March 7, 1936
Men of the
German Reichstag!
The
President of the German Reichstag, Party Comrade Goring, convened today’s
session at my request in order to give you an opportunity to hear a declaration
from the Reich Government pertaining to questions which instinctively are
regarded not only by yourselves but by the entire German Volk as important, if
not to say decisive.
When in the gray
November days of 1918 the curtain was lowered on the bloody tragedy of the Great
War ...
[…]
However, I have a
right to lay these views of mine open before you gentlemen, Deputies of the
Reichstag, for they constitute both the explanation for our own political
experience, for our internal work among the Volk and for our external
standpoint.
Since the rest of
the world often talks about a “German question,” it will be wise to reach for
ourselves an objective clarification on the essence of this question. Some
regard the “question” as being the German regime itself, as being the completely
misunderstood difference between the German regime and the other regime, as
being the so-called “rearmament” perceived as threatening, and as being all
those things one imagines one sees as a mirage ensuing from this rearmament. For
many, this question is rooted in the German Volk’s alleged lust for war, in its
slumbering plans for offensive or in its diabolical skill in outwitting its
opponents. No, my dear politicians! The German question is something entirely
different.
Here we have
sixty-seven million people
living on a
very limited and only partially fertile area. That means approximately 136
persons per square kilometer. These people are no less industrious than other
European peoples; they are no less demanding; they are no less intelligent and
they have no less will to live. They have just as little desire to allow
themselves to be heroically shot dead for some fantasy as, for instance, a
Frenchman or an Englishman does.
Neither are these
sixty-seven million Germans more cowardly; and by no means do they have less
honor than members of the other European nations.
Once they were torn
into a war in which they believed no more than other Europeans and for which
they bore just as little responsibility. Today’s young German of twenty-five had
just celebrated his first birthday during the pre-war years and at the beginning
of the war; thus, he can hardly be held responsible for this catastrophe of the
nations. Yes, even the youngest German who could have been responsible was
twenty-five years old when the German voting age was fixed. Hence he is today at
least fifty years old. That means that the overwhelming majority of men in the
German Volk were simply forced to take part in the war, just as was the bulk of
the survivors from the French or English peoples. If they were decent, they did
their duty then-if they were already of age-just as well as every decent
Frenchman and Englishman. If they were not decent, they failed to do this and
perhaps earned money instead or worked for the revolution. These people are no
longer in our ranks today, but live for the most part as emigrants with some
host or another. This German Volk has just as many merits as other peoples, and
naturally just as many disadvantages and weaknesses, too.
The German question
lay in the fact that this Volk-even as late as, for example, 1935, and on the
basis of a guilt it had never committed-was to be made to suffer lesser rights
which constitute an intolerable burden to an honorloving Volk, a torment to an
industrious Volk, and an outrage to an intelligent Volk. The German question
also means that one is attempting, by way of a system of unreasonable actions,
measures and hate-filled incitements, to make even more difficult the already
hard battle to assert the right to live, and to make it more difficult not only
artificially, but perversely and absurdly.
For the rest of the
world does not profit in the slightest from making it more difficult for Germany
to maintain its life. There is eighteen times less land per capita of the
population in respect to the German being than, for instance, in respect to a
Russian. It is understandable how hard the mere fight for one’s daily bread must
be and is. Without the efficiency and industriousness of the German peasant and
the organizational ability of the German Volk, it would hardly be possible for
these sixty-seven million to lead their lives. Yet what are we to think of the
mental naivety of those who perhaps recognize these difficulties yet nonetheless
celebrate our misery in childish glee in articles, publications and lectures,
who moreover actually hunt down every indication of this, our inner plight, to
tell it to the rest of the world? Apparently they would be pleased were our
distress even worse, were we not able to succeed over and over again in making
it bearable by industriousness and intelligence.
They have no idea
how the German question would present a completely different picture were the
abilities and industriousness of these millions to falter, whereby not only
misery but also political unreason would come into evidence. This, too, is one
of the German questions, and the world cannot but be interested in seeing that
this matter of securing a German means of living year after year is successfully
solved, just as it is my desire that the German Volk will also comprehend and
respect a happy solution to these vital questions for other peoples, just as in
its very own best interest.
However, mastering
this German question is initially a matter involving the German Volk itself and
need not concern the rest of the world. It touches upon the interests of other
peoples only to the extent that the German Volk is forced, when solving this
problem, to establish contact in an economic sense with other peoples as buyers
and sellers.
And this is where,
again, it will be solely in the interests of the rest of the world to understand
this question, i.e. to comprehend the fact that the cry for bread in a Volk
consisting of forty, fifty, or sixty million is not some sly feat of malice on
the part of the regime or certain governments but rather a natural expression of
the urge to assert one’s right to live; and that well-fed peoples are more
reasonable than those who are hungry; and that not only the respective
government should have an interest in securing sufficient nourishment for its
citizens, but the surrounding states and peoples should as well; and that it
therefore lies in the interest of all to make it possible to assert one’s right
to live in the highest sense of the word. It was the privilege of the pre-war
age to take up the opposite view and proclaim it a state of war, namely the
opinion that one part of the European family of peoples would fare all the
better, the worse another part fared The German Volk needs no special assistance
to assert its own life. It wants, however, to have opportunities no worse than
those given to other peoples. This is one of the German questions.
