Franz Bäke – With the 6th Panzer Division in the East and West

Source: Franz Kurowski – Panzer aces: German tank commanders of World War II

 

 

The French Campaign (Part I)

 

On 30 January 1940, the 6th Panzer Division, which had been formed from the 1st Light Division, left its garrisons in Germany. The division was commanded by Brigadier General Kempf, one of the pioneers of Germany’s panzer arm. By 2 February the division had assembled in the Euskirchen area. The division headquarters was established in Münstereifel. In the west, German and French forces still faced each other across the frontier. The French promise of help to the Poles, which was to see French forces attack Germany no later than the beginning of the second week after a German attack on Poland, had proved to be a pipe dream. France missed its opportunity to simply overrun Germany’s weakly defended western frontier and end the war in 1939. When Britain and France declared war, Germany did not have a single panzer division in the west. With the return of Germany’s six armored divisions from Poland, any chance of a quick Allied victory disappeared for good.

 

The core of the new 6th Panzer Division was provided by the 65th Panzer Battalion, commanded by Major Thomas. This battalion, which had been part of the 1st Light Division, was joined by the two battalions of the 11th Panzer Regiment, which was commanded by Col. Wilhelm Phillips. The two battalions were commanded by Major Stephan and Major Koll. The period of quiet on the Western Front allowed the newly formed division to carry out regimental exercises starting on 18 October 1939.

 

On 1 March 1940 the 6th Panzer Division was moved into the Wester Woods, where one week later it was incorporated into the XXXXI Army Corps under General of Armored Troops Hans-Georg Reinhardt. Also included in the corps were the 8th Panzer Division and the 29th Motorized Infantry Division. The corps was one of three assigned to Operation Sickle Cut, the German armored thrust through the Ardennes.

 

The XXXXI Army Corps, together with the XIX Army Corps under General Guderian and the XIV Army Corps under General Gustav von Wietersheim, made up Panzer Group Kleist. Under the command of General of Cavalry Ewald von Kleist, it was to drive through to the Meuse River. The vehicles of the panzer group all bore a large “K,” in honor of their commanding general. The panzer group faced the difficult task of moving 41,140 vehicles of all types through the Ardennes over only four axes of advance, which were also being used by infantry formations.

 

On 9 May the 11th Panzer Regiment was moved forward into the Mayen area; the main body of the division was still in the Wester Woods, east of the Rhine. The French Campaign began on the morning of 10 May. The 6th Panzer Division moved westwards in four march groups. These were led by Colonel Freiherr von Esebeck, the commander of the 6th Rifle Brigade, Colonel von Ravenstein, the commander of the 4th Rifle Regiment and Lieutenant Colonel von Seckendorff, the commander of the 6th Motorcycle Battalion. The light columns and the combat trains were under the command of Major Dr. Topf.

 

A general halt was ordered when the division ran into the rear of the 2nd Panzer Division, which was still waiting in its readiness positions. The division was held up for one day and crossed the Luxembourg frontier on 12 May, reaching the Belgian border at 1600. The division’s objective was the Meuse; it was to cross at Montherme. The battle group commanded by Colonel von Esebeck led the way. The Division Operations Officer, Major Helmut Staedtke, requested “strong air support.” The requested air support arrived, but a unit of He-111s dropped some of its bombs on the 4th and 8th Companies of the 76th Artillery Regiment, commanded by Major Aschoff and Major Graf respectively. This error resulted in twenty dead and twenty-six wounded, the division’s first casualties of the French Campaign.

 

The briefings for the Meuse crossing were conducted by General Kempf himself. Standing on a hill from which he and his staff could view the approaches to the Meuse, he issued the attack orders to his unit leaders and battle group commanders. The assembled officers had a good view of the barbed wire entanglements and rifle pits, as well as French artillery positions and bunker installations. Also visible were four armored cupolas on an island in the river.

 

The first attack went forward that afternoon. The crossing attempt failed, even though the infantry of the 4th Rifle Regiment’s 3rd Battalion received support from the tanks of the 1st Company of the 11th Panzer Regiment, which had been directed to eliminate the enemy bunkers with direct fire. Nevertheless, part of the battalion did succeed in crossing the river, thanks to the efforts of its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Häfer.

 

After darkness fell on 12 May, General Kempf personally committed the 1st Battalion of the 4th Rifle Regiment and part of the 65th Panzer Battalion to force a crossing for the remaining units. “Have the 1st Company, 65th Panzer Battalion, report to me!” ordered Kempf. First Lt. Dr. Franz Bäke, a still-youthful reserve officer who had seen combat in the First World War and was a dentist by trade, rolled forward in his Czech-built (Skoda) tank and reported to the division commander. Kempf told him: “We’re going to the Meuse! And, as quickly as possible. One of your platoons will lead the way; the rest will follow close behind the infantry. We’ll be moving with normal headlights!”

 

Dr. Bäke saluted and ordered his 1st Platoon into the lead position. Then the division’s second attack force rolled towards the Meuse. On the far side of the river at Montherme, the French defenders suddenly saw a long column of lights moving at high speed toward the position where the Semois River emptied into the Meuse. General Potzert, who was commanding the French 102nd Fortress Division, called out in surprise: “It’s a regular torchlight parade. If we had some bombers, we could wipe them out completely!”

