Monday, 17 August 2026

German-German Authority

Source: SS Leitheft, No. 2, 1939

 

The destiny of a people is linked to the greatness and worth of its ruling class. In it is expressed the revolutionary power of courage, will and aspiration. The laws on which it depends, which govern its actions, are timeless and eternally valid. Only men who love risk and danger, its tireless promoters, are called to be leaders; they never lose the creative fever, put on their helmets after every victory and constantly seek out more difficult and more attractive tests in new battles. In the past, the history of our nation was shaped by these forces. Periods of weakness and historical emptiness for our people reigned when they failed and with them this courageous spirit. But after this decadence, and long before the popular force withered away in a desolate renunciation, the nation was taken in hand by a strong leader, straightened by a new will. The history of our people is the history of its leaders. Whoever wants to understand it and learn from it must go back to its sources.

 

The association of all popular forces and their coming together to serve a higher community based on the idea of a ruling class and a troop, are not inventions of National Socialist ideology, arising after the period of political impotence and internal fragmentation of the post-war period. Rather, it resurrected them. For the notion of the leader is an essential component of the nature of German-German man. It is, so to speak, an inherent law of the blood, a vital expression of the racial essence that aspires to order in the community and corresponds to the innermost need to commit one’s life to a cause or a work. It gives meaning to the life of the individual only within the group and enables him or her, as part of the community, to put national values to work in a creative sense. Without the organic unity of leaders and troops, no national and social achievement on the part of the Germanic people could be expected, even in the past. All periods of national expansion found at their head those figures whom we can look upon with pride and admiration. But their achievement was always based on a voluntary and faithful recognition of their ability to lead the community.

 

Elite chefs

 

Every genuine ruling class in the German-German spirit has risen from the bottom, from the people, to the top, and this by force of personality, by its predispositions and worth. This natural selective process goes back a long way in the recent history of our people and corresponds to the political concept of the Germanic peasantry, from the individual and his economy to the community, extending in ever-widening circles to the peoples and ethnic groups. The intelligence of an organic interplay between all the forces present in the organised community blocks that arose from daily needs was aroused by the particularity of the peasant farm in which all members work together. Like the peasant leading the farm, which is part of a whole, a chief was at the head of larger communities and popular groups, concentrating all units on the basis of voluntary subordination. However, the will of the chief did not influence the communal order; only the autonomy of the free members was decisive. The people had all the rights, the chief had no legal power of his own. He was a mere delegate of the people and had duties to fulfil towards his group.

 

The choice or acceptance of the Germanic leader was based on his origin and personal worth. The Germanic man considered that his ability to lead the community came from the quality of his blood, the clan from which he came. To this racial selection was added the judgement of personality: what the racial origin promised in virtue, character and value of the individual, was valued in his achievements and its approval was made by the clan and the community. It was according to these two principles that Germanic men co-opted their leaders. It has been rightly said that Germanic life was a ‘man evaluation’ where aptitude and deeds were judged reciprocally in order to identify the best in the community. Only the best, noblest, bravest and proudest could be elected as chief, the first of all.

 

The leader and the troop

 

The Germanic ruler did not rule over subjects. His relationship was based on a faithful alliance and a pact of assistance between free men and equals in rights; this pact was established on a voluntary feeling, dignity, love of freedom, pride and a sense of responsibility. All rights and duties between the leader and the troop were reciprocal and determined by purely practical, legal, economic and political aspects of life, thus giving rise to a high moral standard. The leader saw his troop’s right as his own, his distress as his own, and his honour and fame as his own, and his affront or outrage as that of the whole troop. “On the battlefield,” wrote the Roman writer Tacitus in his Germania, “it is a shame for the leader to be defeated in courage, it is a shame for the companions not to match the courage of the leader. But above all it is a blight on one’s life and a disgrace to have returned from a battle in which one’s leader has perished; to defend him, to save him, to bring to his glory his own exploits, is the essence of their commitment: the leaders fight for victory, the companions for their leader.”

 

The clan held the source of earthly life, which was fed by the hereditary position indissolubly linked to the lineage. The product of the field, the Odal, was the lifeblood of every legitimate Germanic man, chief and trooper alike. Since the ethnic communities consisted solely of peasants, the peasant chiefs were also chiefs of peoples. Neither the confrontation with the Roman world and the troubles of the great migrations, nor the glory and joy of battle destroyed the peasant roots of the Germans. Their aim was to preserve the freedom of the home and the land at all costs, to protect the work and effort of the peasants. When Bojokal, the leader of the Angrivarians, met the Roman monarchs with the intention of finding land, he spoke out, looking up at the sun with his arms raised: “As the sky is given to the gods, so is the earth given to mankind, and any land that is abandoned must become someone’s possession. The Roman legate was mistaken about the legitimate request of the Angrivarians: he only wanted to give the arable land to their chief, with the intention of making him an ally. However, Bojokal refused such an absurdity, ‘as a token of treason’, saying: ‘We may lack the land to live, but not to die’. The loyalty of the Germanic leader bound to his troop for better or for worse was expressed in this attitude, and he preferred death to accepting an advantage of which his people were to be deprived.

 

Sense of freedom

 

The names of the great Germanic leaders and their political deeds are unforgettable. The words of Hermann the Cheruscan express how strong their ethnic consciousness was: "If they (the Germans) preferred the fatherland, the ancestors and the ancient customs to the despots and the new Roman colonies, then they had to follow him as their leader to gain fame and freedom. And when he later met his brother Flavus (the fair-haired one), who had joined the Romans, he laughed at “the low reward for his servitude” and spoke of “the sacred rights of the fatherland which they inherited from their ancestors”. The dignity and statesmanship with which Ariovistus, the Germanic leader, confronted Caesar’s general-in-chief is exemplary: ’I do not dictate to the Roman people how they should use their right. If Caesar declares that he will not consider the hostility of the Aedui without reacting, then he must know: no one has yet fought with me without falling. If Caesar feels like it, he can fight: he will see that the invincible Germans are heroes. These words express the same nationalistic pride as the Fiihrer’s speech at Wilhelmshaven on the policy of insolent English interference in matters of German life and territory.

