March 7, 1936
Men of the German Reichstag!
The President of the German
Reichstag, Party Comrade Goring, convened today’s session at my request in
order to give you an opportunity to hear a declaration from the Reich
Government pertaining to questions which instinctively are regarded not only by
yourselves but by the entire German Volk as important, if not to say decisive.
When in the gray November days of 1918 the curtain was lowered on the
bloody tragedy of the Great War ...
[…]
However, I have a right to lay these views of mine open before you
gentlemen, Deputies of the Reichstag, for they constitute both the explanation
for our own political experience, for our internal work among the Volk and for
our external standpoint.
Since the rest of the world often talks about a “German question,” it will
be wise to reach for ourselves an objective clarification on the essence of
this question. Some regard the “question” as being the German regime itself, as
being the completely misunderstood difference between the German regime and the
other regime, as being the so-called “rearmament” perceived as threatening, and
as being all those things one imagines one sees as a mirage ensuing from this
rearmament. For many, this question is rooted in the German Volk’s alleged lust
for war, in its slumbering plans for offensive or in its diabolical skill in
outwitting its opponents. No, my dear politicians! The German question is
something entirely different.
Here we have sixty-seven million people62 living on a very limited and only partially fertile area. That means
approximately 136 persons per square kilometer. These people are no less
industrious than other European peoples; they are no less demanding; they are
no less intelligent and they have no less will to live. They have just as
little desire to allow themselves to be heroically shot dead for some fantasy
as, for instance, a Frenchman or an Englishman does.
Neither are these sixty-seven million Germans more cowardly; and by no
means do they have less honor than members of the other European nations.
Once they were torn into a war in which they believed no more than other
Europeans and for which they bore just as little responsibility. Today’s young
German of twenty-five had just celebrated his first birthday during the pre-war
years and at the beginning of the war; thus, he can hardly be held responsible
for this catastrophe of the nations. Yes, even the youngest German who could
have been responsible was twenty-five years old when the German voting age was
fixed. Hence he is today at least fifty years old. That means that the
overwhelming majority of men in the German Volk were simply forced to take part
in the war, just as was the bulk of the survivors from the French or English
peoples. If they were decent, they did their duty then-if they were already of
age-just as well as every decent Frenchman and Englishman. If they were not
decent, they failed to do this and perhaps earned money instead or worked for
the revolution. These people are no longer in our ranks today, but live for the
most part as emigrants with some host or another. This German Volk has just as
many merits as other peoples, and naturally just as many disadvantages and
weaknesses, too.
The German question lay in the fact that this Volk-even as late as, for
example, 1935, and on the basis of a guilt it had never committed-was to be
made to suffer lesser rights which constitute an intolerable burden to an
honorloving Volk, a torment to an industrious Volk, and an outrage to an
intelligent Volk. The German question also means that one is attempting, by way
of a system of unreasonable actions, measures and hate-filled incitements, to
make even more difficult the already hard battle to assert the right to live,
and to make it more difficult not only artificially, but perversely and
absurdly.
For the rest of the world does not profit in the slightest from making it
more difficult for Germany to maintain its life. There is eighteen times less land
per capita of the population in respect to the German being than, for instance,
in respect to a Russian. It is understandable how hard the mere fight for one’s
daily bread must be and is. Without the efficiency and industriousness of the
German peasant and the organizational ability of the German Volk, it would
hardly be possible for these sixty-seven million to lead their lives. Yet what
are we to think of the mental naivety of those who perhaps recognize these
difficulties yet nonetheless celebrate our misery in childish glee in articles,
publications and lectures, who moreover actually hunt down every indication of
this, our inner plight, to tell it to the rest of the world? Apparently they
would be pleased were our distress even worse, were we not able to succeed over
and over again in making it bearable by industriousness and intelligence.
They have no idea how the German question would present a completely
different picture were the abilities and industriousness of these millions to
falter, whereby not only misery but also political unreason would come into
evidence. This, too, is one of the German questions, and the world cannot but
be interested in seeing that this matter of securing a German means of living
year after year is successfully solved, just as it is my desire that the German
Volk will also comprehend and respect a happy solution to these vital questions
for other peoples, just as in its very own best interest.
However, mastering this German question is initially a matter involving the
German Volk itself and need not concern the rest of the world. It touches upon
the interests of other peoples only to the extent that the German Volk is
forced, when solving this problem, to establish contact in an economic sense
with other peoples as buyers and sellers.
And this is where, again, it will be solely in the interests of the rest of
the world to understand this question, i.e. to comprehend the fact that the cry
for bread in a Volk consisting of forty, fifty, or sixty million is not some sly
feat of malice on the part of the regime or certain governments but rather a
natural expression of the urge to assert one’s right to live; and that well-fed
peoples are more reasonable than those who are hungry; and that not only the
respective government should have an interest in securing sufficient
nourishment for its citizens, but the surrounding states and peoples should as
well; and that it therefore lies in the interest of all to make it possible to
assert one’s right to live in the highest sense of the word. It was the
privilege of the pre-war age to take up the opposite view and proclaim it a
state of war, namely the opinion that one part of the European family of
peoples would fare all the better, the worse another part fared The German Volk
needs no special assistance to assert its own life. It wants, however, to have
opportunities no worse than those given to other peoples. This is one of the
German questions.
