. Griephan then took over the 9th Company.
4. Hstuf. Harbig (12th Co.) was injured in a motorcycle accident and he was replaced by Hstuf. Engelmann from 11th Company.
5. Hptm. Dietrich who commanded 6th Co. up to 20 July, then took over 4th Company.
6. Ustuf. Leu, who had helped form 4th Co. was then posted to 12th Co. as a platoon leader.
7. Also on 20 July, Hptm. Zieschang turned over his 5th Co. to Ostuf. Hennemann, who was formerly in charge of II./2nd Company.
8. Hptm. Zieschang next replaced Hptm. Christian as CO of 8th Co. and Christian took over 10th Company.
9. Ustuf. Schmeiduch (platoon leader of I./3) became a platoon leader in III. Battalion.
10. Ostuf. Kempf, formerly a platoon leader in 9th Co., took over Schmeiduch’s old command.
11. Leutant Knust, a platoon leader in II.Btl. became a platoon leader in 10th Co. on 25 July.
12. Likewise, Lt. Feller from II,/49 also became a platoon leader in III./49.
13. Ustuf. Hans Paar from the 1st SS T&R PzGr.Btl. arrived to take over a platoon in III. Battalion.
Third Battery/SS Art.Dot. 49 under Hstuf. Bartl (fifth from right, front row).
On 2 July, Hstuf. Schittenhelm (I./49) received a promotion to Sturmbannführer, while the SS-Standartenoberjunker Erich Plesel (Art.Det.), Joachim Schulz (Art.Det.), Walter Schlett (Art.Det.), Alfred Gnelding (Art.Det.) and Franz Schmeiduch (I.Btl.), all were promoted to Untersturmführer effective 21 June.
Some changes were made as well in the brigade structure. Brigade Orders Nr. 8 for 10 July, eliminated the Flak Co. as an independent entity and transformed it into a battery for the Artillery Detachment. As a result „14th Co.“ was dropped from the brigade roster. Effective 19 July, the engineer platoons of II. and III. Battalions along with a platoon from 15th Engineer Co. were assigned to the neighboring 160th Reserve Div. which was short of combat engineers.
On 7 July, the 49th SS Bgde. assumed the duties of the Security Staff „Donwald,” which had been situated in Bramming. Hptm. Gerhold from this staff joined the brigade staff. At the same time the brigade officers who had come from the SS NCO schools and replacement units learned that they were now permanently assigned to the brigade, retroactive to 10 June 1944.
As the training continued it was clear that II.Btl. from the Police School I in Dresden had the most catching up to do. These men had not really been Waffen-SS recruits to begin with. On 11 July the officer corps of the brigade participated in a „war game” that involved the speculative deployment of the brigade against enemy airborne landings to the north and east of Esb- jerg, the big Danish town to the northwest of the brigade’s sector.
On 12 July, special brigade directives were issued emphasizing the value of physical fitness and the responsibility of the different unit commanders to see that their soldiers kept fit. To further this point the three battalions and the artillery detachment held their first inter-unit sports competitions from 27 July to 1 August, with the winners to represent their units at the full brigade competition that was to be held on 8 August at the Toftlund athletic field. The following sports were placed on the agenda: 3,000 meter obstacle course, 600 meter relay, field handball and tug-of-war.
Waffen-SS artillery „spotter” during the fight for northern France.
After a „gas“ protection course was completed (that lasted from 25 to 29 June) the brigade HQ authorized training courses for stretcher bearers and their assistants to run from 7 to 13 July. These were to be carried out on the battalion level by the battalion doctors. Each company had to provide four stretcher bearers and nine assistants.
One of the first brigade training orders had stated that each member of the brigade was to receive instruction in close antitank combat. But it was not until 16 July that the following anti-tank training program was drawn up for the brigade elements:
1st Class for I.Btl. from 23-29 July
2nd Class for brigade units from 30 July-5 August
3rd Class for III.Btl. from 6-12 August
4th Class for the Artillery Det. from 13-19 August
5th Class for I.Btl. from 20-26 August
Two men from each squad in each platoon were required to attend the instruction class. The overall training course leader was Ostuf. Fabry (CO of the Engineer Co.) with Ustuf. Assmus- sen (lI.Btl.) and Ustuf. Leu (I. and later lII.Btl’s) as instructors.
Brigade Training Orders Nr. 4 for 23 July, established machine gun target shooting training classes that were to commence on 31 July under the auspices of the individual battalions and their commanders. Brigade staff also authorized a sharpshooter’s training class to take place in Skaerbaek from 24 July to 5 August. I. Battalion was made responsible for overseeing this. Assigned to the course were one man from each squad, two NCOs from each company, and one platoon leader from each battalion. Once they had attained their goals, the course participants would have their achievement noted in the brigade orders-of-the-day and were then entitled to carry the designation „sharpshooter“ with their rank and name. In close conjunction with this sharpshooter’s course, was a shooting instructor’s training course carried out in Cophenhagen from 8 to 11 August.
In the brigade orders of 25 July, it was decided that a planned 10-day staff sergeant’s training course to be conducted by the artillery detachment, was just too long to proceed with. Because of their training and security duties the men of the 49th SS PzGr. Bde. had very little free time. Most recreational activities centered around the brigade’s sports competitions and a musical competition that was held at the athletic field in Hygum on 6 August. Parts of the individual units were able to get films to view or make a few cinema visits. In the first half of July, two „Strength through Joy“ entertainment troups, the „Golden Triangle” and the „Cheer Bringers.“ visited the brigade area and put on shows for the men.
From 4 to 10 July, a political speaker. Leo Klora Korn, lectured the brigade units on two topics: „England Without a Mask“ and „Why the USA Fights Against Germany.“ As a change of pace, the SS men were occasionally given the opportunity to visit the small cafes and restaurants in Bramming, Ribe and Skaerbaek, though they were carefully admonished not to associate with or bother the locals. This last provision became so frequently ignored that the brigade HQ finally had to issue specific orders on 28 July forbidding the Waffen-SS soldiers from taking part in the local dances!
In the course of July 1944. many units changed their billets, and this included the brigade staff, which moved its HQ from Seem to Sr.Hygum. The following chart gives the disposition of the troops from I.Btl. in the towns in the battalion sector up to 1 August. (Note: Figures are for Officers: NCOs: Men):
|
Skaerbaek |
Btl.Stab |
5:22:73 |
|
|
1. Kompanie |
1:11:73 |
|
|
4. Kompanie |
2:38:48 |
|
Bröns |
4. Kompanie |
0:12:13 |
|
Astrup |
1. Kompanie |
1: 6:50 |
|
|
4. Kompanie |
0: 4:38 |
|
Hjemstedt |
1. Kompanie |
0: 3:27 |
|
Ör.-Gasse |
1. Kompanie |
1: 6:35 |
|
Mjolden |
2. Kompanie |
1: 8:17 |
|
Döstrup |
2. Kompanie |
1: 4:39 |
|
Ottersböll |
2. Kompanie |
0: 3:23 |
|
Ballum |
2. Kompanie |
0: 4:40 |
|
F. Ballum |
2. Kompanie |
0: 1:12 |
|
Fährhaus |
2. Kompanie |
0: 5:20 |
|
Heuberg |
2. Kompanie |
0: 2:11 |
|
Rejsby |
3. Kompanie |
1: 8:114 |
|
Birkelev |
3. Kompanie |
1: 3:26 |
In the middle of the month some difficulty emerged with the Estonian volunteers concentrated in 12th Company. Their purpose in joining up in the first place was to fight the communists and they were not happy about the idea of winding up on the Western Front. As a result, they were sent back to the SS NCO School at Radolfzell and were replaced by a contingent from the 6th Training Company at the school. At the same time, 12th Co. also received an infantry gun platoon.
As the fighting in Normandy intensified, the enemy began nightly flights over the 49th SS Bgde. sector. These nocturnal visitors usually dropped a large quantity of propaganda flyers which were duly rounded up in the mornings and handed over to the engineers who burned them in rubbish piles on the perimeters of the minefields. At 01:10 on 20 July, the III. Flak Platoon attached to I.Btl. went into action for the first time, firing at two enemy planes that flew in over their positions at heights of 200-300 meters. This aggressive response only piqued the enemy’s curiousity and for a long time afterwards any number of enemy planes put in appearances circling high above the „fortified town“ of Skaerbaek.
In the night of 21 July, I.Btl. received a readiness alert to see how fast it could get ready for action. The exercise demonstrated that it took about 3*/2 hours for the battalion to fully mobilize for combat. Over the next several days the brigade units began strengthening their strongpoints. The engineer platoon from I./49 mined the beach between the coastal embankments and the shoreline and on 27 July a Danish fisherman managed to set off one of the newly placed mines. His fate was not recorded. The battalions also began to form special commando teams to hunt down possible enemy paratroopers, and the supply troops began organizing their own reserve assault groups.
New orders from I./49 HQ addressed this issue:
„In case of an enemy attack on Skaebaek, it is commanded that Skaerbaek, as a fortified locale, be defended to the last man. For this purpose the supply elements of 1st, 4th and Staff Companies are to assemble combat units on an emergency basis to serve under the Ordnance Officer of I. Battalion.” The commander of the I.Btl. assault troop was Oberscharführer Moltrer. Eventually the battalion formed the following six assault troops, each with a strength of seven men:
Assault Troop 1 (1st Co.) under Oscha. Kempkens
Assault Troop 2 (4th Co.) under Ocha. Neumann
Assault Troop 3 (Staff Co.) under Hscha. Reining
Assault Troop 4 (Staff Co.) under Oscha. Waitzbauer
Assault Troop 5 (Staff Co.) under Oscha Hendel
Assault Troop 6 (Staff Co.) under Oscha. Rolf
In the pre-dawn hours of 28 July. I.Btl. tested its companies to see how fast they could get ready for transport. It took two to three hours to get the vehicles out of the woods around Skaerbaek and loaded up with supplies and equipment. The battalion staff was not happy with these results; way too much time had elapsed. The conclusion formed was that the vehicles had to be parked closer to their units and supply sources even if it meant foregoing some additional cover.
A similar test was carried out for III.Btl.. which was in reserve and did not have its units as widely scattered. This exercise showed much better results:
|
Day of Exercise Company |
Strength |
Vehicles |
Readiness Time |
|
|
28 July |
9th |
1/24/187 |
30 |
60 min. |
|
1 August |
10th |
2/26/188 |
31 |
65 min. |
|
29 July |
11th |
2/29/195 |
36 |
60 min. |
|
27 July |
12th |
3/20/141 |
42 |
45 min. |
|
27 July |
Staff |
2/26/39 |
39 |
60 min. |
In another such exercise held on 31 July, 1st Battery of the Artillery Detachment set the brigade record by getting itself „march ready” in only 35 minutes. Of course this unit suffered from a vehicle shortage and thus had fewer of them to load up! In an attempt to deal with the vehicle shortages, the brigade staff decided to break up the transport company and distribute its trucks and cars to the 1. and II. Battalions and the Artillery Detachment.