 

Although the Germanic state idea lacked a solid external framework— the concept of borders—and was thus deprived of a homogeneous strike force, it was distinguished by an elaborate justice and a good structure. The extension of the communal order to several tribes and peoples depended even more on the ability of the individual chieftain to create a state than on kinship. Thus, the Roman historiographer Velleius Paterculus reports that Marbod, the chief of the Marcomans, ’did not gain power among his countrymen by a coup de force or the favour of fate; after strongly consolidating his empire, he took the royal power and then brought his people out of the Roman sphere of influence. As some peoples had yielded to the superiority of arms, he decided instead to advance where he could enhance his personal power. He took possession of the ... fields surrounded by the Hercynian forest ... and subdued the whole neighbourhood by war or treaty. Under his authority, the mass of those who protected his Empire and who had almost acquired through constant training the strong structure of Roman military discipline, reached in a short time a great level of development, dangerous for our (Roman) Empire.

 

But when Marbod turned from an ethnic and peasant leader into a stubborn ruler and allied himself with the Romans ‘to increase their tyranny’, his proud Marcan Empire went to war with the Cheruscians fighting ‘for their old fame and soon recovered freedom’. Tacitus tells us (Annals II): The strength of the two peoples, the worth of their chiefs were equal, but the title of king made those of Marbod odious, while Armin (Hermann) won all the favours as a freedom fighter’. The resistance of the people was not against kingship per se, which is a Germanic form of expression, but only against the abuses of royal power, and for this reason most of Marbod’s troops went over to his enemy Hermann in order to fight under his command for their ancient right and freedom. Throughout the Germanic period and into the Middle Ages, there were uprisings led by the ruling class united with the people against rulers who were considered degenerate because they no longer wanted to be leaders of the people, the first of all, but masters of their subjects and thus muzzle the old order and freedom. Julius Civilis, the leader of the Batavians, expressed this feeling of Germanic freedom in these words: “May Syria, Asia Minor and the East which have been won over to the king, remain in their servitude: in Gaul there are still many people who were born before a tribute was imposed on the country ... nature gives dumb animals a sense of freedom. On the other hand, virile virtue is the hallmark of the human race. And the gods are favourable to him who has the greatest courage. (Josephus, Bell. Jud. IV).

 

Example and attitude

 

The framework of the Germanic communal order only appeared in extraordinary events. It was most evident in external political events, colonisations and warlike expeditions. The tasks of the leader then went far beyond those of everyday life and, in addition to courage and bravery, required a special political skill, intelligence and prudence. In the national assemblies, the most worthy of the innumerable small tribal chiefs was raised to the podium. “Kings are chosen according to their nobility, chiefs according to their courage,” reports Tacitus, “but the power of kings is not unlimited or arbitrary, and chiefs, by example more than by authority, if they have decision, if they attract attention, if they fight in front of the front, impose themselves by admiration.”

 

In war as in peace, the Germanic leader was an example of valour and action. When his competence was tested in turbulent and battle-filled times, the troops closed ranks around him and demanded that he express his sense of duty unreservedly to the death. The sovereign power of the leader was not, however, unlimited; a higher right only implied greater duties. The man in the troop owed less obedience than loyalty to his leader. This was the bond, the basis of the relationship of mutual responsibility. If the leader betrayed, he lost the right to obedience of his troop, for the German- German man owes obedience only as long as loyalty demands it. Despotism and blind obedience are alien to him.

 

The purely human relationship between leader and troop is only healthy and natural when it is determined by friendship and comradeship and does not violate the natural distance conditioned by value and its respect. But it would be a mistake to confuse this distance from the troop by any true leader with a lack of comradeship. The lack of distance and the crude familiarity also exclude any notion of authority; the person in this position is an individual among others. The leader must share joys and sorrows with his troop in good times and bad, be one with them in prosperity and misfortune. He must, however, constantly maintain his dignity, be an example in the best sense, prevent excesses and outbursts, keep a sense of proportion and respect good morals. These qualities are a manifestation of the nature of the German-German man, especially of the peasant, who can only maintain his authority over the members and subordinates with whom he closely cohabits under one roof by means of distance, power and dignity. In a genuine ruling class, the feeling of distance reflects the living heritage of Germanic blood. It must not be lost under any circumstances and forbids even the display of emotions before the troops.

 

A genuine German-German legal community is characterised by the participation of the entire free people in political life and by the small social gap between the leaders and the people. The extension of this elementary principle is revealed today in the naturalness of our National Socialist state system, whose internal structure is based on the clear recognition of our particularity. When the Nordic peasant Aki replies to his king in the Heimskringla: “If I am your man, king, then you are also mine”, he is expressing what we still feel today, namely that the relationship between leader and troop is based on the mutual duty of loyalty and assistance.

 

Peaceful missions

 

The Germanic ruling class not only participated effectively in war and combat, but also influenced the peace of the homeland, law and civility, honour, calm, order and prosperity. It still lacked an external framework at that time, for ‘during peace’, says Caesar (B. G. VI), ‘there is no common authority, but the chiefs of the tribes of the provinces and districts discuss with their people, law and benign quarrels...’. The fact that these chiefs of small communities belonged to noble racial communities or that they were large free peasants determines in an essential way their peculiarities and their tasks. In the old Norse texts, they are all generally referred to as tribal or clan chiefs, ‘the first of the region’ or ‘the ruler of the province’, in contrast to their troop of Thing people’. Such Thing communities constituted legal and administrative units; their chiefs were considered ‘the first of all’ on the basis of their origin, achievements, and honourability, and formed the supporting pillar of the political order and community structure. This relationship between the Thing and the ruling class at the origin of the political order of the community can best be defined as a happy connection between a democratic (popular sovereignty) and an aristocratic (noble sovereignty) principle.