 

The same thought had occurred to Dr. Franz Bäke, who was enjoying his first opportunity to lead a tank company into action. During the Polish Campaign he had seen the war from the sidelines as battalion adjutant and executive officer. Now he was commanding the 65th Panzer Battalion’s 1st Company. He was determined to put all he had learned into practice and justify the confidence placed in him by his superiors.

 

After the war General Kempf wrote that he, too, had been concerned about the possibility of French bomber attacks on his division. As he related to the author: “Despite that, I saw the possibility of achieving a crossing with the minimum possible casualties in this rapid forward movement.”

 

Fortunately, the general’s concerns were unfounded. As dawn was breaking on 13 May the lieutenant leading the forward platoon of Bäke’s company reported: “The Meuse is in front of us, sir!” Dr. Bäke passed on the report to the general. General Kempf: “Forward, Bäke! Tanks move to the front. Likewise, the combat-engineer battalion moves forward through the gaps and readies the assault boats.”

 

The mass of the Czech-built Panzer 35(t) tanks, which were impressed into German service, rolled forward. Close behind the 1st Platoon was the general’s command vehicle. Behind it was the radio vehicle that kept the general in contact with the individual battle groups. As the sun came up, Dr. Bäke could see before him the silvery, shimmering ribbon of the Meuse. The first French guns opened fire from the far side. “Tanks and assault guns move forward to take out the artillery positions, bunkers, and machine-gun positions!”

 

Close behind the tanks were the truck-mounted combat engineers, who were to take the infantry across the river under the tanks’ covering fire and help capture the village of Montherme. The tanks, armed with 3.7-cm guns, rolled up the riverbank with the assault guns, which carried a short-barreled 7.5-cm gun. The first burst of machine gun fire smacked into the riverbank below the tanks. “Open fire on the machine gun nest at twelve o’clock!” ordered Dr. Bäke. Bäke’s gunner had already spotted the target. He made a slight correction and fired. The first round flitted across the stream and struck just below the machine-gun position. The second round was a direct hit, which silenced the enemy gun. Lined up along the bank, the tanks of Bäke’s company opened fire. The assault guns concentrated their fire on the French bunkers, aiming for the embrasures.

 

While this was going on, the combat engineers and infantry were moving down to the edge of the river, carrying their inflatable boats above their heads. The boats splashed into the water and their outboard motors roared to life, driving them towards the center of the stream. The French shifted their fire onto the boats. One of them took a burst of fire and capsized. The men inside jumped into the water and swam for the other side.

 

“Engage the machine-gun nests!” Dr. Bäke instructed his tank commanders.

 

The eighteen tanks the company had on hand – four had been left behind with mechanical problems – directed their fire at the French machine guns. Their high-explosive rounds blasted away the French camouflage. The assault guns moved to one side and opened fire on the French bunkers. The crash of gunfire merged with the sound of shells exploding on the far bank.

 

The assault by the German infantry struck the 42nd Demi-Brigade of the 102nd Colonial Division. Isolated French machine guns were still firing from Montherme. Now that the crossing had succeeded, the tanks and assault guns shifted their fire onto these. Montherme was on fire. A short time later signal flares rose into the sky from the edge of the city, indicating to the German tank crews: “We are here!” The tanks turned their fire once again to the far bank of the Meuse, while the infantry moved into Montherme and occupied the city.

 

“Everyone across the river through the ford!” General Kempf ordered. The tanks rolled to the shallow crossing point that had been discovered earlier. One strayed from the prescribed route and sunk up to its turret. It was later recovered by a heavy prime mover.

 

General Kempf, who had crossed the river with his troops, placed himself at the head of his division, just behind the advance guard, and ordered the advance to begin at once. The armored elements quickly won ground towards the west. The objective was the Mon Idee. Patrols and aerial reconnaissance had determined that the French were preparing to make a stand there. They hoped to employ their artillery and tanks to stop this raid by the 6th Panzer Division, one of the first German armored divisions to enter France. General Kempf used his armor to break through the French defenses. The Mon Idee line of defense was broken on the evening of 13 May. The 6th Panzer Division was now sixty-five kilometers west of the Meuse, deep in the enemy rear. For this daring advance, Werner Kempf was awarded the Knight’s Cross on 3 June 1940. With his division he had successfully translated the concept of the armored advance, which he had been advocating for more than fifteen years, into reality.

 

The rest of the division’s tanks – those that had been unable to ford the Meuse – had to wait for the bridging of the river to be completed. Once across, they quickly caught up with the advance guard and engaged French forces that opposed the division. The 1st Company under 1st Lieutenant Bäke was heavily involved in the battles of pursuit over the next three days, overcoming pockets of resistance which held up the advance. The company accounted for seven French tanks, two of which were credited to Dr. Bäke.

 

On the evening of 15 May, the XXXXI Army Corps issued orders for the continued pursuit of the shattered enemy on the sixteenth. The 6th Panzer Division was to set out at 0600, its objective Hirson. The troops were hoping for another quick breakthrough. However, this was not to be the case. During the night Panzer Group Kleist received orders to halt and advance no farther. The order was partially withdrawn following a heated exchange between General Guderian and General Kleist. Nevertheless, the panzer group remained inactive for at least twenty-four hours.

