For the Victory of Our kind

 

by Reichsminister Herbert Backe

 

Germany is in the midst of the most enormous upheaval in its history. Out of a sorrowful development of the many hundreds of years our country, through the genius of Adolf Hitler, has been undergoing a revolution, the last stage of which we are witnessing today and which will fundamentally change not only the face of Germany, but of all Europe and perhaps even of the whole world. It is only the dynamic force of the National Socialist movement that created a life-affirming, duty sworn, soldierly community out of a downtrodden, sorrow stricken, self-divided people. Only the National Socialist movement was in a position to raise the German people, embittered by the collapse of 1918 and the development of a political and economic catastrophe, to a self-sacrificing, and active community-minded comrade of the Volk. Whoever wants to understand and comprehend the causes of our time must take the trouble - in spite of all present worries and notes - to think back to those years when the National Socialist movement was struggling to gain power in the state and to eliminate the November system.

 

Fundamental change

 

If I am taking the floor here in Hanover for the first time after being commissioned by the Fuhrer, it is because I regard this region in many respects as ‘my own’, I can call it home. Already as a working student almost twenty years ago I became an SA man in Gottingen. For three years I was able to promote and fight for the National Socialist idea here in Hanover as an assistant at the Technical University. Finally, when I took over a lease in the Hanoverian countryside in 1928, I saw my task in winning the country people for National Socialism. At that time, I struggled for the hearts of the Lower Saxons, first as a party orator, then as a Preußischer member of the state parliament for the electoral district of Hanover Süd. It was not always easy to carry the National Socialist idea from village to village, for the peasant was, for good reason, mistrustful of anyone who advertised with political slogans. But as deeply as I was imbued with the absolute correctness of the National Socialist idea, I was also firmly convinced that the farmer would become the most devote men for Adolf Hitler. And after subsequent events have proved this view correct. It was precisely the distinctly rural constituencies that were the first to produce a National Socialist majority. The loyalty expressed by this confession -1 may express this at this point - has not only remained to this day, but has grown. The achievements of our country people in the battle of war are irrefutable proof of this. At the moment of the seizure of power, the national socialist agricultural policy took on a difficult legacy. I do not need to go into the details of that bleak period from 1918 to 1933. It should still be vivid in the memory of all the people. One thing, however, I must emphasize the work of reconstruction since 1933 did not mean the elimination of economic hardships alone, but above all the execution of the world’s most important first step. Not only economically, but also ideologically, the dross of liberalistic views of life had to be removed, which for a century and a half had dominated the relationship of people in Germany to the community, to the economy, and to all other aspects of the life of the nation. The primacy of the individual had to be overcome by the faith and will of the community. Only in the realization of the principle The aim was to build a healthy national and economic life based on the principle of “public interest before self-interest”. It was out of this view that the fundamental revolutionary agrarian-political laws were created in 1933. The first of these was the Reich Agricultural Law, which pointed to the farthest future of our people. It was followed by the Reich Food Law, the laws on the agricultural market organization and the other numerous agricultural policy and agricultural economic measures.

 

From the spirit of National Socialism

 

So why were these laws enacted in such rapid succession immediately after the seizure of power? Should a single class of the people be given a privileged right to life?

 

Should a single class be particularly challenged independently of the life of the people? No, my fellow citizens, it was precisely the agricultural policy of the new Reich that was deeply rooted in the National Socialist world view. These laws were enacted not only for the peasantry alone, but for the entire German Volk. Decisive for the economic and blood strength of a people is its peasantry. All of the political and economic demands of National Socialism had the idea of a “peasantry”, which only made sense and could only be realized if a strong, viable peasantry guaranteed the biological future of the people and ensured economic independence, i.e., above all, freedom of food.

 

Agricultural policy in Germany was thus born solely out of the spirit of national socialism. The task set us by the Fuhrer at that time: saving the peasantry could not be solved by economic measures and aid alone; for, on the one hand, a millennia of history have proved to our satisfaction that only partial successes, at best, could be achieved with economic aid, and, on the other hand, the peasantry was to be secured economically not for the sake of the peasantry itself, but in order to secure the biological tasks of the peasantry for the future of the people. It was therefore not any agricultural specialists, practitioners of agriculture or departments who made and implemented the new agricultural laws, but men who had grown up in the National Socialist movement and had joined in its struggle. The extent to which these laws are shaped by the National Socialist spirit becomes apparent today when we compare German agricultural policy with the agricultural policy of, say, Soviet Russia. In no field is the antagonism between National Socialism and Bolshevism greater than in that of agrarian policy; in our case it is characterized by the erbhof (hereditary farm) as the basis of the peasant clan, compared to the kolhos (collective farm), which has suppressed every creative activity and self-responsibility of the individual and has thus led to the decline of the once flourishing Russian agricultural and food economy. And so it is only today that it becomes apparent with particular urgency how much National Socialist agricultural policy has preserved itself as a basis not only for today but for all times to come. From this, it is self-evident that agricultural policy in Germany is and must remain a task of the NSDAP. The party alone possesses the dynamic and revolutionary impetus and the forward-looking spirit necessary to keep agricultural policy, principles, and guidelines pure, to continue to shape them and to ensure that the bodies responsible for implementing agricultural policy steer upon the right course at all times and in all circumstances.

 

Agricultural policy in the foreground

 

Sometimes in recent years these principles have seemed to take a back seat to the issues of the day. The confined space of Germany, the scarcity of land, the dependence of Germany on food supplies from abroad as a result of liberal development, inevitably led to food policy being in the foreground. But this should not obscure the fact that we were only able to pursue food policy because the prerequisite, that of the agricultural policy, had already been so completely solved in 1933 with a few laws. In this framework Germany was able to pass the agricultural policy decisively. Only a healthy agricultural policy can create the preconditions for a healthy food economy. The correctness of this sentence is proven by Germany’s food economy performance in contrast to that of most other countries. The shaping of this National Socialist agricultural policy must therefore be transferred back to where alone it found the necessary activism, i.e. in the party, in the Reich Office for Agricultural Policy.

 

Clear distribution of tasks

 

You have to be clear about one thing: The creation of the of the Greater German Reich now makes it possible to solve many of the decisive problems within the agricultural sector, problems which could not be solved before the creation of the Greater Reich. These issues, however, can only be solved if the most active and determined of the nation stand up to solve them. We do not want to overlook and forget the sometimes almost insurmountable difficulties which confronted the implementation of the new agricultural policy in 1933. It is always extremely difficult to replace outmoded forms with new, forward thinking ones, and there will always be people who are mentally rigid and lack a vision of the future, and who oppose any new order with a myriad of misgivings. This will also be the case with the reorganization of the agricultural policy area in Germany and Europe. And that is why the solution of these great tasks requires the full commitment of the party and the revolutionary spirit of National Socialism. At the moment when the Führer entrusted me with the management of the affairs of the Reichsleiter, the Reichsbauernführer and the Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture, I therefore decided to implement a clear division of tasks between the Reich Office for Agricultural Policy, the Reich Nutrition Council and the Reich Ministry of Food. At the same time, this provided the opportunity for a fundamental simplification of the administration and the establishment of a simple and clear organization in which all available forces could be concentrated on the most essential. In accordance with the principle that leadership is the task of the Party, I dissolved the former Reichshauptabteilung of the Reichsnährstand. Its tasks, as far as those of political leadership are concerned, I transferred to the Reich Office for Agricultural Policy in the NSDAP. The other fields of work of the old Reichshauptabteilung, such as the professional, social, economic, legal, and social care that was demanded for country people. The task of implementing and enforcing our land regulations was assigned to a reorganized Reichshauptabteilung. A corresponding simplification of administration results inevitably from this for the Land and District Farmers’ Associations. I have dismissed or dissolved all special representatives or special offices which hitherto existed outside the Reich Main Departments. Their duties have been transferred to the Reich Headquarters. Thus a concentration of forces has been effected in the Reich Food Council, in keeping with the severity of the war and the magnitude of the tasks which the Reich Food Council is now and will be called upon to perform in the future.

 

With real idealism

 

My comrades in arms, the peasant does not like to be “administered” from the core of his healthy view of life. He is averse to any bureaucratic structure. On the other hand, administration is necessary. But it must not become an end in itself. Where there is an idea of order, there must also be an instrument for maintaining order. It must be clear, however, that the creative cannot come from the administrative, that even the best administration only ever administers the existing, that is, to preserve it in essence. Revolutionary times, however, set new forms. They must even consciously create something new in contrast to the traditional structures, whereby it depends on the self-sacrificing personality of man to create new healthy, viable conditions. Therefore, in order to take into account, the dynamics of our time, the form of self-administration and honorary leadership has been consciously resorted to in the establishment of the Reichsnährstand. However, this healthy idea must not be exaggerated to the extent that the administrative tasks also necessary in the Reichsnährstand are now to be performed by honorary leaders. Therefore, the new Reichshauptabteilung I, which essentially comprises the actual administration, will in the future be led by a civil servant and not by an honorary farmer.

 

In general, I am of the opinion that the enormous tasks before us require a fighting front of all interested men and forces. The tasks of the future cannot be solved by working formations, but only by a real idealism. It is not who has done something that is essential, but that something is done. It is not prestige or status that is decisive, but only the task itself. We therefore are proud of everyone who fights in our ranks. Yes, we cannot have enough people who cooperate in strengthening and enhancing the peasantry as the bearers of our blood power and guarantors of our freedom of food. National Socialism has taught us that we should never see what divides us, but only what we have in common. And the tasks set for us today are worth putting this common ground in the foreground. I therefore particularly welcome the fact that the Reichsführer-SS Himmler has been appointed by the Fuhrer as Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of the German People. I have therefore, as one of the first measures, not by means of paper agreements, but by assigning two men from the Reich Commissariat for the Consolidation of German Nationality. Similarly, the basis for cooperation with other branches of the Party has already been established. With this short essay I have clarified the essential forms of the distribution of tasks between the Reich Office for Agricultural Policy, the Reich Food Board and the initiation of cooperation with other Reich departments.