 

Apart from this military authority in war, the tasks of the Germanic leader extended to the exercise of religious faith, the safeguarding of law and administration. As a leader, the chief was also the one most entitled to perform religious ceremonies in public and in the community and to preside over the great cultural festivals. For the ruling class touched on all areas of life that still formed a whole, such as faith, morals and law. The knowledge of the sacred was not monopolised by wizards but was the common property of all, and the acts of consecration were performed both by each peasant in his own community and by the chief of the Thing.

 

As regards the safeguarding of law, the chief only had the power to practice the right of assembly, the calling and holding of the Thing Assembly. He had little influence on jurisprudence itself, for pronouncing, enacting law and making laws was the business of the Thing assembly. “Then the king or the chief,” says Tacitus, “each according to his age, according to his nobility, according to the glory of his campaigns, according to his eloquence, make themselves heard by the ascendancy of persuasion rather than by virtue of their power to command. If the advice has been displeased, they reject it with murmurs; if it has pleased, they stir up their frames: the most honourable assent is praise with arms.” Only his great legal knowledge enabled the chief to assert himself, to safeguard the rights of his Thing people and to guarantee their protection. In the old Norse texts, the emphasis is on knowledge of the law, for example in the Njala: “There was a man named Mord ... a powerful tribal chief and a great legal adviser, so learned in the law that no judgement was considered lawful unless he attended it” “Skapti and his father were great tribal chiefs and great scholars of the law.”

 

Legal knowledge, helpfulness, righteousness and insight were as valuable as warlike fame. At a time when there were no treaties and no neutral jurisdiction, but only self-defence and the law of the quarrel, they were the best instrument at the disposal of the chieftain to settle problems peacefully and to maintain the community order through honourable agreements and arbitration. The words of the great Nordic legal chief Njal express the importance attached to keeping the law and laws to ensure peace: “Our country is built by law, but devastated by lawlessness.

 

The Germanic people voluntarily placed themselves under the protection and authority of the chief; they looked to him for friendly help, not only in words and advice, but also for energetic social support when they suffered from bad harvests and old nuisances. In the Nordic sagas, the generous chief is referred to as ‘the most beloved man in the region’ or as ‘one of the noblest of the pagan era’. The human relationship between the chief and the troop was a pact of assistance that was driven by a genuine spirit of comradeship and imposed on the first man in the community a sense of duty to help when misery struck. “It is customary,” says Tacitus, “for the cities, by voluntary and individual contributions, to offer to the chiefs large cattle and wheat, which, received as a tribute, provides for their needs.” The chief received as much as he gave; the gifts made to him were considered cooperative capital for the relief he distributed in a patriarchal manner. For the troop man, his contributions were voluntary, he provided the chief with no imposed services or contributions but with friendly help and gifts as is customary between free and equal men.

 

The law of honour

 

The Germanic ruling class was not only concerned with the ‘leadership of the province’, the legal order and administration on an external level, but also with the definition of morality. The laws that were generally recognised as moral values were the foundation. The supreme moral law was ‘life with honour’, to which the ruler was even more strongly bound than any other. For the man of the old Germanic period, honour was of decisive importance, enabling him to judge the value of his life and his character. At the level of public judgement honour was also the proof of one’s ability and value to the community. On honour depended the individual’s self-esteem and commitment, the consciousness of his own worth. It determined his authority as well as his political and social position. It related to personal pride as well as to public judgement and was generally regarded as the recognised law governing human life and by which judgement was made.

 

The community felt it had a mandate as a judge to apply the law of honour to the chief. The latter had to prove his honourability and defend it. For the honour of the chief was also the honour of the troop. If a citizen’s honour or his own was damaged, then so was that of the whole community, and everyone had a duty to clear it up. The leader displayed a sense of honour, an extreme virtue before the troop and exerted his moral influence on the community. These moral values included heroic attitude, bravery and self-assertion, sense of dignity, individual and community responsibility, unconditional fulfilment of duty to the community relying on him. Apart from this, other particular virtues of the leader were celebrated such as magnanimity, generosity, generosity and constant dedication to support in deed and word those who need help.

 

All these qualities and virtues of leadership are not exclusive to one era. They do not only characterise the internal community structure of our

 

Germanic ancestors, but also constantly determine the nature of the authentic, mainly Nordic ruling class. To participate in them, to emulate them, is for us the noblest action, for there is always a lack of leaders, of men who cannot live without a goal and a struggle, without the desire and the fever for action, men who are inhabited by a creative force and whose self-control calls them to lead others.

 

Our generation is alone in the fleeting present. We must learn again to know the laws of life most characteristic of our popular existence, which was denied us by the direct route of natural transmission. The recent past up to the outbreak of the Great War shows us only satisfied and softened generations who manifested their own lack of culture and participated from afar in the struggle. We cannot draw any strength from the emptiness of their existence because we are now on the threshold of a new world. We have to look for a virgin path and walk with courage in the darkness of the future. We must find our own scale of values in the untroubled source of our history, in ancient Germanic history, and choose the models of its fighters and leaders to guide our dangerous existence. We are an awakened and creative generation that cannot live without its historical ties and its brothers from the past.

 

He who today claims to lead, must know what was the origin of the ruling class in the course of history, must be aware of the great duties he has to fulfil at all levels, towards the past and the future. He must beware of the spirit of complacency and be filled with a fiery Germanic pride that overcomes and breaks down all obstacles.

