Published in „Siegrunen“ Magazine – Vol. XIII No. 5 — Whole Number 79 — Summer 2007
Translated, corrected and adapted by Ramiro Bujeiro from the book Del Caucaso a Leningrado
(From the Caucasus to Leningrad)
by Argentine Army Lt.Col. Alberto Marini based on the memoirs of the
Danish SS-Standartenführer Paul Ranzow Englehardt.
The Breakthrough and Exploitation
The battle-group from the SS Division „Wiking” which was to participate in the attack to overwhelm the Rostov defensive positions from the north and west, was formed as follows:
- Commander: SS-Sturmbannführer August Dieckmann (CO of I./SS Rgt. „Germania”)
- Staff: From combined units.
- I.Btl./SS Rgt. „Germania” (reserve battalion)
- 5.SS-Panzer Abteilung (attached to the division a few months earlier).
- III./SS-Artillery Regiment 5 with 2 10.5cm howitzer batteries and 1 15.5cm howitzer battery.
- 10th Company/SS-AR 5 with one battery of 10.5cm guns.
- One „Wiking” combat engineer company.
- One Flak (air defense) section with 4 or 6 6.2cm guns.
- One small combined unit supply and maintenance column.
SS-Kampfgruppe „Dieckmann” was organized in the „Wiking” rearguard area between 18 and 20 July 1942. In this short time it was able to exchange its battered and damaged vehicles for others in good condition from other units. New armaments, ammunition, uniforms, etc. were also added and an order to operate for „up to six months” without extra supplies was also received. On the same day SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” was sent to the front, German infantry forces broke into Russian positions to the east of the Taganrog Bridgehead and slowly advanced against heavy resistance.
SS-Obersturmbannführer August Dieckmann
The „Wiking” battle-group was forced to make a big loop to the west in order to reach the main Mariupol-Rostov road about 10 kilometers to the west of the Mius River. During the course of 20 July, German mountain infantry had advanced about 10 kilometers to the east, allowing follow-up units to move in behind them.
On 21 July 1942, SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” was ordered to advance north of IL. Mountain Corps in a tactical flanking maneuver. As so often occurs in war, it proved impossible to carry out the order given the uncertainty of the situation. From air reconnaissance it was known that the Russians had constructed fortifications but their strength and occupancy was unknown. Therefore SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” was given a new mission: conquer the city of Rostov as quickly as possible to prevent the construction of a defensive line to the south of the Don River by the retreating Russians.
SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” received the new directive to advance on the north wing of the Army Corps, penetrating as far as possible to the east in order to support the Corps’ advance. After reaching a distance of 12 kilometers to the east of the Mius River (about 2 kilometers to the east of the village of Sambek), SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” changed its course to the northeast, passing through the town of Vodianoi in the following formation:
1. Lead or vanguard element: SS-Stubaf. Johannes Mülenkamp (CO of SS-Pz.Abt.5), with one tank company and half a rifle company mounted on the tanks. This group traveled about 2 kilometers in advance of the main body of the battle group.
2. The main force: SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann along with the bulk of the formation. A reinforced tank section along with two squads of riflemen were used to protect the flanks. A distance of about 1 kilometer was maintained ahead of the rearguard.
3. The rearguard: the commander of a tank platoon with his section reinforced by a rifle squad.
Ten kilometers to the east of Vodianoie, the forward tanks exchanged fire with the Soviet positions located a few kilometers to the east. SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann continued the advance with the vanguard element in order to scout the length of the enemy positions, as his mission proscribed for him the task of finding a weak point in the Russian lines that could be exploited. While doing this, the Kampfgruppe was forced to change direction and bend towards the north. During the night of 21/22 July, the battle group halted in „bristle” or „hedgehog” positions („Circle the wagons” formation.), about 3 kilometers to the west of Stojakov, around a cross- roads. In the inner defensive ring was placed the artillery with a constant guard crew. The tanks and heavy infantry guns were put into the second ring ready to give support to the rifle squads that were situated in the exterior ring of the „hedgehog”.
The Attack Against the First Russian Position
On the morning of 22 July 1942, SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” continued its advance. The vanguard, after passing through Stojakov, received fire from hills occupied by the Russians about 3 kilometers to the south. As the incoming fire was only from small arms, the tanks continued their advance to about 1 kilometer from the enemy positions where the riflemen dismounted to attack on foot. But the close proximity of the German tanks was enough to cause the Soviets to retreat.