Emergency Transfer to the Invasion Front
Due to serious losses being suffered by the Waffen-SS on both the Eastern and Western Fronts, the 49th SS Bgde. was requested to make some excess personnel available to other units. In many cases such requests gave the commanding officers a chance to get rid of some of their deadbeats! At any rate, this resulted in Brigade Orders Nr. 14 for 10 August 1944 which called for the sending of 100 NCOs and men from I and III. Battalions to the Waffen-SS Front Transfer Station in Flensburg. A few officers were also given up. They were: Ostuf. Kempf (3rd Co ). Ustuf. Karle (9th Co.). Ustuf. Knoll (1st Co.), Ustuf. Keil (10th Co.) and Ustuf. Messenberg (Staff Co.). These personnel losses were supposed to be made up by replacements from the SS NCO schools but these were not due to leave for the brigade until 15 August and by then it would be too late. Bigger things were in the offing!
On 12 August, with the German 7th Army being surrounded by the Americans near Mortain in France. SS PzGr.Bgde. 49 received the following High Command orders: „Brigade is to leave Denmark for deployment elsewhere.” Immediately, everything went into motion. The companies reconsolidated and the engineer platoons attached to the battalions were sent back to the 15th Company. The Flak gunners had to stay in place as long as possible to guard against any air attack on the brigade during its reassembly.
In the staff offices all secret materials and charts had to be disposed of and the administrative officers had to make sure that all clerical records were in order. Afterwards the company quartermasters turned over all buildings used to house the troops to the appropriate town mayors. In the meantime, repair crews worked frantically, checking to see that all vehicles were in good working condition.
At 1800 on 12 August. I.Btl. reported that it was „march ready.” The strengths of its companies at this time ran as follows:
1st Co.: 1/16/159
2nd Co : 2/18/171
3rd Co : 2/17/144
4th Co.: 2/41/72
Waffen-SS mortar team in northern France, summer 1944.
In the night of 12/13 August, the brigade learned that it was due for „emergency deployment at the front.“ Early in the morning of the 13th. 4th and 7th Companies boarded a troop train in Skaerbaek for a trip to the German border; the train left at 10:20 under the supervision of Hauptmann Dietrich. Unfortunately. during the brigade’s last days in Denmark a number of sabotage incidents transpired. Some of the Danish railroad employees conveniently disappeared, causing delays in loading the trains and several members of the brigade were abducted by the Danish „Resistance.” Much precious time was lost as a result of these occurrences.
At 2000 hours on the 13th. 2nd and 3rd Companies left Hviding under their Transport Officer, Ostuf. Matz. and 24 hours later, 1st Co. and I.Btl. staff took their leave of Skaerbaeck. The main body of the brigade and the artillery detachment left Denmark from different railroad stations on 14 and 15 August. The troops trains rolled through Flensburg. Hamburg, Bremen and Oldenburg on their way towards the southwest. The German Army High Command (OKW) intended to send the brigade to northern France to guard the coast between Calais and Boulogne. Also being sent to France from Denmark was the 49th SS Brigade’s twin, the 51st SS Brigade. For the purpose of deceiving the enemy, the two units had their titles dramatically upgraded to 25th and 26th Panzer SS Divisions (still later changing again to 26th and 27th SS Panzer Divisions when it was noticed that the 25th Hungarian SS Division had already been authorized in May 1944!). Perhaps surprisingly, this deception seems to have fooled the „Allied“ intelligence.
On its journey through northern Germany. 49th SS Bgde. (or „Nucleus Rgt.” 25.SSPz.Div. as it was also known) was attacked on more than one occasion by American fighter-bombers. The light Flak guns and machine guns on the trains always fought back vigorously, and most of the transport trains got through with little loss. However, some trains were not so lucky. The locomotive for the 2nd and 3rd Companies’ transport train was shot-up in an attack and burst into flames. Many hours were lost trying to get a replacement.
At about 1200 hours on 16 August, four American fighter- bombers attacked the train carrying part of the SS Art.Det 49 (2nd and 4th Batteries) just as it was leaving the Grossen- Kneten station A furious fight ensued as the SS men tried to protect their cargo, which included some 36.000 rounds of artillery ammunition, land mines and infantry munitions. Unfor tunately some of the supply cars were hit and exploded in a tremendous inferno. Second Battery lost 3 or 4 men killed and another 5 or 6 wounded The dead men were buried in Alhorn.
But the worst was yet to come. The 6th transport train from the brigade left the Vojens station on 14 August with a total of 56 railroad cars On board was the entire 10th Co (2/14/177) and parts of 11th Co. (0/10/73) and 16th Co. (1/7/36), along with three NCOs and nine men from the III.Btl. staff. Also being transported were 14 motorcycles, three motorcycles with sidecars, 56 cars and trucks (25 of which were fully loaded with ammo) and two field kitchens. The Transport Officer was Hptm. Christian.
Waffen-SS motorcycle scout troop members, France 1944.
The train made it as far as Twistringen without any losses. After a short stopover there on the morning of 15 August, it began steaming towards Osnabrueck. The sky was mostly cloudy. At 12:35, two American fighter-bombers suddenly appeared on an east-west course. They quickly disappeared into the clouds but it was a bad sign. At the small town of Borwede, Hptm. Christian decided to prepare for the inevitable. The grenadiers were sent off the train to take cover as best they could along both sides of the rail line. The machine guns were made ready (there apparently were no Flak guns aboard). Then two planes reappeared through a break in the clouds to the south and they were followed by a veritable swarm of fighter-bombers, and in seconds ten of them were attacking the troop train. The SS men fired back with everything they had but it was hopeless from the start. The ground weapons could not pierce the armor plating on the planes and within ten minutes the entire train had been shot-up from end to end. Then came the explosions as the ammunition blew up, and shells, fragments and bullets went flying off in every direction. As the SS men tried to get out of the way they were raked by 20 mm cannon fire from the fighter- bombers; 12 NCOs and men were killed and another 20 were wounded, most seriously.
Fire trucks rushed to the scene from Twistringen but they could do little until the air attack finally stopped at 13:18. Had there been multi-barrelled Flak guns on board the defensive effort might have been a little more effective. Only a few odds and ends could be salvaged from the wreckage; of all the vehicles on the train, only two passenger cars remained intact and workable. Seven of the more lightly wounded men remained with the troops while the rest were rushed to nearby hospitals. A clean-up crew was sent down from Bremen and the SS men were temporarily quartered in the town of Borwede, where the civilians did everything to be helpful to them. The dead soldiers were buried in the Twistringen cemetery with full military honors. On 17 August the men from the destroyed train joined with those from the artillery detachment train, which had also been damaged, in Rheine, where the two groups were combined. The overall Transport Officer was now Ostuf. Nagler.
On the way to Reims other „Allied” fighter-bombers („Jabos“) tried to attack the train but they were driven off by four-barrelled Flak guns. By 18 August the troop train had entered northern France. At the Cambrai station where the train stopped for refueling, the French locomotive engineers suddenly went on „strike“ and made themselves scarce. A former German railways man, now serving with the 2nd Battery of the Artillery Det.. volunteered to run the train and did a more than adequate job of it.
The train ended up in Reims on 19 August where Ostuf. Nagler had to make further arrangements to get his men to their destination. It was not easy. Feldmarschall von Kluge was on his deathbed (a suicide attempt), and his staff was completely shaken up. At the train depot, the men of the 49th SS Bgde. had to wait long hours while another train was loaded with „one-man torpedoes” in what was supposed to be a top secret operation. However, Ostuf. Nagler found that the French railroad employees were familiar with all facets of this operation, from its „code name“ to the final destination of the train!
At Kortriyk in Belgium, the transport train carrying the brigade’s 15th Engineer Co. came under a „Jabo“ attack. No one was killed, but some vehicles were lost and some railroad cars fell off the tracks. With the onset of evening, the men carefully worked at getting an upset munitions car back on the tracks. One great mystery occurred during the company’s journey: the acting CO, Ustuf. Schindler, simply vanished without a trace. He may have fallen into the hands of „partisans,” who more often than not, executed their captives.
Deployment of the 49th SS Panzergrenadier Brigade in France
In the meantime, the other brigade transport trains successfully completed a three-day journey through Hilversum. Utrecht and Antwerp to Lille. Only one „Jabo” attack was reported between Montreuil and Lille and this was driven off by the Flak gunners. On 16 August. I.Btl. was able to disembark its troops and equipment and set itself up as follows in its designated arrival sector:
I. Btl. Staff at St. Justin
1st Co. at Beaumaries St. Martin
2nd Co. at Campigneulles
3rd Co. at Wailly-Beaucamp
4th Co. at Ecuires
While relocating to St. Justin, three men of the battalion staff crashed their motorcycle with sidecar and two of the men had to be hospitalized in Campagne. The brigade staff set up its HQ in Buire-le-Sec, with the staff company in nearby Montreuil. The Artillery Detachment and its only deployable forces (1st and 3rd Batteries) were quartered around Aiguille and the 15th and 16th Companies were placed in Gouy-St. Andre.
II. Btl’s Panzergrenadier companies were situated in St. Remy aux Bois, St. Josse-au-Bois. Douriez and Argoules. The battalion command post was in Douriez. IH.Btl’s Panzergrenadier companies were in Lepin, Nampont and St. Martin, with the battalion CP in Maintenay. Upon arrival, the SS men immediately went to work building earthen bunkers. From time-to-time they could observe V-1 rockets passing directly overhead en route to England.
At the brigade’s first command briefing in France, Stubaf. Faulhaber gave his assembled officers the unit’s new assignment. It was to:
1. Serve as counterattack reserve to be used against any enemy landing from the sea between the Canches and Authie Rivers.
2. Stand alert to defend against any enemy airborne landings and be prepared to „directly attack” and regain any paratroop occupied towns.
3. Prepare to attack any enemy landing effort in the rearward operational area to the east (around the V-l launching pad).
In addition the brigade staff demanded the following from all units:
1. Action readiness at all times.
2. Continuous communication link-ups.
3. A well-entrenched, deep series of defensive positions in case of enemy attack.
4. Full camouflaging of men. vehicles and equipment.
5. Careful concealment of detached vehicles. (They were not to be concentrated together.)
6. Maintenance of an effective warning system.
7. Troops to be brought out from the towns and away from well-known landmarks so they wouldn’t be easy targets.
Hstuf. Faulhaber as a training course commander at the SS Officer’s School „Toelz” with Germanic volunteer officer candidates. The man on the front left is a Dutch war reporter.
Early in the morning of 18 August (03:30), I.Btl. was put on full alert. After 12 hours (around 15:00) orders came indicating that the battalion was to relocate to the Calais area. At 18:30, the company commanders assembled at the battalion CP along with the transport, medical and administrative officers for a briefing. Soon afterwards the battalion commanders were called to the brigade HQ. Here they received the following order at 21:55:
„The Nucleus-Rgt. is to relocate from its present billeting area to the vicinity of Calais in the night of 19/20 August.”
