Published in „Siegrunen“
Magazine – Vol. XIII No. 5 — Whole Number 79 — Summer
2007
Translated, corrected and
adapted by Ramiro Bujeiro from the book Del Caucaso a Leningrado
(From the Caucasus to Leningrad)
by Argentine Army Lt.Col.
Alberto Marini based on the memoirs of the
Danish SS-Standartenführer Paul
Ranzow Englehardt.
The
Breakthrough and Exploitation
The
battle-group from the
SS Division „Wiking” which was to participate in the attack to overwhelm the
Rostov defensive positions from the north and west, was formed as follows:
-
Commander: SS-Sturmbannführer August Dieckmann (CO of I./SS Rgt. „Germania”)
- Staff:
From combined units.
- I.Btl./SS
Rgt. „Germania” (reserve battalion)
-
5.SS-Panzer Abteilung (attached to the division a few months earlier).
-
III./SS-Artillery Regiment 5 with 2 10.5cm howitzer batteries and 1 15.5cm
howitzer battery.
- 10th
Company/SS-AR 5 with one battery of 10.5cm guns.
- One „Wiking”
combat engineer company.
- One
Flak (air defense) section with 4 or 6 6.2cm guns.
- One
small combined unit supply and maintenance column.
SS-Kampfgruppe
„Dieckmann” was organized in the „Wiking” rearguard area between 18 and 20 July
1942. In this short time it was able to exchange its battered and damaged
vehicles for others in good condition from other units. New armaments,
ammunition, uniforms, etc. were also added and an order to operate for „up to
six months” without extra supplies was also received. On the same day SS-KGr. „Dieckmann”
was sent to the front, German infantry forces broke into Russian positions to
the east of the Taganrog Bridgehead and slowly advanced against heavy
resistance.
SS-Obersturmbannführer August Dieckmann
The „Wiking”
battle-group was forced to make a big loop to the west in order to reach the
main Mariupol-Rostov road about 10 kilometers to the west of the Mius River.
During the course of 20 July, German mountain infantry had advanced about 10
kilometers to the east, allowing follow-up units to move in behind them.
On 21
July 1942, SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” was ordered to advance north of IL. Mountain
Corps in a tactical flanking maneuver. As so often occurs in war, it proved
impossible to carry out the order given the uncertainty of the situation. From
air reconnaissance it was known that the Russians had constructed fortifications
but their strength and occupancy was unknown. Therefore SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” was
given a new mission: conquer the city of Rostov as quickly as possible to
prevent the construction of a defensive line to the south of the Don River by
the retreating Russians.
SS-KGr.
„Dieckmann” received the new directive to advance on the north wing of the Army
Corps, penetrating as far as possible to the east in order to support the Corps’
advance. After reaching a distance of 12 kilometers to the east of the Mius
River (about 2 kilometers to the east of the village of Sambek), SS-KGr. „Dieckmann”
changed its course to the northeast, passing through the town of Vodianoi in the
following formation:
1. Lead
or vanguard element: SS-Stubaf. Johannes Mülenkamp (CO of SS-Pz.Abt.5), with one
tank company and half a rifle company mounted on the tanks. This group traveled
about 2 kilometers in advance of the main body of the battle group.
2. The
main force: SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann along with the bulk of the formation. A
reinforced tank section along with two squads of riflemen were used to protect
the flanks. A distance of about 1 kilometer was maintained ahead of the
rearguard.
3. The
rearguard: the commander of a tank platoon with his section reinforced by a
rifle squad.
Ten
kilometers to the east of Vodianoie, the forward tanks exchanged fire with the
Soviet positions located a few kilometers to the east. SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann
continued the advance with the vanguard element in order to scout the length of
the enemy positions, as his mission proscribed for him the task of finding a
weak point in the Russian lines that could be exploited. While doing this, the
Kampfgruppe was forced to change direction and bend towards the north. During
the night of 21/22 July, the battle group halted in „bristle” or „hedgehog”
positions („Circle the wagons” formation.),
about 3 kilometers to the west of Stojakov,
around a cross- roads. In the inner defensive ring was placed the artillery with
a constant guard crew. The tanks and heavy infantry guns were put into the
second ring ready to give support to the rifle squads that were situated in the
exterior ring of the „hedgehog”.
The Attack
Against the First Russian Position
On the
morning of 22 July 1942, SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” continued its advance. The
vanguard, after passing through Stojakov, received fire from hills occupied by
the Russians about 3 kilometers to the south. As the incoming fire was only from
small arms, the tanks continued their advance to about 1 kilometer from the
enemy positions where the riflemen dismounted to attack on foot. But the close
proximity of the German tanks was enough to cause the Soviets to retreat.
