Fighting for Berlin – A Battle Memoir

Published in „Siegrunen” Monograph 4 – French Volunteers of the Waffen-SS, 2006

 

 

The story of the battle according to the late SS-Brigadeführer  Dr. Gustav Krukenberg in interviews and letters to J. L. Roba, further adapted by the present author.

 

From the end of March 1945, Brigfhr. Krukenberg was stationed with his staff at a farm 12 kilometres east of Neustrelitz. His two missions were to reconstitute an assault regiment (Sturmregiment) from the remnants of the “Charlemagne” Division and whatever future reinforcements were available, and to build up defensive positions from the Tollensee to the south, following the perimeter of the lake.

 

In the night of 23/34 April, he received two telephone calls at around 0400 hours; these were from the Personnel Office of the Waffen-SS near Furstenberg and the Army Group staff and both transmitted the order of the Wehrmacht High Command for Krukenberg to proceed to Berlin and take charge of a division whose commander was “ill.” Upon his arrival in the German capital, Krukenberg was to meet with General of the Infantry Krebs and the liaison officer of the Waffen-SS to the Fuehrer HQ, SS- Gruppenführer Hermann Fegelein.

 

Krukenberg asked about the military situation and he was told that Russian troops had launched a great offensive and were advancing in two separate columns towards Berlin. But there was some hope; some contact had been made with U.S. troops and in the west the German Army had been advised to cease resistance in order that the Americans might be the first to reach Berlin. Also in the area of Rathenow/Genthin, a German Panzer Army under the command of General Wenck was ready to move to Potsdam to break the Soviet effort at encirclement and free the passage for U.S. troops.

 

Brigfhr. Krukenberg could not believe what he had heard! Was it possible that contacts with the Americans could save Berlin? He had seen what the Soviets had done when they had “liberated” the Eastern territories and he knew the fate that would befall the German capital if the Reds occupied it. Berlin was not an “open city” but since 1 February 1945 had been organized as a “Festung” (fortress) for defensive purposes. Since the situation was not very clear, Krukenberg then decided to organize a personal escort to accompany him to Berlin.

 

[There is now a hazy area in the Krukenberg memoirs concerning the formation of the French SS battlegroup. He does not mention whether or not a telegram had been received ordering “Charlemagne” into Berlin, although this has been confirmed by others, including Hstuf. Weber. In any event a combat task force of battalion strength was assembled to accompany Krukenberg.]

 

All of the Frenchmen were ready to fight until the end. Those who did not go to Berlin remained in the Neusterlitz area to participate in the fortifications work. The words of Monsignor Mayol de Lupe however remained in the minds of those who went to fight. He had advised them to “remain true Frenchmen” who must remember that “before God they had sworn to protect the West from the dangers of the East.”

 

Krukenberg decided to leave Neustrelitz at 0830 hours. Soon after the detachment was assembled, the French SS troops were surprised to see a Mercedes sedan driving rapidly down the road towards them with the Reichsführer-SS himself at the wheel. The troops immediately threw themselves into parade formation but Himmler never slowed down or even looked their way. It was a disappointment for the Frenchmen who thought that their “leader” would surely stop and inspect them, but in truth, Himmler was engaged in hopeless negotiations with the Swedish Count Bernadette and he had other things on his mind.

 

After loading their vehicles with ammunition, the men began their journey to the south. Many times they met cars and trucks leaving Berlin filled with personnel from one administrative service or another. These men were quite surprised to see soldiers moving in the opposite direction to them, and one of them stopped the French SS column and told them that Russian tanks had appeared in the vicinity of Oranienberg and that it was no longer possible to reach Berlin via Frohnau. Krukenberg then searched his memory of the area around pre-war Berlin and decided upon another route through Neu-Rupin.

 

Near Frisack the French SS column switched to the highway that led to Hamburg. They found the traffic heavy and particularly congested at intersections. The pace slowed down to a crawl; assorted troops passed them going in the other direction. With the exception of a small signals troop from the “Nord land” Division that had been ordered to relocate to Holstein, none of the passing soldiers were Waffen-SS. Some Police troops who were well equipped and in good condition, were also encountered. However they seemed confused and their vehicle convoys were in disorder. Groups of singing soldiers, believing that the Soviets would not follow them due to pacts between the USA and USSR, were also run into.

 

The “Charlemagne” column received some light fighter- bomber strafing while proceeding down the main avenue in Nauen, but little damage was done and the troops proceeded to the town of Wustermark. Here the situation was markedly more serious; part of the town was under enemy artillery fire. Brigfhr. Krukenberg searched his pre-war memories of the suburbs of Berlin and decided to reroute his command through Ketzin. After covering about 6 kilometers on the Ketzin road the French SS convoy came in sight of two Soviet columns, one advancing from the southwest and the other moving down from the northeast. These were in fact the advance pinchers of the Soviet Army Corps that were about to encircle Berlin. Once they linked up, Berlin would be cut off.