The brigade was to move out in the following order: II.Btl., III. Btl., 15th Co.. Art.Det., Flak Bttry., 16th Co., I.Btl., traveling through Manighem. Zoteux, Pesores, Wiaume, Effroy, Marquise Rinxent and Laubringhe. The march was to commence at 20:00 on 19 August. The advance commando, which would proceed the brigade to make preparations for its arrival in its new sector, was to consist of Stubaf. Schittenhelm as acting „regimental” commander, Hstuf. Wiemann from the brigade staff. Ustuf. Wiedemann (the Signals Platoon leader) and one motorcycle messenger. In addition each battalion was to provide the commando with one officer and one motorcycle messenger, while each company was to send two platoon leaders, two squad leaders and one motorcycle messenger. The advance commando assembled at 01:30 on 19 August at the I.Btl. CP in St. Justin.
After arriving in the new deployment area, the advance commando was to go to the HQ of the 47th Inf. Div. in Piennes, where new billeting areas were to be worked. On a provisional basis. I.Btl. was to be routed to Soubre. the Art.Det. was to go to Bonningues-les-Calais while the 15th Co. was to report to Leulinghem-Bernes. The Transport Co. (reassembled) was to come under the 47th Inf.Div. staff in Piennes while the Flak battery was to be subordinated to the „Fortress Commandant’’ in Boulogne.
But in a very short time, everything was placed on hold At 02:2- the advance commando received an emergency message from 1st Army: „Advance commando stop —prepare to start the march of the battalions to the Meaux sector, to commence upon receiving further orders. These will be passed on through the regiment.”
One hour after the receipt of these orders the rgt’l/brig./ divs’l commander (take your pick —the unit was being classified as all three simultaneously!), Stubaf. Faulhaber came up to I. Btl. to discuss the new situation. The battlefield developments south of the River Seine were grim. Increasingly splintered and disorganized German forces were struggling to break out of a massive entrapment and try to assemble some new line of defense. It was clear that SS-Pz.Gr.Bde. 49 was going to be caught up in the maelstrom.
On 19 August 1944, Army Group „G,” responsible for the crumbling German Army in France, issued the following command directive:
„The Führer has ordered that the 26th and 27th SS Panzer Divisions arriving from Denmark be placed in the area south of Paris. The command of both formations is to come from a battle- tested divisional staff of the Waffen-SS (17th SS), with other commanders and supply troops possibly provided by the rest of the (17th SS) division. Through the allocation of detached panzer and assault gun companies (improvised from supply and rear area personnel), the combat capabilities of these formations will be enhanced. The Commander-in-Chief West reports that the assembly area for both of these formations comes under the supervision of the aforementioned divisional staff of the Waffen- SS.“
Reassembly Around Meaux
The command conference at I.Btl. HQ broke up at 03:00 and a short while later, Stubaf. Schittenhelm issued marching orders for his command: „The battalion is to relocate to Doullens in a day march. Air reconnaissance and enemy fighter attacks may be anticipated ...”
Hptm. Dietrich with four motorcycle messengers proceeded ahead to Doullens to prepare for the arrival of the battalion. Simultaneously, the Motorcycle Group „Stoeckmann,” from the brigade motorcycle platoon, undertook the job of marking out the march route for the brigade by placing signposts along the road running from Montreuil to Doullens. I.Btl. assembled on the St. Justin-Brimeux road and proceeded down it in three staggered marching groups.
First aid for W-SS troops in Franca 1944.
About 120 km to the south the last battle-worthy portions of 7th Army, under the command of SS-Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser, were fighting their way out of the Falaise Pocket to the German lines. At 05:00 on 19 August, I./SS-49 passed through the suburbs of Paris. In case of air attack, the men had been instructed to halt immediately, take cover and fight back with all available weapons. Fortunately no „Jabos” turned up. The rest of the brigade was supposed to follow I.Btl., but large chunks of the Artillery Detachment 49 and the II. and III. Battalions had still not shown up due to costly delays caused by fighter-bomber attacks on their troop trains.
I.Btl. reached the Bray-seur-Somme area in the afternoon of 19 August and began to deploy. The 1st Co. was sent to Cappy to provide protection for Bray from the south while the other companies and the battalion staff went to Suzanne. All units had to stay „under cover” as much as possible so that they would be out of easy detection from either the land or air, so the soldiers stuck to the woods when they were not on the roads. The battalion command post was set up in a forest about 250 m from Suzanne. From here Stubaf. Schittenhelm reported to 15th Army Corps that his battalion was in its designated place. At 16:00 hours, battalion staff supervised the distribution of two-days’ worth of supplies and rations to the companies.
At 20:00 the battalion suddenly received orders to get ready to march out again by 22:00, but there was a fuel shortage and the tanker trucks had not arrived. Therefore the continuation of the advance had to be delayed until 05:30 on the 20th when the fuel was finally delivered. The route now took the battalion through Harbonnieres and Rosieres-en-Santerre. After stopping to make a head count in Compiegne, the march continued through Crepy-en-Valois, Levignen, Betz and points southeast.
As the brigade’s soldiers drew nearer to the front, more and more detached groups of retreating soldiers and vehicles turned up. They had all sorts of weapons and apparently came from a wide variety of different units. These were the remnants of the 7th Army —the „lucky“ ones that had broken out of the hellish Falaise cauldron; the so-called „Stalingrad of Normandy”.
Soon after arriving in Meaux. Stubaf. Faulhaber set to work trying to bring order out of the prevailing chaos. He immediately set up a commando to round up the escaping soldiers, and they were regrouped as they turned up at the school by the Meaux cathedral. Most were soon given marching orders and pointed in the direction of their units. The exceptions were members of the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Div. „Goetz von Berlichengen” who were on their way towards Metz for the reconstruction of their division. Stubaf. Faulhaber took advantage of the on-paper relationship between his „26th SS Panzer Div.“ and the 17th SS Div., to simply incorporate these men into his brigade.
At the same time, 49th SS Bgde. began reporting its first missing personnel—mostly men who had fallen into the hands of the French terrorists. Four members of 12th Co. were initially reported missing, but two of them turned up later. The other two men were never found, although one of their ID „Soldbuchs” turned up. They had to be presumed executed by the partisans. The 4th Co. also reported its first casualty when motorcycle messenger Rottenführer Läufer was lightly wounded by a terrorist-thrown hand grenade.
On 20 August, I.Btl. took up quarters in and around Meaux. The battalion CO set up his command post in some woods adjacent to the Meaux-Crepy road. In the evening 4th Co. reported that the entire anti-tank platoon and 33 members of the mortar platoon had not yet turned up. They turned out to be victims of vehicular failures and they showed up the next day. II. and III. Battalions were much later in getting to the Meaux assembly area as they had suffered severely from „Jabo“ attacks en route. Many of the men in these units were infuriated over a particularly savage American fighter attack that they witnessed against a clearly marked Red Cross train carrying wounded soldiers back to Germany.
The final brigade transport trains arrived at Sezanne on 22 August and on this same day a radio message arrived at Army Command West from Major Remer at the Army High Command Office:
„The Führer desires that both of the arriving SS-Panzer- grenadier brigades either be further expanded through the 17th SS Pz.Gr.Div., or be used to reinforce other SS formations that have suffered heavy losses. [He] has in mind eventually the 2nd or 9th SS Panzer Divisions. On no account are either of these brigades to be incorporated into Army formations.
On 21/22 August, around Meaux. the brigade received its last allotment of provisions before going into action. All secret papers were destroyed and weapons and vehicles were given a final going over Fuel trucks brought up their cargos from the Army Fuel Depot at Chateau-Thiery. The platoon leaders briefed their men on what to do if they got separated, captured or wounded. One last instruction period followed in the use of „Stove Pipe” bazookas and Panzerfausts.
Eighteen-year-old W-SS gunners engage the enemy, France 1944.
The members of I . Battalion’s engineer squads were outfitted with anti-tank close combat weapons and sent back to their companies designated as tank destruction troops. The former members of the 8th and 9th SS NCO Training Classes at the SS NCO School in Laibach were now informed that they had met all the requirements for graduating from their course and on the orders of the „regiment” had been promoted en masse to the rank of Unterscharführer.
Preparing for Battle
The German Front (northwest to east) along the Seine River to the east of Montereau had the following elements in place by 22 August: 48th Inf.Div., 49th SS Pz.Gr.Bde., remnants of 9th Panzer Div. (less than a full regiment), and the 51st SS Pz.Gr. Bde. around Troyes, with one less Panzergrenadier battalion than 49th SS Brigade. Elements of the American 3rd Army were advancing practically at will towards this line.
During the early morning hours of 23 August, the „Nucleus Rgt.“/26th SS Pz.Div. (49th SS Bde.). received orders to secure and defend the area along the Seine between Marolles and Pont. Without tank support and heavy weapons though, the brigade had little chance of halting a powerful enemy thrust. At 07:00 the brigade began its march from Meaux towards its new defensive area. At 10:20 the advance commando reached Provins. Stubaf. Schittenhelm (I.Btl.) set up his HQ in Provins and became „town commandant.“ The supply section went into the woods at Sourdun.
At 13:30, Ustuf. Meisenberg from the staff company reached Mouy along the Seine and reported no sign of the enemy. However. a little bit earlier at 11:00, two motorcycle squads reported being shot at from the rear by terrorists about 6 km south of Provens. In the late afternoon. 3./I.Btl. took up positions in the woods near Provens.
Stubaf. Faulhaber now positioned his brigade elements as follows:
The deployable portion of 111. Btl. (9th and 12th Companies), was placed to the west of Donnemarie. adjacent to the sector of the 48th Inf. Division. It had the job of protecting the brigade’s right flank.
The II Btl. was placed along both sides of Bray, while I.Btl. was situated around Nogent and maintained a link-up with the surviving remnant of the 9th Panzer Div led by Generalmajor Jolasse The Artillery Detachment was brought up from Sezanne to Esterbilly, where its command post was set up.
The 2nd Battery under Ostuf. Nagler went into position in I. Battalion’s sector near Le Meriot. Its observation post was established on the grounds of an old castle northwest of Nogent. The other two howitzer batteries were supposed to provide fire support for II. and III. Battalions from the Donnemarie area. By evening all companies were in place and were in the process of securing contacts with neighboring units and reconnoitering their sectors.
The battalion command posts were in Donnemarie (III Btl ). Bray (II.Btl.) and Melz (I.Btl ). On the right wing. 12th Co. assumed the defense of Donnemarie. Detached infantry guns were positioned in Villenauves and Orvilliers, while heavy machine gun groups protected the road to Bray. The 9th Co. (CP in Chatenay) maintained strongpoints along a line from Marolles to Sallins. along the west edge of the woods at Fresnoy to Choutencon, where the border with 48th Inf.Div. began. A standing scout troop was positioned on the north bank of the Seine opposite La Tombe. Part of the Flak Battery took up firing positions on both sides of Courcelles.