And the second German question is the following: because, as a result of
the extremely unfortunate general circumstances and conditions, the economic
life-struggle of the German Volk is very strenuous-whereas the intelligence,
industriousness, and hence the natural standard of living are in contrast very
high-an extraordinary exertion of all our energies is required in order to
master this first German question. Yet this can only be accomplished if this
Volk enjoys a feeling of political security in an external sense.
In this world, it is impossible to maintain-or much less lead-a Volk of
honor and bravery as Helots for any length of time.
There is no better confirmation of the German Volk’s innate love of peace
than the fact that, in spite of its ability and in spite of its bravery-which
cannot be denied, even by our opponents-and in spite of this Volk’s large
numbers, it has secured for itself only such a modest share of the Lebensraum
and goods of this world. Yet it is above all this trait of concentrating
increasingly on the inland, so characteristic of German nature, which cannot bear
being abused or shamefully deprived of its rights.
In that the unfortunate Peace Treaty of Versailles was intended to fix the-
historically unique-perpetuation of the outcome of the war in moral terms, it
created that very German question which constitutes a critical burden to Europe
if unsolved and, if solved, will be Europe’s liberation. And following the
signing of the Peace Treaty in the year 1919, I set myself the task of one day
solving this problem-not because I have any desire to do harm to France or any
other state, but because the German Volk cannot, will not, and shall not bear
the wrong done to it on the long term! In the year 1932, Germany stood at the
brink of a Bolshevist collapse. What this chaos in such a large country would
have meant for Europe is something perhaps certain European statesmen will have
an opportunity to observe elsewhere in future. For my part, I was only able to
overcome this crisis of the German Volk, which was most visibly manifest in the
economic sector, by mobilizing the ethical and moral values common to the
German nation. The man who wanted to rescue Germany from Bolshevism would have
to bring about a decision on-and thus a solution for-the question of German
equality of rights. Not in order to do harm to other peoples, but on the
contrary: to perhaps even spare them great harm by preventing a catastrophe
from engulfing Germany, the ultimate consequences of which would be
unimaginable for Europe.
For the re-establishment of German equality of rights has had no harmful
effect on the French people. Only the Red revolt and the collapse of the German
Reich would have dealt the European order and the European economy a blow
having consequences which, unfortunately, are virtually beyond the grasp of
most European statesmen. This battle for German equality of rights which I
waged for three years does not pose a European question, but answers one.
It is a truly tragic misfortune that of all things, the Peace Treaty of
Versailles created a situation the French people thought they should be
particularly interested in maintaining. As incapable as this situation was of
holding any real advantages for the individual Frenchman, all the greater was
the unreal connection which appeared to exist between the discrimination of the
German Volk by Versailles and the interests of the French. Perhaps the
character weakness of the German postwar years; of our Governments; and, in
particular, of our parties, was also to blame for the fact that the French
people and the serious French statesmen could not be made sufficiently aware of
the inaccuracy of this view. For, the worse the individual governments before
our time were, the more reason they themselves had to fear the national
awakening of the German Volk. Therefore, they were all the more frightened of
any type of national self-awareness, and thus all the more supportive in their
attitude toward the widespread international defamation of the German people.
Yes, they simply needed this disgraceful bondage to prop up their own sorry
regimes. Where this regime finally led Germany was vividly illustrated in the
imminent collapse.
Now, of course it was difficult, in view of the fact that our neighbors had
become so firmly accustomed to non-equality of rights, to prove that a
reestablishment of German equality of rights would not only do no harm to them,
but on the contrary: in the final analysis, it would be useful internationally.
You, my Deputies and men of the Reichstag, know the difficult path I have
had to take since that thirtieth of January 1933 in order to redeem the German
Volk from its unworthy situation, to then secure for it, step by step, equality
of rights, without removing it from the political and economic community of the
European nations and, particularly, without creating a new enmity in the
process of settling an old one.
One day I will be able to demand from history confirmation of the fact that
at no time in the course of my struggle on behalf of the German Volk did I
forget the duties I myself and all of us are obligated to assume toward
maintaining European culture and civilization.
However, it is a prerequisite for the existence of this continent, which
ultimately owes its uniqueness to the diversity of its cultures, that it is
unthinkable without the presence of free and independent national states.
Each European people may be convinced that it has made the greatest
contribution to our Western culture. On the whole, however, we would not wish
to do without any of what the separate peoples have given, and thus we do not
wish to argue over the value of their respective contributions. Rather, we must
recognize that the greatest achievements in the most diverse areas of human
culture doubtless stem from the rivalry between individual European accomplishments.