 

Edmund Weber

Wednesday, 12 August 2026

Die Deutsche Wochenschau – Newsreel No. 655, 24 March 1943


1. Germany.

 

A day of mourning in Berlin, dedicated to the memory of soldiers who fell on the Eastern Front.

 

The Führer arrives at the Arsenal building, where he is met by Göring.

 

– Adolf Hitler steps out of the car and greets Field Marshal Keitel, Rear Admiral Dönitz, Reichsführer-SS Himmler, Field Marshal von Bock and Field Marshal Milch.

 

A solemn gathering.

 

– Adolf Hitler, Göring, Keitel and others are seated.

 

A symphony orchestra performs Beethoven’s 7th Symphony.

 

– Adolf Hitler’s speech (narrated by the commentator) on the treacherous plans of Bolshevism and the merits of German soldiers.

 

The Führer leaves the Arsenal building; on the steps, the Commandant of Berlin, Lieutenant General Paul von Hase, approaches him with a report.

 

On the right flank, a guard of honour with 30 banners of the old army and navy and 30 new Wehrmacht banners.

 

A military parade, with the Führer inspecting the ranks of soldiers and sailors.

 

– Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring.

 

– Adolf Hitler visits the pantheon tomb of the fallen heroes.

 

Four recipients of the Knight’s Cross lay a wreath on behalf of the Führer in the pantheon.

 

Bowed banners.

 

Berliners with their arms outstretched in the German salute.

 

The Führer greets the wounded and disabled veterans of the First and Second World Wars, shaking hands and speaking with them.

 

Disabled veterans in wheelchairs.

 

The ceremonial march of the honour guard company.

 

Standard-bearers.

 

Weapons of the Wehrmacht and sailors marching past.

 

– Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring reviewing the parade.

 

2. The Atlantic.

 

A German submarine in the northern part of the ocean during a storm.

 

This submarine belongs to a flotilla deployed against a large British transport convoy.

 

The crew on deck in waterproof overalls.

 

Huge waves.

 

The lookout.

 

Alarm on the submarine.

 

The crew take up their positions according to the battle station order.

 

The crew’s actions.

 

Diving.

 

The commander observes through the periscope.

 

The periscope is retracted.

 

The submarine evades the enemy destroyer.

 

A depth charge explosion.

 

Damage to the electrical wiring.

 

Assessing the damage.

 

Restoring the electrical system.

 

The commander at the periscope.

 

The submarine fires a torpedo.

 

The submarine surfaces.

 

The sinking of an enemy vessel.

 

A German submarine.

 

The sinking of an enemy vessel.

 

3. Greece.

 

The deployment of additional Wehrmacht units to Greece.

 

German tanks on the streets of Athens.

 

Tanks.

 

Artillery.

 

Tanks and other military equipment being loaded for dispatch to the islands.

 

A naval transport ship sets sail for the island of Crete.

 

Escort destroyers.

 

A German convoy at sea.

 

4. Crete.

 

A view of the island.

 

Construction of coastal defences.

 

A German artillery battery.

 

An airfield.

 

Pilots boarding an aeroplane.

 

Aeroplanes taking off.

 

5. The USSR. The Battle of Kharkiv.

 

Tanks and motorised units of the Waffen-SS advance through the snow towards Kharkiv, where the Bolsheviks have taken up defensive positions.

 

Tanks and motorised infantry launch an attack on one of the settlements near Kharkiv.

 

A firefight ensues with Soviet troops.

 

Tanks advance.

 

Infantrymen carrying the German flag.

 

A motorcyclist rides up to a tank and receives a parcel.

 

Following a sudden thaw, the roads have turned into quagmires.

 

Motorcycles ride along a waterlogged road.

 

Anti-aircraft batteries are clearing the approaches to the city.

 

German infantrymen on the attack.

 

German troops storm the city from the north and east.

 

Germans in the suburbs of Kharkiv.

 

Scenes of street fighting.

 

German machine-gunners and artillery are firing.

 

Wounded Soviet soldiers in a barracks, abandoned by retreating Soviet units.

 

The Germans in the city; soldiers resting after the battle, eating.

 

Fritz Witt, recipient of the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and commander of a motorised regiment, talks to a scout in camouflage uniform whilst looking at a map.

 

German tanks and infantry on the streets of Kharkiv.

 

Soldiers march past the park’s fence.

 

Street fighting continues throughout the day.

 

Almost every house has to be stormed following artillery preparation.

 

Burning buildings.

 

Soldiers carry a wounded man on a stretcher; the wounded are taken to the medical unit through courtyards and over fences.

 

The red flag is taken down from the sentry box.

 

A gun fires. On 14 March, Kharkiv was recaptured.

 

Luftwaffe bomber squadrons bombing the retreating Bolsheviks east of Kharkiv

Sunday, 9 August 2026

Adolf Hitler – Address to the Members of the International Olympic Committee, 1 August 1936

 

Berlin, Reich Chancellery, August 1, 1936

 

Esteemed Mr. President, Gentlemen of the International Olympic Committee and the Organization Committee! It is a pleasure for me to welcome you personally and on behalf of the German Volk on this, the day marking the opening of the Olympic Games and to have an opportunity to thank you, esteemed Mr. President, for the kind remarks you have addressed to me.

 

My thanks also include the International Olympic Committee for having chosen the capital of the German Reich as the site of the Eleventh Olympics of the modern cycle, thus affording Germany the opportunity to make its contribution to the immortal memory of the Olympic Games. It was with enthusiasm and joy that Germany applied itself to the task of preparing this years’ competitions in a framework which attempts to do justice to the grand idea and traditions of the Olympic Games, and it hopes to have thus contributed toward promoting the ideal of strengthening the bonds between the peoples, the ideal upon which these competitive Games are based.