Towards 16:30. Stubaf. Schittenhelm personally briefed his company commanders at the I.Btl. CP in Melz. At 18:45, Hstuf. Broenne (1st Co.) reported in from the crossroads at the Cour- ceroy railroad station: „At 18:30 the company was defense- ready with the following strength: 2/26/155. The positions are completed and manned.”
At the same time, 2nd Co. at the southwest entrance to Nogent reported losing contact with the Wehrmacht strongpoint commando in Nogent. which had pulled out without notice at 17:00. The company then began close reconnaissance patrolling throughout the area Ostuf. Dronske’s 3rd Co. had the job of securing I. Btl ‘s foremost positions and its left flank with two groups of sentries at Crancey and a standing scout troop at Challautre-la-Grande. The undeployed parts of the company were placed at the disposal of the battalion in Sourdun where the battalion staff and supply troops were located.
Recce missions carried out in the night of 23/24 August turned up no particular surprises. Scout Troop „Greif“ (2nd Co ) reported in at 05:30 on 24 August that there was no enemy movement seen, nor any special occurrences to note. The town of Tremblay was found to be peaceful and enemy free.
In the sector of 111 Btl . scouting parties from 9th Co. patrolled along the Coutancon-ia-Courtille road and around Donne- marie. where partisan activity was in evidence in the woods to the northwest and southwest of the town. Motorized recce troops even passed over the Seine to feel out the situation as far as the Yonne. Early on 24 August the brigade ordered „intensive frontal reconnaissance” on all front sectors; it was essential to know where the enemy was. The brigade staff was particularly fearful that enemy paratroops might be dropped behind the lines to the northeast of Nogent.
Waffen-SS wounded helped by their comrades during the retreat through northern France.
To facilitate the required scouting-out mission, I.Btl. put two separate radio scout parties into the field at 09:00:
1) Group „Kempf,” with two squads from 3rd Co. under Ostuf. Kempf and a 30-Watt radio transmitter was sent to Sens.
2) Group „Schueler,” with two squads from 3rd Co. under Hscha. Schueler was sent to Villeneuve-l’Archeveque.
A further radio party was sent towards Troyes at 10:30. It consisted of two squads from 2nd Co. under Oscha. Sossens.
At 13:10, Ostuf. Kempf’s scout troops reached Gumery and radioed in the fact that the town was „enemy free.” The party continued on south towards Thorigny, and found numerous houses in the area already displaying American flags in anticipation of the arrival of the U.S. Army. Civilians volunteered the fact that American tanks had already appeared in Fleurigny but had gone back the way they came. Group „Kempf” continued on to a bend in the road southeast of Thorigny. From here, „spotters” from the party observed three U.S. armored cars going into Fleurigny. At 14:17, the group made its second report to the battalion:
„Three enemy armored cars north of Thorigny going in march direction to the east—scouting party will clarify later on.”
Group „Kempf” then proceeded back to Grange-le-Bocage. About 600 m north of the village a new observation post was set up. From here, two American tanks were spotted to the north of Chaume, moving in the direction of Thorigny and at 15:00 a report to this effect was radioed in to the battalion HQ. A half-hour later, the sound of loud motors was heard emanating from the area under observation. At 16:23, the scouting party, after sending in another report, moved to a hill about 1500 m from Thorigny and for another hour kept enemy movements under visual observation. Then the party started back towards Grange-le-Bocage. At that instant, the little column came under a furious attack by 18 „Jabos.” The commotion alerted the American tanks to the presence of the Germans and they also opened fire on the hapless party. In the midst of the turmoil Ostuf. Kempf kept his head and calmly noted the number of American tanks in the vicinity. He counted 13 and at that
point the activity became rather superfluous; the SS men had to make a run for it to save their necks!
During the violent burst of firing from the enemy side, two of Group „Kempf’s” vehicles caught fire, one of which was unfortunately the radio wagon. The radio section leader, Uscha. Bendix, was killed and three other members of the party were wounded. In the course of the confused action two of the SS signalmen became missing. Towards 22:30, the surviving members of the scouting party reached their own lines. On the next morning, the wounded men were sent to the hospital in Chalons, about 150 km away.
The Radio Scouting Group „Schueler” had the mission of determining which towns on the road to Villeneuve the enemy would soon occupy, how strong the opposition was, and how many tanks the other side would be utilizing. At Trancault, the party learned from civilians that four American troop carriers had come into town early on 22 August, but had left the way they came on the same day. From Trancault, Group „Schuler” continued down Highway 374. No enemy troops were sighted. At 15:40 the party radioed in: „Bourdenay enemy free. It is the assertion of some French civilians that there are American soldiers in Lasnerey seeking to repair their vehicles.”
Supposedly about 20 GIs were in Lasnerey trying to fix an armored car. Hscha. Schuler decided to move in on the town from two sides and occupy it. West of the Bourdenay-Lasnerey road the group spotted an enemy tank at the west end of the village. A tank destruction squad was sent to deal with it, but the U.S. tank went into action and moved to a new position in the woods about 300 m farther to the north with the obvious intention of trying to cut off the scouting party. Shortly thereafter. Group „Schuler” received a strong dose of machine gun and tank cannon fire from the woods which kept it from advancing. The American soldiers in Lasnerey took advantage of the covering fire to flee from the town into the woods. About 30 of them were actually counted.
Suddenly another American tank appeared from the east and it went into position in the woods to the south of Lasnerey. Then two more tanks came up through the forest to the southeast and began to open fire on the scouting party. That was enough for Hscha. Schuler; it looked to him that a pretty strong enemy attack was underway and it was high time for him to get his men out of there.
While retreating northwards, a number of French refugees joined up with the SS column (not everyone was waiting around to greet the Americans with open arms!), and they stated that the main body of an American armored task force was only about 2 km to the south of Lasnerey. At 19:30, Hscha. Schuler reported in at the battalion CP at the Melz Chateau; he had taken no losses and had discovered much about the enemy forces —the situation did not look good!
1. Battalion’s third radio scout troop led by Oscha. Sossen. went through Nogent and on south towards Romily. The party reached the town uneventfully and some Flak and artillery elements from the 9th Panzer Div. also arrived to take up firing positions around Romily. The SS men were a little surprised to find the entire area between Romily and Troyes to still be free of the enemy, even though no German troops were in evidence.
In Troyes Group „Sossen” made contact with 51st SS Pz. Gr.Bde.. which had begun assembling at the town on 21 August, when its advance commando arrived. The 51st SS was charged by Gen. Schramm, the field commandant of Troyes, with the defense of a bridgehead across the Seine. There were also a number of different Wehrmacht units in the town. As an added precaution the bridges and approach roads to Troyes were mined with explosives. In the late afternoon the scouting party returned to the company command post without incident.
In addition to the three radio scouting parties, I.Btl. formed three more scout groups which had the job of maintaining linkups with neighboring units on the battalion’s flanks. The groups were as follows:
•One squad from 1st Co. under Oscha. Wohlfahrt, dispatched at 10:00 hours to the right flank.
•Two squads and two motorcycles from 2nd Co. under Oscha. Hein sent to the left flank at 10:30 hours.
•One squad from III.PI./3rd Co. under Uscha. Reinert was also sent to the left flank at 11:00 hours.
Group „Wohlfahrt” travelled from the company CP in Courceroy along the Seine to a point just south of Bray where contact was made with 5th Company. The staff of II.Btl. was located in Bray and the entire unit was given the job of defending the ground to the south and east of the town. At 15:15, the party returned to 1st Co. reporting that all of the bridges across the Seine between Bray and Courceroy had been destroyed. The engineer squad attached to 1st Co. was given the responsibility for eliminating the bridge at Courceroy. This meant that the enemy would have to make his initial crossing over the river in boats.
Scout Group „Hein” made contact with 9th Pz.Div. in Romilly, and then began a search for enemy air-landed troops or tank forces. The party went from Nogent through St. Aubin, Ferreux and La Poste, to the Seine bridge north of Pont, arriving at 15:52. Because of the destruction of a canal bridge it was impossible to reach the Seine bridge so Group „Hein” continued to patrol south of the river.
In Crancey, the party made contact with a squad from 3rd Co. Group „Hein” next had a friendly encounter with a scout troop from Company „Guhl“ of the 1st SS Div. „LSSAH,” which was operating out of St. Hillaire. At 21:00, the Seine bridge north of Pont was destroyed, but in case of emergency, foot troops could still pass over it. At 16:00 Group „Hein” continued on its mission, passing through Barbuise, La Villeneuve-au-Chatelot and other towns until it reached Montpothier where an engineer company from 243rd Inf.Div. was stationed.
In Bethon, Group „Hein” found a Luftwaffe Flak battery and the staff of another Waffen-SS unit (unspecified). After passing through several more towns, contact was made with a squad from 3rd Co. in Charlautre-la-Grande. In St. Nicolas-la-Chapelle an army artillery battery was discovered. From here the party returned to the starting-off point at Nogent, arriving at about 18:00 without making any contact with the enemy.
Scout Group „Reinert” followed a route similar to that of Group „Hein. ” It was supposed to find out the strengths and armaments of the Wehrmacht elements along I. Battalion’s left flank. It left the battalion CP in Melz towards noon traveling in a northeasterly direction and subsequently passing through most of the towns earlier visited by Group „Hein.” In Bethon, Group „Reinert” found the previously reported Luftwaffe Flak unit, but not the Waffen-SS staff. In the evening, the party returned without incident to the battalion CP.
Stubaf. Faulhaber after the award of the Knight’s Cross, as commander of the „Iron Third” Co./SS Rgt. „Germania”/5th SS Div. „Wiking.”
At 12:00 on 24 August, the Commander-in-Chief West ordered all deployable segments of the 17th SS Pz.Gr.Div. „GvB ‘ to return to the front in the sector of 1st Army Corps, from the Metz area where it was to have undergone refurbishing. At the same time the „25th and 26th SS Panzer Divisions” were to be subordinated to the 17th SS Division. Once again there was a nomenclature foul-up pertaining to the fake numerical designations of the twin SS brigades. All reformed units of 17th SS Div. were to go back into combat as small battle-groups.
Simultaneously with these orders, 49th SS Bde. received instructions to construct two bridgeheads across the Seine at Bray (II.Btl.) and Nogent (I.Btl.); each was to be manned in battalion strength. The security of the terrain in between the bridgeheads was to be maintained by the 10th and 11th Companies from III. Battalion. Over the next few hours. 10th Co. took over the sector between Bray and Montain, while 11th Co. (CP in the vicinity of Blunay), secured the ground south of the Beaulieu Canal to the northern part of the partisan-infested woods near Sourdun.