And the second
German question is the following: because, as a result of the extremely
unfortunate general circumstances and conditions, the economic life-struggle of
the German Volk is very strenuous-whereas the intelligence, industriousness, and
hence the natural standard of living are in contrast very high-an extraordinary
exertion of all our energies is required in order to master this first German
question. Yet this can only be accomplished if this Volk enjoys a feeling of
political security in an external sense.
In this world, it
is impossible to maintain-or much less lead-a Volk of honor and bravery as
Helots for any length of time.
There is no better
confirmation of the German Volk’s innate love of peace than the fact that, in
spite of its ability and in spite of its bravery-which cannot be denied, even by
our opponents-and in spite of this Volk’s large numbers, it has secured for
itself only such a modest share of the Lebensraum and goods of this world. Yet
it is above all this trait of concentrating increasingly on the inland, so
characteristic of German nature, which cannot bear being abused or shamefully
deprived of its rights.
In that the
unfortunate Peace Treaty of Versailles was intended to fix the- historically
unique-perpetuation of the outcome of the war in moral terms, it created that
very German question which constitutes a critical burden to Europe if unsolved
and, if solved, will be Europe’s liberation. And following the signing of the
Peace Treaty in the year 1919, I set myself the task of one day solving this
problem-not because I have any desire to do harm to France or any other state,
but because the German Volk cannot, will not, and shall not bear the wrong done
to it on the long term! In the year 1932, Germany stood at the brink of a
Bolshevist collapse. What this chaos in such a large country would have meant
for Europe is something perhaps certain European statesmen will have an
opportunity to observe elsewhere in future. For my part, I was only able to
overcome this crisis of the German Volk, which was most visibly manifest in the
economic sector, by mobilizing the ethical and moral values common to the German
nation. The man who wanted to rescue Germany from Bolshevism would have to bring
about a decision on-and thus a solution for-the question of German equality of
rights. Not in order to do harm to other peoples, but on the contrary: to
perhaps even spare them great harm by preventing a catastrophe from engulfing
Germany, the ultimate consequences of which would be unimaginable for Europe.
For the
re-establishment of German equality of rights has had no harmful effect on the
French people. Only the Red revolt and the collapse of the German Reich would
have dealt the European order and the European economy a blow having
consequences which, unfortunately, are virtually beyond the grasp of most
European statesmen. This battle for German equality of rights which I waged for
three years does not pose a European question, but answers one.
It is a truly
tragic misfortune that of all things, the Peace Treaty of Versailles created a
situation the French people thought they should be particularly interested in
maintaining. As incapable as this situation was of holding any real advantages
for the individual Frenchman, all the greater was the unreal connection which
appeared to exist between the discrimination of the German Volk by Versailles
and the interests of the French. Perhaps the character weakness of the German
postwar years; of our Governments; and, in particular, of our parties, was also
to blame for the fact that the French people and the serious French statesmen
could not be made sufficiently aware of the inaccuracy of this view. For, the
worse the individual governments before our time were, the more reason they
themselves had to fear the national awakening of the German Volk. Therefore,
they were all the more frightened of any type of national self-awareness, and
thus all the more supportive in their attitude toward the widespread
international defamation of the German people. Yes, they simply needed this
disgraceful bondage to prop up their own sorry regimes. Where this regime
finally led Germany was vividly illustrated in the imminent collapse.
Now, of course it
was difficult, in view of the fact that our neighbors had become so firmly
accustomed to non-equality of rights, to prove that a reestablishment of German
equality of rights would not only do no harm to them, but on the contrary: in
the final analysis, it would be useful internationally.
You, my Deputies
and men of the Reichstag, know the difficult path I have had to take since that
thirtieth of January 1933 in order to redeem the German Volk from its unworthy
situation, to then secure for it, step by step, equality of rights, without
removing it from the political and economic community of the European nations
and, particularly, without creating a new enmity in the process of settling an
old one.
One day I will be
able to demand from history confirmation of the fact that at no time in the
course of my struggle on behalf of the German Volk did I forget the duties I
myself and all of us are obligated to assume toward maintaining European culture
and civilization.
However, it is a
prerequisite for the existence of this continent, which ultimately owes its
uniqueness to the diversity of its cultures, that it is unthinkable without the
presence of free and independent national states.
Each European
people may be convinced that it has made the greatest contribution to our
Western culture. On the whole, however, we would not wish to do without any of
what the separate peoples have given, and thus we do not wish to argue over the
value of their respective contributions. Rather, we must recognize that the
greatest achievements in the most diverse areas of human culture doubtless stem
from the rivalry between individual European accomplishments.