Following this episode, the lead element, with riflemen once again riding on the
tanks, continued the advance. In a short time they began receiving fire from
Russian positions located about 2 kilometers to the north of the village of
Sultan Saly. As in the previous case, the riflemen again dismounted the tanks.
The attack was well coordinated and carried out rapidly. The tanks fired and
advanced by stretches and with that support the infantry was able to continue on
under their protection. When they reached a point 800 to 1000 meters from the
enemy positions the situation became more clear.
SS-Stubaf. Johannes Mühlenkamp inspecting SS Panzer Abteilung 5 at Wildflecken
shortly before its deployment to action with the „Wiking” Division. Wildflecken
was later the training camp of the French 33rd
SS Volunteer Grenadier Division „Charlemagne”. [Erik Rundkvist Archives]
The
Soviet lines here were stronger than the previous positions and automatic
weapons and anti-tank gun fire had begun with some intensity. The German tanks
retreated immediately to about 1500 meters from the Russian lines. One tank
received a direct hit on a track (however it was recovered that night) and
another caught fire and burned, but both crews managed to get away safely.
SS-Stubaf.
Dieckmann was now in direct command of the lead element from the turret of the
battalion command tank so he immediately brought the main body of his force to a
halt in a valley about 4 kilometers to the north of the enemy positions and
range of fire. The artillery group commander who followed the lead element at a
distance of 100 meters or so in his car, was ordered to place the artillery in
firing order to support an infantry and tank assault against the Russian line.
Dieckmann decided on a quick assault, since he could see through his field
glasses that the Russian trenches ran on either side of Sultan Saly without a
common juncture and they seemed to be occupied by a small force.
A „Wiking”
Division troop train somewhere on the southern part of the Eastern Front, circa
1942/1943. [Erik
Rundkvist Archives]
The
Kampfgruppe had a Luftwaffe liaison officer from the „Wiking” Division staff
attached to it, so SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann was able to ask for Stuka (Dive Bomber)
support as well. In the meantime, the rifle battalion was deployed and the rifle
companies began to advance supported by their own heavy weapons and by the
artillery group (less the 10.5cm gun battery). The tanks covered the flanks of
the grenadiers and also supported them with their fire. At about 17:00 hours, 36
Stukas appeared and began to bomb the Russian positions.
The
targets attacked by the Stukas were not visible but they seemed to be near the
village of Sultan Saly and at points farther to the south-southeast in the
suburbs of Rostov. Simultaneously with the air attack, the artillery group and
their heavy weapons section laid down their heaviest rate of fire. After the
Stukas left, the tanks rushed up against the Russian positions and the infantry
companies began their assault. The heavy weapons fire shifted towards Sultan
Saly. Many of the SS riflemen remained mounted on the tanks and since the enemy
positions were not protected by anti-tank ditches or minefields the tanks were
able to penetrate the defensive works.
Once
among the Russian positions, the tank-riding infantrymen dismounted and jumped
into the trenches to clear them out. Very few prisoners were taken because the
communists had retreated in time. A few Red Army troops still held out in Sultan
Saly, so Waffen-SS troops with tank support had to mop them up in a
house-to-house operation that lasted until 22:00 hours, or one hour after sunset
in that portion of the world. Once the enemy resistance ended, SS-KGr. „Dieckmann”
reassembled in a hedgehog-bristle position to the south of the village and the
assault troops were able to get some rest.
Motorcycle messenger team from the „Wiking” Division; note divisional emblem.
[Erik Rundkvist
Archives]
The
Breakthrough of the Second Russian Defensive Position
At this
time the men of the Kampfgruppe hadn’t realized that they had broken into the
outside defensive perimeter around Rostov and that there were successive, in
depth defensive lines still before them. SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann had learned only
that his troops had come up against and driven back at best one enemy battalion,
that there was fighting continuing to the west along the Krim-Tschaltir line
against strong enemy forces and that in the east and northwest there were
Russian concentrations of unknown strength. It was presumed that the 13th Panzer
Division was located between 10 and 20 kilometers to the east-northeast of
Rostov, but there was not contact maintained with that division.