Following this episode, the lead element, with riflemen once again riding on the tanks, continued the advance. In a short time they began receiving fire from Russian positions located about 2 kilometers to the north of the village of Sultan Saly. As in the previous case, the riflemen again dismounted the tanks. The attack was well coordinated and carried out rapidly. The tanks fired and advanced by stretches and with that support the infantry was able to continue on under their protection. When they reached a point 800 to 1000 meters from the enemy positions the situation became more clear.
SS-Stubaf. Johannes Mühlenkamp inspecting SS Panzer Abteilung 5 at Wildflecken shortly before its deployment to action with the „Wiking” Division. Wildflecken was later the training camp of the French 33rd SS Volunteer Grenadier Division „Charlemagne”. [Erik Rundkvist Archives]
The Soviet lines here were stronger than the previous positions and automatic weapons and anti-tank gun fire had begun with some intensity. The German tanks retreated immediately to about 1500 meters from the Russian lines. One tank received a direct hit on a track (however it was recovered that night) and another caught fire and burned, but both crews managed to get away safely.
SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann was now in direct command of the lead element from the turret of the battalion command tank so he immediately brought the main body of his force to a halt in a valley about 4 kilometers to the north of the enemy positions and range of fire. The artillery group commander who followed the lead element at a distance of 100 meters or so in his car, was ordered to place the artillery in firing order to support an infantry and tank assault against the Russian line. Dieckmann decided on a quick assault, since he could see through his field glasses that the Russian trenches ran on either side of Sultan Saly without a common juncture and they seemed to be occupied by a small force.
A „Wiking” Division troop train somewhere on the southern part of the Eastern Front, circa 1942/1943. [Erik Rundkvist Archives]
The Kampfgruppe had a Luftwaffe liaison officer from the „Wiking” Division staff attached to it, so SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann was able to ask for Stuka (Dive Bomber) support as well. In the meantime, the rifle battalion was deployed and the rifle companies began to advance supported by their own heavy weapons and by the artillery group (less the 10.5cm gun battery). The tanks covered the flanks of the grenadiers and also supported them with their fire. At about 17:00 hours, 36 Stukas appeared and began to bomb the Russian positions.
The targets attacked by the Stukas were not visible but they seemed to be near the village of Sultan Saly and at points farther to the south-southeast in the suburbs of Rostov. Simultaneously with the air attack, the artillery group and their heavy weapons section laid down their heaviest rate of fire. After the Stukas left, the tanks rushed up against the Russian positions and the infantry companies began their assault. The heavy weapons fire shifted towards Sultan Saly. Many of the SS riflemen remained mounted on the tanks and since the enemy positions were not protected by anti-tank ditches or minefields the tanks were able to penetrate the defensive works.
Once among the Russian positions, the tank-riding infantrymen dismounted and jumped into the trenches to clear them out. Very few prisoners were taken because the communists had retreated in time. A few Red Army troops still held out in Sultan Saly, so Waffen-SS troops with tank support had to mop them up in a house-to-house operation that lasted until 22:00 hours, or one hour after sunset in that portion of the world. Once the enemy resistance ended, SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” reassembled in a hedgehog-bristle position to the south of the village and the assault troops were able to get some rest.
Motorcycle messenger team from the „Wiking” Division; note divisional emblem. [Erik Rundkvist Archives]
The Breakthrough of the Second Russian Defensive Position
At this time the men of the Kampfgruppe hadn’t realized that they had broken into the outside defensive perimeter around Rostov and that there were successive, in depth defensive lines still before them. SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann had learned only that his troops had come up against and driven back at best one enemy battalion, that there was fighting continuing to the west along the Krim-Tschaltir line against strong enemy forces and that in the east and northwest there were Russian concentrations of unknown strength. It was presumed that the 13th Panzer Division was located between 10 and 20 kilometers to the east-northeast of Rostov, but there was not contact maintained with that division.
Little was known of the Soviet forces before the Kampfgruppe. Patrols sent out in the darkness of night were unable to find any enemy to the south of Sultan Saly. At any rate, only one point was quite clear to SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann: the small victory had to be exploited as rapidly as possible without worrying about danger on the flanks or in the rear. The worst that could happened would be that the Kampfgruppe could be attacked from all directions, but in such a contingency, the hedgehog positions could be expected to hold out for one or two days, which would be enough to get assistance from the higher echelons.