 

It would only be a matter of minutes before the pinchers closed, so Brigfhr. Krukenberg paused briefly to consider the situation. If they continued on it might prove impossible to turn back and if the bridge on the canal near the farms of Falkenrede had been destroyed it might prove impossible to proceed to Berlin, and the Russians would only be a few hundred meters away! In the meantime the scouts at the heads of the Soviet columns had spotted the Waffen-SS troops and had quickly taken the vanguard elements into cover until more forces could be moved up. This brought a little time for the Frenchmen.

 

Krukenberg then decided to go forward and risk being cutoff, as it might be (and was!), the last chance they had to get into Berlin. As the convoy continued on, more and more Red Army troops were seen all around in the distance, but these soldiers decided the “Charlemagne” convoy was probably one of their own and paid it no heed. So a bold bluff had to be maintained. In a short time the Falkenrede Canal bridge was reached and it was intact!

 

However there were barbed wire entanglements and antitank obstructions blocking the entrance to the bridge. Some soldiers were detached to remove them. No sooner had they begun working then the bridge blew up in their faces! One man was lightly wounded and thrown into the canal (he swam out), and another was more severely wounded in the legs. But the bridge was now impassable. Brigfhr. Krukenberg immediately ordered all supplies and ammunition unloaded from the vehicles and distributed among the troops. From here on they would proceed on foot. The trucks would be sent back slowly with the badly wounded men and hopefully they would still fool the Russians (they did!).

 

At about 1500 hours the French SS men had crossed over the damaged bridge and found the cause of their difficulties around the bend a little further down the road. It was a three man Volkssturm (home guard) contingent who had been guarding the bridge with orders to destroy it at the approach of the enemy. Naturally they felt the “Charlemagne” convoy probably belonged to the Red Army, so they did their duty! The French SS men had now been mistaken for Soviet soldiers by troops on both sides!

 

The Sturmbataillon foot column now took off at a quick pace with the 57 year old Brigfhr. Rrukenberg accompanied by an 18 year old Unterscharführer at its head. Behind him came Hstuf. Fenet with the battalion staff and the “runners” and messengers. Then came 2nd (Michel), 3rd (Rostand) and 4th (Olliver) Companies with 1st Company under Ustuf. Labourdette forming a rear guard and following at a slower pace.

 

The resultant march of about 20 kilometers was somewhat longer than had been anticipated. The only troops that were passed were a trio of Hitler Youth on bicycles carrying Panzerfausts. All of the bridges en route had been left unguarded to the amazement of the French SS men; there was certainly nothing to prevent a surprise coup by the Soviets!

 

At about 2200 hours on 24 April, the Sturmbataillon arrived at the Olympic Stadium in Berlin where they had the luck to find an unguarded Luftwaffe canteen which was quickly divested of its confections, particularly chocolate items, by the tired and hungry SS troopers. All of the houses in the vicinity were still occupied by staff members of the various administrative services, and all still appeared normal since noise and music could be heard emanating from the dwellings. Seeing this “normalcy,” Brigfhr. Krukenberg went through the neighborhood requisitioning civilian vehicles for the use of his unit.

 

This being accomplished, Krukenberg then allowed his men to get some rest, although they were carefully instructed to stay under trees or some cover to avoid being spotted by enemy aircraft, The Brigadeführer and his giant-sized Berlin-born adjutant, Ustuf. Pachur, then took one of the newly acquired autos and drove down the Bismarckstrasse to the Brandenburg Gate and thence to the Reichschancellery. The streets were uniformly quiet and the two SS officers saw no sign of any defensive works. They were also able to cross completely through the city without once being stopped by military sentries!

 

At approximately 0030 hours on 25 April 1945 (a Wednesday), the “Charlemagne” command car stopped near the Fuehrer Bunker. The sentries here did not recognize Brigfhr. Krukenberg but when he asked to meet with General Krebs they guided him and Pachur to a communications room where they were kept waiting for three hours (Krebs disliked the Waffen-SS!). Krukenberg used the time to call back to his old Army Group headquarters in Prenzlau to let them know of his successful arrival in Berlin. For the rest of the time Krukenberg and Pachur were left to dwell upon the complete unpreparedness of Berlin to receive an enemy offensive. It was quite apparent to Krukenberg that a small Russian commando team could have captured all of the personnel in the bunker in a single surprise attack!