Little
was known of the Soviet forces before the Kampfgruppe. Patrols sent out in the
darkness of night were unable to find any enemy to the south of Sultan Saly. At
any rate, only one point was quite clear to SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann: the small
victory had to be exploited as rapidly as possible without worrying about danger
on the flanks or in the rear. The worst that could happened would be that the
Kampfgruppe could be attacked from all directions, but in such a contingency,
the hedgehog positions could be expected to hold out for one or two days, which
would be enough to get assistance from the higher echelons.
So, for
four hours, the Kampfgruppe rested that night between 23:00 hours on 22 July to
03:00 hours on 23 July. For a change, the grenadiers didn’t dig foxholes for the
night but spent the valuable time eating, washing, doing weapons’ maintenance
and sleeping. Half an hour before the sun rose, the Kampfgruppe formed up as it
had on the previous day and continued its advance. By 04:00 hours the lead
element had reached Point 93, 3 kilometers to the south of Sultan Saly and the
following battle situation then became known:
1. West
of the villages of Krim and Tschlatir, two Russian divisions, or the remnants of
them (about 10,000 to 15,000 men), held the first line of defense against the
German IL. Mountain Corps. They were unaware that their flank had been penetrat-
ed at Sultan Saly by the SS-KGr. „Dieckmann.”
2.
Directly in front of SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” at Point 93 was about one company of
enemy troops (perhaps 200-300 men), in an intermediate position with what looked
like successive defensive works and a possible anti-tank ditch. The extent of
the positions (north-south spread), could not be ascertained. Point 93 itself
was about 8 kilometers from the northwestern out- skirts of Rostov.
3. At
the Trud Factory, 4 kilometers southeast of Point 93, the Russians had
established a supporting position.
4. To
the east of Trud, Russian troops could be observed moving from north to south.
Several
times the east flank guard element of SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” tried to contact 13th
Panzer Division with patrols, but they had no success. As the vanguard of the
battle-group drew up be- fore Point 93, it received fire from the Russian
positions. As a matter of routine course, the rifle sections dismounted and
supported by the tanks, began to attack the enemy line. Soon they discovered
that a stream bridge had been blown and that the Russian positions were
supported by anti-tank ditches to either side of them. When the grenadiers
reached a point about 800 meters from the enemy, they were able to confirm that
the continuous anti-tank ditch would not permit tank passage. The commander of a
tank company asked his wing tank sections to look for a way through the ditch.
The results were negative. The only course left was to put the Russian defense
under the highest possible volume of fire and they attack with infantry only.
The
tanks then approached to between 50 and 100 meters (of the enemy lines) and
began to fire on the Russian infantry. The deter- mined actions of the lead SS
riflemen, supported by four machine guns and two 88mm mortars, forced the
communists to retreat. While the infantry gained the positions at compass Point
80, the battle-group engineers blew up the walls of the anti-tank ditches to
enable the tanks to cross them.
At
07:00, the lead element passed Point 80 and confronted the enemy at the village
of Leninava to the southeast where fire was received from small arms, heavy
weapons and one or two artillery batteries. Due to the fire from anti-tank guns,
the Germans stopped their tanks in Leninava and the riflemen halted about 100
meters to the south of the village. The Russian positions seemed to be heavily
occupied and well organized. Unknown to the Waffen-SS soldiers, the Kampfgruppe
was now up against the main Rostov defensive line complete with anti-tank
ditches, minefields, barbed wire obstacles, bunkers and a profusion of fortified
works. The 800 meters of terrain which divided both sides was fully exposed and
offered only the choice of a frontal attack which would involve a heavy price in
blood.
When SS-Stubaf.
Dieckmann arrived in person at Point 80, his first order was to bring the
howitzer batteries into firing positions to neutralize the enemy fire. He asked
again for air support, but unfortunately there were no planes available at that
moment. But he did receive the services of an observation plane through his
Luftwaffe liaison officer and was able to radio the following request to the
pilot:
„Determine the extension of the Russian positions southeast of Leninava,
checking the following:
1. „If
they are occupied for their entire length.
2. „If
the type of terrain on the wings of the positions can be determined.
3.
„Which sections are more heavily occupied.
4. „If
there are passages through the anti-tank obstacles that can be determined.”
Successful „Wiking” Panzer commander receives a toast from a visiting Waffen-SS
soldier. [Erik
Rundkvist Archives]
At about
11:00 hours, the pilot radioed back the following:
1. „In
the direction northeast of Leninava, the positions spread for at least some
kilometers and are fully occupied.
2.
„About 2 kilometers to the south of Point 80 there is an intact bridge with no
evidence of Russian troops guarding it or in the vicinity.”
Heavily laden „Wiking” grenadiers on the march with accompanying tanks and
vehicles.