The new deployment of these two companies freed 1st Co. for another assignment. Consequently at 16:55, I.Btl. requested that 1st Co. be removed from the III.Btl. sector as soon as possible Brigade staff, however, ordered 1st Co. to remain in a third small bridgehead across the Seine at Courceroy. By the early afternoon, part of 3rd Co. along with a supporting mortar platoon from 4th Co., was on the march from Sourdun to Blunay. A standing scout troop led by Oscha. Riemersheimer returned back to Charlautre-la-Grande and 2nd Bttry./Art.Det.49 took up new firing positions along the flood plain of the Seine. In addition, I.Btl. ordered a further scout group from 3rd Co. under Hscha. Stieler to reconnoiter from Melz through Herme The mission of Group „Stieler“ was to patrol the assigned security sector of I.Btl. and determine if the march routes and towns along the way were free of terrorists and enemy soldiers. The party passed through a series of towns from Noyen to St. Aubin, finally returning to the company CP at 18:00 with a report that all points were still enemy free.
But the overall results of the recce missions carried out on 24 August, gave little room for encouragement. American motorized infantry and tank forces were advancing in strength between the Vanne and the Seme. A number of detached Army and SS elements stationed near the 49th SS Bde had either pulled out or were in the process of doing so It was known that 51st SS Pz.Gr.Bde. was firmly in place at Troyes and that weak units of 9th Pz.Div. still held a bridgehead at Romilly (but not for long; most of these troops would pull back from Romilly on the afternoon of 24 August). To the 49th SS Brigade’s right, the 48th Inf.Div. was still in position between Montereau and Melun. But approaching the bend in the Seine River that was held by the Army infantry division and two SS brigades were two U.S. armored divisions and two U.S. infantry divisions. The German defensive forces were therefore outnumbered by more than 3 to 1 in total manpower and had no armored or air support of their own to call upon. A battle under these circumstances was almost suicidal to begin with.
Stubaf. Gusa, commander of SS Artillery Det. 49. Later temporary commander of 49th SS Bde. upon the wounding of Stubaf. Faulhaber and still later commander of SS Art.Rgt. 17/Div. „GvB.”
During the evening hours of 24 August (around 19:00), the brigade ordered its units to „secure and defend the Seine sector from Marolles to Pont.“ The northern bank of the Seine was designated the main battle line. The brigade therefore called back most of its forces from the south side of the Seine and evacuated the newly established bridgeheads at Bray (II.Btl.) and Courceroy (1st Co.). Only the bridgehead at Nogent was retained, and I.Btl. continued to build it up and reinforce it. All remaining bridges over the Seine were now supposed to be destroyed.
111. Battalion put all of its men to work in its sector digging entrenchments and building hasty fortifications. But the ground was chalky and loose which made it difficult to construct a good foxhole! During the evening the remaining men from the brigade’s 16th Transport Co. were divided into groups and sent to the different battalions as infantry reinforcements. I. Battalion received one Untersturmführer and ten men from 16th Company. The supply elements were also dispatching all available men to the combat units.
The evacuation of 1st Company’s bridgehead at Courceroy was delayed until 11th Co. got back over the Seine and at 19:30 the planned destruction of the Courceroy bridge had to be postponed until sometime in the next morning. At 20:40, 1st Co. finally got its relocation orders: „The company is to immediately remove itself from the area south of the Seine . . . the company will next position itself along both sides of the road in the vicinity of Le Meriot. Reconnaissance commandos are to be set in march to this area immediately.”
Organization of the Nogent Bridgehead
Because of enemy air recce flights over the I.Btl. sector between Noyen and Pont, Stubaf. Schittenhelm had to assemble and redeploy his forces under the cover of night. The 1st Co. was assigned the defense of the right (western) part of the bridgehead while 2nd Co. defended the left (eastern) side of it. The dividing line between the two companies was the Nogent-Trembly road. The infantry gun platoon led by Ustuf. Schuss from 4th Co., was set up in the 1st Co. positions. Another 1G platoon under Oscha. Zinsl along with an anti-tank and mortar platoon, also from 4th Co., were established in the 2nd Co. sector. The anti-tank troops were positioned to cover the road approaching Nogent from the south. Lookouts were set up in advance posts to watch for enemy tanks. The CP and supply elements of 4th Co. were also shifted into the bridgehead.
The companies were instructed to maintain general contacts with Wehrmacht units at the corners of their flanks and to keep their positions as hidden from view as possible. They were also supposed to erect tank obstacles. Two squads from 2nd Co. and one engineer squad from 15th Co. had already begun to work on these during the morning of 24 August. The repositioning of the battalion placed one rifle platoon from 3rd Co. along with Hscha. Stieler’s heavy weapons platoon in the unit’s right sector between Novent and 1st Co. on a line from the Seine River bend to 1600 m northeast of Point 94 —St. Maurice-aux-Riches Hommes. Sharpshooters from 3rd Co. provided additional protection for this area, while scout troops-maintained links to the neighboring II. Battalion. The 3rd Company’s remaining two rifle platoons were kept in battalion reserve around Melz.
Because of the increasing civilian and police contacts with the enemy, Stubaf. Schittenhelm placed a 21:00 to 05:00 hours curfew on all local residents in the I.Btl. defensive zone. The battalion’s unneeded vehicles were parked in the woods to the south of Sourdun. while the battalion medical officer. Hstuf. Dr. Muthig, set up his hospital dressing station in the Melz Chateau. Ostuf. Nagler’s 2nd Artillery Battery put its observation posts at Point 123 to the east of Fontaine-Macon.
At 19:30, the brigade HQ ordered the engineers to destroy the ferry and boat launches on the Seine near Mesrigny. while also preparing to blow up the last Seine bridges at Mesrigny and Romilly —though the actual destruction of these important edifices could only take place on direct orders from I. Army Corps. While this was going on, I.Btl. deployed a motorcycle squad to protect the connections of the Nogent bridgehead to the north bank of the Seine.
At 21:15, I.Btl. sent a recce party out towards II.Btl. to find out exactly what units lay between I. Battalion ‘s right border and the town of Bray. Just before dawn on 25 August, 1st Co. finally left its bridgehead at Courceroy and went into position in the Nogent bridgehead. At 05:30 a destruction commando from 15th Co. blew up the bridge at Courceroy. By 11:30, 1st Co. had completed its relocation to the right part of the battalion sector and was busy digging in. All contacts with the local civilians were broken off for security reasons.
While the regrouping of I.Btl. continued without difficulty, a sentry post under Uscha. Runghammer from III./3rd Co. was attacked by partisans at 01:30 on 25 August and an exchange of fire (without German casualties) continued until 04:30. The terrorist attack emanated from a piece of wooded land where another shooting incident had transpired at 16:00 on the previous day.
The Battle is Joined
I./SS-49’s Ordnance Officer, Oberscharführer Molterer learned about a supply depot near Troyes that was still filled with clothing and equipment dating back to the Western Campaign of - 1940. For four years the only people to benefit from this stockpile were the members of the permanent Luftwaffe contingent that guarded the depot. Oscha. Molterer took off in search of the unused supply dump with two trucks on the morning of 25 August. He was seeking a supply of boots for I. Battalion’s grenadiers. whose footwear had fallen on hard times. When they arrived in Troyes, the depot was being wired for demolition and the sound of American artillery fire could be heard in the distance. At first the guards tried to turn back the SS supply trucks, but a heated exchange of words ensued and Oscha. Molterer won the right to load up his trucks with anything he wanted. The trucks arrived back in Nogent with quite a load of „booty“ that was well appreciated by the men. The supply dump was subsequently blown up shortly before the arrival of American troops in Troyes.
While the bulk of I./SS-49 went into the Nogent bridgehead, the other two battalions reinforced their positions and carried out some more recce missions. The 9th Pz.Div. also sent out two radio scout groups to provide link-ups with I./49. They were connected to reinforced scouting parties led by Hscha. Stieler and Hscha. Schuler, both from 3rd Company. In the course of the morning of 25 August, I.Btl. dispatched the Scouting Parties „Reuter” (1st Co.), „Haewel” (2nd Co.) and „Bauer” (4th Co.) to survey the terrain in advance of the Nogent bridgehead perimeter.
The 3-squad Scout Troop „Stieler,” reinforced by the Radio Armored Scout Troop „Kaichel” (from 9th Pz.Div.), received the following assignments from the Btl. CP in Melz at 11:58:
1. Find out if the towns along the battalion march route are still free of the enemy.
2. Locate the enemy security defenses.
3. See if there were still [enemy] tanks in place in Grange- le-Bocage, as they were on 24 August.
The scout party went first to the road crossing about 1500 meters southeast of Courceroy. From here it continued down Highway 439 in the direction of Thorigny-sur-Oreuse. Towards 13:00 the group reached the south entrance to Gumery. A little bit further on an enemy recce troop with an armored car and four jeeps was suddenly encountered in Trainel. Group „Stieler” was fully alert to the situation and immediately went into action, and after a brief exchange of fire the Americans were driven off to the west.
At 13:15. the party ran into an armored car scout troop from the Panzer Recce Training Detachment 130 (under Major von Born-Fallois). The „Panzermen” immediately took up the pursuit of the fleeing Americans, while Hscha. Stieler continued with his group to a hill a kilometer south of the Fontaine- Fourches to La Borde road. At 14:00 they arrived at Soligny-les- Etangs and found it clear of the foe. A half-hour later enemy
forces were seen occupying the east side of La-Louptiere-Thenard. Two U.S. tanks situated in a fruit orchard protected the road to the north of the town. About 2 km west of the village, in some woods, there were some more tanks and vehicles. In addition, three more tanks and four armored cars were spotted around the town.
After discovering two more tanks and a further column of trucks and armored cars underway to Fontaine-Fourches, Hscha. Stieler decided to head back to Courceroy while he still could. At 16:00 the SS scout party received some light machine gun fire near Courceroy, but no enemy movements were noticed. The group next went back to Trainel, however, no more enemy troops were encountered. After Scout Party „Stieler” returned to the battalion CP in Melz, the Armored Recce Troop „Kaichel” was sent back towards Gumery to engage the advancing American detachment. After another brief firefight, the enemy retreated to Grange-la-Bocage and Group „Kaichel” stayed in place on Hill 120, 3 kms southeast of Gumery.
While this was going on, the Scouting Party „Schuler” with two squads from 3rd Co. and the Radio Armored Scouting Party „Schellwitz” took off on their assignment. They had the job of seeing how many tanks were still at Lasnerey and between the towns along the march route. From Nogent the party traveled down Highway 374 in the direction of Bourdenay. At 14:00 hours Soligny-les-Etangs was found to be enemy free. A little bit later Group „Schuler” met up with some men from 2nd Co. under Ustuf. Haenel.
On the way to Trancault a civilian volunteered the information that an enemy armored force had arrived in the town at about 15:20 hours. Thus forewarned, the party carefully went around the village and approached it from a rear entrance street at about 16:30. Two tanks and five armored cars were identified and more armored cars could be seen advancing from the southwest. After receiving fire from Trancault, the scouting party cleared a way through the woods to Charmoy where the road continued. The forest about 3 km to the southeast of Solig- ny was still unoccupied by the enemy.
