This and the succeeding Directives point the way of the German advance in Russia.
Directive No. 32
The Leader and Supreme Commander of The Armed Forces.
The Leader’s Headquarters. 14th July, 1941. 13 copies
On the basis of my intentions for the future prosecution of the war, as stated in Directive 32, I issue the following general instructions concerning personnel and equipment:
1. General:
Our military mastery of the European continent after the overthrow of Russia will make it possible considerably to reduce the strength of the Army. Within the limits of this reduced Army, the relative strength of the armoured forces will be greatly increased.
The manning and equipment of the Navy will be limited to what is essential for the direct prosecution of the war against England and, should the occasion arise, against America.
The main effort of equipment will be devoted to the Airforce, which will be greatly strengthened.
2. Manpower:
The future strength of the Army will be laid down by me, after receiving proposals from Commander in Chief Army.
The Replacement Army will be reduced to conform with the diminished strength of the Army.
The Chief of The High Command of The Armed Forces will decide, in accordance with my Directives, on the employment of the manpower which will become available for the Armed Forces as a whole and for the armaments industry.
The Class of 1922 will be called up at the latest possible date, and will be distributed by the High Command of The Armed Forces in accordance with the future tasks of the various branches of the Armed Forces.
3. Arms and Equipment:
(a) The Armed Forces as A Whole.
The arming and equipment of troops will be reduced to the requirements of the situation in the field, without reference to existing establishment scales.
All formations not intended for actual combat (security, guard, construction, and similar units) will be armed basically with captured weapons and second line equipment.
All requests for general Armed Forces equipment will be immediately reduced or rejected in relation to available supplies, need, and wear and tear. Continued manufacture of such weapons as can be proved to be necessary will be decided in agreement with the Minister for Armaments and Munitions.
Plant (buildings and machine tools) already in use will not be expanded unless it can be shown that existing equipment cannot be put to full use by the introduction of shift working.
Work on all such permanent buildings for industry and the Armed Forces as are intended for use in peacetime, rather than for the immediate prosecution of the war and for the production of arms, will be halted. Construction directly necessary for the conduct of the war and for armaments will remain subject to the regulations of the General Plenipotentiary for Building. Buildings erected by civilian contractors will be limited by him to such as are most essential to the war effort.
Contracts of all kinds which do not comply with these principles will be immediately withdrawn.
The manpower, raw materials, and plant released by these measures will be made available for the main tasks of equipment and placed, as soon as possible, at the disposal of the Minister of Armaments and Munitions for use elsewhere.
(b) Army:
The extension of arms and equipment and the production of new weapons, munitions, and equipment will be related, with immediate effect, to the smaller forces which are contemplated for the future. Where orders have been placed for more than six months ahead, all contracts beyond that period will be cancelled. Current deliveries will only continue if their immediate cancellation would be uneconomic.
The following are exceptions to these limitations:
The tank program for the motorised forces (which are to be considerably reinforced) including the provision of special weapons and tanks of the heaviest type.
The new program for heavy antitank guns, including their tractors and ammunition.
The program for additional equipment for expeditionary forces, which will include four further Armoured Divisions for employment in the tropics, drawn from the overall strength of the armoured forces.
Preparations for the manufacture of equipment unrelated to these programs will be halted.
The Army’s program for antiaircraft guns is to be coordinated with that of the Airforce, and represents a single unified scheme from the manufacturing point of view. All available plant will be fully employed in order to achieve the delivery targets which I have laid down.
Navy:
The Navy will continue its submarine program. Construction will be limited to what is directly connected with this program. Expansion of the armaments program over and above this is to be stopped.
Airforce:
The overall armaments program will concentrate on carrying out the expanded Air Armaments Program which I have approved. Its realisation up to the spring of 1942 is of decisive importance for the whole war effort. for this purpose, all available manpower from the Armed Forces and industry will be employed. The allocation of aluminium to the Airforce will be increased as far as possible.
The speed of the program, and the extent to which it can be fulfilled, will be linked to the increased production of light metals and mineral oil.