 

Finally, Gen. Krebs, accompanied by Gen. Burgdorf (a Wehrmacht liaison officer on Hitler’s staff), put in an appearance. Krukenberg had known Krebs when he himself was in the Wehrmacht in 1943. Both generals were surprised to see the SS officers. They had sent many messages all over Germany asking officers and their commands to come to Berlin and help defend it, but Krukenberg and his “Charlemagne” troops were the only ones to show up! The Army generals then gave Krukenberg and Pachur a situation briefing but they mostly talked about the future help of the USA and that of Armee “Wenck,” which was supposed to be plotting the relief of Berlin. In his turn, Brigfhr. Krukenberg then informed them of witnessing the Soviet pinchers advancing well to the north and west of Berlin, but the two generals downgraded that information, stating that those Red troops were certainly weak in strength and would be no match for the soldiers of General Wenck. General Krebs then ordered Krukenberg to meet with General of the Artillery Weidling, commander of the 56th Panzer Corps, for reassignment in the morning. Weidling had personally asked to see him when he arrived; his command post was in the Hohenzollem- dam. Krukenberg and Pachur then inquired as to the whereabouts of Gruf. Fegelein, whom they were also supposed to meet with, but he could not be found; they were told to come back later.

 

At about 0500 hours, Krukenberg and Pachur arrived back at the Stadium; the sky was clear and city life was proceeding normally—it was almost like peace time. Defensive troops just were not to be found. After resting for a while, the Brigadeführer journeyed to the command post of 56th Panzer Corps. To pass through the sentries he merely had to present a closed Soldbuch (ID booklet). He was then admitted into the presence of the Corps’ chief-of- staff Oberst von Duvfing. They were soon joined by Gen. Weidling himself, and he struck Krukenberg as a man totally without confidence in his mission. Weidling noted that he had arrived in Berlin only two days previously and had been appointed “battle commandant” of the city, but the defensive problems were overwhelming. His own armoured corps had suffered greatly in recent battles and of course was not nearly up to strength. Most of the other units in his command were of dubious military value. There were detachments from the administrative services, the Volkssturm, the Hitler Youth, Luftwaffe auxiliaries, etc. Some of them were ready to fight and die, but such intentions would not be enough in the days ahead.

 

The south-eastern portion of the city was designed Defense Zone “C,” and it was occupied by 11th SS Volunteer Panzer Grenadier Division “Nordland,” which had been assigned to 56th Panzer Korps. But Weidling had become worried about its commander, Brigfhr. Joachim Ziegler, who seemed to have lost control of the division, “Nordland” troops were being found milling around in confusion throughout the city. That is why Weidling had called for Krukenberg: to relieve the currently ineffective Ziegler. Krukenberg was surprised by the revelation because Ziegler had certainly distinguished himself in combat in the previous months! Faced with this situation, Krukenberg asked for a written order from Weidling to present to Ziegler; the latter individual was then instructed to proceed to the Reichschancellery to await further developments.

 

Brigfhr. Krukenberg then went to the “Nordland” Divisional HQ on the Hasenheide avenue. He was able to spot it from some distance away since no attempt had been made to disguise the function of the command post, and many vehicles were parked openly about it. The Soviet Air Force had spotted it as well and had bombed it only a few minutes before. There was smoke and dust all around and some wounded. Krukenberg met with Ziegler and informed him of the change of command. Brigfhr. Ziegler took it in stride, expecting no less, and told Krukenberg that he could not hope to hold out in this sector for more than another 24 hours. According to Ziegler the defence of Berlin was an impossible task and the Army High Command was just out to find scapegoats, presumably himself included.

 

Krukenberg then asked for a briefing on the general military situation and asked Ziegler how many troops he had deployed in the frontlines. The answer was about 70 men, with all the other troops trying to rest and recuperate. In addition the “Nordland” Artillery Regiment was assembled in the Tiergarten, but Ziegler was vague about everything else and he had no contact with neighbouring Volkssturm units. Krukenberg was startled to say the least by the laxity displayed by a once formidable SS division, and he laid much of the blame on Ziegler’s depressed mental state.

 

At 1200 hours on the 25th of April, Brigfhr. Ziegler left the “Nordland” command post for the Reichsehancellery; he would meet with Krukenberg again during the desperate breakout effort on I May. Brigfhr. Krukenberg then sent trucks back to bring up SS Sturmbataillon “Charlemagne” from the Reichsportfeld complex which included the Olympic Stadium. In the meantime, Krukenberg took stock of his surroundings, noting that Russian artillery fire was occasionally sweeping the Hasenheide. He then walked to the frontlines to see what was there. Outside of a few “Nordland” elements in the immediate vicinity of the command post he could not find too many of his own troops. In the foremost positions were scattered Volkssturm members armed only with captured weapons that were already running out of ammunition. They seemed lost and confused.

 

The Brigadeführer eventually came upon their leader, an NSDAP District Leader, in the Hermannplatz. He complained that the Volkssturm men had been sent alone to the “front” and had no contact with regular Army or SS troops. According to him the Soviets were everywhere in the eastern suburbs and generally advancing without much resistance. Reichsleiter Hilgenfeld, overall Volkssturm commander for the sector had been killed two hours previously at the Gorlitzer train station. Fighting was raging at Templehof.