Stubaf. Linn, chief-of-staff of the 17th SS Div. „GvB,” who informed Stubaf. Guse of 49th SS Brigade’s incorporation into the 17th SS Division.
At 11:15. another scout troop under Uschar. Reuter from 1st Co. was sent to reconnoiter the ground that lay before the defensive lines held by 3rd Company. The mission ended at 18:35 with no enemy contact, although some civilian sightings of detached enemy tanks and vehicles were noted. The 4th Co. also sent out a recce party under Uscha. Bauer which went from Lasnery to Bercenay-le-Hayer without seeing the enemy, though again civilians reported that an American unit had passed through the Fay-les-Marcilly area.
All reports from the scouting parties indicated that the point of an enemy tank force was slowly advancing through Gumery and Trancault and was at best only a few kilometers away from the defensive lines of I./SS-49. With the Americans coming forward, the local terrorists also grew bolder in their actions. Partisans ambushed an empty fuel truck convoy going to Troyes, near Romilly. Fortunately, two squads from 3./49 led by Uscha. Allisat provided an escort, and the SS men drove back the French attackers in a brief firefight. When the column neared Troyes it could be clearly seen that the battle for the city was well underway. Task Force A of the 4th U.S. Armored Div. under a Col. Clark had launched an attack on Troyes during the morning of 25 August. The grenadiers of the 51st SS Pz.Gr.Bde. put up a fierce and bitter resistance. The 49th SS Bde. tanker truck convoy was just able to get away without any losses.
At 12:00 hours, two Rottenführers from the 10th Engineer Co. of the 51st SS Bde. reached the CP oif I./49 in Melz and reported on the advance of the enemy tanks on Troyes and the destruction of the Seine bridges behind the city. There was no way that they could return to their unit so they were incorporated into the 2nd Artillery Bttry. under Ostuf. Nagler. An hour later, six Army members from units in Troyes reached the lines of 2nd Co. and stated that the battle for the city still raged, though it was largely isolated by American and French terrorist forces. The HQ of the 51st SS Bde. had been cut off and encircled (it would later break out), but the front still held.
Towards 16:00 hours on the 25th, Ostuf. Dronske from 3rd Co. went out to make contact with the German forces at Romilly. Here he learned that the troops from 9th Pz.Div. had left on their own on the afternoon of the 24th. Only some Flak batteries had remained behind. The officer in charge informed Dronske that they intended to evacuate their positions at dawn on 26 August and that sometime between 16:30 and 17:30, some Army destruction commandos were supposed to destroy the Romilly
Luftwaffe bases. Dronske was not that happy with the situation and he radioed a report to battalion HQ asking for further instructions.
At 19:35 hours new orders arrived down the command channels. The „26th SS Panzer Div.” was instructed to occupy the Romilly bridgehead with its III.Btl. along with 1st Co. from I. Btl., an infantry gun platoon and the already in-place Flak batteries. I./49 was to maintain contact to the bridgehead through 1st Company. The land in between Nogent and Romilly was to be patrolled by two motorized scouting parties from I.Btl. in the daytime, and by one such group at night.
To the west, near Paris, the Americans had already built four of their own bridgeheads across the Seine. The German defenses (which were really little more than glorified picket lines) had crumbled rapidly and 49th SS Bde. suddenly found itself on the right flank of the American advance. Early on the 25th, III.Btl. even began to receive some long-distance enemy artillery fire, so everyone knew that things were just about to break loose.
In the afternoon of 25 August an advance detachment of the 5th U.S. Inf.Div. supplemented with tanks, assaulted the 48th German Inf.Div., which promptly abandoned its positions to the northwest of Montereau. Another enemy column moved down Highway 375 towards Salins where it came into violent contact with 11./SS-49. This marked the brigade’s first real battle. One Sherman tank was knocked out by a „stove pipe“ bazooka and the U.S. advance came to a screeching (if temporary) halt. The 11th Co. had taken no fatalities, but had lost many men wounded.
To the north the enemy was quickly outflanking III.Btl., and the CO, Hstuf. Burzlaff had to act fast. He pulled his companies back from the east of Bray intending to take up new blocking positions with them in the area from Chateney to Orvilliers. The orders for III.Btl. to take over the Romilly bridgehead had to be abandoned, since this unit was all that was protecting the rest of the brigade from enemy units advancing from the west and southwest. Therefore at 03:00 on 26 August, I.Btl. was ordered to occupy the Romilly bridgehead with part of its forces. First Co., along with Ustuf. Schuss’ infantry gun platoon and one 7.5 cm PAK (anti-tank gun) was sent to occupy the Romilly bridgehead, while 2nd Co. assumed the defense of the entire Nogent bridgehead. SS-Oscha. Molterer with a squad from 3rd Co. was to take 1st Company’s route-of-march, join up with it in Romilly, then try to establish contact with the 51st SS Bde. in the vicinity of Troyes.
During the night of 25/26 August, I.Btl. sent out four scouting parties to operate out in front of the lines towards Romilly. A considerable amount of enemy activity was visually observed before the positions of 2nd and 3rd Companies. At 05:00, while 1st Co. was on its way to Romilly and 2nd Co. was expanding into 1st Company’s former sector, numerous enemy aerial reconnaissance planes were observed passing overhead.
In the early morning of 26 August, Scout Troop „Grief” from2nd Co. turned in an inconsequential report and then noted that it was going to proceed towards the south and that further reports would follow. The group was never heard from again and all of its men are still listed today by the German Red Cross as ‘‘missing in the vicinity of Nogent.” It is highly probable that the men were captured and killed by “partisans”.
SS-Standartenführer Eduard „Eddi” Deisenhofer, who took charge of the 17th SS Div. and the 49th SS Bde. during the withdrawal through northern France.
Scout Troop ‘‘Molterer” was out of touch with the I.Btl. CP from 03:00 to 11:00 on 26 August while it made a fruitless attempt to locate the 51st SS Pz.Gr. Brigade. The party ran right smack into an American advance force and some close combat ensued with both parties eventually breaking off the affair. No casualties were taken. En route back to the Btl. CP, Group „Molterer” received some scattered small arms fire, most likly from terrorists. The small detachment arrived back in Nogent at the very instant that the Americans had begun an attempt to cross the Seine River near the town.
The Front Collapses
At 04:45 on 26 August, Stubaf. Schittenhelm assumed command of the Romilly Flak batteries and ordered the abandonment of the bridgehead. The Seine River was to be the main defensive line. The bridge east of Romilly near Mesgrigny was ordered immediately destroyed to be followed by the main Romilly bridge once the Flak crews reached their new positions. First Co., whose men were near exhaustion from being shuttled around from one place to another for the better part of two days, was sent to the Saron-Aube area to provide security towards the east-southeast.
On the brigade’s right wing, III.Btl. built up new blocking positions between La Fontain Couverte and Chatenay during the night of 25/26 August. Eleventh Co. returned to Donnemarie while 10th Co. marched from Bray to the road crossing northeast of Vimpelles. A platoon was placed there where the road met the railroad lines. The rest of the company went through Egligny to the area between Montigny-Orvilliers, where it dug in. Ninth Co., which in the late afternoon of 25 August had left its positions north of Madolles, reassembled around Chatenay and took up a new defensive line. III. Battalion’s hurriedly constructed blocking positions ran from Conflans to La Fontaine to Couverte with the CP of 9th Co. at Chatenay and the CP of 10th Co. at Orvilliers.
The scourge of the Western Front, the „Jabos” (fighter bombers) had begun attacking anything that moved or any position that was slightly visible soon after daybreak. The 1st and 3rd Artillery Batteries of SS Art.Det. 49 which were in fire readiness positions around Donnemarie were particularly hard hit.
In the early morning of 26 August, I.Btl. suddenly received information from brigade HQ that the enemy was attacking along Highway 374 from the Soligny-Les Etaus area as well as along Highway 442 from Ferreux in the direction of Fay. Shortly after this disturbing information was transmitted all communications with brigade HQ were lost. It was an omen of things to come. Stubaf. Schittenhelm promptly drove off towards Provens in his command car to try and regain contact with brigade HQ. He never made it. He ran right into an American tank column and was taken prisoner. The war diary of I.Btl. was captured along with him.
Interesting photo of three commanding officers of the 38th SS Pz.Gr.Div. „Nibelungen.” Left: Ostubaf. Richard Schulze-Kossens, in charge of forming the division. Center: Ostubaf. Walter Mueller, commander SS Pz.Gr.Rgt. 96. Right: Stubaf. Markus Faulhaber, battalion commander in the division. Faulhaber tragically drowned on 9 May 1945 when his car plunged into a river in Austria while he was trying to convince members of the „Niebelungen” Div. to surrender to the Americans.
Waffen-SS grenadier waiting for the enemy, France 1944.
In the course of an increasingly chaotic morning it became clear that the Seine River defensive line was no longer viable, having been punctured at too many points. The 49th SS Brigade HQ subsequently ordered all units it could reach to abandon their position and fall back on Provins. III. Battalion was given the job of protecting the right flank as long as possible to permit the pullback of the other brigade elements.
Somewhat before noon, 1I.Btl. left the area around Bray and retired to positions north of Provins with the enemy following. I. Battalion was not so lucky. At 12:30, Ostuf. Macherhammer, the battalion adjutant and temporary commander, ordered a phased withdrawal from the cross-river bridgehead positions. Third and 4th Companies started down the road to Provins and the Americans diverted their forces from the pursuit of II.Btl. to attack them. In very sharp fighting both companies were shattered and dispersed with high losses. First and 2nd Companies along with the 2nd Artillery Battery would stay in place for awhile longer around Nogent.
III. Battalion enjoyed somewhat more success. It was able to hold on to its positions around Donnemarie all day long on the 26th, driving off many enemy assaults with the help of the 1st and 3rd Artillery Batteries. The American tanks in particular were very vulnerable to accurate artillery fire and they didn’t stay around long once they realized that they were being exposed to it. The key points in the day’s fighting centered on the road bend at Orvilles and on the positions held by 10th Co. at Montigny-Lencoup. The enemy was unable to gain any ground at either location.
During the day III.Btl. was outflanked by two enemy penetrations, so at dusk a general pullback towards Provins had to be carried out. The parts of I.Btl. that had remained in Nogent enjoyed a peaceful morning on 26 August but that was to change in the afternoon. At 14:00 the enemy began moving towards the town from the north and northeast (the opposite direction from that the SS Panzergrenadiers had been facing), and it was apparent that a major attack was in the making. One of the Seine River bridges at Nogent was promptly blown up but on a secondary bridge the explosive charges misfired, causing only minimal damage. At the same time a scouting party returned to 2nd Co. and reported that about 40 enemy tanks were driving towards Nogent from the south. They were carrying infantrymen mounted on them
The first U.S. tank soon came in sight and roared across the slightly damaged secondary Nogent bridge. Apparently this was a pre-arranged signal for the local terrorists to go into action, as the Waffen-SS troops now began to receive a blistering small arms fire from the sides and rear. The French ‘ partisans.” men and women alike, were making their move. Ironically the terrorist fire endangered the lives of many refugees, including children, whom the SS men were trying to escort from the battlefield.