 

On 16 May General Reinhardt ordered the “further pursuit of the beaten enemy.” The 6th Panzer Division was to advance as quickly as possible to the Oise River and reach the crossings at Etreaupont and Marly. General Kempf summoned Colonel von Esebeck and 1st Lieutenant Bäke. His instructions to von Esebeck’s battle group: “Fastest possible advance towards Guise! Bäke, you are the breakthrough force for the battle group, in case the enemy should offer resistance.”

 

The attack was scheduled to begin at 1530 hours. When his watch showed it was time, Bäke raised his right arm and gave the order: “Move out!” The idling engines roared to life, and the eighteen tanks rolled forward. After moving for an hour, during which Bäke scanned the terrain ahead from his open turret hatch, the leading armored group suddenly came under machine-gun fire from a patch of woods to the right. Dr. Bäke ducked inside his tank and closed the hatch cover.

 

“Prepare to engage!” he ordered.

 

“Weapons loaded and ready!” reported his gunner. The other tank commanders also reported ready.

 

“Lieutenant Möbbs: Take two tanks, move to the right and circle behind the woods. Signal when you are in position.” Möbbs repeated the order and Bäke watched as the two tanks moved off to the right and disappeared around the end of the woods.

 

“Open fire!” the commanders ordered when they were in range.

 

Bäke’s gunner targeted a machine gun. Two rounds were sufficient to silence it. The remaining tanks deployed into a wedge and advanced by platoons, alternately halting and firing. A few moments later a flare rose from the far side of the woods. Bäke ordered his tanks to advance as rapidly as possible. While the two tanks positioned in the enemy’s rear engaged the remaining machine guns, the rest of the company charged forward and broke all resistance. Battle Group von Esebeck followed quickly. As darkness fell, von Esebeck gave orders for the tanks to close up and use only those lights absolutely necessary. Dr. Bäke moved at the head of his company. The tanks rolled past fleeing French troops, who cleared the road as soon as they heard the rattle of tracks and the roaring tank engines. They were beaten and offered no resistance. Von Esebeck’s battle group had no time to take prisoners and left the French for the following infantry units.

 

The night march became dangerous, however, when the battle group approached Falvigny, a suburb of Guise. The motorcycles of the advance guard suddenly came under machine-gun and cannon fire from the village. “Antitank guns to the front!” ordered von Esebeck. The 3.7-cm antitank guns of the 41st Antitank Battalion were brought forward. As soon as the antitank guns opened up, French heavy tanks began to fire from well-camouflaged positions. The first antitank gun was hit and knocked out of action. The 3.7-cm guns soon demonstrated their ineffectiveness against the heavily armored thirty-two-ton French tanks.

 

“Move out!” Bäke gave the order to attack. The tanks moved into favorable positions from which they could charge past the enemy’s heavy artillery and into Guise once the other forces were in place. Dr. Bäke, a First World War officer experienced in battles against an enemy in fortified positions, sent patrols ahead to scout the objective. He himself moved forward to select the best route for his tanks. Leaving his tank and continuing on foot with his adjutant, he walked right into a French outpost. The French were so surprised that they surrendered to the two German officers. They were sent to the rear with two slightly wounded antitank gunners.

 

Franz Bäke (center) with his adjutants, Captains Lappe (left) and Herbert (right).

 

Following a final meeting with Colonel von Esebeck, the attack on Guise began at first light on 17 May. As the tanks rumbled forward, the French heavy tanks opened fire from positions at the edge of the town.

 

“Tanks 114 and 115, go to the right, around the house on the corner. Try to take the enemy from the flank” ordered Bäke. He was quite sure that the 3.7-cm guns of the Skoda tanks would not be able to penetrate the frontal armor of the French tanks.

 

The dismounted motorcycle troops worked their way forward from cover to cover. The few antitank guns still operational fired on the enemy tanks, whose muzzle flashes betrayed their positions. Bäke spotted an enemy tank next to a wall ahead and to the left. It was firing at the two tanks Bäke had sent ahead. He instructed his driver to move forward into a flanking position. The gunner already had the French tank in his sights when Bäke ordered a firing halt. The first round struck the enemy tank’s frontal armor and bounced off.

 

“Step on it!” ordered Bäke. “Veer off to the left!”

 

No sooner had the driver done as instructed when the French tank opened fire. The round whizzed two meters past the rear of the company commander’s tank. Bäke’s tank moved forward seventy meters before halting and turned on one track to face the enemy. The loader had already rammed the next round into the chamber. Bäke’s gunner took a new sight picture and fired. The round struck between the turret and hull and jammed the turret. The empty shell casing clattered off the breech guard and tumbled into the canvas bag below. Two more rounds were required to finish off the enemy tank. Two members of the crew tried to scramble to safety, but the tank blew up before they could escape.