 

With this brief outline, I have described the main forms of the of the distribution of tasks between the Reich Office for Agricultural Policy, the Reich Food Board, and the Reich Ministry of Food, and I have indicated the initiation of cooperation with other Reich agencies. And I will now conclude by stating that the Reich Office for Agricultural Policy, and thus the party, will in future be responsible for are responsible for the basic orientation of agricultural policy, while the Reich Ministry of Nutrition will be in charge of state management and the Reich Nutrition Service will be responsible for the practical implementation of agricultural and nutritional tasks. This creates clear areas of work and the prerequisites for the cooperation of all agencies that I have called for.

 

The current food problems

 

When the German peasantry now looks back on the times that has passed, we may well say without arrogance that the men and women and the youth of the country have achieved unheard-of feats in the struggle to secure our bread, we can say without arrogance that the men, women and youth of the country have achieved unheard-of things. The German country people have once again, as so often in German history, proved themselves as a battalion. With pride I may emphasize at this point emphasize once again that the Führer himself described the achievements of the German peasantry as unique. of the German peasantry as unique and unparalleled. Since the beginning of the battle of production, the coverage of their own needs from their own land has been has been substantially increased. Despite all the difficulties caused by the war the war conditions, production was again increased, especially in the last years of the war, production has again been increased, thus creating the prerequisite for maintaining the military strength and labour and manpower of our people.

 

But the German peasants have surpassed themselves in the last spring tillage. What was achieved in those weeks has no precedent in the history of German agriculture. The winter damage we suffered in cereals and seed oils this year was more extensive than at any time in decades. Around 2.5 million hectares that were tilled last fall had to be tilled again this spring. This means an area equivalent to the size of the agricultural land in Lower Saxony, Westphalia and Oldenburg. This additional work was accomplished despite a lack of manpower and limited operating resources. At the same time, weather conditions delayed the start of spring work by four full weeks compared to normal years. The full extent of this achievement can perhaps only be appreciated when one considers that, according to available statistics, about 3 million hectares remained uncultivated in 1917. In contrast, practically no hectare of land remained uncultivated during the third spring tillage of this war. In addition, we have not only maintained the total area under cultivation, but have even been able to increase the area under root crops, which requires a particularly large amount of labour. Similarly, in the case of sugarbeet, the high acreage expansion of recent years was achieved once again. Potato acreage has seen a very significant expansion this spring, which is probably even greater than we planned and expected. In this context, let us not forget connection that in the world war year of 1917, about 800,000 hectares less potatoes and around 170,000 hectares less sugarbeet than in 1914. were cultivated than in 1914, whereas today we not only have already greatly expanded cultivation of root crops thanks to our measures, but root crops thanks to our measures, but also, for example, in the case of potatoes, by around 400,000 hectares = 13% compared with the high level of the previous year. expanded.

 

Supply of operating resources

 

It is self-evident that the necessary replanting of the wintered land will require considerable additional agricultural inputs, seeds, equipment, and fuel. In view of the well- known difficult situation in the trade -the supply of goods - where every kilogram is in any case precisely reallocated and quota-allocated, it seemed impossible at first to meet these additional demands. Today I can say that the management of German agriculture has done everything possible to meet these additional requirements. It is clear that this has not been without friction and difficulties. The quantities of seed necessary for replanting the wintered- out areas have been procured, although the requirements for summer seed cereals alone have increased by some 250%. More than 130,000 wagons of seed potatoes were transported in a few weeks, which is more than twice as much as in the last year of peace. In view of its other than normal use for military and other war-related transports, the German Reichsbahn has rendered a great service to the German food industry. If the supply of foodstuffs showed certain local difficulties, this was due to the difficult transport conditions. However, for a given transport volume, we considered it more advisable to transport the seeds first and then the drying agents. Here, too, wartime conditions set limits that we were unable to exceed.

 

It was a particularly difficult task to meet the increased demand for fuel as a result of the reordering. If, in spite of this, German agriculture has been able to manage the great peak workload of this spring with a limited allocation of operating resources, this again proves how every farm manager strives over and over again to do the best he can with what little is available. German agriculture can be assured that in such difficult times everything necessary will be done on the part of the management. But just as the military leadership has to plan the supply of ammunition and rations to the soldiers down to the last detail, but then difficulties arise in the execution of the plan and there are occasional shortages, but the troops nevertheless continue to fight and win, German agriculture will continue to stand its ground in the future. It can be sure that everything possible will be done to facilitate its tasks within the framework of the war effort.

 

As important as production is in itself, what ultimately remains important is the supply of food to the people. The amount of food delivered is proof that the nation could rely on the people here as well. Already after 1940/41 year, the agricultural sector has been required to make a delivery of bread grain in the war year 1941/42 again that exceeded expectations by almost 800,000 tons. The change in the utilization of the potato harvest, caused by the increase in consumption of table potatoes from 13 million tons before the war to about 23 million tons last year, also demonstrated the exemplary willingness of the agricultural sector to deliver. Without this willingness to deliver on the part of the farm managers and their followers, it would undoubtedly not have been possible in the last few weeks to guarantee the supply of potatoes for consumption in the large consumer areas to the extent actually achieved and to catch up with the early potato harvest. Only by delivering the last quantity of potatoes needed by farmers’ households and the economy as such was it possible to compensate for the frost losses in potato stocks and also to meet the additional demand for several hundred thousand tonnes of seed potatoes.

 

Success of the Community effort

 

The most impressive example of the usual readiness of the agricultural sector to deliver milk, however, is expressed in the development of milk deliveries to the dairies. In 1941 it exceeded that of 1938 by no less than 3 billion litters. The 3 billion litters of additional milk delivered, however, made it possible to produce an additional 90,000 tons of butter, which was of decisive importance in view of the loss of oil supplies from the world market. In commemorating these achievements of our rural people, I must point out that in all these cases we have worked without state coercion, as was the case in the World War. The Fuhrer did not appeal to the sense of sacrifice of the peasants and agricultural workers for nothing.

 

All of them, who worked day after day and often during many hours of the night in the fields, in the stables, and wherever else it was necessary, have surpassed themselves by these efforts. It will have to be left to a later time to do justice to this effort. This tremendous success, which was of decisive importance for the military and military-economic strength of the Reich, was due in part to everyone, the farm leaders, the agricultural followers, the countrywomen and also the boys and girls of the country. Last but not least, however, it has been my volunteer farmer leaders, in particular the more than 60,000 local farmer leaders, who showed unconditional loyalty alongside the agricultural followers who have supported the efforts of the farm leaders. Even from their own earnings, the agricultural workers have contributed substantially to the supply of the markets. It was not uncommon for farm workers to take over the management of the farms at the side of the farm wife when the farm manager himself was at the front. We must not forget the heavy burdens our countrywomen have to carry. One must have seen the farms themselves, where the men are in the field and the woman alone took over the management of the farm, often with only foreign labourers to help her. We have no illusions about the fact that the woman often had to do more than was her natural duty. The entire German people owe her a great debt of gratitude. It will be all the more necessary in the future to give her the relief she deserves as the mother of her children and the sustainer of our national strength. As spokesman for the German rural people, it is also my duty to take this opportunity to thank all those helpers who have rendered outstanding services to food security. Tens of thousands of helpers have been mobilized by the Party to bring comradely aid to the rural front which is fighting so hard. The German country people will not forget this expression of the community spirit of town and country.

 

Our thanks are due in particular to the energetic work of the Commissioner for Labour Deployment, Gauleiter Pg. Sauckel, and his staff for the procurement of hundreds of thousands of workers from the East, an achievement which was accomplished in a few weeks and will continue to be accomplished in spite of difficulties which often seem insurmountable. In spite of this enormous help, however, the cooperation of all, especially of women and young people, must succeed more than ever in recovering the harvest and ensuring the new sowing. We therefore welcome the appeal of the Reichsfrauenführerin, Frau Scholtz-Klink, to the women of the city to help the German countrywoman to make her great and decisive task easier.

 

Tasks still to be performed

 

Men and women of the land! The past years have been difficult and full of privation for you. Perhaps some of you have even had the feeling that, within the framework of the new German national and economic order, the rural economy is regarded only as the fifth wheel on the wagon. Up to now, demands have only been made on the people, without the self-evident reciprocation of the people as a whole having made a corresponding appearance. But here, too, one must evaluate the facts. In the years before the present struggle broke out, the German national economy had first of all the task of working for armament, of making the German sword sharp. Political and military developments proved that the military and industrial build-up, the construction of the West Wall, the production of armoured cars, airplanes, and gears was the most important task at first. The Fuhrer himself has often enough expressed how much he regrets having to put aside his great peace work for the German people in order first to secure the freedom of the people. National Socialist agricultural policy has hitherto been able to devote itself essentially only to the task of striving for freedom from food and, by renouncing a just remuneration for the work of the peasantry, to making possible the carrying out of the slaughter of labour and thus the necessary Aufrustung. All the fundamental problems of the healthy popular and economic reorganization of the peasant habitat had to and must be put aside until victory clears the way here too. Principles of the reorganization The revolutionary beginning of this reorganization, however, had already been initiated by the Reichserbhofgesetz, published as early as 1933. The previously mentioned compelling nutritional and economic demands initially prevented the correct further development of the principles laid down in the Reich’s Hereditary Court Act. We must be clear that with the Erbhofgesetz the reorganization of the rural structure in the sense of the creation of healthy farms began, even if the final realization of these principles failed due to the fact of the narrowness of the German living space.

 

In Germany, which had been stifled by Versailles, it was practically impossible to bring the idea of the hereditary court to a full breakthrough. A large-scale reformation of the German peasantry, the indispensable extension of the law on hereditary estates, could not be carried out. At first it seemed absurd to speak of an inheritance law and of a new formation of the German peasantry in a country that still had millions of unemployed to accommodate.