4. The program for powder and explosives will concentrate upon the requirements of the Airforce (bombs and antiaircraft ammunition) at the expense of the requirements of the Army. Buildings will be restricted to the barest essentials and confined to the simplest type of construction.
Production of explosives will be limited to the existing basis.
5. It is particularly important to ensure supplies of raw materials and mineral oil. Coal production and the extension of the light metal, artificial rubber, substitute materials, and liquid fuel industries will be supported by the Armed Forces in every way, particularly by the release of miners and specialist workers. The construction of the necessary plans for the extended air armaments industry will be developed simultaneously.
6. The allocation of manpower, raw materials, and plant will be made in accordance with these principles.
7. The Chief of The High Command of The Armed Forces will issue the necessary orders for the Armed Forces, and the Minister for Armaments and Munitions for his sector, in mutual agreement.
Adolf Hitler.
The Leader and Supreme Commander of The Armed Forces.
The Leader’s Headquarters. 19th July, 1941. 13 copies
Directive No. 33 – Continuation of The War in The East
1. The second series of battles in the East has ended, along the whole front, with the breach of the Stalin Line and the deep thrust of the armoured forces. in the area of Army Group Centre, mopping up of the strong enemy forces which still remain between the motorised formations will still require considerable time.
The northern flank of Army Group South is restricted in its freedom of movement and effectiveness by the fortress of Kiev and the Russian 5th Army in its rear.
2. The aim of the next operations must be to prevent any further sizeable enemy forces from withdrawing into the depths of Russia, and to wipe them out.
Plans will be made for this as follows:
(a) Southeastern Front:
The most important object is, by concentric attacks, to destroy the enemy 12th and 6th Armies while they are still west of the Dnieper River. The main Romanian forces will support these operations in the south.
The enemy 5th Army can also be quickly and decisively defeated and annihilated by cooperation between forces on the south flank of Army Group Centre and the northern flank of Army Group South.
While Infantry Divisions of Army Group Centre move southward, other forces, chiefly motorised, after carrying out the tasks assigned to them, securing their lines of communication, and providing cover in the direction of Moscow, will advance south-eastwards in order to cut off the withdrawal of enemy forces which have crossed to the further bank of the Dnieper River, to prevent their withdrawal deeper into Russia, and to destroy them.
(b) Central Part of The Eastern Front:
After the destruction of the many pockets of enemy troops which have been surrounded and the establishment of lines of communication, Army Group Centre, while continuing to advance to Moscow with infantry formations, will use these motorised units which are not employed in the rear of the Dnieper River line to cut communications between Moscow and Leningrad, and so cover the right flank of the advance on Leningrad by Army Group North.
(c) Northern Part of The Eastern Front:
The advance on Leningrad will be resumed only when 18th Army has made contact with 4th Armoured Group and the extensive flank in the east is adequately protected by 16th Army. At the same time Army Group North must endeavour to prevent Russian forces still in action in Estonia from withdrawing to Leningrad.
Early capture of the Baltic Islands, which might be used as bases by the Soviet Navy, is desirable.
(d) Finnish Front:
It remains the task of the main Finnish forces, reinforced by most of 163rd Division, to attack the enemy opposing them, with the main weight of attack east of Lake Ladoga and, later, in conjunction with Army Group North, to destroy them.
The object of the attack under the direction of XXXVI Corps and the Mountain Corps remains as already directed, except that stronger support from the air cannot be expected for the moment and operations may therefore have to be temporarily delayed.
3. The task of the Airforce is, in particular, as forces become available from the Central Front, to support operations on the South-eastern Front at their most important point by bringing air and antiaircraft units into action, and, if necessary, by early reinforcement or regrouping.
The attack on Moscow by the bomber forces of 2nd Air Fleet, temporarily reinforced by bomber forces from the west, will be carried out as soon as possible as reprisal for Russian attacks on Bucharest and Helsinki.
4. The Navy will continue to ensure the free passage of seaborne traffic, especially of supplies for the land forces, as far as enemy activity at sea and in the air allows. Further, with the increasing threat to enemy bases, appropriate steps are to be taken to prevent the escape of enemy ships to Swedish ports, where they would be interned.