So, for four hours, the Kampfgruppe rested that night between 23:00 hours on 22 July to 03:00 hours on 23 July. For a change, the grenadiers didn’t dig foxholes for the night but spent the valuable time eating, washing, doing weapons’ maintenance and sleeping. Half an hour before the sun rose, the Kampfgruppe formed up as it had on the previous day and continued its advance. By 04:00 hours the lead element had reached Point 93, 3 kilometers to the south of Sultan Saly and the following battle situation then became known:
1. West of the villages of Krim and Tschlatir, two Russian divisions, or the remnants of them (about 10,000 to 15,000 men), held the first line of defense against the German IL. Mountain Corps. They were unaware that their flank had been penetrat- ed at Sultan Saly by the SS-KGr. „Dieckmann.”
2. Directly in front of SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” at Point 93 was about one company of enemy troops (perhaps 200-300 men), in an intermediate position with what looked like successive defensive works and a possible anti-tank ditch. The extent of the positions (north-south spread), could not be ascertained. Point 93 itself was about 8 kilometers from the northwestern out- skirts of Rostov.
3. At the Trud Factory, 4 kilometers southeast of Point 93, the Russians had established a supporting position.
4. To the east of Trud, Russian troops could be observed moving from north to south.
Several times the east flank guard element of SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” tried to contact 13th Panzer Division with patrols, but they had no success. As the vanguard of the battle-group drew up be- fore Point 93, it received fire from the Russian positions. As a matter of routine course, the rifle sections dismounted and supported by the tanks, began to attack the enemy line. Soon they discovered that a stream bridge had been blown and that the Russian positions were supported by anti-tank ditches to either side of them. When the grenadiers reached a point about 800 meters from the enemy, they were able to confirm that the continuous anti-tank ditch would not permit tank passage. The commander of a tank company asked his wing tank sections to look for a way through the ditch. The results were negative. The only course left was to put the Russian defense under the highest possible volume of fire and they attack with infantry only.
The tanks then approached to between 50 and 100 meters (of the enemy lines) and began to fire on the Russian infantry. The deter- mined actions of the lead SS riflemen, supported by four machine guns and two 88mm mortars, forced the communists to retreat. While the infantry gained the positions at compass Point 80, the battle-group engineers blew up the walls of the anti-tank ditches to enable the tanks to cross them.
At 07:00, the lead element passed Point 80 and confronted the enemy at the village of Leninava to the southeast where fire was received from small arms, heavy weapons and one or two artillery batteries. Due to the fire from anti-tank guns, the Germans stopped their tanks in Leninava and the riflemen halted about 100 meters to the south of the village. The Russian positions seemed to be heavily occupied and well organized. Unknown to the Waffen-SS soldiers, the Kampfgruppe was now up against the main Rostov defensive line complete with anti-tank ditches, minefields, barbed wire obstacles, bunkers and a profusion of fortified works. The 800 meters of terrain which divided both sides was fully exposed and offered only the choice of a frontal attack which would involve a heavy price in blood.
When SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann arrived in person at Point 80, his first order was to bring the howitzer batteries into firing positions to neutralize the enemy fire. He asked again for air support, but unfortunately there were no planes available at that moment. But he did receive the services of an observation plane through his Luftwaffe liaison officer and was able to radio the following request to the pilot:
„Determine the extension of the Russian positions southeast of Leninava, checking the following:
1. „If they are occupied for their entire length.
2. „If the type of terrain on the wings of the positions can be determined.
3. „Which sections are more heavily occupied.
4. „If there are passages through the anti-tank obstacles that can be determined.”
Successful „Wiking” Panzer commander receives a toast from a visiting Waffen-SS soldier. [Erik Rundkvist Archives]
At about 11:00 hours, the pilot radioed back the following:
1. „In the direction northeast of Leninava, the positions spread for at least some kilometers and are fully occupied.
2. „About 2 kilometers to the south of Point 80 there is an intact bridge with no evidence of Russian troops guarding it or in the vicinity.”
Heavily laden „Wiking” grenadiers on the march with accompanying tanks and vehicles.