The
bridge therefore would become the immediate objective. SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann
ordered two rifle companies that were in readiness to the north of Point 80 to
join with an engineer group and mount the tanks of two armored companies that
were concealed in the same ravine. The artillery group was instructed to
maintain a heavy fire on the Soviet positions and as rapidly as possible they
would disengage one after another and join the reformation movement of the
battle-group. An orderly officer was dispatched to the vanguard element (one
rein- forced grenadier company with tanks), to relay on SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann’s
directives and order them to continue firing on the enemy lines in order to
obstruct their observation of the Kampfgruppe’s movements.
SS-Stubaf.
Dieckmann climbed on the battalion commander’s tank and signaled his troops into
action by pointing with his arm to the south. His further orders were conveyed
by radio to the tank commanders: „Reach the road from Tschaltir to Rostov; from
there bear to the east and as quickly as possible seize the bridge over the road
5 kilometers to the west of Rostov.”
The
column then rushed forward along the ravine, reached the designated road and
passed over the bridge. The engineer group remained on the bridge, cutting the
wires and disarming the explosive charges that had been placed on it by the
Russians. The race to seize the bridge had taken place successfully in less than
20 minutes with about 8 to 9 kilometers of ground covered in the process. The
Kampfgruppe and Panzer Abteilung commanders were at the head of the column
without any forward security sections and the column included a mixture of
tanks, trucks, communication vehicles, etc. The job was done in a very
unorthodox manner!
When the
bulk of the Kampfgruppe reached the bridge, SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann ordered one
tank company reinforced by a rifle company to attack along the main Russian line
from southeast to northeast (i.e. coming in from behind), with the objective of
eliminating the resistance, mopping up the positions and linking-up with
battle-group elements still near Leninava. The remainder of the battle-group was
organized into a hedgehog position at the main juncture of the road and railroad
lines going into Rostov. The railroad tracks ran around the western part of
Rostov and then turned towards the main station in the center of the city.
Between 13:00 and 14:00 hours, all of the vital positions around the hedgehog
had been occupied by the SS troops. These included houses and stands of trees in
which observers were stationed. Scout patrol were then sent out to explore the
next route of the battle-group.
Breakthrough of
the Third Defensive Line and Drive into Rostov
At a
little past 14:00, the entire Kampfgruppe was reassembled and SS-Stubaf.
Dieckmann was faced with the following situations:
1. The
main defensive positions were now cleared of Red troops, but between these lines
and the Rostov city limits were other organized enemy forces.
2. The
situation in the southeast, alongside the railroad lines and around the city
limits, was unclear. The presence of Russian soldiers in a wooded area and a
housing complex with both heavy machine guns and infantry guns had been
reported, but their exact numbers and disposition was unknown.
3. More
towards the south, in the so-called „special” area, patrols from the Kampfgruppe
met scattered groups of Russian soldiers who surrendered without resistance. In
the same direction and within the boundary of the city, the Soviets had
constructed an anti-tank ditch 5 meters deep and some 6 to 8 meters wide. In the
surrounding houses, the deployment of about 40 to 60 enemy riflemen with 7 to 8
automatic weapons, had been confirmed. Between the anti-tank ditch and the
houses were barbed wire obstacles and other defensive works.
SS-Stubaf.
Dieckmann decided to attack towards Sapadni. Dividing his Kampfgruppe into one
assault group, one support group and one reserve group, he devised the following
plan:
1. The
1st Assault Group under the command of the tank battalion commander (SS-Stubaf.
Mühlenkampf), was formed from one tank company, one rifle company and two-thirds
of an engineer company with explosive charges. Behind this group would follow a
reserve rifle company, directly at the disposal of SS-Stubaf. Mühlenkampf.
2. The
2nd Group was given the job of supporting the 1st Assault Group, concentrating
on the enemy forces in the southern part of Sapadni. It was formed from the
I.Btl./ „Germania” heavy weapons company and the artillery section from SS-AR 5.
The heavy weapons, machine guns, infantry howitzers, mortars and anti-tank guns
were deployed in the western outskirts of Sapadni. The two 10.5 cm howitzer
batteries were placed south of the village and were able to hit with direct fire
the outer buildings of Rostov some 1500 meters away. The heavy howitzer battery
and a 10.5 cm gun battery were placed west of Sapadni, enabling them to place
indirect fire on Rostov, and if need be, fire on the Don River bridges.