Therefore, although
we are willing to cooperate in this European world of culture as a free and
equal member, we are just as stubbornly determined to remain what we are.
In these three
years, I have again and again attempted-unfortunately all too often in vain-to
build a bridge of understanding to the people of France. The further we get from
the bitterness of the World War and the years that followed it, the more the
evil fades in human memory, and the more the better things of life, knowledge,
and experience advance to the fore.
Those who once
faced one another as bitter foes today honor each other as brave fighters in a
great struggle of the past, and once again recognize one another as responsible
for maintaining and upholding a great shared cultural inheritance.
Why should it not
be possible to terminate the futile, centuries-old strife which has not brought
either of the peoples a final settlement-and which never will-and replace it by
the consideration of a higher reason? The German Volk has no interest in seeing
the French suffer, and vice versa: how would France profit if Germany were to
come to ruin? What use is it to the French peasant if the German peasant fares
badly-or vice versa? Or what advantage does the French worker have from the
distress of the German worker? And what blessing could it hold for Germany, for
the German worker, the German Mittelstand, for the German Volk as a
whole, if France were to fall prey to misfortune? I have attempted to solve the
problems of a hate-filled theory of class conflict within Germany’s borders by
means of a higher reason, and I have been successful. Why should it not be
possible to remove the problem of the general European differences between
peoples and states from the sphere of irrationality and passion and to place it
in the calm light of a higher insight? In any case, I once swore to myself that
I would fight with persistence and bravery for German equality of rights and
make it a reality one way or another,63
but also
that I would strengthen the feeling of responsibility for the necessity of
mutual consideration and cooperation in Europe.
When today my
international opponents confront me with the fact that I refuse to practice this
cooperation with Russia, I must counter this assertion with the following: I
rejected and continue to reject this cooperation not with Russia, but with the
Bolshevism which lays claim to world rulership.
I am a German, I
love my Volk and am attached to it. I know that it can only be happy if allowed
to live in accordance with its nature and its way. The German Volk has been able
not only to cry, but also to laugh heartily all its life, and I do not want the
horror of the Communist international dictatorship of hatred to descend upon it.
I tremble for Europe at the thought of what would lie in store for our old,
heavily populated continent were the chaos of the Bolshevist revolution rendered
successful by the infiltrating force of this destructive Asiatic concept of the
world, which subverts all our established ideals. I am perhaps for many European
statesmen a fantastic, or at any rate uncomfortable, harbinger of warnings. That
I am regarded in the eyes of the international Bolshevist oppressors of the
world as one of their greatest enemies is for me a great honor and a
justification for my actions in the eyes of posterity.
I cannot prevent
other states from taking the paths they believe they must or at least believe
they can take, but I shall prevent Germany from taking this road to ruin. And I
believe that this ruin would come at that point at which the leadership of state
decides to stoop to become an ally at the service of such a destructive
doctrine.
I would see no
possibility of conveying in clear terms to the German worker the threatening
misfortune of Bolshevist chaos which so deeply troubles me were I myself, as
Fuhrer of the nation, to enter into close dealings with this very menace. As a
statesman and the Fuhrer of the Volk, I wish to also do myself all those things
I expect and demand from each of my Volksgenossen. I do not believe that
statesmen can profit from closer contact with a Weltanschauung which is the ruin
of any people.
In the past twenty
years of German history, we have had ample opportunity to gain experience in
this sector. Our initial contact with Bolshevism in the year 1917 brought us the
revolution one year later. The second encounter with it sufficed to put Germany
near the brink of a Communist collapse within but a few years’ time. I broke off
these relations and thus jerked Germany back from the verge of destruction.
Nothing can
persuade me to go any other way than that dictated by experience, insight and
foresight.
And I know that
this conviction has grown to become the most profound body of thought and ideas
for the entire National Socialist Movement. With persistent tenacity we shall
solve the social problems and tensions in our Volk by means of carrying on the
evolutionary process, thereby ensuring for ourselves the blessing of a peaceful
development from which all of our Volksgenossen will profit. And each of the
many new tasks we will encounter in this process will fill us with the joy of
those who are incapable of living without work and hence without a task to
perform.
When I apply this
basic attitude to European politics at large, I find that Europe is divided into
two halves: one comprised of self-sufficient and independent national states, of
peoples with whom we are linked a thousandfold by history and culture and with
whom we wish to continue to be linked for all time in the same manner as with
the free and self-sufficient nations of the non-European continents; and the
other governed by the very same intolerant Bolshevist doctrine claiming general
international supremacy, which even preaches the destruction of the immortal
values-sacred to us-of this world and the next, in order to built a different
world whose culture, exterior and content seem abhorrent to us. Except for the
given political and economic international relations, we do not wish to have any
closer contact with that.