 

You, gentlemen of the German Organization Committee, I may thank for the devoted and careful work you have put into the preparation of these Games.

 

I am confident in my hope that success will reward you for your efforts.

 

The basic principles which are once more evidenced to the world in the Olympic Games are ones of very ancient origin. They have been passed down from that old place of worship where the Games were celebrated for more than a thousand years as an expression of religious sentiment and a demonstration of the competitive spirit of the Greek people. German scholars unearthed this honorable site in the years 1875-81 in accordance with agreements concluded at that time with the Greek government: hence the world was given a more detailed impression of the arena of this national shrine of the Hellenes and of the type and structure of the games. The excavation was not fully completed at that time.

 

I have now decided, as a lasting memory of the Eleventh Olympics in Berlin, to resume and complete the excavation work begun in 1875 at the site of the Olympic festivities and sports events.166 I may extend my thanks to the Royal Greek Government for granting its enthusiastic consent to this task. Thus a consecrated site from ancient culture is returned to today’s civilization. It is my hope that this will help to keep the memory of the Olympic Games of 1936 alive for all time to come.

 

That they may be a wonderful success is my one sincere desire and the one we all share.

Thursday, 6 August 2026

The SS „Wiking” Division - Conquers Rostov, July 1942

Published in „Siegrunen“ Magazine – Vol. XIII No. 5 — Whole Number 79 — Summer 2007

 

Translated, corrected and adapted by Ramiro Bujeiro from the book Del Caucaso a Leningrado

 

(From the Caucasus to Leningrad)

 

by Argentine Army Lt.Col. Alberto Marini based on the memoirs of the

 

Danish SS-Standartenführer Paul Ranzow Englehardt.

  

 

The Breakthrough and Exploitation

 

The battle-group from the SS Division „Wiking” which was to participate in the attack to overwhelm the Rostov defensive positions from the north and west, was formed as follows:

 

- Commander: SS-Sturmbannführer August Dieckmann (CO of I./SS Rgt. „Germania”)

 

- Staff: From combined units.

 

- I.Btl./SS Rgt. „Germania” (reserve battalion)

 

- 5.SS-Panzer Abteilung (attached to the division a few months earlier).

 

- III./SS-Artillery Regiment 5 with 2 10.5cm howitzer batteries and 1 15.5cm howitzer battery.

 

- 10th Company/SS-AR 5 with one battery of 10.5cm guns.

 

- One „Wiking” combat engineer company.

 

- One Flak (air defense) section with 4 or 6 6.2cm guns.

 

- One small combined unit supply and maintenance column.

 

SS-Kampfgruppe „Dieckmann” was organized in the „Wiking” rearguard area between 18 and 20 July 1942. In this short time it was able to exchange its battered and damaged vehicles for others in good condition from other units. New armaments, ammunition, uniforms, etc. were also added and an order to operate for „up to six months” without extra supplies was also received. On the same day SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” was sent to the front, German infantry forces broke into Russian positions to the east of the Taganrog Bridgehead and slowly advanced against heavy resistance.

 

SS-Obersturmbannführer August Dieckmann

 

The „Wiking” battle-group was forced to make a big loop to the west in order to reach the main Mariupol-Rostov road about 10 kilometers to the west of the Mius River. During the course of 20 July, German mountain infantry had advanced about 10 kilometers to the east, allowing follow-up units to move in behind them.

 

On 21 July 1942, SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” was ordered to advance north of IL. Mountain Corps in a tactical flanking maneuver. As so often occurs in war, it proved impossible to carry out the order given the uncertainty of the situation. From air reconnaissance it was known that the Russians had constructed fortifications but their strength and occupancy was unknown. Therefore SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” was given a new mission: conquer the city of Rostov as quickly as possible to prevent the construction of a defensive line to the south of the Don River by the retreating Russians.

 

SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” received the new directive to advance on the north wing of the Army Corps, penetrating as far as possible to the east in order to support the Corps’ advance. After reaching a distance of 12 kilometers to the east of the Mius River (about 2 kilometers to the east of the village of Sambek), SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” changed its course to the northeast, passing through the town of Vodianoi in the following formation:

 

1. Lead or vanguard element: SS-Stubaf. Johannes Mülenkamp (CO of SS-Pz.Abt.5), with one tank company and half a rifle company mounted on the tanks. This group traveled about 2 kilometers in advance of the main body of the battle group.

 

2. The main force: SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann along with the bulk of the formation. A reinforced tank section along with two squads of riflemen were used to protect the flanks. A distance of about 1 kilometer was maintained ahead of the rearguard.

 

3. The rearguard: the commander of a tank platoon with his section reinforced by a rifle squad.

 

Ten kilometers to the east of Vodianoie, the forward tanks exchanged fire with the Soviet positions located a few kilometers to the east. SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann continued the advance with the vanguard element in order to scout the length of the enemy positions, as his mission proscribed for him the task of finding a weak point in the Russian lines that could be exploited. While doing this, the Kampfgruppe was forced to change direction and bend towards the north. During the night of 21/22 July, the battle group halted in „bristle” or „hedgehog” positions („Circle the wagons” formation.), about 3 kilometers to the west of Stojakov, around a cross- roads. In the inner defensive ring was placed the artillery with a constant guard crew. The tanks and heavy infantry guns were put into the second ring ready to give support to the rifle squads that were situated in the exterior ring of the „hedgehog”.

 

The Attack Against the First Russian Position

 

On the morning of 22 July 1942, SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” continued its advance. The vanguard, after passing through Stojakov, received fire from hills occupied by the Russians about 3 kilometers to the south. As the incoming fire was only from small arms, the tanks continued their advance to about 1 kilometer from the enemy positions where the riflemen dismounted to attack on foot. But the close proximity of the German tanks was enough to cause the Soviets to retreat.