 

After all, the desolate settlements on the outskirts of the cities of that time, and the small, small settlements of the Marxist Era, were seen as a means of alleviating the labour and economic hardship. It was not the consolidation and enlargement of farms that seemed to offer a way out, but the division into small and micro-enterprises. One must recall this development in order to understand how revolutionary the idea of the hereditary farm was. The The triumphant march of the German armies has brought about a new situation.

 

There is enough land available to provide a healthy livelihood for hundreds of thousands of new of new farming families a healthy livelihood. In the near future, we can approach the reorganization of land tenure and create new legal entities not only in the new areas, but also in the Reich itself. We shall now be able to achieve a structure of ownership which is reasonable and sensible for the preservation of the people’s strength and the safeguarding of their livelihood. This great work will take years.

 

In the course of settling the acquired territories with thousands of volunteers, especially the soldiers as farmers, who will have become acquainted with these regions and turn the conquered soil into German land, it will also be possible to convert many non-viable small and very small farms in the homeland into healthy farms that permit the use of modern machinery. This structural change will have to be carried out with the necessary caution, so as not to spoil the source of life of ancient farming settlements. There will be a repetition of the processions of Germans willing to settle who have so often moved eastward in the course of German history. Only on the basis of the healthy economic structure created by the reorganization of the German peasantry and the reallocation of land will it be possible to begin the reorganization of villages in a big way. Through the regeneration of the German peasantry and the reorganization of villages, that economic balance will be created which will raise the standard of living in the countryside and thus create the prerequisite for the peasantry to be able to fulfil its most important task, that of being the source of the people’s blood. For the larger the areas to be settled, the more this most fundamental task of the peasantry will come to the fore, since, as I have already said elsewhere, a secure food policy will come about entirely as a result of a sound agricultural policy.

 

In order to improve the living conditions

 

The leadership of the Reich knows about the preliminary work that you, men and women of the country, have done. The Führer himself is the guarantor that after this victory the German people as a whole will step up to improve the living conditions of the country people. All the problems that beset you today - rural exodus, undervaluation of farm labour, price issues, supply of the necessary inputs, structural design and modernization of farms - will then find their solution of their own accord as parts of a whole. If I briefly outline the future tasks and solutions here, it is also to help you, who are overburdened with daily worries, to look to the future. Measured against this future, the present hardships, as difficult as they may seem to us, are small. Nothing new can be born without sacrifice and struggle. But this new thing, the basic form of which was laid in the agricultural policy of the NSDAP as early as 1933, can only now be fully developed. Thus, agricultural policy is now entering a new, decisive stage. If its core - the hereditary farm - encompassed only a part of agriculture in the constricted Germany, it will then step out of this narrow framework. Not only by the fact that innumerable hereditary farms will come into being in the new territories, and not only by the fact that new hereditary farms will be created by reallocation in the old Reich territories, but also by the fact that the granting of hereditary farm status in the old Reich will be granted to all those who profess their allegiance to National Socialism and the people and who have now substantiated this allegiance by deed and performance during the war and in the war economy; For the hereditary farm was not economic consolidation as an end in itself, but economic consolidation in order to preserve the clan, the clan as the nucleus of the growing people.

 

Preservation in war

 

The tasks and objectives laid down by the National Socialist agricultural policy are unavoidable, and - to this end - can only be referred to in the following terms, you can rely on it, my fellow countrymen - you will be honoured. Thus, for the first time in its history, the German country people will also enjoy the full benefit of an unrestricted evaluation of their achievements. The prerequisite for this development, however, is victory. For this reason, it must be our task to accomplish the given war tasks with the most ruthless effort:

 

1.      We must produce as much food as the German soil is capable of yielding

 

2.      We have to put as much food on the market as possible, with the utmost frugality in our own consumption.

 

The magnitude of the work done so far should not blind us to the fact that the tasks we have to master in the fourth year of the war will not be less, but greater. I will have to demand even more from you in this 4th year of war than before. The last winter dealt us a hard blow. We must and will overcome them. You yourselves know best why we have to expect a lower yield of winter cereals and seed oils this year. We must make up for this shortfall by stepping up deliveries to make up for it. In the interest of supplying the front, I have to expect the agricultural sector to go beyond the usual economic limits when it comes to deliveries in the interest of supplying the fighting front and the homeland. Therefore, I appeal to your performance, your spirit and your attitude. It is through your performance that the forthcoming harvest will be saved without loss and all your strength will be used for the preparation of the next harvest. But your spirit and attitude are the prerequisite for the success of the great delivery in all fields. The number of those who in attitude and performance in this war is infinitesimal. It is our duty not only to look up to these few, but, for the sake of cleanliness in our ranks, to subject them to exemplary punishment. But you other many, you workers and brave ones, do not only fulfil your duty by your own exemplary performance, but you must also, with the necessary national socialist spirit of attack, urge those who are weak or suffering to faith and commitment. It was in accordance with this old law of struggle that National Socialism began and had its unimaginable successes. According to this law, here in Lower Saxony, too, a small group of National Socialists has, through their commitment and struggle, won over the people thanks to the Fuhrer. How much easier it is today for you, who are the vast majority of the faithful, to win over the few others to the task. This war is about the existence of the whole nation. There should be no doubt in anyone’s mind that in the event of a collapse the enemy would wipe us out economically and popularly. All the people’s strength is now stretched to the limit. The Home Front must consider itself as responsible for the outcome of this struggle as responsible as the soldier. Without adequate nutrition neither the manpower nor the of the nation can be maintained.

 

In this struggle, let us think of ourselves as soldiers who, at the complete sacrifice of their personal lives, labour and property, are fighting for the sake of the Reich. Let us remember, in those hours when we may think we are collapsing under the burden of daily work, our fathers, husbands and sons at the front who, in an unparalleled sacrifice and with incomparable courage, have lost their lives in the struggle for the Reich. Heroism have kept Bolshevism away from our borders. Let us also remember in those hours the men of the agricultural organization in the East who, under particularly hard working conditions and at the risk of their lives, create the conditions so that the new areas in the East can begin to supply Germany and Europe with grain, seed oils, and other products. Let us lift up our hearts in this hour! Let us not be weighed down by the cares of everyday life. We have sworn unconditional allegiance to the Fuhrer. This oath will be kept. As great as the present difficulties may be, we do not want to overestimate them. We always want to see them in the context of the great times and the great tasks that lie ahead of us. Let us be clear about the fact that the preservation of the peasantry in this war will be decisive for its future position in the nation and for its value in the national community. What we sacrifice today will be repaid in many ways after the victory. Thus, believing in the leader and his historical mission, we want to go back to our hard day’s work. In the future, as in the past years, we want to be the Fuhrer’s most faithful followers. Our sole guideline and slogan for the coming weeks and months can only be: Work for the victory of our weapons and thus for the victory of our kind!

Ludwig van Beethoven - Symphony No. 6 in F major, Op. 68 (Pastoral)

Conductor: Herbert von Karajan

Performance: Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra

Year of recording: November 1982

 

I. Allegro ma non troppo

II. Andante molto mosso

III. Allegro

IV. Allegro

V. Allegretto

 

Die Deutsche Wochenschau – Newsreel No. 552 – 02 April 1941

– Initiation Ceremonies of Hitler Youth and German Girls League;

 

– Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Welcomed in Berlin.

Adolf Hitler - speech in Lustgarten, Berlin, May 1, 1933

“The Day of National Labor.”

 

 

  May 1, 1933

 

German boys! German girls!

 

Three cheers for our Reich President, Field Marshal von Hindenburg, the great soldier and leader of the World War: Er lebe hoch, hoch, hoch!

 

 

German Volk, you are strong when you are one. German Volk, you are not second-class, even if the world wants you to be a thousand times over. German Volk, forget fourteen years of disintegration and rise up to two thousand years of German history!

 

German Volksgenossen! ‘Der Mai ist gekommen.”  That is how a German folksong puts it. And for many centuries, the first day of May was not only symbolic of spring’s arrival in the countryside; it was also a day of joy, of festive spirits and sentiments.

 

There came a time when this day was enlisted for other purposes, and the day of new life and hopeful joy was transformed into a day of quarrel and internal strife. A dogma which had seized hold of our Volk attempted to transform the day of awakening nature, of the visible approach of spring, into a day of hate, of fraternal strife, of discord, and of suffering. Centuries passed by this German country, and this day seemed more and more destined to document the division and disunity of our Volk. But there finally came a time of reflection, too, after the deepest suffering had seized our Volk, a time of turning inward and for German people to come together again.

 

And today we can once more join in singing the old folk song: “Der Mai ist gekommen. “Our Volk’s awakening has come to pass. The symbol of class conflict, of never-ending strife and discord, is now becoming once again the symbol of the great unity and uprising of the nation. And thus, for all time to come, we have chosen this day when nature awakens as the day of regaining our own power and strength and, at the same time, the productive work which knows no limits, which is not bound to unions or factories or offices; work we wish to recognize and promote wherever it is performed in a positive sense for the very existence and the life of our Volk.

 

The German Volk has a gruesome crisis behind it. But it is not as though this were due to lack of industry, no! Millions in our Volk are working like before. Millions of peasants are walking behind their plows as in the past, millions of workers are standing at the workbench, hammering to the sound of the ringing anvil. Millions in our Volk are working, and millions more want to work, but they cannot! Tens of thousands voluntarily put an end to an existence which, for them, holds only grief and misery. They have traded it for the next world, in which they hope for something more and better. Appalling suffering and misfortune have descended upon us and brought, in their wake, despondency and even despair. And we now ask ourselves, why? It is a political crisis. The German Volk has become disintegrated internally, its entire vitality is being used up in the internal struggle. The ability to build on the power of one’s own will has dwindled, people’s faith in the power of the individual has diminished. Millions are eyeing the rest of the world in the hope that it will bestow upon them good fortune and well-being. The Volk is disintegrating, and its vitality, its power to assert its own life, is fading with this disintegration. We see the consequences of this class conflict around and within us, and we want to learn from this. For there is one thing we have recognized as the primary requirement for the recovery of our Volk: the German Volk must once again come to know itself! The millions of people divided into professions, separated into artificial classes which, infested by arrogance of rank and class madness, are no longer able to understand each other-they must find their way back together! A gigantic, tremendous task-we know it! But when madness has been upheld and preached as a political idea for seventy years, when the destruction of the Volksgemeinschaft has been the political rule for seventy years, then it is difficult to seek to change people’s minds overnight. We must not allow this to let us become despondent and despair. What one man has built, another can tear down; what human madness once created can be overcome by the power of reason.