The bridge therefore would become the immediate objective. SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann ordered two rifle companies that were in readiness to the north of Point 80 to join with an engineer group and mount the tanks of two armored companies that were concealed in the same ravine. The artillery group was instructed to maintain a heavy fire on the Soviet positions and as rapidly as possible they would disengage one after another and join the reformation movement of the battle-group. An orderly officer was dispatched to the vanguard element (one rein- forced grenadier company with tanks), to relay on SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann’s directives and order them to continue firing on the enemy lines in order to obstruct their observation of the Kampfgruppe’s movements.
SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann climbed on the battalion commander’s tank and signaled his troops into action by pointing with his arm to the south. His further orders were conveyed by radio to the tank commanders: „Reach the road from Tschaltir to Rostov; from there bear to the east and as quickly as possible seize the bridge over the road 5 kilometers to the west of Rostov.”
The column then rushed forward along the ravine, reached the designated road and passed over the bridge. The engineer group remained on the bridge, cutting the wires and disarming the explosive charges that had been placed on it by the Russians. The race to seize the bridge had taken place successfully in less than 20 minutes with about 8 to 9 kilometers of ground covered in the process. The Kampfgruppe and Panzer Abteilung commanders were at the head of the column without any forward security sections and the column included a mixture of tanks, trucks, communication vehicles, etc. The job was done in a very unorthodox manner!
When the bulk of the Kampfgruppe reached the bridge, SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann ordered one tank company reinforced by a rifle company to attack along the main Russian line from southeast to northeast (i.e. coming in from behind), with the objective of eliminating the resistance, mopping up the positions and linking-up with battle-group elements still near Leninava. The remainder of the battle-group was organized into a hedgehog position at the main juncture of the road and railroad lines going into Rostov. The railroad tracks ran around the western part of Rostov and then turned towards the main station in the center of the city. Between 13:00 and 14:00 hours, all of the vital positions around the hedgehog had been occupied by the SS troops. These included houses and stands of trees in which observers were stationed. Scout patrol were then sent out to explore the next route of the battle-group.
Breakthrough of the Third Defensive Line and Drive into Rostov
At a little past 14:00, the entire Kampfgruppe was reassembled and SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann was faced with the following situations:
1. The main defensive positions were now cleared of Red troops, but between these lines and the Rostov city limits were other organized enemy forces.
2. The situation in the southeast, alongside the railroad lines and around the city limits, was unclear. The presence of Russian soldiers in a wooded area and a housing complex with both heavy machine guns and infantry guns had been reported, but their exact numbers and disposition was unknown.
3. More towards the south, in the so-called „special” area, patrols from the Kampfgruppe met scattered groups of Russian soldiers who surrendered without resistance. In the same direction and within the boundary of the city, the Soviets had constructed an anti-tank ditch 5 meters deep and some 6 to 8 meters wide. In the surrounding houses, the deployment of about 40 to 60 enemy riflemen with 7 to 8 automatic weapons, had been confirmed. Between the anti-tank ditch and the houses were barbed wire obstacles and other defensive works.
SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann decided to attack towards Sapadni. Dividing his Kampfgruppe into one assault group, one support group and one reserve group, he devised the following plan:
1. The 1st Assault Group under the command of the tank battalion commander (SS-Stubaf. Mühlenkampf), was formed from one tank company, one rifle company and two-thirds of an engineer company with explosive charges. Behind this group would follow a reserve rifle company, directly at the disposal of SS-Stubaf. Mühlenkampf.
2. The 2nd Group was given the job of supporting the 1st Assault Group, concentrating on the enemy forces in the southern part of Sapadni. It was formed from the I.Btl./ „Germania” heavy weapons company and the artillery section from SS-AR 5. The heavy weapons, machine guns, infantry howitzers, mortars and anti-tank guns were deployed in the western outskirts of Sapadni. The two 10.5 cm howitzer batteries were placed south of the village and were able to hit with direct fire the outer buildings of Rostov some 1500 meters away. The heavy howitzer battery and a 10.5 cm gun battery were placed west of Sapadni, enabling them to place indirect fire on Rostov, and if need be, fire on the Don River bridges.