 

As Krukenberg talked with the District Leader, two enemy tanks appeared on the other side of Hermannplatz. That broke off the conversation; Krukenberg left saying he would immediately send up some of his men to knock out the tanks. On the way back to the “Nordland” command post, the tanks, supported by “Stalin Organ” rockets opened fire, and Krukenberg was slightly wounded by shell fragments. He soon found his French SS men installed in the Gneisenau Barracks near the divisional HQ and sent half of them under Fenet and Weber up to the “front” near the Her- mannplatz.

 

In the afternoon of violent action, the French volunteers destroyed 14 Red tanks in close combat, driving back the entire Soviet vanguard by dusk. At this stage of the war the Soviet troops were not too keen at pressing their attack, and when they met with significant resistance, tended to break off any frontal assault. An example of their timidity came at the Halensee Bridge where three men of the Reich Labour Service held off an entire enemy company for 48 hours with one machine gun!

 

Brigfhr. Krukenberg’s next task was to deal with the matter of a headquarters for the “Nordland” Division; the one on the Hasenheide had been so devastated by aerial bombardment that it was no longer useable. Thus the Gneisenau Barracks, which had formerly housed Police troops, was requisitioned. Authorization for said act was requested of and received from 56th Pz. Corps HQ, which had since relocated to the Bendlerstrasse. There were suitable communications facilities at the Gneisenau Barracks, even though the loss of the signals unit which had been sent to Holstein was having its effect. There were also two fully equipped, fresh police battalions there that had been forgotten about by higher authorities.

 

As a result Krukenberg asked for a more important defensive area for his troops, telling Corps that the newly found Police soldiers could handle the old “Nordland” sector. “Nordland” was ordered first to the Gendarmenmarkt and then was to relocate on 26 April to Defence District “Z” (Zentrum/Center), in the heart of Berlin. Brigfhr. Krukenberg then went to report to the commander of District “Z,” Oberstleutnant Seiffert.

 

He found Seiffert to be acutely hostile towards the SS. Seiffert told Krukenberg he did not want the “Nordland” Division, since it did not have enough men and the officers were therefore rendered superfluous. Krukenberg replied that most of the troops were resting and would be ready for action shortly and noted that fully one-third of the grenadiers were Scandinavian volunteers who had good relations with their superiors and would follow them anywhere. Seiffert cut him off, saying he already prepared for the defence of his district. Krukenberg then volunteered to place all of his men directly under the command of Seiffert if he so desired, asking only to serve with them as a private or NCO if necessary. He pointed out that he had transferred from the Army into the Waffen- SS only a year or so previously and there were no real grounds for distrusting the Waffen-SS. But the Oberstleutnant still turned him down.

 

Somewhat disconsolate, Krukenberg then returned to his new command post in the Berlin Opera House. Along with his staff officers he then slept a little bit in the night of 25/26 April, which was very quiet and almost tranquil. The morning of 26 April 1945 dawned somewhat cold. The famous Unter den Linden was empty and devoid of life. Some artillery fire could be heard from the bend in the River Spree. At around noon, the Brigadeführer assembled his unit commanders for a conference.

 

The commanders of the SS Panzergrenadier Regiments “Norge” and “Danmark” each indicated that they had about 600- 700 combat troops. Krukenberg had about one-third of these soldiers formed into a battalion-strength battlegroup and sent them to the critical Defense District “Z”; the rest were to be held in ready reserve for future use. The officers were told that there were directly responsible for their commands and they did not come under the control of the obdurate Oberstleutnant Seiffert.

 

The first reports of the troops sent to Defensive District “Z” were very bleak; there simply were no prepared field works or defenses—they only existed on paper in Seiffert’s office. Krukenberg then understood why the Oberstleutnant did not want any SS officers in his “area.” The Brigadeführer then decided to relay the information on to Gruf. Fegelein in the Fuehrer Bunker. Upon his arrival at the bunker, Krukenberg was escorted in and he noticed many high-ranking NSDAP officials in the rooms; one in particular was giving many orders. He asked his guide who was that high- ranking “political.” Surprised the guide replied that it was Reichsleiter Martin Bormann; he had believed that everyone knew who Bormann was!