 

We know that this process of coming to know and understand each other cannot be a matter of weeks or months or even of a mere few years. We do, however, have the unshakable will to accomplish this great task before German history, we have the resolution to lead German people back together, and if necessary, to force them back together.

 

That is the meaning of May Day which shall be celebrated in Germany from now on and throughout the centuries so that all those who are active in the great machinery of our productive national work may join together and extend their hands to one another once a year in the realization that nothing can be accomplished unless everyone contributes his share of work and efforts. And thus, as our motto for this day, we have chosen the sentence, “Honor the work, and respect the worker!” For millions, it is difficult to overcome all the hate and misunderstandings which have been artificially cultivated in the past and find their way back together. There is one realization which allows us to tread this path more easily.

 

Take a person who is working, wherever it may be-he should and must not forget that his Volksgenosse, who is doing his duty just like him, is indispensable; that the nation does not subsist on the work of a government, of a certain class or in the products of its intelligence, but rather lives from the mutual and harmonious work of all! When millions believe that the type of work itself is any indication of the worthiness of those who execute it, this is a bitter mistake. There are many tens of thousands among us who want to make respect for the individual dependent upon the type of work he does. No! Not what he does, but rather how he does it must be the decisive factor. The fact that millions among us are industrious year in, year out, without ever being able to hope to gain riches, or even only to achieve a life without cares-that should oblige everyone to support them all the more. For it is their idealism and their devotion alone which make it possible for the whole to exist and live. It would be a sorry fate if today this idealism in our Volk were to fade and the value of an individual were to be judged solely by the external fortunes of life which have fallen to his lot. The value of our Volk would then no longer be great and its term of existence would not be long.

 

It is useless to explain to the worker that he is important or to prove to the peasant the necessity of his existence; useless to approach the intellectual, the mental worker, in order to make him understand the importance of what he does. It is necessary to teach each rank and class the significance of the other ranks and classes. And therefore we want to go forth into the cities to proclaim to them the necessity and the essentiality of the German peasant and go out into the country and to our thinkers and teach them the significance of the German working class. We want to go to the worker and to the peasant to teach them that there can be no German life unless there is a German spirit; that they all must unite to form a great community: spirit, mind and hand, worker, peasant, and burgher.

 

This First of May shall also convey to the German Volk the realization that industry and work alone do not make up life if they are not wed to the power and the will of a people. Industry and work, power and will-only if they join forces, only when the strong fist of the nation is raised to protect and shelter the work, only then can real blessings result. And this day shall also make the German Volk conscious of one thing: German Volk! You are strong when you are united, when you banish from your heart the spirit of class conflict and your discord. You can place an enormous power behind your work if you unite that work with your entire Volkstum’s will to live! We dream of a State of the German Nation which is capable of once more securing our Volk’s daily bread on earth, and we know that this requires the concentrated force of the nation. Though today Marxism scoffs that this will never work, we will provide proof that it does. My friends! Things that are great in this world are never free. One must fight bitterly for everything; similarly, it will not be an easy matter for the uprising of the Volk to become reality: it, too, requires an inner struggle. We should not complain today; we know that we will earn this uprising, will earn the freedom of our Volk. And then it will be proven that Marxism was no more than mere theory and, as such, attractive and seductive, but in reality incapable of bringing real profit and good fortune to a people.

 

This First of May shall document that we do not intend to destroy, but rather plan to build up. One should not choose the most beautiful spring day of the year as a symbol of fight, but as a symbol of constructive work; not as an embodiment of decay and thus disintegration, but only of völkisch solidarity and thus of rising up. It is no coincidence that our opponents, who claim to have been celebrating this day for seventy years now and who have been in power in Germany for fourteen years have not, in spite of everything, succeeded in gaining hold of the German Volk on this day as we have done from the very beginning. The Volk unconsciously perceives in its core that any celebration of the Marxist type was contrary to the springtide season. It did not want hate, it did not want struggle, it wanted uplifting! And today the Volk senses it: the First of May has recovered its true, intrinsic meaning. That is the reason why millions throughout Germany are joyfully pouring forth to bear witness to a will which desires to take part in the reconstruction of the nation. And while we observe this holiday for the first time today, let us call to mind our aims for the time which lies before us: without faltering shall we struggle to ensure that the power captured by the new concept, the new political faith in Germany, will never again fade, but instead grow stronger and stronger.

 

We want to fight to ensure that this new idea rises above all of Germany and gradually captivates the entire German Volk in its spell. With courage and determination, we want to defend this flag of the resurrection of our Volk against anyone who believes he can tear it down. We want to reawaken our Volk’s self-esteem and self-confidence and attempt to increase them on a permanent basis. We know the time which lies behind us and those who typified it. They intentionally inoculated our Volk with the idea that it was, as a whole, inferior in the world, incapable of great deeds, not worthy of the rights accorded all others. They artificially cultivated inferiority complexes because this corresponded to the inferiority of the parties which seduced this Volk for long years. We want to release the Volk from this spell, want to continually impress upon it this belief: German Volk! You are not second-class, even if the world wishes it so a thousand times over. You are not of lesser value, of lesser significance. German Volk, remember what you are, remember your past and the accomplishments of your fathers, of your very own generation! Forget fourteen years of disintegration, and rise to two thousand years of German history! We have called out to you this way, my Volksgenossen throughout Germany, from the first day onwards to instill in all of you this conviction from a feeling of inner solidarity: Germans! You are a strong Volk if you will yourself to be strong! The millions who are demonstrating in Germany today will return home with the feeling of a newly won inner power and unity. I know, my comrades, that tomorrow your tread will be firmer again than it was yesterday. For all of us feel it: today it may be possible to rape the nation, to put it in chains-but it is no longer possible to break or humiliate it! Thus it is also our desire on this day to fortify the confidence not only in yourself, German Volk, no, but the confidence in your government, too, which feels bound to you and is a part of you, which belongs to you, which fights with you for your life, which has no other purpose but to make you, German Volk, free and happy once more.

 

And finally, today our solidarity is to be documented for all time by an act.

 

When we first presented the idea of compulsory labor service to the public, the representatives of the dying Marxist world raised a great outcry, declaring, “That is a new attack on the proletariat, an attack on work, an attack on the life of the worker!” Why did they do that? They knew very well that it would never be an attack on work and much less an attack on the worker, but merely an attack on a terrible prejudice, namely that manual labor is inferior. We want to wipe out this prejudice in Germany. At a time when millions in our ranks live without any comprehension of the significance of manual labor, we want to bring the German Volk, by means of compulsory labor service, to the realization that manual labor does not discredit, does not degrade, but rather, just as any other activity, does honor to him who performs it faithfully and honestly.

It remains our firm decision to lead every single German, be he who he may, whether rich or poor, whether the son of scholars or the son of factory workers, to experience manual labor once in his lifetime so that he can come to know it, so that he can here one day more easily take command because he has learned obedience in the past. We intend by no means to eliminate Marxism only in an external sense. We are resolved to remove its very foundations. We want to spare coming generations the mental confusion it causes.

 

Mental and manual workers must never be allowed to be on opposite sides.

 

For this reason we are exterminating that feeling of arrogance which so readily befalls the individual and makes him look down upon comrades who “only” stand at the workbench or the machine or walk behind the plow. Not only must every German become acquainted at least once with this type of work, but viceversa, too: the manual worker must realize that mental work is also necessary.

 

And he must be taught that no one has the right to look down upon others, to imagine oneself something better; rather, each must be willing to join the great community.

 

This year for the first time we will turn this great ethical concept, which we connect with the Arbeitsdienst, into reality. And we know that when forty years have passed, the term manual work will have undergone a change in meaning for millions of people, just as the term Landsknecht has come to be replaced by the concept of the German soldier.

 

This year we will also accomplish the great task of liberating creative initiative from the disastrous influences of majority resolutions. Not only in parliament, but in the economy as well. We know that our economy cannot advance unless a synthesis can take place between the freedom of the creative spirit and the obligation to the Volk as a whole. Thus it will also be our task to give to the treaties the meaning they deserve. Man does not live for the sake of treaties; treaties are there in order to make it possible for man to live. And finally, this year we will endeavor to finish the first lap on the way to an organic management of the economy, and we will proceed on the basic realization that there is no advancement which does not begin at the root of national, völkisch and economic life: the peasant. There begins the path which leads to the worker and further on to the intellectual.

 

Thus we will begin with our husbandman and, as first priority, lead his business back to health. We know that this is the foremost prerequisite for the recovery of the rest of the economy. The opposite has been done now for fourteen years. And we are witnessing the results. It has helped neither the urban dweller nor the worker nor the Mittelstand-they have all been forced to the brink of destruction.

And this leads to yet another task: the elimination of unemployment by a program providing employment. We are dividing this employment program into two parts. First of all, there is private provision of employment. Before the year is over, we will have set out to accomplish a work of greatness, a work which will put German structures and buildings back in order and thus provide work for hundreds of thousands. At this time and in this place, we want to direct our appeal to the German Volk for the first time: German Volk! Do not believe that the problem of providing employment will be solved in the stars. You yourself must lend a hand toward solving it. You must do everything you can out of understanding and trust to provide work. Each and every person has the duty not to hesitate to provide that which he requires; not to wait to produce what he will once have to produce. Every entrepreneur, every property owner, every businessman, every private person has the duty to bear German labor in mind. Since today the world is circulating untrue allegations against us, since German labor is being denounced, we must expect each German to take on his work. This is an appeal which, directed to millions of individuals, is best able to provide work for millions of people. We will also attempt to provide public employment opportunities on a large scale within the current year. We are installing a program which we do not want to pass on to posterity, the program of building a new road system, a gigantic undertaking which will require billions. We will sweep away resistance and make a great beginning. We will thereby introduce a series of public work projects which will help to steadily decrease the unemployment rate.