3. The
Reserve Group was formed by one rifle company, one engineer section and one tank
section and was situated to the west of Sapadni. It was given the following
roles to play:
a) To
constitute a reserve of the Kampfgruppe commander to be used against Rostov.
b) To
protect the battle-group artillery against attacks from the north or west.
4. A
Security Troop composed of one rifle platoon and one tank section was left to
hold the captured bridge and keep the roads to Krim and Tschaltir closed to the
enemy.
The
attack now got underway. When the grenadiers of the 1st Assault Group reached a
point 100 meters from the anti-tank ditch (the ditch was located about 20 meters
from the enemy-held housing complex), they received fire from rifles and
automatic weapons; the latter being mostly light machine guns placed in the
windows of the houses. Since no anti-tank fire was received, the Assault Group
tanks were able to advance to a point about 50 meters away from the houses and
began opening fire on the windows. Under the cover of the tank fire, the
grenadiers crossed the anti-tank ditch and took the first houses.
While
the combat engineers were busy building a passage across the ditch for tanks,
the reserve rifle company joined in the fighting and entered the city, bringing
in with them the forward artillery observers. In the course of their attack the
Waffen-SS soldiers reached Hill 80 about 2 kilometers southwest of the railway
station and about 1500 meters from the Don River. Here they organized a hedgehog
position. Almost at once, the commander of the artillery group and the commander
of the two heavy batteries (15.5 cm howitzers and 10.5 cm guns), arrived with
communications and radio equipment.
From the
hedgehog position on top of the hill, the Don River valley could be observed. To
the south large swamps stretched, while the towns of Koisug and Bataisk could be
seen. Towards the east, a large island formed in the Don River to the south of
the city, where two bridges, one road and one railroad could be made out. Large
numbers of Russian troops from inside of Rostov were attempting to cross the
river to the south. Thousands and thousands of khaki dressed men, mixed together
from all arms of the service, and many weaponless, could be seen congregating.
To the southwest, thousands of other men were moving towards the river carrying
hastily built rafts, trunks, doors, barrels and other objects to try and cross
the Don with. These were the defeated troops from Krim and Tschaltir who had
been cut off from the Don bridges.
The
heavy artillery took for their targets the troops on the two bridges to the
south while the light artillery fired on the Russian troops to the southwest.
Meanwhile, with the assistance of the engineers, the tanks were able to cross
the anti-tank ditch. The Tank Bat- talion commander with one tank company, one
rifle company, some heavy weapons and engineer sections rushed forward into the
city to try and close off the bridges to traffic. This was accomplished in the
dark of the evening. During the night, this group was able to make contact with
units from the 13th Panzer Division which had entered Rostov from the northeast.
Since
there were still thousands of scattered Russian soldiers inside of Rostov and to
the west, SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann laid down the following directives for his men to
follow in the night to come:
1. One
hedgehog position under the command of the Tank Battalion CO would be located
between the Don River railway bridge and the Rostov railroad station. From this
position contact would be maintained with a unit of the 13th Panzer Division
holding the western road bridge over the Don.
2.
Another hedgehog position was to be formed with one tank company and one rifle
company 2 kilometers to the south of Hill 80, 50 cover the road along the north
bank of the river.
3. A
third hedgehog position would be maintained around Hill 80 with the Kampfgruppe
commander, the four artillery batteries and the remainder of the battle-group.
By 20:00
hours, all hedgehogs had been organized, established and their activities
coordinated. At this time the officers and their staffs felt secure enough to
take a formal mess break, assisted by a delicate wine from the Crimean
peninsula.
SS-Kampfgruppe
„Dieckmann” had marched and fought hard for three whole days with little rest.
The losses in the first two days had amounted to only a few men; during the
attack to take Rostov itself, 3 men had died and 12 had been wounded, 2 of them
seriously. In material damage, one tank had been destroyed and one partially
damaged. SS-Sturmbannführer August Dieckmann was awarded the Knight’s Cross of
the Iron Cross for his actions in the battle for Rostov. He would be killed in
action as the commanding officer of SS-Pz.Gr.Rgt.10 „Westland”/5.SS-Pz.Div. „Wiking”,
with the rank of SS- Obersturmbannführer, in October 1943.
Acknowledgment
Dieckmann portrait and combat map both by Ramiro Bujeiro.
A group of veteran Finnish officers from the SS „Wiking” Division. Top row:
Mauri Sautio, Heikki Mansala, Kauko Ingero. Bottom row: Olli Somersalo, Kalevvo
Kuukiala, Yrjo Tenomaa. Photo taken at Izjnmissa, early 1943.
[Erik Rundkvist Archives]