 

Finally meeting Gruf. Fegelein, Brigfhr. Krukenberg expressed his concerns. He felt that Defense Zone “Z” was the most critical area in the city and that it would be stupid not to have the SS troops there particularly after the dismissal of the trusted and distinguished soldier, Brigfhr. Ziegler. He explained that he felt the Waffen-SS was being set up as a scapegoat for an incompetent High Command by not getting a chance to prove its worth where it counted the most. During the conversation, Gen. Weidling entered the room. He too was unhappy with the idea of the SS moving into Defence Zone “Z,” but against his will he agreed to divide the area into two sectors with the Wilhelmstrasse being the demarcation line. The northern sector with the key Luftwaffe Ministry Building remained under the command of Oberstleutnant Seiffert. The southern sector would be given over to the Waffen-SS, with Brigfhr. Mohnke, formerly commander of the “Leibstandarte,” being given overall jurisdiction. The SS units given to Seiffert had to remain in his sector until they could be relieved. Then they could join the other Waffen-SS troops in the southern sector. The command post for the Waffen-SS portion of Defence District “Z” was to be located in the main subway station in the centre of the city.

 

Following his conference with Fegelein and Weidling, neither of whom he would ever see again, Brigfhr. Krukenberg had a chance of discuss the combat situation with the Reich Propaganda Minister Dr. Goebbels, whom he had worked with prior to a falling out in the early 1930s. Goebbels wanted his unvarnished view of developments. Krukenberg bluntly described the defensive deficiencies of Berlin and the disaster that was now spreading over the entire Eastern Front. Goebbels appeared to be anxious about it all, but he spoke of his contacts with the Americans and the chance that they would help save Berlin from the Soviets. He also stated that Armee “Wenck” was a strong one and the Berlin garrison would only have to hold out for a few days until it got there. It was a desperate illusion.

 

At about 0100 hours on 27 April, a Friday, Krukenberg finally returned to his HQ in the Opera House. The remainder of the night was again quiet, but artillery fire could be heard from the east. A briefing of the “Nordland” officers was held early in the morning, and everyone felt that the decision to create an SS sector in the central part of the city would be advantageous. After holding an inspection of most of his troops, Brigfhr. Krukenberg left to confer with Brigfhr. Mohnke. On the way he ran into Gen. Krebs and Obergruppenführer of the Police Heinrich Müller (Gestapo), who were also on the way to the SS command post.

 

Mohnke greeted Krukenberg cordially and promised to give him all available help. Krukenberg told him that he knew very few of the men in his new command but he had the advantage of being extremely familiar with all of the streets and thoroughfares in the heart of Berlin. Mohnke advised him that a company of Naval infantrymen had been airlifted into Berlin during the past night and he was putting them at Krukenberg’s disposal. Krukenberg then met the Naval company commander and was very impressed by him and his command. He also learned that a portion of SS schwere Panzer Abteilung 503, the tank detachment of III. SS Corps (Germanic), was at his disposal and officially attached to the “Nordland” Division. Unfortunately it only had 8 armoured vehicles left.

 

On 27 April 1945 some isolated groups of Russians soldiers were seen near the canal at the Hallesche Gate. Brigfhr. Krukenberg decided to launch a counterattack in that sector; since the enemy incursions were still only patrol strength his men would have the manpower advantage and that might boost their morale after so much withdrawal fighting against a superior foe. The counterattack proved impossible however because members of the Volkssturm quickly blew up the canal bridges upon seeing the first enemy troops so there would be no easy way to cross the waterway.

 

The “Nordland” occupation of its new defensive sector was carried out peacefully, without any difficulty. Krukenberg divided his command into three segments of equal size; one of which would go into the foremost lines, the second of which would be held in ready reserve around the divisional command post and the third of which was comprised of men who still needed rest and recuperation, and this group would be held in emergency reserve. The Leipziegerstrasse, running through the SS sector, was reserved for use by tanks, but the objective was to support these tanks with “Charlemagne” troops armed with Panzerfausts, and the French SS troops found themselves heavily engaged in the northern sector of Defence Zone “Z” under the overall control of Oberstleutnant Seiffert and it proved impossible to immediately recall them.

 

Instead, Krukenberg fed other Waffen-SS and European volunteer units into his line of defence as they arrived in his sector. He also sent for a contingent from SS Artillery Rgt. 11 in the Tiergarten. The field pieces from this detachment were deployed to cover the streets to the north, towards the Reichstag and the Schlossplatz. No one knew what was really going on in that area and if any enemy tanks broke through the artillery gunners would be in place to deal with them.

 

In the afternoon of the 27th, Krukenberg arrived at his newly designated command post in the central subway station. It had been well organized by Ustuf. Pachur, but there was no electricity and communications to the outside were almost non-existent. The ceiling of the station was so thin that a Soviet artillery shell passed through it, exploded and wounded 15 men. They were promptly treated by Dr. Zimmermann (who was awarded the Iron Cross, 1st Class for his participation in the battle of Berlin), and then evacuated to the Pariserplatz. Food was located in nearby warehouses and was put under the guard of sentries. The drinking of alcoholic beverages was banned in order to maintain discipline. Ammunition was still being stored in the Gneisenau Police Barracks. A supply of Panzerfausts was made available to the SS troops from stocks at the Fuehrer Bunker.