Therefore, although we are willing to cooperate in this European world of
culture as a free and equal member, we are just as stubbornly determined to
remain what we are.
In these three years, I have again and again attempted-unfortunately all
too often in vain-to build a bridge of understanding to the people of France.
The further we get from the bitterness of the World War and the years that
followed it, the more the evil fades in human memory, and the more the better
things of life, knowledge, and experience advance to the fore.
Those who once faced one another as bitter foes today honor each other as
brave fighters in a great struggle of the past, and once again recognize one
another as responsible for maintaining and upholding a great shared cultural
inheritance.
Why should it not be possible to terminate the futile, centuries-old strife
which has not brought either of the peoples a final settlement-and which never
will-and replace it by the consideration of a higher reason? The German Volk has
no interest in seeing the French suffer, and vice versa: how would France
profit if Germany were to come to ruin? What use is it to the French peasant if
the German peasant fares badly-or vice versa? Or what advantage does the French
worker have from the distress of the German worker? And what blessing could it
hold for Germany, for the German worker, the German Mittelstand, for the
German Volk as a whole, if France were to fall prey to misfortune? I have
attempted to solve the problems of a hate-filled theory of class conflict
within Germany’s borders by means of a higher reason, and I have been
successful. Why should it not be possible to remove the problem of the general
European differences between peoples and states from the sphere of
irrationality and passion and to place it in the calm light of a higher
insight? In any case, I once swore to myself that I would fight with
persistence and bravery for German equality of rights and make it a reality one
way or another,63 but also that I would strengthen the feeling of
responsibility for the necessity of mutual consideration and cooperation in
Europe.
When today my international opponents confront me with the fact that I
refuse to practice this cooperation with Russia, I must counter this assertion
with the following: I rejected and continue to reject this cooperation not with
Russia, but with the Bolshevism which lays claim to world rulership.
I am a German, I love my Volk and am attached to it. I know that it can
only be happy if allowed to live in accordance with its nature and its way. The
German Volk has been able not only to cry, but also to laugh heartily all its
life, and I do not want the horror of the Communist international dictatorship
of hatred to descend upon it. I tremble for Europe at the thought of what would
lie in store for our old, heavily populated continent were the chaos of the
Bolshevist revolution rendered successful by the infiltrating force of this
destructive Asiatic concept of the world, which subverts all our established ideals.
I am perhaps for many European statesmen a fantastic, or at any rate
uncomfortable, harbinger of warnings. That I am regarded in the eyes of the
international Bolshevist oppressors of the world as one of their greatest
enemies is for me a great honor and a justification for my actions in the eyes
of posterity.
I cannot prevent other states from taking the paths they believe they must
or at least believe they can take, but I shall prevent Germany from taking this
road to ruin. And I believe that this ruin would come at that point at which
the leadership of state decides to stoop to become an ally at the service of
such a destructive doctrine.
I would see no possibility of conveying in clear terms to the German worker
the threatening misfortune of Bolshevist chaos which so deeply troubles me were
I myself, as Fuhrer of the nation, to enter into close dealings with this very
menace. As a statesman and the Fuhrer of the Volk, I wish to also do myself all
those things I expect and demand from each of my Volksgenossen. I do not
believe that statesmen can profit from closer contact with a Weltanschauung
which is the ruin of any people.
In the past twenty years of German history, we have had ample opportunity
to gain experience in this sector. Our initial contact with Bolshevism in the
year 1917 brought us the revolution one year later. The second encounter with
it sufficed to put Germany near the brink of a Communist collapse within but a
few years’ time. I broke off these relations and thus jerked Germany back from
the verge of destruction.
Nothing can persuade me to go any other way than that dictated by
experience, insight and foresight.
And I know that this conviction has grown to become the most profound body
of thought and ideas for the entire National Socialist Movement. With
persistent tenacity we shall solve the social problems and tensions in our Volk
by means of carrying on the evolutionary process, thereby ensuring for
ourselves the blessing of a peaceful development from which all of our
Volksgenossen will profit. And each of the many new tasks we will encounter in
this process will fill us with the joy of those who are incapable of living
without work and hence without a task to perform.
When I apply this basic attitude to European politics at large, I find that
Europe is divided into two halves: one comprised of self-sufficient and
independent national states, of peoples with whom we are linked a thousandfold
by history and culture and with whom we wish to continue to be linked for all
time in the same manner as with the free and self-sufficient nations of the
non-European continents; and the other governed by the very same intolerant
Bolshevist doctrine claiming general international supremacy, which even
preaches the destruction of the immortal values-sacred to us-of this world and
the next, in order to built a different world whose culture, exterior and
content seem abhorrent to us. Except for the given political and economic
international relations, we do not wish to have any closer contact with that.