 

We want to work and we will work! However, in the end everything depends upon the German Volk itself, on you, on the confidence you place in us; it depends on the force of your belief in the national State. Only when you all unite in the single will to save Germany will the German individual be able to find his salvation in Germany. We know that we still have tremendous difficulties to overcome. We also know that all human labors are doomed to fail if they are not blessed by the light of Providence. But we do not belong to those who comfortably rely on a hereafter. Nothing will be given us for free. Just as, for us, the road from the past fourteen years to the present day has been a road of incessant struggle, a road which often led us near despair, the road to a better future will also be difficult. The world is persecuting us, it is turning against us, it does not wish to recognize our right to live, does not want to admit that we have a right to protect our homeland.

 

My German Volksgenossen! The fact that the world is so against us is all the more reason why we must become a unified whole; all the more reason for us to continually assure the world: you can do whatever you want! But you will never break us, never force us to submit to any yoke! You will no longer be able to wipe out the cry for equal rights in our Volk! The German Volk has come to its senses. It will no longer tolerate people in its midst who are not for Germany! We want to earn the renewed ascent of the nation by honest means, through our industry, our persistence, our unshakable will! We are not asking of the Almighty, “Lord, make us free!” We want to take an active part, to work, to accept one another as brothers and unite in a common struggle so that one day the hour will come when we can step before the Lord and have the right to ask of Him, “Lord, You can see that we have changed. The German Volk is no longer a Volk of infamy, shame, self-reproach, faintheartedness, and little faith.

 

No, Lord, the German Volk is once again strong in its will, strong in its persistence, strong in bearing any sacrifice. Lord, we will not give You up! Now bless our fight for our freedom and thus our German Volk und Vaterland!”

Fighting for Berlin – A Battle Memoir

Published in „Siegrunen” Monograph 4 – French Volunteers of the Waffen-SS, 2006

 

 

The story of the battle according to the late SS-Brigadeführer  Dr. Gustav Krukenberg in interviews and letters to J. L. Roba, further adapted by the present author.

 

From the end of March 1945, Brigfhr. Krukenberg was stationed with his staff at a farm 12 kilometres east of Neustrelitz. His two missions were to reconstitute an assault regiment (Sturmregiment) from the remnants of the “Charlemagne” Division and whatever future reinforcements were available, and to build up defensive positions from the Tollensee to the south, following the perimeter of the lake.

 

In the night of 23/34 April, he received two telephone calls at around 0400 hours; these were from the Personnel Office of the Waffen-SS near Furstenberg and the Army Group staff and both transmitted the order of the Wehrmacht High Command for Krukenberg to proceed to Berlin and take charge of a division whose commander was “ill.” Upon his arrival in the German capital, Krukenberg was to meet with General of the Infantry Krebs and the liaison officer of the Waffen-SS to the Fuehrer HQ, SS- Gruppenführer Hermann Fegelein.

 

Krukenberg asked about the military situation and he was told that Russian troops had launched a great offensive and were advancing in two separate columns towards Berlin. But there was some hope; some contact had been made with U.S. troops and in the west the German Army had been advised to cease resistance in order that the Americans might be the first to reach Berlin. Also in the area of Rathenow/Genthin, a German Panzer Army under the command of General Wenck was ready to move to Potsdam to break the Soviet effort at encirclement and free the passage for U.S. troops.

 

Brigfhr. Krukenberg could not believe what he had heard! Was it possible that contacts with the Americans could save Berlin? He had seen what the Soviets had done when they had “liberated” the Eastern territories and he knew the fate that would befall the German capital if the Reds occupied it. Berlin was not an “open city” but since 1 February 1945 had been organized as a “Festung” (fortress) for defensive purposes. Since the situation was not very clear, Krukenberg then decided to organize a personal escort to accompany him to Berlin.

 

[There is now a hazy area in the Krukenberg memoirs concerning the formation of the French SS battlegroup. He does not mention whether or not a telegram had been received ordering “Charlemagne” into Berlin, although this has been confirmed by others, including Hstuf. Weber. In any event a combat task force of battalion strength was assembled to accompany Krukenberg.]

 

All of the Frenchmen were ready to fight until the end. Those who did not go to Berlin remained in the Neusterlitz area to participate in the fortifications work. The words of Monsignor Mayol de Lupe however remained in the minds of those who went to fight. He had advised them to “remain true Frenchmen” who must remember that “before God they had sworn to protect the West from the dangers of the East.”

 

Krukenberg decided to leave Neustrelitz at 0830 hours. Soon after the detachment was assembled, the French SS troops were surprised to see a Mercedes sedan driving rapidly down the road towards them with the Reichsführer-SS himself at the wheel. The troops immediately threw themselves into parade formation but Himmler never slowed down or even looked their way. It was a disappointment for the Frenchmen who thought that their “leader” would surely stop and inspect them, but in truth, Himmler was engaged in hopeless negotiations with the Swedish Count Bernadette and he had other things on his mind.

 

After loading their vehicles with ammunition, the men began their journey to the south. Many times they met cars and trucks leaving Berlin filled with personnel from one administrative service or another. These men were quite surprised to see soldiers moving in the opposite direction to them, and one of them stopped the French SS column and told them that Russian tanks had appeared in the vicinity of Oranienberg and that it was no longer possible to reach Berlin via Frohnau. Krukenberg then searched his memory of the area around pre-war Berlin and decided upon another route through Neu-Rupin.

 

Near Frisack the French SS column switched to the highway that led to Hamburg. They found the traffic heavy and particularly congested at intersections. The pace slowed down to a crawl; assorted troops passed them going in the other direction. With the exception of a small signals troop from the “Nord land” Division that had been ordered to relocate to Holstein, none of the passing soldiers were Waffen-SS. Some Police troops who were well equipped and in good condition, were also encountered. However they seemed confused and their vehicle convoys were in disorder. Groups of singing soldiers, believing that the Soviets would not follow them due to pacts between the USA and USSR, were also run into.

 

The “Charlemagne” column received some light fighter- bomber strafing while proceeding down the main avenue in Nauen, but little damage was done and the troops proceeded to the town of Wustermark. Here the situation was markedly more serious; part of the town was under enemy artillery fire. Brigfhr. Krukenberg searched his pre-war memories of the suburbs of Berlin and decided to reroute his command through Ketzin. After covering about 6 kilometers on the Ketzin road the French SS convoy came in sight of two Soviet columns, one advancing from the southwest and the other moving down from the northeast. These were in fact the advance pinchers of the Soviet Army Corps that were about to encircle Berlin. Once they linked up, Berlin would be cut off.

 

It would only be a matter of minutes before the pinchers closed, so Brigfhr. Krukenberg paused briefly to consider the situation. If they continued on it might prove impossible to turn back and if the bridge on the canal near the farms of Falkenrede had been destroyed it might prove impossible to proceed to Berlin, and the Russians would only be a few hundred meters away! In the meantime the scouts at the heads of the Soviet columns had spotted the Waffen-SS troops and had quickly taken the vanguard elements into cover until more forces could be moved up. This brought a little time for the Frenchmen.

 

Krukenberg then decided to go forward and risk being cutoff, as it might be (and was!), the last chance they had to get into Berlin. As the convoy continued on, more and more Red Army troops were seen all around in the distance, but these soldiers decided the “Charlemagne” convoy was probably one of their own and paid it no heed. So a bold bluff had to be maintained. In a short time the Falkenrede Canal bridge was reached and it was intact!

 

However there were barbed wire entanglements and antitank obstructions blocking the entrance to the bridge. Some soldiers were detached to remove them. No sooner had they begun working then the bridge blew up in their faces! One man was lightly wounded and thrown into the canal (he swam out), and another was more severely wounded in the legs. But the bridge was now impassable. Brigfhr. Krukenberg immediately ordered all supplies and ammunition unloaded from the vehicles and distributed among the troops. From here on they would proceed on foot. The trucks would be sent back slowly with the badly wounded men and hopefully they would still fool the Russians (they did!).

 

At about 1500 hours the French SS men had crossed over the damaged bridge and found the cause of their difficulties around the bend a little further down the road. It was a three man Volkssturm (home guard) contingent who had been guarding the bridge with orders to destroy it at the approach of the enemy. Naturally they felt the “Charlemagne” convoy probably belonged to the Red Army, so they did their duty! The French SS men had now been mistaken for Soviet soldiers by troops on both sides!

 

The Sturmbataillon foot column now took off at a quick pace with the 57 year old Brigfhr. Rrukenberg accompanied by an 18 year old Unterscharführer at its head. Behind him came Hstuf. Fenet with the battalion staff and the “runners” and messengers. Then came 2nd (Michel), 3rd (Rostand) and 4th (Olliver) Companies with 1st Company under Ustuf. Labourdette forming a rear guard and following at a slower pace.

 

The resultant march of about 20 kilometers was somewhat longer than had been anticipated. The only troops that were passed were a trio of Hitler Youth on bicycles carrying Panzerfausts. All of the bridges en route had been left unguarded to the amazement of the French SS men; there was certainly nothing to prevent a surprise coup by the Soviets!

 

At about 2200 hours on 24 April, the Sturmbataillon arrived at the Olympic Stadium in Berlin where they had the luck to find an unguarded Luftwaffe canteen which was quickly divested of its confections, particularly chocolate items, by the tired and hungry SS troopers. All of the houses in the vicinity were still occupied by staff members of the various administrative services, and all still appeared normal since noise and music could be heard emanating from the dwellings. Seeing this “normalcy,” Brigfhr. Krukenberg went through the neighborhood requisitioning civilian vehicles for the use of his unit.