 

Confusion still reigned all over and no defence works had been prepared in advance. The situation would have been much improved if the various administrative services in Berlin had simply put in a minimal amount of preparation work over the previous three months. On Saturday, 28 April 1945, Soviet assault troops threw bridges over the canals and crossed into the heart of Berlin. Fierce street fighting, that blazed from building to building, now raged in earnest. Losses were very heavy to both sides, due not only to the exchanges of fire but also to crumbling masonry from buildings hit by enemy artillery. Nevertheless through this day and the following one the men of the “Nordland” stayed in position, fighting back hard. The “Nordland” self-propelled guns proved their worth many times over as did the volunteers of SS- Sturmbataillon “Charlemagne.”

 

Unterscharführer Eugene Vaulot, who had knocked out 2 enemy tanks at Neukollin, now destroyed 6 more in succession with his Panzerfausts. At the request of Brigfhr. Krukenberg he was nominated for the Knight’s Cross and received it personally from Krukenberg in a candle-light ceremony at the “Nordland” command post in the subway station on the afternoon of 29 April. Upon this occasion, Krukenberg gave a short address in French praising the actions of Vaulot noting that it personified the bravery of the French Waffen-SS and indeed all French soldiers, who had fought throughout history in all parts of the world.

 

In the evening of the 29th, the commander of SS schwere Pz.Btl. 503, which was attached to the “Nordland” Division, SS Stubaf. Friedrich Herzig was personally decorated with the Knight’s Cross by Brigfhr. Mohnke. Three more awards of the Knight’s Cross also went to members of the “Charlemagne” Assault Btl. They were: Hstuf. Henri Fenet, battalion commander, Ostu£ Wilhelm Weber, combat school commander, and Oscha. Francois Apollot, platoon leader. Apollot had personally destroyed 6 enemy tanks on the Wilhelmstrasse which were advancing towards the Reichsehancellery. This action shattered a major enemy attack.

 

Ostuf. Weber had personally accounted for five tanks and had also been decorated with the Tank Destruction Badge in Gold. Vaulot and Apollot were later both killed-in-action. By this point in time 108 enemy tanks had been destroyed in Defense District “Z,” 62 of them by members of SS-Sturmbataillon “Charlemagne!” That gave rather eloquent testimony to the increasing fierceness of the fighting and demonstrated quite clearly why the frontlines had not yet broken. During the course of the action on 28 and 29 April. Brigfhr. Krukenberg was out of touch with all other military commands in Berlin; the men of “Nordland” were simply fighting on their own.

 

On Sunday, 29 April, it was learned that Armee “Wenck” was advancing towards Berlin, but by this time the very existence of that army was doubted by many of the soldiers. Krukenberg had no news whatsoever from either the High Command or the Reichsehancellery. On the 30th, Brigfhr. Krukenberg learned that Gen. Weidling had assembled his unit commanders for a very “frank” briefing, but both Krukenberg and Brigfhr. Mohnke had been deliberately excluded from the conference. Since the next day was “May Day,” a great holiday for the Soviet “workers,” Krukenberg felt that the Red Army would then make it supreme effort to capture Berlin. There was little to do but prepare for the worst eventuality. 

 

 

April 30th saw an increasing amount of enemy artillery fire and the frontline outposts of the Waffen-SS were on the receiving end of more and more deadly “Stalin Organ” rockets. Krukenberg moved up reserves to replace tired men in the front positions and saw to it that quantities of Panzerfausts and munitions were brought up to points just behind the main lines for easy access. Four of the “Nordland” tanks had been damaged and rendered immobile. They were now being used as static artillery pieces. In the evening hours, the men at the front tried to relocate to new emplacements that were not known to enemy artillery gunners. Krukenberg did not go to Brigfhr. Mohnke’s evening briefing, but instead devoted his time to trying to allocate supplies to all combat elements. Since he felt that the next day would probably be a bad one, he had extra rations and cigarettes distributed to the troops.

 

Because it was impossible to coordinate all of the defensive area, the fate of the battle now rested in the hands of each soldier. This was quite appropriate for the Waffen-SS, which had always tried to train its soldiers to operate independent of one another and individually if necessary. At 2400 hours on the 30th, the artillery fire from the other side began to decrease and gradually ceased. The front became quiet but the soldiers remained alert.

 

At 0700 hours on 1 May, Krukenberg finally received some new information from Brigfhr. Mohnke. He learned that Gen. Krebs (a former German Military Attache in Moscow who spoke Russian), Oberst von Duvfing and Oberstleutnant Seiffert had all gone through the lines to the Soviet command center to discuss the surrender of the city. Although they had been given a free pass to come and go by the Russians, they had not returned. Mohnke thought that they might be under interrogation in which case, they might compromise the weak spots in the city’s defenses. There was also more bad news about Armee “Wenck”: it had gotten bogged down in the face of superior enemy forces and had been forced to retreat!