It is infinitely tragic that, in conclusion of our long years of sincerely
endeavoring to obtain the trust, sympathy and affection of the French people, a
military alliance was sealed, the beginning of which we know today, but-if
Providence is not once again more merciful than mankind deserves-the end of
which will perhaps have unforeseeable consequences. In the past three years I
have endeavored to slowly but surely establish the prerequisites for a
German-French understanding. In doing so, I have never left a single doubt that
an absolute equality of rights and thus the same legal status of the German
Volk and State form part of the prerequisites for such an understanding. I have
consciously regarded this understanding not only as a problem to be solved by
means of pacts, but as a problem which must first be brought home
psychologically to the two peoples, for it has to be prepared not only in
mental, but also in emotional terms. Thus I was often confronted with the
reproach that my offers of friendship contained no specific proposals. That is
not correct.
I bravely and explicitly proposed everything that could in any way possibly
be proposed to lessen the tension of German-French relations.
I did not hesitate on one occasion to join a concrete arms proposal for a
limit of 200,000 men. When this proposal was abandoned by those responsible for
drawing it up, I approached the French people and the European Governments with
a new, quite specific proposal. This proposal for 300,000 men was also
rejected. I have made a whole series of further concrete proposals aimed at
eliminating the poison from public opinion in the individual states and at
cleaning up methods of warfare, and thus ultimately at a slow yet, therefore,
sure reduction in arms. Only one of these German proposals was given any real
consideration. A British Government’s sense of realism accepted my proposal for
establishing a permanent ratio between the German and English fleets, which
both corresponds to the needs of German security and, conversely, takes into
account the enormous overseas interests of a great world empire. I may also
point out here that, to date, this agreement has remained practically the only
truly considerate and thus successful attempt to limit arms. The Reich
Government is willing to supplement this treaty by a further qualitative
agreement with England.
I have expressed the very concrete principle that the collective programs
of an international Paktomanie have as little chance of becoming reality
as the general proposals for world disarmament which have been shown from the
very onset to be impracticable under such circumstances. In contrast, I have
stressed that these questions can only be approached step by step more
specifically in that direction from which there is presumably the least
resistance. Based upon this conviction, I have also developed the concrete
proposal for an air pact grounded on a parity of strength between France,
England and Germany. The consequence was that this proposal was initially
ignored, and then a new Eastern-European-Asiatic factor was introduced on the
stage of European equilibrium, the military ramifications of which are
incalculable. Thus, for long years I took the trouble to make concrete
proposals, yet I do not hesitate to state that the psychological preparation
for the understanding has seemed just as important to me as the so-called
concrete proposals, and I have done more in this area than any honest foreign
statesman could ever have even hoped. I removed the question of the everlasting
revision of European borders from the atmosphere of public discussion in
Germany.64 Yet, unfortunately, it is often held, and this
applies particularly to foreign statesmen, that this attitude and its actions
are not of any particular significance. I may point out that it would have been
equally possible for me as a German, in a moral sense, to place the restoration
of the 1914 borders on my program and to support this item in publications and
oratory, just as the French ministers and popular leaders did after 1871, for
instance. My esteemed critics would do better not to deny me any ability
whatsoever in this sector.
It is much more difficult for a National Socialist to persuade a Volk to
come to an understanding than to do the opposite. And for me it would probably
have been easier to whip up the instinct for revenge than to awaken and
constantly amplify a feeling for the necessity of a European understanding. And
that is what I have done. I have rid German public opinion of attacks of this
sort against our neighboring peoples.
I have removed from the German press all animosity against the French
people. I have endeavored to awaken in our youth a sense for the ideal of such
an understanding, and was certainly not unsuccessful. When the French guests
entered the Olympic Stadium in Garmisch-Partenkirchen several weeks ago, they
perhaps had an opportunity to observe whether and to what extent I have been
successful in bringing about this inner conversion of the German Volk.
This inner willingness to seek and find such an understanding is, however,
more important than clever attempts by statesmen to ensnare the world in a net
of pacts obscure as to both legal and factual content.
These efforts on my part have, however, been twice as difficult because at
the same time I was forced to disentangle Germany from the web of a treaty
which had robbed it of its equality of rights and which the French people-
whether rightly or wrongly is secondary-believed it to be in their best
interest to uphold. Being a German nationalist, I above all was forced to make
yet another particularly difficult sacrifice for the German Volk in that context.
At least in modern times, the attempt had not yet been made following a war
to simply deny the loser its sovereign rights over large and long-standing
parts of its empire. It was only in the interest of this understanding that I
bore this, the most difficult sacrifice we could be made to bear politically
and morally, and had intended to continue bearing it for the sole reason that I
believed it was necessary to abide by a treaty65 which could perhaps contribute to eliminating the poison from the political
atmosphere between France and Germany and England and Germany and to spreading
a feeling of security on all sides.