 

This being accomplished, Krukenberg then allowed his men to get some rest, although they were carefully instructed to stay under trees or some cover to avoid being spotted by enemy aircraft, The Brigadeführer and his giant-sized Berlin-born adjutant, Ustuf. Pachur, then took one of the newly acquired autos and drove down the Bismarckstrasse to the Brandenburg Gate and thence to the Reichschancellery. The streets were uniformly quiet and the two SS officers saw no sign of any defensive works. They were also able to cross completely through the city without once being stopped by military sentries!

 

At approximately 0030 hours on 25 April 1945 (a Wednesday), the “Charlemagne” command car stopped near the Fuehrer Bunker. The sentries here did not recognize Brigfhr. Krukenberg but when he asked to meet with General Krebs they guided him and Pachur to a communications room where they were kept waiting for three hours (Krebs disliked the Waffen-SS!). Krukenberg used the time to call back to his old Army Group headquarters in Prenzlau to let them know of his successful arrival in Berlin. For the rest of the time Krukenberg and Pachur were left to dwell upon the complete unpreparedness of Berlin to receive an enemy offensive. It was quite apparent to Krukenberg that a small Russian commando team could have captured all of the personnel in the bunker in a single surprise attack!

 

Finally, Gen. Krebs, accompanied by Gen. Burgdorf (a Wehrmacht liaison officer on Hitler’s staff), put in an appearance. Krukenberg had known Krebs when he himself was in the Wehrmacht in 1943. Both generals were surprised to see the SS officers. They had sent many messages all over Germany asking officers and their commands to come to Berlin and help defend it, but Krukenberg and his “Charlemagne” troops were the only ones to show up! The Army generals then gave Krukenberg and Pachur a situation briefing but they mostly talked about the future help of the USA and that of Armee “Wenck,” which was supposed to be plotting the relief of Berlin. In his turn, Brigfhr. Krukenberg then informed them of witnessing the Soviet pinchers advancing well to the north and west of Berlin, but the two generals downgraded that information, stating that those Red troops were certainly weak in strength and would be no match for the soldiers of General Wenck. General Krebs then ordered Krukenberg to meet with General of the Artillery Weidling, commander of the 56th Panzer Corps, for reassignment in the morning. Weidling had personally asked to see him when he arrived; his command post was in the Hohenzollem- dam. Krukenberg and Pachur then inquired as to the whereabouts of Gruf. Fegelein, whom they were also supposed to meet with, but he could not be found; they were told to come back later.

 

At about 0500 hours, Krukenberg and Pachur arrived back at the Stadium; the sky was clear and city life was proceeding normally—it was almost like peace time. Defensive troops just were not to be found. After resting for a while, the Brigadeführer journeyed to the command post of 56th Panzer Corps. To pass through the sentries he merely had to present a closed Soldbuch (ID booklet). He was then admitted into the presence of the Corps’ chief-of- staff Oberst von Duvfing. They were soon joined by Gen. Weidling himself, and he struck Krukenberg as a man totally without confidence in his mission. Weidling noted that he had arrived in Berlin only two days previously and had been appointed “battle commandant” of the city, but the defensive problems were overwhelming. His own armoured corps had suffered greatly in recent battles and of course was not nearly up to strength. Most of the other units in his command were of dubious military value. There were detachments from the administrative services, the Volkssturm, the Hitler Youth, Luftwaffe auxiliaries, etc. Some of them were ready to fight and die, but such intentions would not be enough in the days ahead.

 

The south-eastern portion of the city was designed Defense Zone “C,” and it was occupied by 11th SS Volunteer Panzer Grenadier Division “Nordland,” which had been assigned to 56th Panzer Korps. But Weidling had become worried about its commander, Brigfhr. Joachim Ziegler, who seemed to have lost control of the division, “Nordland” troops were being found milling around in confusion throughout the city. That is why Weidling had called for Krukenberg: to relieve the currently ineffective Ziegler. Krukenberg was surprised by the revelation because Ziegler had certainly distinguished himself in combat in the previous months! Faced with this situation, Krukenberg asked for a written order from Weidling to present to Ziegler; the latter individual was then instructed to proceed to the Reichschancellery to await further developments.

 

Brigfhr. Krukenberg then went to the “Nordland” Divisional HQ on the Hasenheide avenue. He was able to spot it from some distance away since no attempt had been made to disguise the function of the command post, and many vehicles were parked openly about it. The Soviet Air Force had spotted it as well and had bombed it only a few minutes before. There was smoke and dust all around and some wounded. Krukenberg met with Ziegler and informed him of the change of command. Brigfhr. Ziegler took it in stride, expecting no less, and told Krukenberg that he could not hope to hold out in this sector for more than another 24 hours. According to Ziegler the defence of Berlin was an impossible task and the Army High Command was just out to find scapegoats, presumably himself included.

 

Krukenberg then asked for a briefing on the general military situation and asked Ziegler how many troops he had deployed in the frontlines. The answer was about 70 men, with all the other troops trying to rest and recuperate. In addition the “Nordland” Artillery Regiment was assembled in the Tiergarten, but Ziegler was vague about everything else and he had no contact with neighbouring Volkssturm units. Krukenberg was startled to say the least by the laxity displayed by a once formidable SS division, and he laid much of the blame on Ziegler’s depressed mental state.

 

At 1200 hours on the 25th of April, Brigfhr. Ziegler left the “Nordland” command post for the Reichsehancellery; he would meet with Krukenberg again during the desperate breakout effort on I May. Brigfhr. Krukenberg then sent trucks back to bring up SS Sturmbataillon “Charlemagne” from the Reichsportfeld complex which included the Olympic Stadium. In the meantime, Krukenberg took stock of his surroundings, noting that Russian artillery fire was occasionally sweeping the Hasenheide. He then walked to the frontlines to see what was there. Outside of a few “Nordland” elements in the immediate vicinity of the command post he could not find too many of his own troops. In the foremost positions were scattered Volkssturm members armed only with captured weapons that were already running out of ammunition. They seemed lost and confused.

 

The Brigadeführer eventually came upon their leader, an NSDAP District Leader, in the Hermannplatz. He complained that the Volkssturm men had been sent alone to the “front” and had no contact with regular Army or SS troops. According to him the Soviets were everywhere in the eastern suburbs and generally advancing without much resistance. Reichsleiter Hilgenfeld, overall Volkssturm commander for the sector had been killed two hours previously at the Gorlitzer train station. Fighting was raging at Templehof.

 

As Krukenberg talked with the District Leader, two enemy tanks appeared on the other side of Hermannplatz. That broke off the conversation; Krukenberg left saying he would immediately send up some of his men to knock out the tanks. On the way back to the “Nordland” command post, the tanks, supported by “Stalin Organ” rockets opened fire, and Krukenberg was slightly wounded by shell fragments. He soon found his French SS men installed in the Gneisenau Barracks near the divisional HQ and sent half of them under Fenet and Weber up to the “front” near the Her- mannplatz.

 

In the afternoon of violent action, the French volunteers destroyed 14 Red tanks in close combat, driving back the entire Soviet vanguard by dusk. At this stage of the war the Soviet troops were not too keen at pressing their attack, and when they met with significant resistance, tended to break off any frontal assault. An example of their timidity came at the Halensee Bridge where three men of the Reich Labour Service held off an entire enemy company for 48 hours with one machine gun!

 

Brigfhr. Krukenberg’s next task was to deal with the matter of a headquarters for the “Nordland” Division; the one on the Hasenheide had been so devastated by aerial bombardment that it was no longer useable. Thus the Gneisenau Barracks, which had formerly housed Police troops, was requisitioned. Authorization for said act was requested of and received from 56th Pz. Corps HQ, which had since relocated to the Bendlerstrasse. There were suitable communications facilities at the Gneisenau Barracks, even though the loss of the signals unit which had been sent to Holstein was having its effect. There were also two fully equipped, fresh police battalions there that had been forgotten about by higher authorities.

 

As a result Krukenberg asked for a more important defensive area for his troops, telling Corps that the newly found Police soldiers could handle the old “Nordland” sector. “Nordland” was ordered first to the Gendarmenmarkt and then was to relocate on 26 April to Defence District “Z” (Zentrum/Center), in the heart of Berlin. Brigfhr. Krukenberg then went to report to the commander of District “Z,” Oberstleutnant Seiffert.

 

He found Seiffert to be acutely hostile towards the SS. Seiffert told Krukenberg he did not want the “Nordland” Division, since it did not have enough men and the officers were therefore rendered superfluous. Krukenberg replied that most of the troops were resting and would be ready for action shortly and noted that fully one-third of the grenadiers were Scandinavian volunteers who had good relations with their superiors and would follow them anywhere. Seiffert cut him off, saying he already prepared for the defence of his district. Krukenberg then volunteered to place all of his men directly under the command of Seiffert if he so desired, asking only to serve with them as a private or NCO if necessary. He pointed out that he had transferred from the Army into the Waffen- SS only a year or so previously and there were no real grounds for distrusting the Waffen-SS. But the Oberstleutnant still turned him down.

 

Somewhat disconsolate, Krukenberg then returned to his new command post in the Berlin Opera House. Along with his staff officers he then slept a little bit in the night of 25/26 April, which was very quiet and almost tranquil. The morning of 26 April 1945 dawned somewhat cold. The famous Unter den Linden was empty and devoid of life. Some artillery fire could be heard from the bend in the River Spree. At around noon, the Brigadeführer assembled his unit commanders for a conference.

 

The commanders of the SS Panzergrenadier Regiments “Norge” and “Danmark” each indicated that they had about 600- 700 combat troops. Krukenberg had about one-third of these soldiers formed into a battalion-strength battlegroup and sent them to the critical Defense District “Z”; the rest were to be held in ready reserve for future use. The officers were told that there were directly responsible for their commands and they did not come under the control of the obdurate Oberstleutnant Seiffert.