 

The two tanks Bäke had sent ahead then opened fire, drawing the enemy towards them. “Move out!” called Bäke. The tanks rumbled forward until they came upon an antitank gun position. In the engagement against the stationary antitank guns, the tanks took advantage of their maneuverability to emerge victorious. In the meantime the motorcycle troops had fought their way past the enemy positions at the edge of town and were now engaged in house-to-house fighting in Guise. It required several hours of fighting, with Bäke’s tanks providing supporting fire, before the enemy troops in Guise surrendered.

 

Dr. Bäke’s company had achieved its first major success of the French campaign, destroying or putting out of action three heavy tanks, four antitank guns, and a large number of trucks. The advance was resumed immediately. Von Esebeck’s forces moved quickly and captured the bridges at Hauteville and Marquigny intact.

 

Von Ravenstein’s battle group, which was accompanied by the division commander, was also successful, advancing as far as Grigny. On the evening of that eventful 17 May, the forces of the 6th Panzer Division in the Hauteville-Neuvillette bridgehead had to face an attack by French tanks. The division’s tanks took part in the defense, and Dr. Bäke was able to add another enemy tank to his total. He also damaged one French tank, which turned away smoking.

 

The German antitank guns – Panzerabwehrkanone, or “Pak” – however, had a hard time of it trying to cope with the attacking French tanks. One 3.7-cm Pak of the 41st Antitank Battalion’s 3rd Company under 1st Lieutenant Neckenauer fired no less than twenty-six (!) rounds at an attacking French tank before hitting both its tracks and immobilizing it. General Kempf immediately demanded 8.8-cm antiaircraft guns, which had been used with success as antitank weapons in the first days of the campaign.

 

Battle Group von Ravenstein achieved a major success on 18 May, when it stormed into La Catelet and captured the entire staff of the French Ninth Army in a hotel in the center of the town. Had it arrived in La Catelet a half-hour earlier, it might have scored an even greater coup by nabbing Marshall Petain and the Commander-in-Chief of the Ninth Army, General Corap. Both had been at the headquarters of the Ninth Army and left just thirty minutes before the Germans arrived. General Corap’s successor, General Giraud, also escaped capture, as he was still en route to La Catelet. Many valuable documents were captured, among them the war diary of the Ninth Army.

 

The 65th Panzer Battalion moved on towards the bridge at Scheide. Dr. Bäke had discussed the advance with the battalion commander earlier, and they agreed that the battalion should push through to the objective, ignoring whatever was taking place to the sides of the avenue of advance. The tanks moved at high speed. They overtook retreating columns of beaten French soldiers, but met no resistance. The French Ninth Army was in a state of disintegration following the loss of its command apparatus.

 

Later, the enemy made an attempt to interdict the 6th Panzer Division’s advance. Dr. Bäke engaged the French force, prompting Major Schenk, commander of the 65th Panzer Battalion, to come forward to the lead company to see what was going on. The enemy was put to flight following a brief exchange of fire, and the advance was resumed behind the withdrawing French Army. Several motorcycles had already reached and secured the bridge, removing the demolition charges in place. By the time Bäke’s tanks reached the bridge, the issue had been decided. The 5th Company, 11th Panzer Regiment, had also arrived, and the bridgehead was firmly in German hands. There was little cause for concern, however, as the French had no thoughts of launching a counterattack, or indeed of mounting any resistance at all. They had been completely demoralized by the loss of their headquarters staff and the rapid German advance.

 

Continuing the advance at the head of Battle Group von Esebeck, the 1st Company reached the important fork in the road ten kilometers from Cambrai and established another bridgehead at Banteux. The rapid advance had bypassed many French units, and as night fell, enemy forces appeared in the rear of the 6th Panzer Division. The 6th Motorcycle Battalion ran into a group of French armored cars withdrawing from La Catelet and suffered some casualties. Lieutenant Colonel Polzer, commander of the 76th Artillery Regiment’s 2nd Battalion, was killed in that fighting. During this day’s fighting, the small number of Panzer IVs that had reached the division by 10 May suffered a large number of mechanical breakdowns.

 

The 6th Panzer Division received further orders from corps on the evening of 19 May: “Advance to Canal du Nord and take possession of the crossings.”

 

The rapid advance of the 6th Panzer Division and its outflanking of the French Ninth Army enabled it to capture another senior French commander, General Giraud. Giraud was cut off while en route to his army and sought cover in a barn that, unfortunately for him, had been selected as the site of a field kitchen from the 11th Panzer Regiment’s 7th Company. The latter found him and delivered Giraud and his entourage to the division.

 

The twentieth of May saw the first exchange of blows with British troops, with the enemy forces being pushed back by both battle groups. Dr. Bäke and his company engaged British tanks for the first time; they destroyed five. One of the enemy tanks was accounted for by Dr. Bäke. By evening of that day the advancing forces had passed Cambrai, site of the first major tank battle of the First World War. The 6th Panzer Division under General Kempf was now only thirty kilometers from the sea. However, the division was inexplicably turned northward. The new objective was to encircle the British Expeditionary Corps as well as the French First Army and the remaining Belgian troops. The 6th Motorized Reconnaissance Battalion became the first of the division’s units to reach the sea at Montrieul.