Yes, beyond that I have often-in this forum, too-upheld the standpoint that
we are not only willing to make this most difficult contribution to
safeguarding peace in Europe as long as the other partners fulfill their
obligations; furthermore, we view this treaty-because concrete-as the only
possible attempt to safeguard Europe.
You, my Deputies, are acquainted with the letter and spirit of this treaty.
It was to prevent the use of force for all time between Belgium and France
on the one hand and Germany on the other. But unfortunately the treaties of
alliance which France had concluded at an earlier date presented the first
obstacle, although this obstacle did not contradict the essence of that Pact,
namely, the Rhine Pact of Locarno. Germany’s contribution to this Pact
presented the greatest sacrifice, for while France fortified its border with
steel, cement and arms, and equipped it with numerous garrisons, we were made
to bear the burden of permanently maintaining total defenselessness in the
West.
We nonetheless complied with this, too, in the hope of serving-by making
that contribution, one so difficult for a major power-the cause of European
peace and promoting an understanding between nations.
Now, this Pact is in contradiction to the agreement France entered into
last year with Russia which has already been signed and just recently received
the Chamber’s approval. For, by virtue of this new Franco-Soviet agreement, the
threatening military power of a huge empire has been given access to Central
Europe via the detour of Czechoslovakia, which has signed a similar treaty with
Russia. The incredible thing in this context is that these two states have
undertaken an obligation in their treaty, regardless of any presently existing
or anticipated rulings of the Council of the League of Nations, to clarify the
question of guilt in the event of an Eastern-European complication at their own
discretion and to thus consider the obligation to render mutual assistance as
given or not, as the case may be.
The claim that the former obligation was canceled in this Pact by virtue of
a supplemental restriction is incomprehensible. I cannot in one context define
a certain procedure as a clear breach of obligations otherwise valid and hence
thereby assume that such procedure is binding, and in another context declare
that no action is to be taken which violates these other obligations. In such a
case, the first binding obligation would be unreasonable and thus make no
sense.
But this is first and foremost a political problem and is to be rated as
such with all its weighty significance.
France did not conclude this treaty with any arbitrary European power.
Even prior to the Rhine Pact, France had treaties of mutual assistance both
with Czechoslovakia and with Poland. Germany took no offense at this, not only
because such pacts-in contrast to the Franco-Soviet Pact-recognized the
authority of rulings passed by the League of Nations, but also because the
Czechoslovakia of that time, and particularly Poland as well, will always
basically uphold a policy of representing these states’ own national interests.
Germany has no desire to attack these states and does not believe it will
lie in the interest of these states to prepare an offensive against Germany.
But above all: Poland will remain Poland, and France will remain France.
Soviet Russia, in contrast, is the exponent of a revolutionary Weltanschauung
organized as a state. Its concept of the state is the creed of world
revolution. It is not possible to rule out that tomorrow or the day after, this
Weltanschauung will have conquered France as well. However, should this be the
case-and as a German statesman I must be prepared-then it is a certainty that
this new Bolshevist state would become a section in the Bolshevist
International, which means that the decision as to aggression or non-aggression
will not be made by two separate states according to their own objective
judgment, but instead by directives issuing from a single source. And in the
event of such a development, this source would no longer be Paris, but Moscow.
If only for mere territorial reasons, Germany is not in a likely position to
attack Russia,66 yet Russia is all the more in a position to
bring about a conflict with Germany at any time via the detour of its advanced
positions. Ascertaining the aggressor would then be a foregone conclusion, for
the decision would be independent of the findings of the Council of the League
of Nations.
Allegations or objections that France and Russia would do nothing which
might expose them to sanctions-on the part of England or Italy-are immaterial,
because one cannot begin to gauge which type of sanctions might possibly be
effective against such an overwhelming construction so unified in both weltanschaulich
and military terms.
For many years we anxiously warned of such a development, not only because
we have more to fear from it than others, but because it may one day bring with
it dire consequences for the whole of Europe, if one attempts to dismiss these,
our most serious apprehensions, by citing the unfinished state of the Russian
instrument of war, or even its unwieldiness and unfitness for deployment in a
European war. We have always combated this view, not because we are somehow of
the conviction that the German is inherently inferior, but because we all know
that numbers, too, have their own weight. We are all the more grateful that M.
Herriot67 has just enlightened the French Chamber as to
Russia’s aggressive-military significance. We know that M.
Herriot’s information was given to him by the Soviet Government itself, and
we are certain that this party cannot have supplied the spiritual inspirer of
the new alliance in France with false propaganda; we similarly do not doubt
that M.
Herriot has given a true account of this information. Yet according to this
information, it is a fact that the Russian army has a peacetime strength of 1,350,000
men; that secondly, it has a total of 17,500,000 men ready for war and in the
reserves; that thirdly, it is equipped with the largest tank weaponry; and
fourthly, that it supports the largest air force in the world.