It is infinitely
tragic that, in conclusion of our long years of sincerely endeavoring to obtain
the trust, sympathy and affection of the French people, a military alliance was
sealed, the beginning of which we know today, but-if Providence is not once
again more merciful than mankind deserves-the end of which will perhaps have
unforeseeable consequences. In the past three years I have endeavored to slowly
but surely establish the prerequisites for a German-French understanding. In
doing so, I have never left a single doubt that an absolute equality of rights
and thus the same legal status of the German Volk and State form part of the
prerequisites for such an understanding. I have consciously regarded this
understanding not only as a problem to be solved by means of pacts, but as a
problem which must first be brought home psychologically to the two peoples, for
it has to be prepared not only in mental, but also in emotional terms. Thus I
was often confronted with the reproach that my offers of friendship contained no
specific proposals. That is not correct.
I bravely and
explicitly proposed everything that could in any way possibly be proposed to
lessen the tension of German-French relations.
I did not hesitate
on one occasion to join a concrete arms proposal for a limit of 200,000 men.
When this proposal was abandoned by those responsible for drawing it up, I
approached the French people and the European Governments with a new, quite
specific proposal. This proposal for 300,000 men was also rejected. I have made
a whole series of further concrete proposals aimed at eliminating the poison
from public opinion in the individual states and at cleaning up methods of
warfare, and thus ultimately at a slow yet, therefore, sure reduction in arms.
Only one of these German proposals was given any real consideration. A British
Government’s sense of realism accepted my proposal for establishing a permanent
ratio between the German and English fleets, which both corresponds to the needs
of German security and, conversely, takes into account the enormous overseas
interests of a great world empire. I may also point out here that, to date, this
agreement has remained practically the only truly considerate and thus
successful attempt to limit arms. The Reich Government is willing to supplement
this treaty by a further qualitative agreement with England.
I have expressed
the very concrete principle that the collective programs of an international
Paktomanie have as little chance of becoming reality as the general
proposals for world disarmament which have been shown from the very onset to be
impracticable under such circumstances. In contrast, I have stressed that these
questions can only be approached step by step more specifically in that
direction from which there is presumably the least resistance. Based upon this
conviction, I have also developed the concrete proposal for an air pact grounded
on a parity of strength between France, England and Germany. The consequence was
that this proposal was initially ignored, and then a new
Eastern-European-Asiatic factor was introduced on the stage of European
equilibrium, the military ramifications of which are incalculable. Thus, for
long years I took the trouble to make concrete proposals, yet I do not hesitate
to state that the psychological preparation for the understanding has seemed
just as important to me as the so-called concrete proposals, and I have done
more in this area than any honest foreign statesman could ever have even hoped.
I removed the question of the everlasting revision of European borders from the
atmosphere of public discussion in Germany.64
Yet,
unfortunately, it is often held, and this applies particularly to foreign
statesmen, that this attitude and its actions are not of any particular
significance. I may point out that it would have been equally possible for me as
a German, in a moral sense, to place the restoration of the 1914 borders on my
program and to support this item in publications and oratory, just as the French
ministers and popular leaders did after 1871, for instance. My esteemed critics
would do better not to deny me any ability whatsoever in this sector.
It is much more
difficult for a National Socialist to persuade a Volk to come to an
understanding than to do the opposite. And for me it would probably have been
easier to whip up the instinct for revenge than to awaken and constantly amplify
a feeling for the necessity of a European understanding. And that is what I have
done. I have rid German public opinion of attacks of this sort against our
neighboring peoples.
I have removed from
the German press all animosity against the French people. I have endeavored to
awaken in our youth a sense for the ideal of such an understanding, and was
certainly not unsuccessful. When the French guests entered the Olympic Stadium
in Garmisch-Partenkirchen several weeks ago, they perhaps had an opportunity to
observe whether and to what extent I have been successful in bringing about this
inner conversion of the German Volk.
This inner
willingness to seek and find such an understanding is, however, more important
than clever attempts by statesmen to ensnare the world in a net of pacts obscure
as to both legal and factual content.
These efforts on my
part have, however, been twice as difficult because at the same time I was
forced to disentangle Germany from the web of a treaty which had robbed it of
its equality of rights and which the French people- whether rightly or wrongly
is secondary-believed it to be in their best interest to uphold. Being a German
nationalist, I above all was forced to make yet another particularly difficult
sacrifice for the German Volk in that context.
At least in modern
times, the attempt had not yet been made following a war to simply deny the
loser its sovereign rights over large and long-standing parts of its empire. It
was only in the interest of this understanding that I bore this, the most
difficult sacrifice we could be made to bear politically and morally, and had
intended to continue bearing it for the sole reason that I believed it was
necessary to abide by a treaty65
which could
perhaps contribute to eliminating the poison from the political atmosphere
between France and Germany and England and Germany and to spreading a feeling of
security on all sides.