 

The attack on Calais began on 22 May. The Aa was reached in the face of negligible opposition and the St. Omer-Calais rail line was cut at Setques. The establishment of bridgeheads across the d’Aire Canal just east of Arques and St. Omer was ordered for 23 May. The orders did not reach the 6th Panzer Division until 0620 hours on the morning of 23 May, however, when Battle Group von Esebeck was already advancing on Calais. Dr. Bäke and Colonel von Esebeck talked over the senseless order, which meant recalling the 6th Motorized Reconnaissance Battalion and turning away from the most important objective:

 

“We could still reach Calais this afternoon, Bäke. What do you think of this order?”

 

“We might well reach the objective, sir, but that would mean disobeying an order, and you would be placed in a most difficult situation. Especially since all of the other units might possibly, even certainly, follow the new orders and we would be left on our own. I fear you will have to order our spearhead to turn in the new direction, even though we’re convinced that Calais is the most important objective. It’s the only place where we can prevent the Tommies from getting back to their island.”

 

“You’re right, Bäke. I’ll have to issue the appropriate orders.”

 

At 1000 hours the 6th Motorized Reconnaissance Battalion changed direction. Battle Group von Esebeck reached its new objective without incident. The other units of the 65th Panzer Battalion also played a decisive role in the advance by Battle Group Ravenstein. For example, the platoon under Lt. Horst Scheibert advanced into the village of Eggingheim and captured two trains loaded with military equipment. The trains had been under steam. Lieutenant Ritgen’s platoon, which had been placed under the command of the 4th Rifle Regiment’s 3rd Company (under 1st Lieutenant Sültmann), was able to put a battery of French 15-cm artillery out of action at Fort Rouge and capture the gun crews.

 

Leading Battle Group von Esebeck, the 1st Company under Bäke reached and captured the day’s objective of St. Omer. Several French armored cars and light tanks were engaged. Three were destroyed by the company and one of them was credited to Bäke. Thanks to the tank company’s energetic assault, all enemy resistance was quickly broken. The 6th Panzer Division had advanced ten kilometers and eliminated the last armored obstacle on the flank of Lord Gort’s British Expeditionary Corps. The German forces were now only ten kilometers from Dunkirk, the second major port from which the British could escape. Reconnaissance revealed that only weak security forces that could have been easily overcome guarded the way to Dunkirk.

 

“We could take Dunkirk in a coup de main, sir!” suggested Bäke during a briefing by the battle group commander on the next day’s orders. “If we have the English in the bag, no one will ask about other orders.”

 

Hans Karl von Esebeck agreed. He sent a message to division: “Request approval for a breakthrough to Dunkirk. Enemy in front of the battle group very weak. Quick and decisive success is certain!”

 

In the meantime, however, the 6th Panzer Division had received orders that ran contrary to the suggestion by the commander of Battle Group von Esebeck: “The division can anticipate resuming its attack on the morning of 25 May, with its left wing advancing through Cassel, and its spearhead on the right. The 8th Panzer Division has been deployed on the division’s right.”

 

A further corps order for 24 May arrived after midnight. It intended for the division to hold the existing bridgeheads against an expected strong enemy attack. The division saw this order as misguided and completely out of touch with the situation at the front. Nevertheless, the division command was forced to comply “even though the enemy had not been able to establish a defensive front on the canal in the face of the division’s surprise attack.”

 

A message arrived from the Headquarters of the Führer on 24 May. It read: “The Führer has ordered that the canal is not to be crossed. The XXXXI Army Corps is to commit sufficient forces to the bridgeheads to ensure that the crossings can be held against enemy counterattacks. The movement of further Flak batteries to the east bank of the canal is to be halted.”

 

The resulting confusion was complete. Orders had been issued and countermanded. Subsequently, completely impossible orders were issued, which “could have originated directly from the enemy.” The answer to this puzzle is contained in the war diary of the Chief of the Army General Staff, General Halder: “The fast left wing [including the 6th Panzer Division], which had no enemy forces in front of it, was halted at the express wish of the Führer. The Luftwaffe was to decide the fate of the surrounded enemy armies.”

 

This move by Hitler gave the final impetus to the escape of the 350,000-man British Expeditionary Force. These were the troops that would have defended England if the island had come under attack. They later returned to France in the Allied invasion of 1944. Without these 350,000 men, it is quite likely that Great Britain would have accepted Hitler’s peace offer in July 1940, following the fall of France.

 

Finally, on 27 May, the 6th Panzer Division received orders to leave the bridgeheads and advance eastward to the Belgian frontier and destroy the enemy forces there. Thus the next objective was in the area of Cassel! This was the same objective that the division could have reached on 24 June without fighting. In the meantime, the British had selected Cassel as the cornerstone of the defenses that were to cover their withdrawal to Dunkirk.

 

The initial attack by Battle Group von Esebeck failed to break through. Battle Group von Ravenstein, which was advancing on the right, was now committed. It had elements of the 4th Rifle Regiment and the 65th Panzer Battalion, as well as the 2nd Battalion of the 76th Artillery Regiment, the army-level 605th Artillery Battalion, and a company each of antitank guns and armored combat engineers.