3. The Reserve Group was formed by one rifle company, one engineer section and one tank section and was situated to the west of Sapadni. It was given the following roles to play:
a) To constitute a reserve of the Kampfgruppe commander to be used against Rostov.
b) To protect the battle-group artillery against attacks from the north or west.
4. A Security Troop composed of one rifle platoon and one tank section was left to hold the captured bridge and keep the roads to Krim and Tschaltir closed to the enemy.
The attack now got underway. When the grenadiers of the 1st Assault Group reached a point 100 meters from the anti-tank ditch (the ditch was located about 20 meters from the enemy-held housing complex), they received fire from rifles and automatic weapons; the latter being mostly light machine guns placed in the windows of the houses. Since no anti-tank fire was received, the Assault Group tanks were able to advance to a point about 50 meters away from the houses and began opening fire on the windows. Under the cover of the tank fire, the grenadiers crossed the anti-tank ditch and took the first houses.
While the combat engineers were busy building a passage across the ditch for tanks, the reserve rifle company joined in the fighting and entered the city, bringing in with them the forward artillery observers. In the course of their attack the Waffen-SS soldiers reached Hill 80 about 2 kilometers southwest of the railway station and about 1500 meters from the Don River. Here they organized a hedgehog position. Almost at once, the commander of the artillery group and the commander of the two heavy batteries (15.5 cm howitzers and 10.5 cm guns), arrived with communications and radio equipment.
From the hedgehog position on top of the hill, the Don River valley could be observed. To the south large swamps stretched, while the towns of Koisug and Bataisk could be seen. Towards the east, a large island formed in the Don River to the south of the city, where two bridges, one road and one railroad could be made out. Large numbers of Russian troops from inside of Rostov were attempting to cross the river to the south. Thousands and thousands of khaki dressed men, mixed together from all arms of the service, and many weaponless, could be seen congregating. To the southwest, thousands of other men were moving towards the river carrying hastily built rafts, trunks, doors, barrels and other objects to try and cross the Don with. These were the defeated troops from Krim and Tschaltir who had been cut off from the Don bridges.
The heavy artillery took for their targets the troops on the two bridges to the south while the light artillery fired on the Russian troops to the southwest. Meanwhile, with the assistance of the engineers, the tanks were able to cross the anti-tank ditch. The Tank Bat- talion commander with one tank company, one rifle company, some heavy weapons and engineer sections rushed forward into the city to try and close off the bridges to traffic. This was accomplished in the dark of the evening. During the night, this group was able to make contact with units from the 13th Panzer Division which had entered Rostov from the northeast.
Since there were still thousands of scattered Russian soldiers inside of Rostov and to the west, SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann laid down the following directives for his men to follow in the night to come:
1. One hedgehog position under the command of the Tank Battalion CO would be located between the Don River railway bridge and the Rostov railroad station. From this position contact would be maintained with a unit of the 13th Panzer Division holding the western road bridge over the Don.
2. Another hedgehog position was to be formed with one tank company and one rifle company 2 kilometers to the south of Hill 80, 50 cover the road along the north bank of the river.
3. A third hedgehog position would be maintained around Hill 80 with the Kampfgruppe commander, the four artillery batteries and the remainder of the battle-group.
By 20:00 hours, all hedgehogs had been organized, established and their activities coordinated. At this time the officers and their staffs felt secure enough to take a formal mess break, assisted by a delicate wine from the Crimean peninsula.
SS-Kampfgruppe „Dieckmann” had marched and fought hard for three whole days with little rest. The losses in the first two days had amounted to only a few men; during the attack to take Rostov itself, 3 men had died and 12 had been wounded, 2 of them seriously. In material damage, one tank had been destroyed and one partially damaged. SS-Sturmbannführer August Dieckmann was awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross for his actions in the battle for Rostov. He would be killed in action as the commanding officer of SS-Pz.Gr.Rgt.10 „Westland”/5.SS-Pz.Div. „Wiking”, with the rank of SS- Obersturmbannführer, in October 1943.
Acknowledgment
Dieckmann portrait and combat map both by Ramiro Bujeiro.
A group of veteran Finnish officers from the SS „Wiking” Division. Top row: Mauri Sautio, Heikki Mansala, Kauko Ingero. Bottom row: Olli Somersalo, Kalevvo Kuukiala, Yrjo Tenomaa. Photo taken at Izjnmissa, early 1943. [Erik Rundkvist Archives]