 

The first reports of the troops sent to Defensive District “Z” were very bleak; there simply were no prepared field works or defenses—they only existed on paper in Seiffert’s office. Krukenberg then understood why the Oberstleutnant did not want any SS officers in his “area.” The Brigadeführer then decided to relay the information on to Gruf. Fegelein in the Fuehrer Bunker. Upon his arrival at the bunker, Krukenberg was escorted in and he noticed many high-ranking NSDAP officials in the rooms; one in particular was giving many orders. He asked his guide who was that high- ranking “political.” Surprised the guide replied that it was Reichsleiter Martin Bormann; he had believed that everyone knew who Bormann was!

 

Finally meeting Gruf. Fegelein, Brigfhr. Krukenberg expressed his concerns. He felt that Defense Zone “Z” was the most critical area in the city and that it would be stupid not to have the SS troops there particularly after the dismissal of the trusted and distinguished soldier, Brigfhr. Ziegler. He explained that he felt the Waffen-SS was being set up as a scapegoat for an incompetent High Command by not getting a chance to prove its worth where it counted the most. During the conversation, Gen. Weidling entered the room. He too was unhappy with the idea of the SS moving into Defence Zone “Z,” but against his will he agreed to divide the area into two sectors with the Wilhelmstrasse being the demarcation line. The northern sector with the key Luftwaffe Ministry Building remained under the command of Oberstleutnant Seiffert. The southern sector would be given over to the Waffen-SS, with Brigfhr. Mohnke, formerly commander of the “Leibstandarte,” being given overall jurisdiction. The SS units given to Seiffert had to remain in his sector until they could be relieved. Then they could join the other Waffen-SS troops in the southern sector. The command post for the Waffen-SS portion of Defence District “Z” was to be located in the main subway station in the centre of the city.

 

Following his conference with Fegelein and Weidling, neither of whom he would ever see again, Brigfhr. Krukenberg had a chance of discuss the combat situation with the Reich Propaganda Minister Dr. Goebbels, whom he had worked with prior to a falling out in the early 1930s. Goebbels wanted his unvarnished view of developments. Krukenberg bluntly described the defensive deficiencies of Berlin and the disaster that was now spreading over the entire Eastern Front. Goebbels appeared to be anxious about it all, but he spoke of his contacts with the Americans and the chance that they would help save Berlin from the Soviets. He also stated that Armee “Wenck” was a strong one and the Berlin garrison would only have to hold out for a few days until it got there. It was a desperate illusion.

 

At about 0100 hours on 27 April, a Friday, Krukenberg finally returned to his HQ in the Opera House. The remainder of the night was again quiet, but artillery fire could be heard from the east. A briefing of the “Nordland” officers was held early in the morning, and everyone felt that the decision to create an SS sector in the central part of the city would be advantageous. After holding an inspection of most of his troops, Brigfhr. Krukenberg left to confer with Brigfhr. Mohnke. On the way he ran into Gen. Krebs and Obergruppenführer of the Police Heinrich Müller (Gestapo), who were also on the way to the SS command post.

 

Mohnke greeted Krukenberg cordially and promised to give him all available help. Krukenberg told him that he knew very few of the men in his new command but he had the advantage of being extremely familiar with all of the streets and thoroughfares in the heart of Berlin. Mohnke advised him that a company of Naval infantrymen had been airlifted into Berlin during the past night and he was putting them at Krukenberg’s disposal. Krukenberg then met the Naval company commander and was very impressed by him and his command. He also learned that a portion of SS schwere Panzer Abteilung 503, the tank detachment of III. SS Corps (Germanic), was at his disposal and officially attached to the “Nordland” Division. Unfortunately it only had 8 armoured vehicles left.

 

On 27 April 1945 some isolated groups of Russians soldiers were seen near the canal at the Hallesche Gate. Brigfhr. Krukenberg decided to launch a counterattack in that sector; since the enemy incursions were still only patrol strength his men would have the manpower advantage and that might boost their morale after so much withdrawal fighting against a superior foe. The counterattack proved impossible however because members of the Volkssturm quickly blew up the canal bridges upon seeing the first enemy troops so there would be no easy way to cross the waterway.

 

The “Nordland” occupation of its new defensive sector was carried out peacefully, without any difficulty. Krukenberg divided his command into three segments of equal size; one of which would go into the foremost lines, the second of which would be held in ready reserve around the divisional command post and the third of which was comprised of men who still needed rest and recuperation, and this group would be held in emergency reserve. The Leipziegerstrasse, running through the SS sector, was reserved for use by tanks, but the objective was to support these tanks with “Charlemagne” troops armed with Panzerfausts, and the French SS troops found themselves heavily engaged in the northern sector of Defence Zone “Z” under the overall control of Oberstleutnant Seiffert and it proved impossible to immediately recall them.

 

Instead, Krukenberg fed other Waffen-SS and European volunteer units into his line of defence as they arrived in his sector. He also sent for a contingent from SS Artillery Rgt. 11 in the Tiergarten. The field pieces from this detachment were deployed to cover the streets to the north, towards the Reichstag and the Schlossplatz. No one knew what was really going on in that area and if any enemy tanks broke through the artillery gunners would be in place to deal with them.

 

In the afternoon of the 27th, Krukenberg arrived at his newly designated command post in the central subway station. It had been well organized by Ustuf. Pachur, but there was no electricity and communications to the outside were almost non-existent. The ceiling of the station was so thin that a Soviet artillery shell passed through it, exploded and wounded 15 men. They were promptly treated by Dr. Zimmermann (who was awarded the Iron Cross, 1st Class for his participation in the battle of Berlin), and then evacuated to the Pariserplatz. Food was located in nearby warehouses and was put under the guard of sentries. The drinking of alcoholic beverages was banned in order to maintain discipline. Ammunition was still being stored in the Gneisenau Police Barracks. A supply of Panzerfausts was made available to the SS troops from stocks at the Fuehrer Bunker.

 

Confusion still reigned all over and no defence works had been prepared in advance. The situation would have been much improved if the various administrative services in Berlin had simply put in a minimal amount of preparation work over the previous three months. On Saturday, 28 April 1945, Soviet assault troops threw bridges over the canals and crossed into the heart of Berlin. Fierce street fighting, that blazed from building to building, now raged in earnest. Losses were very heavy to both sides, due not only to the exchanges of fire but also to crumbling masonry from buildings hit by enemy artillery. Nevertheless through this day and the following one the men of the “Nordland” stayed in position, fighting back hard. The “Nordland” self-propelled guns proved their worth many times over as did the volunteers of SS- Sturmbataillon “Charlemagne.”

 

Unterscharführer Eugene Vaulot, who had knocked out 2 enemy tanks at Neukollin, now destroyed 6 more in succession with his Panzerfausts. At the request of Brigfhr. Krukenberg he was nominated for the Knight’s Cross and received it personally from Krukenberg in a candle-light ceremony at the “Nordland” command post in the subway station on the afternoon of 29 April. Upon this occasion, Krukenberg gave a short address in French praising the actions of Vaulot noting that it personified the bravery of the French Waffen-SS and indeed all French soldiers, who had fought throughout history in all parts of the world.

 

In the evening of the 29th, the commander of SS schwere Pz.Btl. 503, which was attached to the “Nordland” Division, SS Stubaf. Friedrich Herzig was personally decorated with the Knight’s Cross by Brigfhr. Mohnke. Three more awards of the Knight’s Cross also went to members of the “Charlemagne” Assault Btl. They were: Hstuf. Henri Fenet, battalion commander, Ostu£ Wilhelm Weber, combat school commander, and Oscha. Francois Apollot, platoon leader. Apollot had personally destroyed 6 enemy tanks on the Wilhelmstrasse which were advancing towards the Reichsehancellery. This action shattered a major enemy attack.

 

Ostuf. Weber had personally accounted for five tanks and had also been decorated with the Tank Destruction Badge in Gold. Vaulot and Apollot were later both killed-in-action. By this point in time 108 enemy tanks had been destroyed in Defense District “Z,” 62 of them by members of SS-Sturmbataillon “Charlemagne!” That gave rather eloquent testimony to the increasing fierceness of the fighting and demonstrated quite clearly why the frontlines had not yet broken. During the course of the action on 28 and 29 April. Brigfhr. Krukenberg was out of touch with all other military commands in Berlin; the men of “Nordland” were simply fighting on their own.

 

On Sunday, 29 April, it was learned that Armee “Wenck” was advancing towards Berlin, but by this time the very existence of that army was doubted by many of the soldiers. Krukenberg had no news whatsoever from either the High Command or the Reichsehancellery. On the 30th, Brigfhr. Krukenberg learned that Gen. Weidling had assembled his unit commanders for a very “frank” briefing, but both Krukenberg and Brigfhr. Mohnke had been deliberately excluded from the conference. Since the next day was “May Day,” a great holiday for the Soviet “workers,” Krukenberg felt that the Red Army would then make it supreme effort to capture Berlin. There was little to do but prepare for the worst eventuality. 

 

 

April 30th saw an increasing amount of enemy artillery fire and the frontline outposts of the Waffen-SS were on the receiving end of more and more deadly “Stalin Organ” rockets. Krukenberg moved up reserves to replace tired men in the front positions and saw to it that quantities of Panzerfausts and munitions were brought up to points just behind the main lines for easy access. Four of the “Nordland” tanks had been damaged and rendered immobile. They were now being used as static artillery pieces. In the evening hours, the men at the front tried to relocate to new emplacements that were not known to enemy artillery gunners. Krukenberg did not go to Brigfhr. Mohnke’s evening briefing, but instead devoted his time to trying to allocate supplies to all combat elements. Since he felt that the next day would probably be a bad one, he had extra rations and cigarettes distributed to the troops.