 

The attack force bypassed the village of Hondeghm, detaching a rifle company to deal with it. In spite of strong armored support, the detached company suffered heavy casualties. First Lieutenant Sültmann, the company commander, and Lieutenant Winkelsträter were killed. The British forces defending Hondeghm held out until nightfall.

 

The next morning Bäke’s company moved toward the French fortifications on the Belgian border as part of Battle Group von Ravenstein. The rear-guard positions, which were virtually unmanned, were passed with little fighting. Then the tanks of the 1st Company reached the line of bunkers. Bäke had his tanks engage the bunkers with direct fire. Eleven bunkers were destroyed. Twenty-five others fell victim to the remaining tanks of the division or to the combat engineers. Just as Bäke gave the order to resume the advance, an enemy tank rolled out from behind one of the bunkers and opened fire.

 

“Target to the right by the bunker!” Bäke shouted to his gunner. “Fire and adjust!”

 

“Identified!”

 

The tank’s gun swung toward the enemy tank. The first round was a direct hit. When the enemy tank tried to turn away it was hit again, this time in the flank. Smoke poured from the stricken vehicle. After a third hit, it began to burn. Three more enemy tanks were knocked out by the Skoda tanks of the 65th Panzer Battalion. The engagement once again demonstrated that none of the German tanks possessed a gun that could knock out an enemy tank with one round. The frontier fortifications fell. A divisional order of the day praised the division’s accomplishments: “This great success is a new page in the victorious record of the 6th Panzer Division. It was achieved through a masterful joint effort between infantry, tanks, artillery, antitank guns, and combat engineers. The organization of the attack was a masterpiece by Colonel von Ravenstein.”

 

On 29 May Battle Group von Ravenstein cut the road from Popheringhe to Proven. It was there that the first contact was made with the infantry of Army Group B, a motorized patrol from the 1st Company, 17th Infantry Regiment. On 30 May, under cover of dense fog, the defenders of Cassel broke out in an attempt to reach Dunkirk. Battle Groups Koll and von Esebeck attempted to stop the breakout. The British had strong tank support and there was heavy fighting. First Lieutenant Bäke led his tanks through the thickening fog in the direction of the British tanks, which were moving from Cassel in the direction of the village of Waten.

 

“Net call: Be prepared to engage!”

 

“Main gun up!” reported the gunners to their commanders. Rounds had been loaded, and the machine guns were ready to fire.

 

Dr. Bäke could hear the enemy tanks firing. He wanted to approach from the south and take them from the flank, relieving Battle Group Koll, which was heavily engaged.

 

“Hedgehog to Commander: Enemy identified! Ten o’clock, range 2,000!” reported the tank on the far-left flank.

 

“Open fire on identified targets!” ordered Bäke.

 

As Bäke issued the order, the first enemy tank rolled past in front of the company. Sixteen guns fired almost as one. The enemy tank was hit at least eight times and went up in flames. Bäke’s loader and gunner worked swiftly and surely. Their second round struck the right side of an enemy tank; seconds later it was ablaze. An internal explosion blew open the turret hatch. A jet of flame shot upwards, followed almost immediately by a terrific explosion which blew the tank to pieces.

 

Bäke’s tanks maintained a high rate of fire. Soon eight enemy tanks lay blazing or smoldering on the battlefield. A round struck close to the company commander’s tank, throwing up a fountain of earth. The tank that had fired the round moved towards Bäke’s tank. Bäke’s gunner tracked the tank until it halted to fire once more, barely 300 meters away. He then pressed the firing button. Almost at once the round struck the enemy tank and dislodged its turret, preventing it from firing again. The second round finished it for good.

 

“Advance by platoons!” Dr. Bäke ordered, when he saw the enemy forces veer off toward the northeast. The tanks moved forward and soon caught up to a smoking enemy tank that was trying to escape. The tank’s gun swung around, and the enemy tank grew larger in the gunner’s sight. There was a crash as he fired, and the round struck the flank of the enemy tank. It ground to a halt. Figures emerged and dashed for cover.

 

“Continue the pursuit!” Dr. Bäke radioed to his commanders.

 

The tank engagement raged along the entire front. Everywhere one looked there were flashes of gunfire, exploding rounds and blazing tanks. The rattle of tank tracks drowned out all other sounds. The tanks approached the birch grove that Dr. Bäke had given them as their objective. When they were about 150 meters away, a British tank emerged from the trees. Flames spat from the muzzle of its gun. The round hissed past the turret of Bäke’s tank. His gunner took aim and fired. The first round struck near the enemy tank’s right track. The loader rammed the next round into the breechblock. Bäke’s gunner pressed the firing button. This time it was a direct hit. The enemy tank began to burn. The British crew scrambled from their blazing steel coffin.

 

Bäke assembled his company and led it forward. He received instructions from Colonel Koll to catch and halt the lead enemy elements. The 1st Company, now reduced to fourteen tanks, rolled onwards at top speed. Bäke led his tanks to a position in front of the enemy. The tank-versus-tank duel resumed. One of Bäke’s tanks took a direct hit and began to burn. The crew bailed out. Bäke sent two vehicles to the location of the knocked-out tank to provide covering fire for the crew. Constantly moving, halting and firing, and frequently changing position to evade enemy fire, Bäke and his tanks halted the enemy and allowed the following German tanks to engage.