 

Brigfhr. Krukenberg had two immediate tasks: 1) To protect his rear area and 2) To go to the command post of Oberstleutnant Seiffert at the Luftministerium and assume command of his sector as well. Task number one was partially facilitated by having a squad of combat engineers obstruct the subway route to the Pots- dammerplatz Station which had been left wide open. To accomplish task number two, Krukenberg went to the Luftministerium with an escort of French and German SS men.

 

Seiffert’s command post was in complete disorder. Ammunition dumps that had been hit by Russian fire were exploding dangerously nearby. There were about 100 Luftwaffe soldiers under the command of an older officer, who had little or no training in ground fighting. Kiukenberg ordered the Luftwaffe troops put in the main defensive line but the officer at first refused to obey him. However, after hearing how bad the situation actually was he reluctantly assembled his men for action.

 

Of Seiffert’s staff, Krukenberg could only locate a young Army Leutnant, who was not very communicative. He refused to tell him where Seiffert was other than that he had locked himself in an office and was busily destroying papers and documents. Just then the Oberstleutnant entered the room accompanied by two SS men attached to Krukenberg’s escort; they had found him in another part of the building. At about the same moment Krukenberg received a telephone call from Brigfhr. Mohnke, who had sent him out to take over Seiffert’s sector in the first place. Mohnke told him that his previous message to that effect had been revoked—it was all a misunderstanding! The situation was very confused!

 

Disgusted, Krukenberg wrote up a report on the incident for his superiors (Even though the world was collapsing, military bureaucracy continued on course!), then returned to his own HQ after first asking Seiffert to “free” his men from “Charlemagne” and “Nord- land” as soon as possible. There is no easy explanation for what happened, but given the incompetence exhibited by Oberstleutnant Seiffert and his hostility towards the SS, Brigfhr. Mohnke seems to have decided to try and incorporate his sector into the Waffen-SS defensive area but was probably overruled by a superior at the last moment.

 

The 1st of May, despite earlier indications, remained relatively quiet. At about noon, Brigfhr. Mohnke commandeered the last “Nordland” “Tiger” (PzKpfw. VI) tank. At 1900 hours, a “real” briefing (the word “real” being emphasized by Brigfhr. Kruken- berg), was held at the Fuehrer Bunker under the ruins of the Reichschancellery. Brigfhr. Ziegler, who had been under “house arrest” there for the last several days, informed Krukenberg of developments.

 

First it was learned that Hitler was dead and that before he had died he had married the sister of Graf. Fegelein’s wife. Unfortunately Fegelein had been executed somewhat prior to that event due to his attempt at “desertion.” More importantly Ziegler stated emphatically that Armee “Wenck” and the “contacts” with the West were myths. Then he noted also that Dr. Goebbels and his family had committed suicide. Krukenberg was shocked by the chain of events. It appeared to him that everything had been done in vain and the sacrifices of his SS volunteers had been made on the basis of falsehoods.

 

Brigfhr. Mohnke then entered the room and verified what Ziegler had said. With him were the Reiehsjugendführer Artur Axmann and other personalities. Mohnke stated that Gen. Krebs had made contact with the Soviet High Command and had proposed a conditional cease fire in Berlin, however the Reds wanted an unconditional surrender. This was out of the question according to Mohnke and he asked Krukenberg if he was willing to fight to the death with all of the units of Defence Zone “Z” under his command.

 

Krukenberg was in no mood for any more useless sacrifices; he told Mohnke it would be far better to organize the troops into a few small detachments and try to break through the enemy encirclement. Mohnke and Ziegler agreed it would be best to try this; but every unit would be on its own, moving in a general direction towards the northwest Gen. Krebs had made the decision to declare a cease fire at 2300 hours and it had been decided (by whom it is not known), that Hitler’s death would be announced in a radio broadcast at 2100 hours. Brigfhr. Ziegler decided to return to the “Nordland” Division for the breakout attempt

 

Brigfhr. Krukenberg then went back to his sector; he was afraid to tell his men that their magnificent resistance had been useless. Their confidence had been misled; the hoped for U.S. troops would never come to help them. He then assembled his officers in his subway command post for one last briefing. Each officer was instructed to remain with his men; comradeship in the smaller units had to remain intact.

 

At 2300 hours on 1 May, small rearguards were assembled to delay any developing enemy pursuit and at 2400 hours the main retreat of the SS Regiments ”Norge” and ““Danmark” got underway to the north via the Charlottenstrasse and the Friedrichstrasse. The subway tunnel seemed to offer an easy route of withdrawal but Brigfhr. Krukenberg ruled against its use because he was fearful his men might be totally entrapped therein. After crossing the Spree, the troops were to reassemble and scout out a further route.