 

Because it was impossible to coordinate all of the defensive area, the fate of the battle now rested in the hands of each soldier. This was quite appropriate for the Waffen-SS, which had always tried to train its soldiers to operate independent of one another and individually if necessary. At 2400 hours on the 30th, the artillery fire from the other side began to decrease and gradually ceased. The front became quiet but the soldiers remained alert.

 

At 0700 hours on 1 May, Krukenberg finally received some new information from Brigfhr. Mohnke. He learned that Gen. Krebs (a former German Military Attache in Moscow who spoke Russian), Oberst von Duvfing and Oberstleutnant Seiffert had all gone through the lines to the Soviet command center to discuss the surrender of the city. Although they had been given a free pass to come and go by the Russians, they had not returned. Mohnke thought that they might be under interrogation in which case, they might compromise the weak spots in the city’s defenses. There was also more bad news about Armee “Wenck”: it had gotten bogged down in the face of superior enemy forces and had been forced to retreat!

 

Brigfhr. Krukenberg had two immediate tasks: 1) To protect his rear area and 2) To go to the command post of Oberstleutnant Seiffert at the Luftministerium and assume command of his sector as well. Task number one was partially facilitated by having a squad of combat engineers obstruct the subway route to the Pots- dammerplatz Station which had been left wide open. To accomplish task number two, Krukenberg went to the Luftministerium with an escort of French and German SS men.

 

Seiffert’s command post was in complete disorder. Ammunition dumps that had been hit by Russian fire were exploding dangerously nearby. There were about 100 Luftwaffe soldiers under the command of an older officer, who had little or no training in ground fighting. Kiukenberg ordered the Luftwaffe troops put in the main defensive line but the officer at first refused to obey him. However, after hearing how bad the situation actually was he reluctantly assembled his men for action.

 

Of Seiffert’s staff, Krukenberg could only locate a young Army Leutnant, who was not very communicative. He refused to tell him where Seiffert was other than that he had locked himself in an office and was busily destroying papers and documents. Just then the Oberstleutnant entered the room accompanied by two SS men attached to Krukenberg’s escort; they had found him in another part of the building. At about the same moment Krukenberg received a telephone call from Brigfhr. Mohnke, who had sent him out to take over Seiffert’s sector in the first place. Mohnke told him that his previous message to that effect had been revoked—it was all a misunderstanding! The situation was very confused!

 

Disgusted, Krukenberg wrote up a report on the incident for his superiors (Even though the world was collapsing, military bureaucracy continued on course!), then returned to his own HQ after first asking Seiffert to “free” his men from “Charlemagne” and “Nord- land” as soon as possible. There is no easy explanation for what happened, but given the incompetence exhibited by Oberstleutnant Seiffert and his hostility towards the SS, Brigfhr. Mohnke seems to have decided to try and incorporate his sector into the Waffen-SS defensive area but was probably overruled by a superior at the last moment.

 

The 1st of May, despite earlier indications, remained relatively quiet. At about noon, Brigfhr. Mohnke commandeered the last “Nordland” “Tiger” (PzKpfw. VI) tank. At 1900 hours, a “real” briefing (the word “real” being emphasized by Brigfhr. Kruken- berg), was held at the Fuehrer Bunker under the ruins of the Reichschancellery. Brigfhr. Ziegler, who had been under “house arrest” there for the last several days, informed Krukenberg of developments.

 

First it was learned that Hitler was dead and that before he had died he had married the sister of Graf. Fegelein’s wife. Unfortunately Fegelein had been executed somewhat prior to that event due to his attempt at “desertion.” More importantly Ziegler stated emphatically that Armee “Wenck” and the “contacts” with the West were myths. Then he noted also that Dr. Goebbels and his family had committed suicide. Krukenberg was shocked by the chain of events. It appeared to him that everything had been done in vain and the sacrifices of his SS volunteers had been made on the basis of falsehoods.

 

Brigfhr. Mohnke then entered the room and verified what Ziegler had said. With him were the Reiehsjugendführer Artur Axmann and other personalities. Mohnke stated that Gen. Krebs had made contact with the Soviet High Command and had proposed a conditional cease fire in Berlin, however the Reds wanted an unconditional surrender. This was out of the question according to Mohnke and he asked Krukenberg if he was willing to fight to the death with all of the units of Defence Zone “Z” under his command.

 

Krukenberg was in no mood for any more useless sacrifices; he told Mohnke it would be far better to organize the troops into a few small detachments and try to break through the enemy encirclement. Mohnke and Ziegler agreed it would be best to try this; but every unit would be on its own, moving in a general direction towards the northwest Gen. Krebs had made the decision to declare a cease fire at 2300 hours and it had been decided (by whom it is not known), that Hitler’s death would be announced in a radio broadcast at 2100 hours. Brigfhr. Ziegler decided to return to the “Nordland” Division for the breakout attempt

 

Brigfhr. Krukenberg then went back to his sector; he was afraid to tell his men that their magnificent resistance had been useless. Their confidence had been misled; the hoped for U.S. troops would never come to help them. He then assembled his officers in his subway command post for one last briefing. Each officer was instructed to remain with his men; comradeship in the smaller units had to remain intact.

 

At 2300 hours on 1 May, small rearguards were assembled to delay any developing enemy pursuit and at 2400 hours the main retreat of the SS Regiments ”Norge” and ““Danmark” got underway to the north via the Charlottenstrasse and the Friedrichstrasse. The subway tunnel seemed to offer an easy route of withdrawal but Brigfhr. Krukenberg ruled against its use because he was fearful his men might be totally entrapped therein. After crossing the Spree, the troops were to reassemble and scout out a further route.

 

A few minutes before leaving the ““Nordland” command post, Krukenberg sent one of his officers, Patzak, to contact Hstuf. Fenet and his troops in the Luftmimsterium and give them the order to retreat. But Patzak disappeared en route and Fenet never got the word; the French SS men thus stayed in position until the end. The roads were nearly choked off with rubble and debris, and it was impossible to move over them with anything but tracked vehicles, a few of which were still in operation. Still the SS troops retreated in good order under the cover of darkness. Upon reaching the other bank of the Spree River, Krukenberg sent out two officers (who were both born in Berlin), to make a reconnaissance. Neither of them returned!

 

At about 0300 hours on Wednesday, the 2nd of May 1945, Krukenberg decided to make the recce himself with his remaining escort of French SS men. After a few attempts to proceed in different directions which were broken off by the intensity of the enemy fire, Krukenberg finally met up with Brigfhr. Ziegler and other soldiers of the “Nordland” Division. They joined with his group. In this small troop were no fewer than five Knight’s Cross holders including the French SS-Unterscharführer Vaulot who would soon fall victim to a sniper’s bullet

 

After daybreak the group found itself exposed to Soviet artillery and was swiftly brought under fire. They relocated quickly to the Brunnenstrasse but again received a barrage of heavy mortar fire and Brigfhr. Ziegler fell, mortally wounded. It proved impossible to move forward in the direction of the retreat. The two original groups now split up again and began making their way back towards the inner city. Near the Ziegelstrasse they came upon a burning “Tiger” tank and Krukenberg recognized it as the last one belonging to the “Nordland” Division which he had dispatched to Brigfhr. Mohnke a little bit previously.

 

It was mutually decided that there was simply no chance of escaping capture, with perhaps disastrous results while wearing SS uniforms, so a decision was made by Krukenberg and his men to change into civilian clothes at the first opportunity and try to pass themselves off as “workers,” and perhaps leave the city that way. Various items of clothing were gathered from wrecked civilian houses and the change began. Krukenberg and his men brazenly passed by several Red Army patrols but when they reached Pankow they were arrested. That is all but Brigfhr. Krukenberg! He had left the group a little in advance to try and secure some better clothing and when he finally succeeded he was unable to locate his troops, who unknown to him, were now POWs!

 

After looking around for his men for a while, Krukenberg moved on. At about 1300 hours he was arrested too by soldiers from a Red artillery force. For some reason the NCO took charge of him saw his Soldbuch (identity papers), and promptly destroyed it, saying: “Not good!” So after that, Krukenberg did not have to admit his identity as an SS officer. After being held for a week with ten other prisoners. Brigfhr. Krukenberg was conducted along with the rest before a Soviet officer who had found an accordion in the ruins of Berlin. The big question he had for them was “Could anyone play this instrument?” One man in the group volunteered his services and after a short concert the pleased officer freed the whole batch, including Krukenberg.

 

He next made his way to the still intact residence of a friend in Dahlem, who put him up for a while and enabled him to rest. Krukenberg managed to evade all of the Russian patrols but one day he saw an official Soviet poster ordering all former German officers to turn themselves in to the “occupation5” authorities. This gave him pause for thought. While convinced that he could probably pass through the Soviet lines and reach the area occupied by the Western “Allies,” he was first and foremost a German soldier and the commander of a troop of foreign volunteers. Under the circumstances it was impossible for him to leave his men in Soviet hands while he found security for himself in the West. A true German officer could only share the fate of these men from other lands who had fought so bravely for the capital of the Reich.

 

So on 12 May 1945, Brigfhr. Krukenberg surrendered himself of his own free will to the communist authorities at Berlin-Steglitz. As an SS general he was immediately placed in high security confinement and “war crimes” charges were drawn up (i.e. fabricated) against him. The Soviet judges accused him of responsibility for the “damages to the Red Army occasioned by his military resistance in Pomerania and Berlin.” Krukenberg could not deny such a charge, so he made no statement at all in his defence. If they were going to convict him for doing his sworn duty as a soldier there was not much he could do about it! He was sentenced to 25 years at hard labour for his “crimes” and was eventually released more than 11 years later (the Soviets returned German soldiers and other ethnic Germans from the slave labour camps as a result of the Soviet Union’s desire to secure a favourable trade agreement with the West German government. Unfortunately the fate of other ethnic groups enslaved by the Soviets did not fare so well—including around 400 members of American and British air crews who had the misfortune to crash land on Soviet territory during the war, were abandoned by the American and British governments due to the political embarrassment that such negotiations would cause in their respective countries if their countrymen were to question the morality of their communist “friends”).