 

When the fight against the British armored brigade was over, fifty enemy tanks lay smashed and burning on the battlefield. The brigade commander and forty of his officers – all of them wounded – went into German captivity. In addition to several hundred dead, a total of about 2,000 of the brigade’s soldiers were captured. The division’s medical battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Spiegelberg, worked with British medical personnel to care for the wounded enemy soldiers. The 6th Panzer Division had scored a great success while suffering only light casualties – and that against an enemy who had fought with bravery and determination.

 

Following this operation, the division received a corps order to go over to the defensive and hold the territory already won, as the enemy facing the XXXXI Army Corps was in retreat towards the north. On the afternoon of that eventful day the division was pulled out of the line. The day’s booty consisted of 60 tanks and 5 armored cars, 10 artillery pieces, 11 antitank guns, 34 motor cars, and 233 trucks. The first part of the French Campaign had come to an end.

 

 

The French Campaign (Part II)

 

The 6th Panzer Division, together with the rest of the XXXXI Army Corps, was now placed under the direct command of General Guderian. The white “K” on the division’s vehicles was replaced by a “G.” Panzer Group Guderian assembled in the Charleville area in preparation for the second part of the French Campaign. The 6th Panzer Division was staged in the Montherme-Rozoy area, which had been a battlefield before the move across the Meuse. In addition to the XXXXI Army Corps, General Guderian also had the XIX Army Corps under his command, placing a total of four armor and two motorized infantry divisions at his disposal. The chief of staff for the panzer group was General Staff Col. Walther K. Nehring; General Staff Maj. Fritz Bayerlein was the operations officer. Many of the commanders in the ranks of the 6th Panzer Division and Panzer Group Guderian would later distinguish themselves on the battlefields of North Africa.

 

As a part of the 12th Army under General List, which was a component of Army Group von Rundstedt, Guderian’s tanks were given the task of advancing southward from the Chateau Porcien and Attigny areas across the Aisne River and Canal.

 

On 3 June Major General Werner Kempf and Colonel Johannes von Ravenstein received the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross. The war diary of the 6th Panzer Division noted: “Seldom before has the award of such a decoration produced such unqualified, sincere and enthusiastic joy and approval among officers and men.”

 

Army Group von Rundstedt was scheduled to attack on 9 June; however, the 6th Panzer Division only remained at a state of heightened readiness on that day. The division in front, the 86th Infantry Division, had failed in its attempt to cross the Aisne and was therefore unable to establish a crossing site for the 6th Panzer Division. As a result, Guderian was forced to move the XXXXI Army Corps behind his XIX Army Corps west of Rethel where the Aisne had been successfully crossed. On the first day of the attack the 3rd Panzer Division had established a bridgehead on the far side of the Aisne, from which the lst and 2nd Panzer Divisions of the XIX Army Corps were attacking towards the south. Now the 6th and 8th Panzer Divisions were to follow.

 

Battle Group von Ravenstein crossed the Aisne over a bridge built by combat engineers. At Machault it ran into a strong enemy defensive position that contained a strong force of artillery. Battle Group von Esebeck encountered an equally strong enemy force at Sernide and was forced to go over to the defensive. Colonel von Ravenstein summoned the commanders of both of the division’s tank battalions for a briefing. He ordered Lieutenant Colonel Koll to lead a tank attack against the enemy positions. The armored personnel carrier company of the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Rifle Regiment was to follow the tanks in its half-tracks, dismount near the point of penetration, and continue the attack on foot. All of the operational elements of the 65th Panzer Battalion were involved, as well as the 11th Panzer Regiment’s 2nd Battalion. General Kempf accompanied the attack, riding in his command car in the midst of the mechanized infantry behind the first group of tanks. The general wanted to be on hand to intervene personally if the situation required.

 

The company under Bäke was positioned roughly in the middle of the wave of tanks. Standing in his open turret hatch, Bäke saw the commander of the 11th Panzer Regiment to his right. All of the tank engines were idling. Lieutenant Colonel Koll gave the order to advance and the tanks moved out. The tanks rolled toward the enemy positions. Artillery rounds burst all over the landscape in front of the advancing armor without, however, inflicting any damage. When the tanks were about 100 meters from the impacting rounds, Dr. Bäke ordered: “Button up! Watch your front!”

 

Bäke dropped down into the turret. He slammed the hatch shut and secured it.

 

“Weapons up!” reported the gunner.

 

The tanks moved onwards. Incoming rounds burst to the right and left. The mounted infantry ducked lower in their vehicles. Then the armored battle group disappeared into a long, shallow valley and were out of sight of the enemy. When the tanks reemerged on the far side of the valley, the French artillery fire intensified. However, the rounds then passed over the tanks and struck the ground behind them.

 

The attack force had passed through the previously scouted valley in good order. On the right and left of the attack wedge the first tanks were engaging the forward enemy positions. Machine guns rattled as the infantry dismounted. The tank gunners zeroed in on the enemy machine guns. There was a crash of gunfire and the French machine guns were silenced abruptly by the bursting rounds. However, the enemy artillery had now found the range. The tanks weaved and turned to escape the enemy fire, all the while drawing nearer to the French artillery position.