Introducing this enormous military factor-which was described as being
excellent in terms of its mobility and leadership as well as ready for action
at any time-onto the Central European stage will destroy any genuine European
equilibrium. This will furthermore present an obstacle to any possibility of
estimating what means of defense on land and in the air are necessary for the
European states involved, and particularly for the sole country targeted as an
opponent: Germany.
This gigantic mobilization of the East against Central Europe contradicts
not only the letter, but above all the spirit of the Locarno Pact. We are not
alone in feeling this because we are directly involved; rather, this view
thrives among innumerable intelligent men of all nations and has been openly
upheld everywhere, as has been documented in publications and politics.
On February 21, a French journalist68 approached me with the request that I grant him an interview. Because I had
been told that the person in question was one of those very Frenchmen who, like
ourselves, is endeavoring to find ways of arriving at an understanding between
our two peoples, I was all the less inclined to refuse, particularly since such
an action would have instantly been interpreted as an indication of my lack of
respect toward French journalism. I provided the desired information, just as I
have openly given it in Germany hundreds and thousands of times, and I once
more attempted to address the French people with a plea for the understanding
to which we are dedicated with all our hearts and which we would so dearly like
to see become reality. At the same time, however, I did express my deep regret
as regards the threatening developments in France brought about by the
conclusion of a pact for which, in our opinion, there was no conceivable
necessity, yet which, were it to come into being, by necessity, would create a
new state of affairs. As you all know, this interview was held back for reasons
unknown to us and was not published until the day after ratification in the
French Chamber.
As much as I will continue in the future to be ready and sincerely willing,
as I stated in that interview, to promote this German-French understanding-for
I see in it a necessary factor in safeguarding Europe from immeasurable dangers
and because I do not expect and indeed am incapable of even perceiving any
advantages whatsoever for the two peoples from any other course of behavior;
while I do, however, perceive the gravest general and international dangers-I
was all the more compelled by the knowledge of the final signing of this Pact
to enter into a review of the new situation thus created and to draw the
necessary conclusions.
These conclusions are of an extremely grave nature, and they fill us and
myself personally with a bitter regret. However, I am obligated not only to
make sacrifices for the sake of European understanding, but also to bow to the
interests of my own Volk.
As long as a sacrifice meets with appreciation and understanding on the
part of the opposition, I will gladly pursue that sacrifice and recommend to
the German Volk that it do the same. Yet as soon as it becomes evident that a
partner no longer values or appreciates this sacrifice, this must result in a
onesided burden for Germany and hence in a discrimination we cannot tolerate.
In this historic hour and within these walls, however, I would like to repeat
what I stated in my first major speech before the Reichstag in May 1933: The
German Volk would rather undergo any amount of suffering and distress than
abandon the precept of honor and the will to freedom and equality of rights.
If the German Volk is to be of any value to European cooperation, it can be
of value only as an honor-loving and hence equal partner. As soon as it ceases
to be valuable in terms of this integrity, it becomes worthless in objective
terms as well. I would not like to deceive ourselves or the rest of the world
with a Volk which would then be completely without value, for it would lack the
essentially natural feeling of honor.
I also believe, however, that even in the hour of such a bitter realization
and grave decision, in spite of everything, one must not refrain from
supporting European cooperation all the more and from seeking new ways to make
it possible to solve these problems in a manner beneficial to all.
Thus I have continued my endeavors to express in specific proposals the
feelings of the German Volk which is concerned for its security and willing to
make any sacrifice for the sake of its freedom, but is likewise willing at all
times to take part in a truly sincere and equally-valued European cooperation.
After a difficult inner struggle, I have hence decided on behalf of the
German Reich Government to have the following Memorandum submitted to the
French Government and the other signatories of the Locarno Pact: Memorandum
Immediately after the Pact between France and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics which was signed on May 2, 1935 became public, the German Government
drew the attention of the Governments of the other signatory powers of the
Rhine Pact of Locarno to the fact that the obligations which France assumed in
the new Pact are not compatible with its obligations according to the Rhine
Pact. At that time, the German Government submitted full legal and political
justification for its standpoint: in legal terms in the German Memorandum dated
May 25, 1935, and in political terms in the numerous diplomatic talks which
followed in the wake of this Memorandum.
The Governments concerned are also aware that neither their written responses
to the German Memorandum nor the arguments they brought forth via diplomatic
channels or in public statements were able to discount the standpoint of the
German Government.
In fact, the entire diplomatic and public discussion which has ensued since
May 1935 on these questions has served merely to confirm every aspect of the
position the German Government has taken from the very beginning.
1. It is an uncontested fact that the Franco-Soviet Agreement is directed
exclusively against Germany.
2. It is an uncontested fact that, under the terms of this Agreement,
France will undertake obligations in the event of a conflict between Germany
and the Soviet Union which far exceed its duty pursuant to the Covenant of the
League of Nations and which force it to take military action against Germany
even if it can cite as grounds for such action neither a recommendation nor
even an existing decision of the Council of the League of Nations.