As naval forces in the Baltic Sea become free, motor torpedo boats and minesweepers – one flotilla of each to start with – will be transferred to the Mediterranean.
To support German operations in Finland, which might be hampered by the arrival of enemy reinforcements by sea, a few submarines will be transferred to the Arctic Ocean.
5. All three branches of the Armed Forces in the west and north will bear in mind the possibility of British attacks on the Channel Islands and the Norwegian coast. Plans must be made for the quick transfer of air forces from the west to all parts of Norway.
The Chief of The High Command of The Armed Forces.
The Leader’s Headquarters. 23rd July, 1941. 14 copies
Supplement to Directive No. 33
After a report by Commander in Chief Army, The Leader on 22nd July issued the following orders to amplify and extend Directive 33.
1. Southern Part of The Eastern Front:
The enemy forces which are still west of the Dnieper River must be decisively defeated and dispersed. as soon as the state of operations and of supplies allows, 1st and 2nd Armoured Groups will be concentrated under command of 4th Tank Army and, with the support of Infantry and Mounted Divisions, will occupy the Kharkov industrial area and thrust forward across the Don River to Caucasia.
The bulk of the Infantry Divisions will then occupy the Ukraine, the Crimea, and the area of Central Russia up to the Don River. The security of the area immediately southwest of the Bug River is to be left to the Romanian Army.
2. Central Part of The Eastern Front:
After mopping up operations around Smolensk and on the southern flank, Army Group Centre, whose infantry formations drawn from both its Armies are strong enough for the purpose, will defeat such enemy forces as remain between Smolensk and Moscow, by an advance on the left flank if possible. It will then capture Moscow.
3rd Armoured Group will come under temporary command of Army Group North to secure its right flank and to surround the enemy in the Leningrad area.
For the further task of thrusting forward to the Volga River, the mobile forces of 3rd Armoured Group will probably be once more available.
3. Northern Part of The Eastern Front:
The subordination to it of 3rd Armoured Group will enable Army Group North to employ strong forces of infantry for an attack in the direction of Leningrad, and to avoid expending its mobile forces in frontal attacks over difficult terrain.
Enemy forces still in action in Estonia will be destroyed. Their embarkation and withdrawal across the Narva River towards Leningrad will be prevented.
3rd Armoured Group is to be returned to Army Group Centre on the completion of its task.
4. The High Command of The Army will plan further operations so that large parts of Army Group North, including 4th Armoured Group and some of the infantry formations of Army Group South, may be moved back to Germany as soon as the situation allows.
3rd Armoured Group will be rendered fully operational by drawing upon 4th Armoured Group for equipment and personnel. 1st and 2nd Armoured Groups will, if necessary, supply themselves by merging units.
5. The orders given for Navy and Airforce in Directive 33 remain valid.
In addition they are to ease the situation of the Mountain Corps: the Navy, by the determined employment of its forces in the Arctic Ocean (now reinforced); the Airforce, by the transfer of several dive bomber groups to the Finnish theatre once the fighting around Smolensk is over. This will also reduce the temptation for England to intervene in the fighting along the Arctic coast.
6. The troops available for securing the conquered eastern territories will, in view of the size of this area, be sufficient for their duties only if the occupying power meets resistance, not by legal punishment of the guilty, but by striking such terror into the population that it loses all will to resist.
The Commanders concerned are to be held responsible, together with the troops at their disposal, for quiet conditions in their areas. They will contrive to maintain order, not by requesting reinforcements, but by employing suitably draconian methods.
Keitel.
By the end of July, 1941, the German Armies had penetrated deeply into Russia; but now they began to meet tougher resistance, especially in the centre of the front, opposite Moscow, where Army Group Centre, under General von Bock, was opposed by the Russian Army Group of General Timoshenko. At this point a serious difference of opinion broke out between Hitler and the Commander in Chief of The Army, General von Brauchitsch. Brauchitsch wished to concentrate on the destruction of Timoshenko’s Army Group and the capture of Moscow. Hitler insisted that Moscow could wait while more sweeping victories were to be won in the north, in the Leningrad area, and in the south, towards the Caucasus. These new conditions, and Hitler’s change of strategy in respect of the Moscow front, are shown in Directive No. 34 and in the Supplement to it.