Yes, beyond that I
have often-in this forum, too-upheld the standpoint that we are not only willing
to make this most difficult contribution to safeguarding peace in Europe as long
as the other partners fulfill their obligations; furthermore, we view this
treaty-because concrete-as the only possible attempt to safeguard Europe.
You, my Deputies,
are acquainted with the letter and spirit of this treaty.
It was to prevent
the use of force for all time between Belgium and France on the one hand and
Germany on the other. But unfortunately the treaties of alliance which France
had concluded at an earlier date presented the first obstacle, although this
obstacle did not contradict the essence of that Pact, namely, the Rhine Pact of
Locarno. Germany’s contribution to this Pact presented the greatest sacrifice,
for while France fortified its border with steel, cement and arms, and equipped
it with numerous garrisons, we were made to bear the burden of permanently
maintaining total defenselessness in the West.
We nonetheless
complied with this, too, in the hope of serving-by making that contribution, one
so difficult for a major power-the cause of European peace and promoting an
understanding between nations.
Now, this Pact is
in contradiction to the agreement France entered into last year with Russia
which has already been signed and just recently received the Chamber’s approval.
For, by virtue of this new Franco-Soviet agreement, the threatening military
power of a huge empire has been given access to Central Europe via the detour of
Czechoslovakia, which has signed a similar treaty with Russia. The incredible
thing in this context is that these two states have undertaken an obligation in
their treaty, regardless of any presently existing or anticipated rulings of the
Council of the League of Nations, to clarify the question of guilt in the event
of an Eastern-European complication at their own discretion and to thus consider
the obligation to render mutual assistance as given or not, as the case may be.
The claim that the
former obligation was canceled in this Pact by virtue of a supplemental
restriction is incomprehensible. I cannot in one context define a certain
procedure as a clear breach of obligations otherwise valid and hence thereby
assume that such procedure is binding, and in another context declare that no
action is to be taken which violates these other obligations. In such a case,
the first binding obligation would be unreasonable and thus make no sense.
But this is first
and foremost a political problem and is to be rated as such with all its weighty
significance.
France did not
conclude this treaty with any arbitrary European power.
Even prior to the
Rhine Pact, France had treaties of mutual assistance both with Czechoslovakia
and with Poland. Germany took no offense at this, not only because such pacts-in
contrast to the Franco-Soviet Pact-recognized the authority of rulings passed by
the League of Nations, but also because the Czechoslovakia of that time, and
particularly Poland as well, will always basically uphold a policy of
representing these states’ own national interests.
Germany has no
desire to attack these states and does not believe it will lie in the interest
of these states to prepare an offensive against Germany. But above all: Poland
will remain Poland, and France will remain France.
Soviet Russia, in
contrast, is the exponent of a revolutionary Weltanschauung organized as a
state. Its concept of the state is the creed of world revolution. It is not
possible to rule out that tomorrow or the day after, this Weltanschauung will
have conquered France as well. However, should this be the case-and as a German
statesman I must be prepared-then it is a certainty that this new Bolshevist
state would become a section in the Bolshevist International, which means that
the decision as to aggression or non-aggression will not be made by two separate
states according to their own objective judgment, but instead by directives
issuing from a single source. And in the event of such a development, this
source would no longer be Paris, but Moscow.
If only for mere
territorial reasons, Germany is not in a likely position to attack Russia,66
yet Russia
is all the more in a position to bring about a conflict with Germany at any time
via the detour of its advanced positions. Ascertaining the aggressor would then
be a foregone conclusion, for the decision would be independent of the findings
of the Council of the League of Nations.
Allegations or
objections that France and Russia would do nothing which might expose them to
sanctions-on the part of England or Italy-are immaterial, because one cannot
begin to gauge which type of sanctions might possibly be effective against such
an overwhelming construction so unified in both weltanschaulich and
military terms.
For many years we
anxiously warned of such a development, not only because we have more to fear
from it than others, but because it may one day bring with it dire consequences
for the whole of Europe, if one attempts to dismiss these, our most serious
apprehensions, by citing the unfinished state of the Russian instrument of war,
or even its unwieldiness and unfitness for deployment in a European war. We have
always combated this view, not because we are somehow of the conviction that the
German is inherently inferior, but because we all know that numbers, too, have
their own weight. We are all the more grateful that M. Herriot67
has just
enlightened the French Chamber as to Russia’s aggressive-military significance.
We know that M.
Herriot’s
information was given to him by the Soviet Government itself, and we are certain
that this party cannot have supplied the spiritual inspirer of the new alliance
in France with false propaganda; we similarly do not doubt that M.
Herriot has given a
true account of this information. Yet according to this information, it is a
fact that the Russian army has a peacetime strength of 1,350,000 men; that
secondly, it has a total of 17,500,000 men ready for war and in the reserves;
that thirdly, it is equipped with the largest tank weaponry; and fourthly, that
it supports the largest air force in the world.