3. It is an uncontested fact that, in such event, France will also be claiming
for itself the right to decide at its own discretion who is the aggressor.
4. Thus it is established that France has entered into obligations
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union which, in practice, are tantamount to its acting as
though neither the Covenant of the League of Nations nor the Rhine Pact, which
rests on such Covenant, were in effect.
This consequence of the Franco-Soviet Pact is not canceled out by the fact
that France has therein made the reservation not to be under obligation to take
military action against Germany if, by doing so, it were to expose itself to
sanctions on the part of the Guarantor Powers Italy and Great Britain. Despite
this reservation, however, what remains decisive is the fact that the Rhine
Pact is based not only upon guarantees on the part of Great Britain and Italy,
but primarily on the obligations governing the relations between France and
Germany. Thus the sole question is whether France has remained within those
limits imposed upon it by the Rhine Pact in regard to its relations with
Germany when assuming these treaty obligations.
And the German Government must answer this question in the negative.
The Rhine Pact was intended to accomplish the goal of securing peace in
Western Europe, in that Germany on the one hand and France and Belgium on the
other were to renounce for all time the use of military force in their
relations with one another. If specific exceptions to this renunciation of war
extending beyond the right of self-defense were allowed at the conclusion of
this Pact, the sole political reason lay, as was generally known, in the fact
that France had earlier undertaken certain alliance obligations toward Poland
and Czechoslovakia which it was not willing to sacrifice for the idea of
unconditionally securing peace in the West. With a clear conscience, Germany
decided to accept these limitations on the renunciation of war. It made no
objection to the agreements with Poland and Czechoslovakia which France’s
representative presented at Locarno, acting as it did under the obvious
condition that these agreements were in line with the layout of the Rhine Pact
and contained no provisions whatsoever on the implementation of Article 16 of
the Covenant of the League of Nations such as those contained in the new Franco-Soviet
agreements.
This also corresponded to the contents of such special agreements as
disclosed to the German Government at that time. The exceptions allowed for in
the Rhine Pact are not, however, explicitly worded so as to apply only to
Poland and Czechoslovakia, but are rather formulated in the abstract. Yet it
was the aim of all respective negotiations to merely bring about a balance
between the German-French renunciation of war and France’s desire to maintain
the alliance obligations it had already undertaken.
If France now attempts to draw an advantage from the abstract wording of
the possibilities of war allowed pursuant to the Rhine Pact in order to
conclude a new alliance against Germany with a state heavily armed with
military weapons; if it chooses to continue, in such a decisive fashion, to
impose limits on the renunciation of war stipulated between itself and Germany;
and if, in the process, it does not even confine itself to the established
formal legal limitations, as stated above, it has ultimately created a
completely new situation and destroyed-in both spirit and fact-the political
system of the Rhine Pact.
The most recent debates and resolutions of the French Parliament have shown
that France is determined-notwithstanding Germany’s standpoint-to definitely
put the Pact with the Soviet Union into effect; talks on the diplomatic level
have even revealed that France already regards itself as bound to the Pact by
virtue of having signed it on May 2, 1935. However, faced with such a
development in European politics, the German Reich Government cannot stand idle
unless it wishes to abandon or betray the interests of the German Volk duly
entrusted to it.
In negotiations in recent years, the German Government has consistently
stressed that it intended to abide by and fulfill all of the obligations
arising from the Rhine Pact as long as the other contracting parties were
willing, on their part, to stand by this Pact. This obvious condition can no
longer be deemed to exist as regards France. France responded to Germany’s
repeated friendly advances and assurances of peace by violating the Rhine Pact
by virtue of a military alliance with the Soviet Union directed exclusively
against Germany.
Hence the Rhine Pact of Locarno has lost its inherent meaning and ceased,
in a practical sense, to exist. As a consequence, Germany no longer views
itself as bound for its part to this lapsed Pact. The German Government is now
compelled to react to the new situation created by this alliance, a situation
aggravated by the fact that the Franco-Soviet Agreement has been supplemented
by a treaty of alliance between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union with
arrangements which are exactly parallel. In the interest of the primal right of
a people to safeguard its borders and maintain its possibilities of defense,
the German Reich Government has today re-established the full and unlimited
sovereignty of the Reich in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.
However, in order to prevent any misinterpretation of its intentions and to
erase any doubt as to the purely defensive character of these measures, as well
as to lend emphasis to its eternally given yearning for a true pacification of
Europe between states enjoying equal rights and equal respect, the German Reich
Government declares its willingness to assent to the following proposals for
new agreements towards establishing a system for securing peace in Europe:
1. The German Reich Government declares its willingness to immediately
enter into negotiations with France and Belgium concerning the formation of a
mutually demilitarized zone and to give its consent to such a proposal from the
very beginning, regardless of extent and effects, under the condition, however,
of complete parity.