SS combat engineers with radio set, pause after laying a minefield before the main defensive line in northern France, 1944.
Ostuf. Nagler. CO of 2nd Art.Battery, had been 200 m from the secondary bridge with his forward observation post and watched the American tank make its crossing. Now with the partisan bullets whistling around them, Nagler and his men had to make a run for it. but not before directing the fire of the battery’s four howitzers on the bridge. The heavy guns subsequently placed 60 rounds right on the target and succeeded in putting the bridge out of commission. Prudently, the American tank had high-tailed it back over the bridge with the first volley. 1 The escorting infantry also retreated and the fighting suddenly dwindled off as the enemy pulled back to the south to regroup.
Ostuf. Nagler used this hiatus to travel to the I.Btl. HQ at the Melz Chateau for further instructions. He received new allotments of fuel and supplies along with an assignment to use his guns to protect the left flank of the battalion. At this time there was no contact with the rest of SS Art.Det. 49. While going from his battery positions to try and locate his forward observation post, Nagler was stopped by an Army General who ordered him to redirect the fire of his battery at American troop movements on the south bank of the Seine. Nagler replied that he had only enough ammunition available for actual battle use and that there was none to spare to use for harassing fire on indefinite targets. He also explained that it was extremely important to conserve shells for use against tanks. But the General would have none of it and a lively argument continued with Nagler being threatened with insubordination, but he did not give in.
During the evening hours, the Nogent bridgehead defenders left the town and the Americans moved in behind their combat engineers who went to work repairing the destroyed bridges. In the late afternoon. Ostuf. Nagler had managed to move his battery down along the Seine to well camouflaged positions. At 17:30 two American tanks followed by infantry came right up to the battery positions and got the shock of their lives when the German guns opened fire at point-blank range. That succeeded in driving off the enemy advance for a time and triggered a retaliatory fighter-bomber attack. Fortunately, 2nd Battery was well concealed, so its men watched in relative safety while the „Jabos“ expended their ammo on non-existent targets along the nearby Romilly-Villenauxe railroad line. Although they didn’t know it at the time, the gunners from 2./SS Art. Det. 49 were the last German defenders left facing the enemy along the north bank of the Seine!
As darkness descended on 26 August, he companies of III. Btl. were on the march for Provins. In fact the SS men had all but been encircled during the course of the day and they left Donnemarie towards Paroy on the only route still left open. At the crossroads east of Paroy the battalion turned north towards Maison-Rouge. In the hills around Savins the columns left the road and traveled cross-country through partisan-infested land near St. Loup de Naud. It was during this part of the trip that the battalion lost much of its cohesiveness; as a result many of the unit’s men were only able to reach Provins in squads or platoons or isolated groups. And all too many grenadiers simply vanished without a trace during the night. Most of the missing would be the victims of partisans.
Upon arrival in Provins. III. Battalion’s companies were regrouped and deployed as follows:
Ninth Co. (Hstuf. Griephan) placed on the west outskirts of Provins on both sides of Route 19. Eleventh Co. (Ostuf. Fischer) put on the south side of town along the railroad line running to Richebourg. Tenth Co. (Hptmn. Christian) was directed towards the northeast near Sormeron. Only small parts of 12th Co. were utilized. Hstuf. Burzlaff set up his command post in Provins proper.
The II.Btl. had already relocated to the north of Provins while the brigade staff had moved from Melz to Villiers-St. Georges. The parts of 12th Co. that were not deployed around Provins were sent to join the brigade staff. But this was not to be easily accomplished. On the way to Villiers-St. Georges, 12th Co. was attacked in turn by fighter-bombers, tanks and partisans, and many soldiers became separated from the unit. One 12th Co. member joined up with a scouting party from l./SS Armored Recce Det. 12/ 12th SS Pz.Div. „Hitler Jugend.” When he later returned to his old command he found that it had been converted into the 12th Co. of the SS Pz.Gr.Rgt. 38/17th SS Pz.Gr.Div. „Goetz von Berlichengen“ and contained few of his original comrades.
During I. Battalion’s retreat from Nogent, two members of the unit carried out a daring and deceptive maneuver that certainly saved the day for a column of troop trucks led by Ustuf. Haehnel. Oberscharführer Sassen who had lived in the U.S. for a year and spoke near perfect American-accented English, put on a captured American helmet and windbreaker and strode out into the middle of a main road where he waved down the point of a U.S. tank column. Sassen informed the commander of the lead tank that an „infantry” convoy had to cross the road in front of the tanks and the officer agreed to halt and wait for the troop trucks to pass. Fortunately, darkness was falling, so the exact configuration of the trucks crossing the road could not be readily ascertained. They of course belonged to I./SS Pz. Gr.Bde. 49.
At the very end of the convoy was a captured jeep driven by Ostuf. „M,” who was also clad in GI helmet and windbreaker. The jeep paused to pick up Oscha. Sassen and also managed to block the road long enough to give the German trucks a headstart. Then with a friendly wave, the two imposters took off after their comrades. A short time later some gunfire sounded from back down the road, indicating that the ruse had been discovered; but it was too late for the Americans —the W-SS column had made a clean escape!
August 26 had proven to be a day of very difficult fighting for Hauptmann Hoellwegen’s II./SS-49 to the north of Provins. Seventh Co., led by Ustuf. Lust, got into a fight for its very existence and lost! The company desperately tried to stop an advance by the 7th U.S. Armored Div. through Nangis and further east to Maison-Rouge, but it was a hopeless effort from the start. Seventh Co. was completely destroyed in the fighting and nothing more was ever known of the fate of its men. The 1st and 3rd Artillery Batteries from SS Art.Det. 49 under Hstuf. Guse were also quite active on 26 August. They were able to blunt an American tank advance directly on the town of Provins and still get away without losses.
On 27 August, Provins became largely surrounded by American armored forces. Hstuf. Burzlaff’s III.Btl. found itself outflanked to both the north and south but strangely enough an escape route lay open to the west in what undoubtedly was an oversight by the enemy commanders. Thus the majority of the 49th SS Bde. was able to take advantage of this „loophole“ and break out of the „Provins Cauldron“ during the evening hours of 27 August. The assembly area for the escaping platoons and companies was Sezanne, which actually lay to the northeast of Provins.
Since mid-day on the 27th, Stubaf. Faulhaber had been frantically trying to build up an interception line at Sezanne from the bits and pieces of his brigade that kept trickling in. At 23:00 hours the intact 2nd Artillery Battery turned up after a fairly tough fighting retreat. But many squads from the dispersed companies of 1. and II. Battalions were now gone forever.
One of the many unlucky brigade contingents was an 8-man supply troop from II. Platoon/3rd Co. led by Hscha. Stieler. In the night of 26/27 August with an enemy tank column closing in, Stieler decided to destroy his vehicles and set off on foot with his men for safer territory. Almost in sight of the German lines on 31 August, Stieler’s group wandered into a partisan trap near Bar le Due and was taken prisoner. The SS men were thrown into the town jail and informed that they would all be shot on the next day for „war crimes.” Only the timely arrival of American troops on 27 August prevented the execution from taking place and Stieler and his men became regular POWs. No one can even estimate the exact number of German soldiers who were less fortunate and were indeed murdered by their terrorist captives but it is thought that the majority of the fatalities suffered by 49th SS Bde. occurred in this manner.
At 04:00 on 28 August, the brigade’s ordnance officer brought 2nd Artillery Battery a new combat mission. In conjunction with III.Btl. it was to maintain blocking positions along the Soudron- Chalons road. Working closely together the infantry and artillerymen from 49th SS Bde. succeeded in building up a new defensive line between National Highway 3 and the Marne River from the southwest to the southeast of Chalons. Fifteenth Engineer Co. put up obstructions on the roads and protected the positions with mines. Before the fighting in France died down this company would be reduced to about 60 men and would lose most of its equipment.
At 07:00, 2nd Battery was instructed to cross back over the Marne and put its four field howitzers in place at L’Epine, to the east of Chalon. Here word arrived that the brigade staff had been overrun by „enemy forces and partisans.” True enough, a tragedy had taken place. The brigade HQ had been caught without protection by an enemy tank force and severe casualties were taken before a relocation could be carried out. Stubaf. Faulhaber was seriously wounded and rushed to the hospital in Verdun for immediate surgery. He would recover to rejoin another W-SS unit and would die during a river crossing on the last day of the war. Additionally, five staff officers, including the brigade adjutant and the signals platoon commander, Ustuf. Wiedemann, were killed in the attack. From now on the brigade’s staff leadership would be rather tenuous, and the de facto or „acting” commander became Hstuf. Guse of the artillery detachment, who more-or-less fell into the role.
The Brigade’s Last Battles
From the Chalons area, I. Battalion’s acting CO and adjutant, Ostuf. Macherhammer, tried to secure a link-up with the 15th Panzer Div. near Vary-le-Francois. On the way he ran into a strong partisan force that had assembled in the area and only narrowly made his escape. During the entire retreat of the 49th SS Bde. towards Metz there was no question but that most of the casualties were derived from terrorist ambushes.
All day long on the 28th, the SS Panzergrenadiers supported by 2nd Battery defended Chalons and stopped the advance of the 5th U.S. Inf. Division. This enabled the battered 51st SS Bde. and its neighboring 15th Panzergrenadier Div. to complete their withdrawals from Troyes to the Verdun-Metz area, although both formations were savagely assaulted by „Jabos” during their pullbacks. The 49th SS Bde. retreat continued on 29 August. Ostuf. Macherhammer moved the remnants of I.Btl. cross-country to St. Menehould, where a fragile link-up was made with the Verdun garrison. The brigade’s overall withdrawal on this day was covered by 12th Co. and by the 15th Engineer Co., which defended the road from Fere-Cahmpoise to Chalons for 24 hours. Continuing in the direct pursuit of the German forces were parts of Gen. Walker’s XX. Corps, including the 7th Armored Division.
SS-Unterscharführer Hans Sterner, SS-Pz.Gr.Bde. 49. Missing: 27 August 1944 near Nogent on the Seine.
In the course of 29 August, SS Art.Det. 49 was able to retreat without losses to St. Menehould. The batteries went into temporary positions in front of the town before receiving new orders to continue their march towards Verdun. During the subsequent journey through Les Islettes, Clermont and Dugny, the detachment had to halt and go into action several times against American armored spearheads; repulsing them each time before continuing on.