 

A few minutes before leaving the ““Nordland” command post, Krukenberg sent one of his officers, Patzak, to contact Hstuf. Fenet and his troops in the Luftmimsterium and give them the order to retreat. But Patzak disappeared en route and Fenet never got the word; the French SS men thus stayed in position until the end. The roads were nearly choked off with rubble and debris, and it was impossible to move over them with anything but tracked vehicles, a few of which were still in operation. Still the SS troops retreated in good order under the cover of darkness. Upon reaching the other bank of the Spree River, Krukenberg sent out two officers (who were both born in Berlin), to make a reconnaissance. Neither of them returned!

 

At about 0300 hours on Wednesday, the 2nd of May 1945, Krukenberg decided to make the recce himself with his remaining escort of French SS men. After a few attempts to proceed in different directions which were broken off by the intensity of the enemy fire, Krukenberg finally met up with Brigfhr. Ziegler and other soldiers of the “Nordland” Division. They joined with his group. In this small troop were no fewer than five Knight’s Cross holders including the French SS-Unterscharführer Vaulot who would soon fall victim to a sniper’s bullet

 

After daybreak the group found itself exposed to Soviet artillery and was swiftly brought under fire. They relocated quickly to the Brunnenstrasse but again received a barrage of heavy mortar fire and Brigfhr. Ziegler fell, mortally wounded. It proved impossible to move forward in the direction of the retreat. The two original groups now split up again and began making their way back towards the inner city. Near the Ziegelstrasse they came upon a burning “Tiger” tank and Krukenberg recognized it as the last one belonging to the “Nordland” Division which he had dispatched to Brigfhr. Mohnke a little bit previously.

 

It was mutually decided that there was simply no chance of escaping capture, with perhaps disastrous results while wearing SS uniforms, so a decision was made by Krukenberg and his men to change into civilian clothes at the first opportunity and try to pass themselves off as “workers,” and perhaps leave the city that way. Various items of clothing were gathered from wrecked civilian houses and the change began. Krukenberg and his men brazenly passed by several Red Army patrols but when they reached Pankow they were arrested. That is all but Brigfhr. Krukenberg! He had left the group a little in advance to try and secure some better clothing and when he finally succeeded he was unable to locate his troops, who unknown to him, were now POWs!

 

After looking around for his men for a while, Krukenberg moved on. At about 1300 hours he was arrested too by soldiers from a Red artillery force. For some reason the NCO took charge of him saw his Soldbuch (identity papers), and promptly destroyed it, saying: “Not good!” So after that, Krukenberg did not have to admit his identity as an SS officer. After being held for a week with ten other prisoners. Brigfhr. Krukenberg was conducted along with the rest before a Soviet officer who had found an accordion in the ruins of Berlin. The big question he had for them was “Could anyone play this instrument?” One man in the group volunteered his services and after a short concert the pleased officer freed the whole batch, including Krukenberg.

 

He next made his way to the still intact residence of a friend in Dahlem, who put him up for a while and enabled him to rest. Krukenberg managed to evade all of the Russian patrols but one day he saw an official Soviet poster ordering all former German officers to turn themselves in to the “occupation5” authorities. This gave him pause for thought. While convinced that he could probably pass through the Soviet lines and reach the area occupied by the Western “Allies,” he was first and foremost a German soldier and the commander of a troop of foreign volunteers. Under the circumstances it was impossible for him to leave his men in Soviet hands while he found security for himself in the West. A true German officer could only share the fate of these men from other lands who had fought so bravely for the capital of the Reich.

 

So on 12 May 1945, Brigfhr. Krukenberg surrendered himself of his own free will to the communist authorities at Berlin-Steglitz. As an SS general he was immediately placed in high security confinement and “war crimes” charges were drawn up (i.e. fabricated) against him. The Soviet judges accused him of responsibility for the “damages to the Red Army occasioned by his military resistance in Pomerania and Berlin.” Krukenberg could not deny such a charge, so he made no statement at all in his defence. If they were going to convict him for doing his sworn duty as a soldier there was not much he could do about it! He was sentenced to 25 years at hard labour for his “crimes” and was eventually released more than 11 years later (the Soviets returned German soldiers and other ethnic Germans from the slave labour camps as a result of the Soviet Union’s desire to secure a favourable trade agreement with the West German government. Unfortunately the fate of other ethnic groups enslaved by the Soviets did not fare so well—including around 400 members of American and British air crews who had the misfortune to crash land on Soviet territory during the war, were abandoned by the American and British governments due to the political embarrassment that such negotiations would cause in their respective countries if their countrymen were to question the morality of their communist “friends”).