2. The German Reich Government proposes that for the purpose of ensuring
the intactness and inviolability of the borders in the West, a nonaggression
pact be concluded between Germany, France and Belgium, whereby it is willing to
fix the term of same at twenty-five years.
3. The German Reich Government desires to invite England and Italy to sign
this treaty as Guarantor Powers.
4. The German Reich Government agrees, in the event that the Royal Dutch
Government so desires, and the other contracting parties hold it to be fitting,
that the Netherlands be included in this treaty system.
5. The German Reich Government is willing to conclude an air pact as a
further reinforcement of these security arrangements between the Western Powers
which shall suffice to effectively and automatically ban the risk of unexpected
air attacks.
6. The German Reich Government repeats its offer to conclude nonaggression
pacts with the states bordering Germany to the East such as that with Poland.
Due to the fact that the Lithuanian Government has made a certain correction in
its position regarding the Memel territory within the past months, the German
Reich Government withdraws the exception it was once compelled to make as
regards Lithuania and declares its willingness, under the condition of an effective
development of the guaranteed autonomy for the Memel territory, to sign such a
non-aggression pact with Lithuania as well.
7. Now that final equality of rights has been achieved for Germany and its
complete sovereignty over the entire German Reich territory has been restored,
the German Reich Government regards the main reason for its earlier withdrawal
from the League of Nations as having been remedied. Thus it is willing to once
more join the League of Nations. In this context, it may state that it
anticipates that, within the course of an appropriate period, both the question
of colonial equality of rights and the question of separating the Covenant of
the League of Nations from its Versailles foundation will be settled by way of
amicable negotiations.
Men, Deputies of the German Reichstag! In this historic hour when German
troops are presently occupying their future garrisons of peace in the Reich’s
western provinces, may we all join together to stand by two sacred, inner vows:
First, to the oath that we shall never yield to any power or any force in
restoring the honor of our Volk and would rather perish honorably from the
gravest distress than ever capitulate before it.
Secondly, to the vow that now more than ever shall we dedicate ourselves to
achieving an understanding between the peoples of Europe and particularly an
understanding with our Western peoples and neighbors. After three years, I
believe that today the struggle for German equality of rights can be deemed
concluded.
I believe that the initial reason for our earlier withdrawal from a
collective European cooperation has now ceased to exist. If we are now,
therefore, once more willing to return to this cooperation, we are doing so
with the sincere desire that these events and a retrospective on those years
will aid us in cultivating a deeper understanding of this cooperation among
other European peoples as well. We have no territorial claims to make in
Europe. Above all, we are aware that all the tensions resulting either from erroneous
territorial provisions or from the disproportion between the size of a
population and its Lebensraum can never be solved by wars in Europe. However,
we do hope that human insight will help to alleviate the painfulness of this
state of affairs and relieve tensions by means of a gradual evolutionary
development marked by peaceful cooperation.
Specifically, I sense today above all the necessity to honor those
obligations imposed upon us by the national honor and freedom we have regained,
obligations not only to our own Volk, but to the other European states as well.
Hence at this time I would like to recall to the minds of European
statesmen the thoughts I expressed in the thirteen points of my last speech
here with the assurance that we Germans are gladly willing to do everything
possible and necessary toward putting these very realistic ideals into
practice.
My Party Comrades! For three years now I have headed the Government of the
German Reich and thus the German Volk. Great are the achievements which
Providence has allowed me to accomplish for our Vaterland these three years. In
every area of our national, political, and economic life, our position has
improved. Yet today I may also confess that, for me, this time was accompanied
by numerous cares, countless sleepless nights and days filled with work. I was
only able to do all this because I have never regarded myself as a dictator of
my Volk, but always as its Fuhrer alone and thus as its agent. In the past, I
fought for the inner approval of the German Volk for my ideals for fourteen
years, and then by virtue of its trust, I was appointed by the venerable Field
Marshal. But since then I have drawn all my energy solely from the happy
consciousness of being inseparably bound up with my Volk as a man and as
Fuhrer. I cannot close this historic period, in which the honor and freedom of
my Volk have been restored, without now asking the German Volk to grant to
me-and hence to all my co-workers and co-fighters-in retrospect their approval
for everything I have had to do during those years in the way of making
decisions that often appeared stubborn, in carrying out harsh measures, and in
demanding difficult sacrifices.
Therefore, I have come to the decision to dissolve the German Reichstag
today so that the German Volk may pass its judgment on my leadership and that
of my co-workers. In these three years, Germany has regained once more its
honor, found once more a faith, overcome its greatest economic crisis, and
ushered in a new cultural ascent. I believe I can say this as my conscience and
God are my witnesses. I now ask the German Volk to strengthen me in my belief
and to continue giving me, through the power of its will, power of my own to
take a courageous stand at all times for its honor and freedom and to ensure
its economic well-being; above all, to support me in my struggle for real
peace.
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