 

 

Following this episode, the lead element, with riflemen once again riding on the tanks, continued the advance. In a short time they began receiving fire from Russian positions located about 2 kilometers to the north of the village of Sultan Saly. As in the previous case, the riflemen again dismounted the tanks. The attack was well coordinated and carried out rapidly. The tanks fired and advanced by stretches and with that support the infantry was able to continue on under their protection. When they reached a point 800 to 1000 meters from the enemy positions the situation became more clear.

 

SS-Stubaf. Johannes Mühlenkamp inspecting SS Panzer Abteilung 5 at Wildflecken shortly before its deployment to action with the „Wiking” Division. Wildflecken was later the training camp of the French 33rd SS Volunteer Grenadier Division „Charlemagne”. [Erik Rundkvist Archives]

 

The Soviet lines here were stronger than the previous positions and automatic weapons and anti-tank gun fire had begun with some intensity. The German tanks retreated immediately to about 1500 meters from the Russian lines. One tank received a direct hit on a track (however it was recovered that night) and another caught fire and burned, but both crews managed to get away safely.

 

SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann was now in direct command of the lead element from the turret of the battalion command tank so he immediately brought the main body of his force to a halt in a valley about 4 kilometers to the north of the enemy positions and range of fire. The artillery group commander who followed the lead element at a distance of 100 meters or so in his car, was ordered to place the artillery in firing order to support an infantry and tank assault against the Russian line. Dieckmann decided on a quick assault, since he could see through his field glasses that the Russian trenches ran on either side of Sultan Saly without a common juncture and they seemed to be occupied by a small force.

 

A „Wiking” Division troop train somewhere on the southern part of the Eastern Front, circa 1942/1943. [Erik Rundkvist Archives]

 

The Kampfgruppe had a Luftwaffe liaison officer from the „Wiking” Division staff attached to it, so SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann was able to ask for Stuka (Dive Bomber) support as well. In the meantime, the rifle battalion was deployed and the rifle companies began to advance supported by their own heavy weapons and by the artillery group (less the 10.5cm gun battery). The tanks covered the flanks of the grenadiers and also supported them with their fire. At about 17:00 hours, 36 Stukas appeared and began to bomb the Russian positions.

 

The targets attacked by the Stukas were not visible but they seemed to be near the village of Sultan Saly and at points farther to the south-southeast in the suburbs of Rostov. Simultaneously with the air attack, the artillery group and their heavy weapons section laid down their heaviest rate of fire. After the Stukas left, the tanks rushed up against the Russian positions and the infantry companies began their assault. The heavy weapons fire shifted towards Sultan Saly. Many of the SS riflemen remained mounted on the tanks and since the enemy positions were not protected by anti-tank ditches or minefields the tanks were able to penetrate the defensive works.

 

Once among the Russian positions, the tank-riding infantrymen dismounted and jumped into the trenches to clear them out. Very few prisoners were taken because the communists had retreated in time. A few Red Army troops still held out in Sultan Saly, so Waffen-SS troops with tank support had to mop them up in a house-to-house operation that lasted until 22:00 hours, or one hour after sunset in that portion of the world. Once the enemy resistance ended, SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” reassembled in a hedgehog-bristle position to the south of the village and the assault troops were able to get some rest.

 

Motorcycle messenger team from the „Wiking” Division; note divisional emblem. [Erik Rundkvist Archives]

 

The Breakthrough of the Second Russian Defensive Position

 

At this time the men of the Kampfgruppe hadn’t realized that they had broken into the outside defensive perimeter around Rostov and that there were successive, in depth defensive lines still before them. SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann had learned only that his troops had come up against and driven back at best one enemy battalion, that there was fighting continuing to the west along the Krim-Tschaltir line against strong enemy forces and that in the east and northwest there were Russian concentrations of unknown strength. It was presumed that the 13th Panzer Division was located between 10 and 20 kilometers to the east-northeast of Rostov, but there was not contact maintained with that division.

 

Little was known of the Soviet forces before the Kampfgruppe. Patrols sent out in the darkness of night were unable to find any enemy to the south of Sultan Saly. At any rate, only one point was quite clear to SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann: the small victory had to be exploited as rapidly as possible without worrying about danger on the flanks or in the rear. The worst that could happened would be that the Kampfgruppe could be attacked from all directions, but in such a contingency, the hedgehog positions could be expected to hold out for one or two days, which would be enough to get assistance from the higher echelons.

 

So, for four hours, the Kampfgruppe rested that night between 23:00 hours on 22 July to 03:00 hours on 23 July. For a change, the grenadiers didn’t dig foxholes for the night but spent the valuable time eating, washing, doing weapons’ maintenance and sleeping. Half an hour before the sun rose, the Kampfgruppe formed up as it had on the previous day and continued its advance. By 04:00 hours the lead element had reached Point 93, 3 kilometers to the south of Sultan Saly and the following battle situation then became known:

 

1. West of the villages of Krim and Tschlatir, two Russian divisions, or the remnants of them (about 10,000 to 15,000 men), held the first line of defense against the German IL. Mountain Corps. They were unaware that their flank had been penetrat- ed at Sultan Saly by the SS-KGr. „Dieckmann.”

 

2. Directly in front of SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” at Point 93 was about one company of enemy troops (perhaps 200-300 men), in an intermediate position with what looked like successive defensive works and a possible anti-tank ditch. The extent of the positions (north-south spread), could not be ascertained. Point 93 itself was about 8 kilometers from the northwestern out- skirts of Rostov.