Introducing this
enormous military factor-which was described as being excellent in terms of its
mobility and leadership as well as ready for action at any time-onto the Central
European stage will destroy any genuine European equilibrium. This will
furthermore present an obstacle to any possibility of estimating what means of
defense on land and in the air are necessary for the European states involved,
and particularly for the sole country targeted as an opponent: Germany.
This gigantic
mobilization of the East against Central Europe contradicts not only the letter,
but above all the spirit of the Locarno Pact. We are not alone in feeling this
because we are directly involved; rather, this view thrives among innumerable
intelligent men of all nations and has been openly upheld everywhere, as has
been documented in publications and politics.
On February 21, a
French journalist68
approached
me with the request that I grant him an interview. Because I had been told that
the person in question was one of those very Frenchmen who, like ourselves, is
endeavoring to find ways of arriving at an understanding between our two
peoples, I was all the less inclined to refuse, particularly since such an
action would have instantly been interpreted as an indication of my lack of
respect toward French journalism. I provided the desired information, just as I
have openly given it in Germany hundreds and thousands of times, and I once more
attempted to address the French people with a plea for the understanding to
which we are dedicated with all our hearts and which we would so dearly like to
see become reality. At the same time, however, I did express my deep regret as
regards the threatening developments in France brought about by the conclusion
of a pact for which, in our opinion, there was no conceivable necessity, yet
which, were it to come into being, by necessity, would create a new state of
affairs. As you all know, this interview was held back for reasons unknown to us
and was not published until the day after ratification in the French Chamber.
As much as I will
continue in the future to be ready and sincerely willing, as I stated in that
interview, to promote this German-French understanding-for I see in it a
necessary factor in safeguarding Europe from immeasurable dangers and because I
do not expect and indeed am incapable of even perceiving any advantages
whatsoever for the two peoples from any other course of behavior; while I do,
however, perceive the gravest general and international dangers-I was all the
more compelled by the knowledge of the final signing of this Pact to enter into
a review of the new situation thus created and to draw the necessary
conclusions.
These conclusions
are of an extremely grave nature, and they fill us and myself personally with a
bitter regret. However, I am obligated not only to make sacrifices for the sake
of European understanding, but also to bow to the interests of my own Volk.
As long as a
sacrifice meets with appreciation and understanding on the part of the
opposition, I will gladly pursue that sacrifice and recommend to the German Volk
that it do the same. Yet as soon as it becomes evident that a partner no longer
values or appreciates this sacrifice, this must result in a onesided burden for
Germany and hence in a discrimination we cannot tolerate. In this historic hour
and within these walls, however, I would like to repeat what I stated in my
first major speech before the Reichstag in May 1933: The German Volk would
rather undergo any amount of suffering and distress than abandon the precept of
honor and the will to freedom and equality of rights.
If the German Volk
is to be of any value to European cooperation, it can be of value only as an
honor-loving and hence equal partner. As soon as it ceases to be valuable in
terms of this integrity, it becomes worthless in objective terms as well. I
would not like to deceive ourselves or the rest of the world with a Volk which
would then be completely without value, for it would lack the essentially
natural feeling of honor.
I also believe,
however, that even in the hour of such a bitter realization and grave decision,
in spite of everything, one must not refrain from supporting European
cooperation all the more and from seeking new ways to make it possible to solve
these problems in a manner beneficial to all.
Thus I have
continued my endeavors to express in specific proposals the feelings of the
German Volk which is concerned for its security and willing to make any
sacrifice for the sake of its freedom, but is likewise willing at all times to
take part in a truly sincere and equally-valued European cooperation.
After a difficult
inner struggle, I have hence decided on behalf of the German Reich Government to
have the following Memorandum submitted to the French Government and the other
signatories of the Locarno Pact: Memorandum Immediately after the Pact between
France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which was signed on May 2,
1935 became public, the German Government drew the attention of the Governments
of the other signatory powers of the Rhine Pact of Locarno to the fact that the
obligations which France assumed in the new Pact are not compatible with its
obligations according to the Rhine Pact. At that time, the German Government
submitted full legal and political justification for its standpoint: in legal
terms in the German Memorandum dated May 25, 1935, and in political terms in the
numerous diplomatic talks which followed in the wake of this Memorandum.
The Governments
concerned are also aware that neither their written responses to the German
Memorandum nor the arguments they brought forth via diplomatic channels or in
public statements were able to discount the standpoint of the German Government.
In fact, the entire
diplomatic and public discussion which has ensued since May 1935 on these
questions has served merely to confirm every aspect of the position the German
Government has taken from the very beginning.
1. It is an
uncontested fact that the Franco-Soviet Agreement is directed exclusively
against Germany.
2. It is an
uncontested fact that, under the terms of this Agreement, France will undertake
obligations in the event of a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union
which far exceed its duty pursuant to the Covenant of the League of Nations and
which force it to take military action against Germany even if it can cite as
grounds for such action neither a recommendation nor even an existing decision
of the Council of the League of Nations.