In a short while just about everything that was left of the 49th SS Bde. was proceeding to Verdun. On the way the main march column, consisting of III.Btl. and the SS Art.Det. 49 was overtaken by Stubaf. Linn, a staff officer of the 17th SS Div. „Goetz von Berlichengen.” Linn informed Hstuf. Guse that the remnants of 49th SS Bde. had now been subordinated to the 17th SS Division. This meant that the orphaned and leaderless brigade now had a new home, but the initial jubiliation over this news diminished on the next day when it was learned that there really wasn’t much left to the „GvB” Div. after three months of severe fighting in Normandy. It consisted mainly of scattered, small, independent battle-groups that were supposed to reassemble in Metz. The 49th SS Bde. had simply joined their ranks. It would be on its own and left to its own devices for several more days yet.
In the late morning hours of 30 August, the batteries of SS Art.Det. 49 went into firing positions to the west of Verdun. Vehicles and guns were given quick overhauls while Hstuf. Guse went into the city to report to the garrison commander. In Verdun he found the staff of the 3rd Panzergrenadier Div. which was just arriving from Italy. As of this day only the following parts of the division were yet on the scene: Pz.Gr.Rgt. 29, Flak Det. 312 and II. and III./Art.Rgt. 3.
Over the next few hours, more and more parts of 49th SS Brigade’s companies trickled into Verdun and it was noticed that there were not many transport vehicles left. What the „Jabos” had not taken care of, had either broken down, been abandoned, or were destroyed in the face of advancing superior enemy forces. Many vehicles were simply ditched due to a lack of fuel.
I. Battalion assembled its meager forces to the west of Verdun and in the evening hours of 29 August had occupied the hills east of the Maas River on both sides of the road leading to Etain, where there were still signs of positions from WWI. The battalion CP was set up in the vicinity of Fort Douaumont. Part of III./SS-49 went into place at the intersection of National Highways 3 and 420, about 10 km to the west of Verdun.
Towards midnight on 30/31 August, Hstuf. Guse was summoned to the garrison command post in Verdun for new orders. Unfortunately the commander of the 3rd Pz.Gr.Div. had prudently left with his staff for safer territory and had left an Oberst (Colonel) behind to supervise things. The Oberst instructed the Verdun unit commanders to keep their troops in place and then he. too. took off for the rear area. So as day broke on 31 August, only Hstuf. Guse and a naval infantry battalion commander remained at the Verdun garrison HQ. The responsibility for the defense of the city had fallen into their hands by default!
Within a short time there were no further contacts remaining between 49th SS Bde and 3rd Pz.Gr Division. In fact, towards Rembercourt to the southeast, units of the 3rd Pz.Gr.Div. had pulled out of the lines almost as soon as they had gotten to them, thus leaving a 30 km hole in the frontlines. In the course of the morning, the naval infantry battalion as well headed for high ground and Hstuf. Guse found himself very much alone. Verdun was now defended only by the survivors of 49th SS Brigade.
To say the least the brigade’s situation was not very promising; the enemy was advancing practically unimpeded from the north, west and south. But Hstuf. Guse did not want to abandon the city without a fight; if the Army wanted to run for it that was their problem —the Waffen-SS had its reputation for tenacity to fulfill! Guse shifted his artillery batteries into new positions along the east bank of the Maas, and the grenadier companies also withdrew across the river, though they were not supposed to. Twelfth Co. took up new defensive positions in old WWI casements in the Maas Hills. A few scouting parties remained on the west bank of the river. Their mission was to report on any sign of enemy movements and to immediately withdraw if threatened.
Oscha. Prohaska set up 2nd Artillery Battery’s Observation post on a hill east of the Maas; from this point there was a good view of the entire city. At 11:00 American artillery began to shell the outskirts of Verdun and SS Art.Det. 49 returned the fire. Next came enemy tank and infantry attacks from the west and southwest; these were brought to a halt by precise artillery fire. Then the enemy began zeroing in on the SS batteries. It was evident that the battery positions were known to the enemy and Hstuf. Guse ordered them to relocate.
During the previous night, units of the 7th U.S. Armored Div. had approached to within 4 or 5 km of the city to the west where they were brought to a halt by some grenadiers from II./Pz.Gr. Rgt. 8 with the support of SS „tank hunters,” presumably from 12./SS-49. The SS men bagged two American tanks in the fighting.
The ubiquitous French „Resistance” also put in an appearance in Verdun with a goal of trying to prevent the destruction of the Maas River bridges. They managed to ambush the forward observation post of 2nd Battery, wounding Oscha. Prohaska. Ostuf. Nagler went out to rescue him and his radioman and despite further terrorist assaults the men were later brought out to safety.
With motorcycle scout squads reporting in that the Americans were well established in bridgeheads on both sides of the city, Hstuf. Guse realized that time was running out. Fortunately orders had reached him to relocate his command to the Mosel River and late in the morning the SS troops pulled out of Verdun, leaving the city, much of which had been reduced to smoking rubble during the artillery bombardments, to the Americans. The artillery detachment was supposed to regroup in Doncourt. Its withdrawal from Verdun was covered by Ostuf. Bartl’s 3rd Battery and the march column left in the following order: supply troops. 1st Battery, 2nd Battery and later 3rd Battery (4th Battery had never been reformed after the crippling „Jabo” attack on its troop train, earlier in August). Part of the brigade’s infantry, including 12th Co., held the high ground near the Maas until evening, then they, too. retreated during the night of 31 August/1 September. The grenadiers marched out through Etain near St. Etienne and they were covered by Ustuf. Haehnel’s 4th Co., which laid down a very destructive fire on a pursuing American column.
The march towards Doncourt had to be eventually rerouted to Metz. In the course of 1 September, the brigade received new orders from Army Group B to build up an interception line from Abbeville to Conflans to Hannonville using two infantry battalions, supporting artillery batteries and whatever stragglers that could be rounded up. On the same day the SS Main Office issued orders which boldly flew in the face of reality: „The SS Panzergrenadier Brigade 49 is to be transformed into the 26th SS Panzer Division.’’ A more impossible task at the time could scarcely be imagined!
During the morning of 1 September, 2nd Artillery Battery was deployed for action near Doncourt while the rest of the detachment continued on its way. First and 2nd Batteries eventually went to Gravelotte, with the detachment staff going to Jussy. Hstuf. Guse next reported in at the HQ of the 462nd Inf. Div. in Metz. After hearing Guse’s description of the fall of Verdun the Metz garrison commander immediately mobilized the staff and students of the officer’s candidate school and SS Signals School in Metz.
While trying to get into firing positions, 2nd Artillery Battery came under attack from five ‘ ‘Jabos, ‘‘ which managed to destroy all of the unit’s vehicles and all but two of its field pieces. But Ostuf. Nagler was amazed that there were no significant personnel losses. An „old” staff „officer” from the brigade, Hscha. Georg Gutheil was able to bring up four new howitzers from Metz to 2nd Battery and by the morning of 2 September they were ready for action on historical ground near Vionville. Ostuf. Nagler placed his observation post in the church tower at Mars la Tour —a spot from which all enemy movement could be readily observed.
In the sector to the brigade’s left, the enemy was driving from near Bar le Due towards Toul with strong armored recce forces. Third Panzergrenadier Div. attempted to destroy an American bridgehead at Commercy, but was unsuccessful, and in the course of 1 September the enemy broke in behind the division’s positions causing another precipitous withdrawal which also swept up the 49th SS Bde. in the early morning of 2 September. During the evening of 1 September, the emergency units from the Army officer’s candidate school and the SS-Signals School in Metz took up defensive positions in the hills around Gravelotte. From his command post at Jussy. Hstuf. Guse was both surprised and moved as he watched companies of 17 to 19 year old SS men from the Signals School, marching past, singing, on their way to battle. They were armed only with hand weapons. To those who had been caught up in endless days and sleepless nights of the crushing „war of material” in France, the spectacle seemed like something out of the distant past.
On 2 September, I./SS-49 held the ground on both sides of Abbeville to Conflans, while III./SS-49 was defending both sides of Mars la Tour. On this day they both repelled advance American armored columns. Late in the day the brigade’s positions were relinquished to the „emergency” companies from Metz, and in the night of 2/3 September the SS battalions began to relocate towards the rear. At 01:50 on 3 September, Hstuf. Burz- laff issued the following orders to III./SS-49 from his CP at Tron- ville: „The battalion will remove itself to a new building area along the Metz-Bouzonville road about 20 km northeast of Metz in the Vigy-St. Hubert area, in the night of 2/3 September, where it will serve as a motorized combat reserve.”
At 02:30, III. Battalion’s companies began the march to their newly assigned area. An advance commando had already left for St. Barbe, where the new commander of the 17th SS Div., Staf. Eduard Deisenhofer was setting up his HQ Oddly enough, during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the 17th German Inf. Div. had also been stationed around St. Barbe during the seige of Metz.
III. Battalion’s marching order was as follows:
Battalion staff, 10th Co.. 9th Co., 12th Co. and 11th Company.
The point of the column passed through Gravelotte at 04:00. While the battalion was en route to St. Barbe and Avancy, a rear guard consisting of one squad and one infantry gun from 12th Co. was left behind to follow at daybreak. At around this time the command of 9th Co was assumed by Hscha. Gaertner. It may well have been the last change of command in the brigade, which was now marching off into history. Later in the day, 49th SS Bde. formally became part of the 17th SS Div. along with most of 51st SS Brigade. The brigade units were incorporated into the „GvB” Div. in the following manner:
SS Art.Det 49 became II./SS Art Rgt. 17
II./SS-51 and I./SS-49 were combined to form II./’SS-Pz. Gr.Rgt.37
11. /SS-49became II./SS Rgt. 38
12. /SS-49 became 12./SS Rgt 38
III./SS-49became III.SS Rgt. 38
I./SS-51 was simply dissolved and its soldiers split up among the divisional units.
The well-trained and experienced men of the brigades, most of whom were now fully qualified officers and NCOs provided quite a windfall for the horribly depleted „GvB’ - Div., and would fully prove their worth in the difficult battles on the Western Front in 1945. At the beginning of October 1944, the officers and NCOs from the staffs of the SS NCO schools at Radolfzell and Laibach returned to their old posts and in similar fashion the SS Art.Det. 51 was sent back to the artillery school which had formed it.
The first divisional orders of Staf. Deisenhofer issued on 30 August 1944 applied to the 17th SS Div. and the SS Brigades 49 and 51: „I have on this day taken over the 17th SS-Pz.Gr.Div. „GvB. ‘‘ This is not the time for great words. I confidently expect that each officer. NCO and man will express himself through his deeds. We will do our duty for Germany.“
And that is certainly just what the soldiers of 49th SS Panzergrenadier Brigade had done!
References
„Die SS-Panzergrenadier-Brigade 49“ Parts 1-12 by Wolfgang Vopersal in Der Freiwillige, December 1971-February 1973.
Die Sturmflut und das Ende by Hans Stoeber
Die Eiserne Faust by Hans Stoeber
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