 

3. At the Trud Factory, 4 kilometers southeast of Point 93, the Russians had established a supporting position.

 

4. To the east of Trud, Russian troops could be observed moving from north to south.

 

Several times the east flank guard element of SS-KGr. „Dieckmann” tried to contact 13th Panzer Division with patrols, but they had no success. As the vanguard of the battle-group drew up be- fore Point 93, it received fire from the Russian positions. As a matter of routine course, the rifle sections dismounted and supported by the tanks, began to attack the enemy line. Soon they discovered that a stream bridge had been blown and that the Russian positions were supported by anti-tank ditches to either side of them. When the grenadiers reached a point about 800 meters from the enemy, they were able to confirm that the continuous anti-tank ditch would not permit tank passage. The commander of a tank company asked his wing tank sections to look for a way through the ditch. The results were negative. The only course left was to put the Russian defense under the highest possible volume of fire and they attack with infantry only.

 

The tanks then approached to between 50 and 100 meters (of the enemy lines) and began to fire on the Russian infantry. The deter- mined actions of the lead SS riflemen, supported by four machine guns and two 88mm mortars, forced the communists to retreat. While the infantry gained the positions at compass Point 80, the battle-group engineers blew up the walls of the anti-tank ditches to enable the tanks to cross them.

 

At 07:00, the lead element passed Point 80 and confronted the enemy at the village of Leninava to the southeast where fire was received from small arms, heavy weapons and one or two artillery batteries. Due to the fire from anti-tank guns, the Germans stopped their tanks in Leninava and the riflemen halted about 100 meters to the south of the village. The Russian positions seemed to be heavily occupied and well organized. Unknown to the Waffen-SS soldiers, the Kampfgruppe was now up against the main Rostov defensive line complete with anti-tank ditches, minefields, barbed wire obstacles, bunkers and a profusion of fortified works. The 800 meters of terrain which divided both sides was fully exposed and offered only the choice of a frontal attack which would involve a heavy price in blood.

 

When SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann arrived in person at Point 80, his first order was to bring the howitzer batteries into firing positions to neutralize the enemy fire. He asked again for air support, but unfortunately there were no planes available at that moment. But he did receive the services of an observation plane through his Luftwaffe liaison officer and was able to radio the following request to the pilot:

 

„Determine the extension of the Russian positions southeast of Leninava, checking the following:

 

1. „If they are occupied for their entire length.

 

2. „If the type of terrain on the wings of the positions can be determined.

 

3. „Which sections are more heavily occupied.

 

4. „If there are passages through the anti-tank obstacles that can be determined.”

 

Successful „Wiking” Panzer commander receives a toast from a visiting Waffen-SS soldier. [Erik Rundkvist Archives]

 

At about 11:00 hours, the pilot radioed back the following:

 

1. „In the direction northeast of Leninava, the positions spread for at least some kilometers and are fully occupied.

 

2. „About 2 kilometers to the south of Point 80 there is an intact bridge with no evidence of Russian troops guarding it or in the vicinity.”

 

Heavily laden „Wiking” grenadiers on the march with accompanying tanks and vehicles.

 

The bridge therefore would become the immediate objective. SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann ordered two rifle companies that were in readiness to the north of Point 80 to join with an engineer group and mount the tanks of two armored companies that were concealed in the same ravine. The artillery group was instructed to maintain a heavy fire on the Soviet positions and as rapidly as possible they would disengage one after another and join the reformation movement of the battle-group. An orderly officer was dispatched to the vanguard element (one rein- forced grenadier company with tanks), to relay on SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann’s directives and order them to continue firing on the enemy lines in order to obstruct their observation of the Kampfgruppe’s movements.

 

SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann climbed on the battalion commander’s tank and signaled his troops into action by pointing with his arm to the south. His further orders were conveyed by radio to the tank commanders: „Reach the road from Tschaltir to Rostov; from there bear to the east and as quickly as possible seize the bridge over the road 5 kilometers to the west of Rostov.”

 

The column then rushed forward along the ravine, reached the designated road and passed over the bridge. The engineer group remained on the bridge, cutting the wires and disarming the explosive charges that had been placed on it by the Russians. The race to seize the bridge had taken place successfully in less than 20 minutes with about 8 to 9 kilometers of ground covered in the process. The Kampfgruppe and Panzer Abteilung commanders were at the head of the column without any forward security sections and the column included a mixture of tanks, trucks, communication vehicles, etc. The job was done in a very unorthodox manner!

 

When the bulk of the Kampfgruppe reached the bridge, SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann ordered one tank company reinforced by a rifle company to attack along the main Russian line from southeast to northeast (i.e. coming in from behind), with the objective of eliminating the resistance, mopping up the positions and linking-up with battle-group elements still near Leninava. The remainder of the battle-group was organized into a hedgehog position at the main juncture of the road and railroad lines going into Rostov. The railroad tracks ran around the western part of Rostov and then turned towards the main station in the center of the city. Between 13:00 and 14:00 hours, all of the vital positions around the hedgehog had been occupied by the SS troops. These included houses and stands of trees in which observers were stationed. Scout patrol were then sent out to explore the next route of the battle-group.

 

Breakthrough of the Third Defensive Line and Drive into Rostov

 

At a little past 14:00, the entire Kampfgruppe was reassembled and SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann was faced with the following situations:

 

1. The main defensive positions were now cleared of Red troops, but between these lines and the Rostov city limits were other organized enemy forces.

 

2. The situation in the southeast, alongside the railroad lines and around the city limits, was unclear. The presence of Russian soldiers in a wooded area and a housing complex with both heavy machine guns and infantry guns had been reported, but their exact numbers and disposition was unknown.

 

3. More towards the south, in the so-called „special” area, patrols from the Kampfgruppe met scattered groups of Russian soldiers who surrendered without resistance. In the same direction and within the boundary of the city, the Soviets had constructed an anti-tank ditch 5 meters deep and some 6 to 8 meters wide. In the surrounding houses, the deployment of about 40 to 60 enemy riflemen with 7 to 8 automatic weapons, had been confirmed. Between the anti-tank ditch and the houses were barbed wire obstacles and other defensive works.