3. It is an
uncontested fact that, in such event, France will also be claiming for itself
the right to decide at its own discretion who is the aggressor.
4. Thus it is
established that France has entered into obligations vis-a-vis the Soviet Union
which, in practice, are tantamount to its acting as though neither the Covenant
of the League of Nations nor the Rhine Pact, which rests on such Covenant, were
in effect.
This consequence of
the Franco-Soviet Pact is not canceled out by the fact that France has therein
made the reservation not to be under obligation to take military action against
Germany if, by doing so, it were to expose itself to sanctions on the part of
the Guarantor Powers Italy and Great Britain. Despite this reservation, however,
what remains decisive is the fact that the Rhine Pact is based not only upon
guarantees on the part of Great Britain and Italy, but primarily on the
obligations governing the relations between France and Germany. Thus the sole
question is whether France has remained within those limits imposed upon it by
the Rhine Pact in regard to its relations with Germany when assuming these
treaty obligations.
And the German
Government must answer this question in the negative.
The Rhine Pact was
intended to accomplish the goal of securing peace in Western Europe, in that
Germany on the one hand and France and Belgium on the other were to renounce for
all time the use of military force in their relations with one another. If
specific exceptions to this renunciation of war extending beyond the right of
self-defense were allowed at the conclusion of this Pact, the sole political
reason lay, as was generally known, in the fact that France had earlier
undertaken certain alliance obligations toward Poland and Czechoslovakia which
it was not willing to sacrifice for the idea of unconditionally securing peace
in the West. With a clear conscience, Germany decided to accept these
limitations on the renunciation of war. It made no objection to the agreements
with Poland and Czechoslovakia which France’s representative presented at
Locarno, acting as it did under the obvious condition that these agreements were
in line with the layout of the Rhine Pact and contained no provisions whatsoever
on the implementation of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations
such as those contained in the new Franco-Soviet agreements.
This also
corresponded to the contents of such special agreements as disclosed to the
German Government at that time. The exceptions allowed for in the Rhine Pact are
not, however, explicitly worded so as to apply only to Poland and
Czechoslovakia, but are rather formulated in the abstract. Yet it was the aim of
all respective negotiations to merely bring about a balance between the
German-French renunciation of war and France’s desire to maintain the alliance
obligations it had already undertaken.
If France now
attempts to draw an advantage from the abstract wording of the possibilities of
war allowed pursuant to the Rhine Pact in order to conclude a new alliance
against Germany with a state heavily armed with military weapons; if it chooses
to continue, in such a decisive fashion, to impose limits on the renunciation of
war stipulated between itself and Germany; and if, in the process, it does not
even confine itself to the established formal legal limitations, as stated
above, it has ultimately created a completely new situation and destroyed-in
both spirit and fact-the political system of the Rhine Pact.
The most recent
debates and resolutions of the French Parliament have shown that France is
determined-notwithstanding Germany’s standpoint-to definitely put the Pact with
the Soviet Union into effect; talks on the diplomatic level have even revealed
that France already regards itself as bound to the Pact by virtue of having
signed it on May 2, 1935. However, faced with such a development in European
politics, the German Reich Government cannot stand idle unless it wishes to
abandon or betray the interests of the German Volk duly entrusted to it.
In negotiations in
recent years, the German Government has consistently stressed that it intended
to abide by and fulfill all of the obligations arising from the Rhine Pact as
long as the other contracting parties were willing, on their part, to stand by
this Pact. This obvious condition can no longer be deemed to exist as regards
France. France responded to Germany’s repeated friendly advances and assurances
of peace by violating the Rhine Pact by virtue of a military alliance with the
Soviet Union directed exclusively against Germany.
Hence the Rhine
Pact of Locarno has lost its inherent meaning and ceased, in a practical sense,
to exist. As a consequence, Germany no longer views itself as bound for its part
to this lapsed Pact. The German Government is now compelled to react to the new
situation created by this alliance, a situation aggravated by the fact that the
Franco-Soviet Agreement has been supplemented by a treaty of alliance between
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union with arrangements which are exactly
parallel. In the interest of the primal right of a people to safeguard its
borders and maintain its possibilities of defense, the German Reich Government
has today re-established the full and unlimited sovereignty of the Reich in the
demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.
However, in order
to prevent any misinterpretation of its intentions and to erase any doubt as to
the purely defensive character of these measures, as well as to lend emphasis to
its eternally given yearning for a true pacification of Europe between states
enjoying equal rights and equal respect, the German Reich Government declares
its willingness to assent to the following proposals for new agreements towards
establishing a system for securing peace in Europe:
1. The German Reich
Government declares its willingness to immediately enter into negotiations with
France and Belgium concerning the formation of a mutually demilitarized zone and
to give its consent to such a proposal from the very beginning, regardless of
extent and effects, under the condition, however, of complete parity.