The Leader and Supreme Commander of The Armed Forces.
The Leader’s Headquarters. 30th July, 1941. 14 copies
Directive No. 34
The development of the situation in the last few days, the appearance of strong enemy forces on the front and to the flanks of Army Group Centre, the supply position, and the need to give 2nd and 3rd Armoured Groups about ten days to rehabilitate their units, make it necessary to postpone for the moment the further tasks and objectives laid down in Directive 33 of 19th July and in the Supplement of 23rd July.
I therefore order as follows:
I. 1. in the northern sector of the eastern front the main attack will continue between Lake Ilmen and Narva towards Leningrad, with the aim of encircling Leningrad and making contact with the Finnish Army.
North of Lake Ilmen this attack will be covered in the Volkhov sector; south of Lake Ilmen it will be carried northeastwards only so far as is required to protect the right flank of the attack north of the lake. The situation around Velikiye Luki will have been previously cleared up. All forces not required for these operations will be transferred to take part in the flank attacking north of Lake Ilmen. The intended thrust by 3rd Armoured Group against the high ground around Valdai will be postponed until armoured formations are fully ready for action. Instead, the left flank of Army Group Centre will advance sufficiently far northeastwards to afford protection to the right flank of Army Group North.
Estonia must first of all be mopped up by all the forces of 18th Army; only then may Divisions advance towards Leningrad.
2. Army Group Centre will go over to the defensive, taking advantage of suitable terrain.
Attacks with limited objectives may still be mounted in so far as they are necessary to secure favourable springboards for our offensive against Soviet 21st Army.
2nd and 3rd Armoured Groups will be withdrawn from the front line for quick rehabilitation as soon as the situation allows.
3. Operations on the southeastern front will, for the present, be conducted only by formations of Army Group South.
Their objective must be to destroy the strong enemy forces west of the Dnieper River and, in addition, by securing bridgeheads near to the south of Kiev, to establish the conditions necessary for bringing 1st Armoured Group later to the eastern bank of the Dnieper River.
The 5th Red Army, fighting in the marshland northwest of Kiev, must be brought to battle west of the Dnieper River and annihilated. Any danger that it might break through to the north across the Pripet River must be countered in good time.
4. Finnish Front:
The attack in the direction of Kandalaksha will be halted. The threat to the flank of the Mountain Corps from the Motovski Bight is to be eliminated. Only so many forces are to be left with XXXVI Corps as are necessary for defence and to give the impression of further offensive preparations.
In the area of III (Finnish) Corps, an attempt will be made to cut the Murmansk railway, particularly towards Louhi. All forces suitable for this attack will be moved to this area; other available forces will be transferred to the Karelian Army. Should difficulties of terrain bring the offensive to a standstill in the area of the III (Finnish) Corps too, the German forces will be withdrawn and employed with the Karelian Army. This applies particularly to mobile units, tanks, and heavy artillery.
The 6th Mountain Division will join the Mountain Corps, using all available transport routes. The Foreign Office will settle whether the railway through Sweden to Narvik may also be used.
II. Airforce.
1. Northeastern Front:
The Airforce will switch the main weight of air attack to the northeastern front by attaching the bulk of VIII Air Corps to 1st Air Fleet. These reinforcements will be moved up in time to go into action at the beginning of the offensive by Army Group North and at its vital point (early morning 6th August).
2. Centre:
The task of such units of the Airforce as remain with Army Group Centre is to afford such fighter cover as is absolutely necessary on the 2nd and 9th Army fronts and to support possible local attacks. Attacks on Moscow will continue.
3. Southeastern Front:
Tasks as already laid down. It is not proposed to reduce the strength of the air forces with Army Group South.
4. Finland:
The main task of 5th Air Fleet is to support the Mountain Corps. The offensive by III Finnish Corps will also be supported at favourable points.
Preparations are to be made for the employment of forces in support of the Karelian Army should this be necessary.
Adolf Hitler.
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