 

SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann decided to attack towards Sapadni. Dividing his Kampfgruppe into one assault group, one support group and one reserve group, he devised the following plan:

 

1. The 1st Assault Group under the command of the tank battalion commander (SS-Stubaf. Mühlenkampf), was formed from one tank company, one rifle company and two-thirds of an engineer company with explosive charges. Behind this group would follow a reserve rifle company, directly at the disposal of SS-Stubaf. Mühlenkampf.

 

2. The 2nd Group was given the job of supporting the 1st Assault Group, concentrating on the enemy forces in the southern part of Sapadni. It was formed from the I.Btl./ „Germania” heavy weapons company and the artillery section from SS-AR 5. The heavy weapons, machine guns, infantry howitzers, mortars and anti-tank guns were deployed in the western outskirts of Sapadni. The two 10.5 cm howitzer batteries were placed south of the village and were able to hit with direct fire the outer buildings of Rostov some 1500 meters away. The heavy howitzer battery and a 10.5 cm gun battery were placed west of Sapadni, enabling them to place indirect fire on Rostov, and if need be, fire on the Don River bridges.

 

3. The Reserve Group was formed by one rifle company, one engineer section and one tank section and was situated to the west of Sapadni. It was given the following roles to play:

 

a) To constitute a reserve of the Kampfgruppe commander to be used against Rostov.

 

b) To protect the battle-group artillery against attacks from the north or west.

 

4. A Security Troop composed of one rifle platoon and one tank section was left to hold the captured bridge and keep the roads to Krim and Tschaltir closed to the enemy.

 

The attack now got underway. When the grenadiers of the 1st Assault Group reached a point 100 meters from the anti-tank ditch (the ditch was located about 20 meters from the enemy-held housing complex), they received fire from rifles and automatic weapons; the latter being mostly light machine guns placed in the windows of the houses. Since no anti-tank fire was received, the Assault Group tanks were able to advance to a point about 50 meters away from the houses and began opening fire on the windows. Under the cover of the tank fire, the grenadiers crossed the anti-tank ditch and took the first houses.

 

While the combat engineers were busy building a passage across the ditch for tanks, the reserve rifle company joined in the fighting and entered the city, bringing in with them the forward artillery observers. In the course of their attack the Waffen-SS soldiers reached Hill 80 about 2 kilometers southwest of the railway station and about 1500 meters from the Don River. Here they organized a hedgehog position. Almost at once, the commander of the artillery group and the commander of the two heavy batteries (15.5 cm howitzers and 10.5 cm guns), arrived with communications and radio equipment.

 

From the hedgehog position on top of the hill, the Don River valley could be observed. To the south large swamps stretched, while the towns of Koisug and Bataisk could be seen. Towards the east, a large island formed in the Don River to the south of the city, where two bridges, one road and one railroad could be made out. Large numbers of Russian troops from inside of Rostov were attempting to cross the river to the south. Thousands and thousands of khaki dressed men, mixed together from all arms of the service, and many weaponless, could be seen congregating. To the southwest, thousands of other men were moving towards the river carrying hastily built rafts, trunks, doors, barrels and other objects to try and cross the Don with. These were the defeated troops from Krim and Tschaltir who had been cut off from the Don bridges.

 

The heavy artillery took for their targets the troops on the two bridges to the south while the light artillery fired on the Russian troops to the southwest. Meanwhile, with the assistance of the engineers, the tanks were able to cross the anti-tank ditch. The Tank Bat- talion commander with one tank company, one rifle company, some heavy weapons and engineer sections rushed forward into the city to try and close off the bridges to traffic. This was accomplished in the dark of the evening. During the night, this group was able to make contact with units from the 13th Panzer Division which had entered Rostov from the northeast.

 

Since there were still thousands of scattered Russian soldiers inside of Rostov and to the west, SS-Stubaf. Dieckmann laid down the following directives for his men to follow in the night to come:

 

1. One hedgehog position under the command of the Tank Battalion CO would be located between the Don River railway bridge and the Rostov railroad station. From this position contact would be maintained with a unit of the 13th Panzer Division holding the western road bridge over the Don.

 

2. Another hedgehog position was to be formed with one tank company and one rifle company 2 kilometers to the south of Hill 80, 50 cover the road along the north bank of the river.

 

3. A third hedgehog position would be maintained around Hill 80 with the Kampfgruppe commander, the four artillery batteries and the remainder of the battle-group.

 

By 20:00 hours, all hedgehogs had been organized, established and their activities coordinated. At this time the officers and their staffs felt secure enough to take a formal mess break, assisted by a delicate wine from the Crimean peninsula.

 

SS-Kampfgruppe „Dieckmann” had marched and fought hard for three whole days with little rest. The losses in the first two days had amounted to only a few men; during the attack to take Rostov itself, 3 men had died and 12 had been wounded, 2 of them seriously. In material damage, one tank had been destroyed and one partially damaged. SS-Sturmbannführer August Dieckmann was awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross for his actions in the battle for Rostov. He would be killed in action as the commanding officer of SS-Pz.Gr.Rgt.10 „Westland”/5.SS-Pz.Div. „Wiking”, with the rank of SS- Obersturmbannführer, in October 1943.

 

Acknowledgment

 

Dieckmann portrait and combat map both by Ramiro Bujeiro.

 

A group of veteran Finnish officers from the SS „Wiking” Division. Top row: Mauri Sautio, Heikki Mansala, Kauko Ingero. Bottom row: Olli Somersalo, Kalevvo Kuukiala, Yrjo Tenomaa. Photo taken at Izjnmissa, early 1943. [Erik Rundkvist Archives]