2. The German Reich
Government proposes that for the purpose of ensuring the intactness and
inviolability of the borders in the West, a nonaggression pact be concluded
between Germany, France and Belgium, whereby it is willing to fix the term of
same at twenty-five years.
3. The German Reich
Government desires to invite England and Italy to sign this treaty as Guarantor
Powers.
4. The German Reich
Government agrees, in the event that the Royal Dutch Government so desires, and
the other contracting parties hold it to be fitting, that the Netherlands be
included in this treaty system.
5. The German Reich
Government is willing to conclude an air pact as a further reinforcement of
these security arrangements between the Western Powers which shall suffice to
effectively and automatically ban the risk of unexpected air attacks.
6. The German Reich
Government repeats its offer to conclude nonaggression pacts with the states
bordering Germany to the East such as that with Poland. Due to the fact that the
Lithuanian Government has made a certain correction in its position regarding
the Memel territory within the past months, the German Reich Government
withdraws the exception it was once compelled to make as regards Lithuania and
declares its willingness, under the condition of an effective development of the
guaranteed autonomy for the Memel territory, to sign such a non-aggression pact
with Lithuania as well.
7. Now that final
equality of rights has been achieved for Germany and its complete sovereignty
over the entire German Reich territory has been restored, the German Reich
Government regards the main reason for its earlier withdrawal from the League of
Nations as having been remedied. Thus it is willing to once more join the League
of Nations. In this context, it may state that it anticipates that, within the
course of an appropriate period, both the question of colonial equality of
rights and the question of separating the Covenant of the League of Nations from
its Versailles foundation will be settled by way of amicable negotiations.
Men, Deputies of
the German Reichstag! In this historic hour when German troops are presently
occupying their future garrisons of peace in the Reich’s western provinces, may
we all join together to stand by two sacred, inner vows: First, to the oath that
we shall never yield to any power or any force in restoring the honor of our
Volk and would rather perish honorably from the gravest distress than ever
capitulate before it.
Secondly, to the
vow that now more than ever shall we dedicate ourselves to achieving an
understanding between the peoples of Europe and particularly an understanding
with our Western peoples and neighbors. After three years, I believe that today
the struggle for German equality of rights can be deemed concluded.
I believe that the
initial reason for our earlier withdrawal from a collective European cooperation
has now ceased to exist. If we are now, therefore, once more willing to return
to this cooperation, we are doing so with the sincere desire that these events
and a retrospective on those years will aid us in cultivating a deeper
understanding of this cooperation among other European peoples as well. We have
no territorial claims to make in Europe. Above all, we are aware that all the
tensions resulting either from erroneous territorial provisions or from the
disproportion between the size of a population and its Lebensraum can never be
solved by wars in Europe. However, we do hope that human insight will help to
alleviate the painfulness of this state of affairs and relieve tensions by means
of a gradual evolutionary development marked by peaceful cooperation.
Specifically, I
sense today above all the necessity to honor those obligations imposed upon us
by the national honor and freedom we have regained, obligations not only to our
own Volk, but to the other European states as well.
Hence at this time
I would like to recall to the minds of European statesmen the thoughts I
expressed in the thirteen points of my last speech here with the assurance that
we Germans are gladly willing to do everything possible and necessary toward
putting these very realistic ideals into practice.
My Party Comrades!
For three years now I have headed the Government of the German Reich and thus
the German Volk. Great are the achievements which Providence has allowed me to
accomplish for our Vaterland these three years. In every area of our national,
political, and economic life, our position has improved. Yet today I may also
confess that, for me, this time was accompanied by numerous cares, countless
sleepless nights and days filled with work. I was only able to do all this
because I have never regarded myself as a dictator of my Volk, but always as its
Fuhrer alone and thus as its agent. In the past, I fought for the inner approval
of the German Volk for my ideals for fourteen years, and then by virtue of its
trust, I was appointed by the venerable Field Marshal. But since then I have
drawn all my energy solely from the happy consciousness of being inseparably
bound up with my Volk as a man and as Fuhrer. I cannot close this historic
period, in which the honor and freedom of my Volk have been restored, without
now asking the German Volk to grant to me-and hence to all my co-workers and
co-fighters-in retrospect their approval for everything I have had to do during
those years in the way of making decisions that often appeared stubborn, in
carrying out harsh measures, and in demanding difficult sacrifices.
Therefore, I have come to the decision to dissolve the German Reichstag today so
that the German Volk may pass its judgment on my leadership and that of my
co-workers. In these three years, Germany has regained once more its honor,
found once more a faith, overcome its greatest economic crisis, and ushered in a
new cultural ascent. I believe I can say this as my conscience and God are my
witnesses. I now ask the German Volk to strengthen me in my belief and to
continue giving me, through the power of its will, power of my own to take a
courageous stand at all times for its honor and freedom and to ensure its
economic well-being; above all, to support me in my struggle for real peace.