 

All of a sudden Bäke spotted an antitank gun and alerted his gunner. The 1st Platoon halted and seconds later the antitank gun was in the gunner’s sight. The other two platoons had moved on and, by the time the 3rd Platoon had stopped to fire, the 1st Platoon was already moving again. Bäke issued the fire command to his gunner as he led the platoon forward: “Ahead, one o’clock, 500 meters, enemy battery!”

 

“Identified!”

 

Three seconds later there was a crash as the Skoda tank’s 3.7-cm gun fired. The high-explosive round was on target. Steel and pieces of equipment whirled through the air. Then the enemy guns’ ammunition went up in several thunderous explosions.

 

“Move out! Step on it!” ordered Bäke.

 

Once again the tank engines roared. A round whizzed past above the turret. The next round was already in the chamber. The tank halted abruptly and fired. Another antitank gun was silenced. Two antitank guns and an artillery piece that had been firing salvoes at the command vehicle now shifted their fire onto Bäke’s company. Bäke’s driver steered the tank out of the line of fire, then halted. Gunner and loader fired off five rounds in quick succession.

 

The noise within the tank was becoming unbearable. However, the barrage from Bäke’s tank brought some relief to the 11th Panzer Regiment which, at that point, moved forward quickly on the left flank. A round from an antitank gun hammered against the turret and bounced off. Then they were upon the French field position and overran the first gun. Men fled for cover. Bäke’s tank tilted dangerously, before falling back onto both tracks with a crash. The surviving French personnel fled towards the rear.

 

St. Etienne came in sight. There the enemy had built an even stronger defensive position. A round fired from this second line threw up a fountain of dirt close to the right track of Bäke’s tank. Then another burst in almost the same spot. There was a terrible crash and the tank spun around in a semi-circle. Bäke’s driver swung the tank back to face the enemy fire.

 

“Lost a track!” reported the driver.

 

“Bail out and fix the track! Driver, remain in the tank!” Bäke ordered.

 

While the other tanks roared past to the left and right, halting only to fire on the French position, Bäke’s crew set about repairing the damaged track. Bäke stopped one of the trailing tanks. Sergeant First Class Knoll got out and Bäke took over the platoon leader’s vehicle. He moved forward at top speed, while his crew completed the repair in record time. Bäke soon caught up with his company and assumed command from Lieutenant Möbbs, who had taken over in Bäke’s absence.

 

The last enemy resistance was broken, or at least so it seemed. Then heavy guns opened fire on the tanks. General Kempf ordered the attack halted and instructed his forces to go over to the defensive in their present favorable locations. The tanks rolled behind a patch of woods and disappeared from the enemy’s sight. First Lieutenant Bäke reported back to the battalion commander by radio and was given new orders for his company.

 

The adjutant of the 11th Panzer Regiment, 1st Lieutenant Schoeller, had been killed by the French artillery fire. Several tanks were so badly damaged that they had to be written off. The artillery fire that had halted the attack of the 6th Panzer Division finally ceased an hour after midnight.

 

That evening General Guderian appeared at the command post of the 6th Panzer Division. General Kempf made his report, and Guderian announced he was in complete agreement with the decisions taken by his friend.

 

“I would have done the same thing, Kempf. To continue in this situation would have meant unnecessary losses.” General Guderian noted in his war diary: “The XXXXI Army Corps, which was moving up on the left of the XIX Army Corps, had to repel attacks against its left wing from the Argonne by the French 3rd Mechanized and 3rd Armored Divisions before resuming its move towards the south.”

 

The enemy forces withdrew undetected during the night. As a result, when the attack was resumed on the morning of 12 June, there was initially no opposition. Two hours later the day’s objective of Somme-Pys was reached. The town itself was free of enemy forces.

 

At noon, Kempf reorganized his division. Spearheading the attack was Battle Group von Esebeck. The 2nd Battalion of the 11th Panzer Regiment formed the steel tip of the attack force. The battle group set out at 1800 hours. After advancing 3,000 meters it came upon a strong defensive position at the outer edge of the Châlons-sur-Marne Training Area. The advance ground to a halt.

 

The next attack, launched on the morning of 13 June, succeeded in breaking through. The German forces moved quickly through the wooded terrain of the Châlons-sur-Marne Training Area. On 14 June, while German troops moved into Paris, the 6th Panzer Division was fighting in a densely wooded area near St. Mard, which General Kempf described to the author as “completely unsuited to the operation of tanks.” He went on to say: “Fortunately for us, the 17th Infantry Division arrived quickly and was able to relieve us and free us for the next offensive operations”.

 

In a several-hour night march on 16 June, the 6th Panzer Division advanced through Langres to Jussey, where the 6th Reconnaissance Battalion had established a bridgehead. Rainecourt was captured by the 6th Motorcycle Battalion and the 65th Panzer Battalion’s 1st Company. Two thousand French soldiers were taken prisoner. Sergeant First Class Seewald, a member of Dr. Bäke’s company, described the operation:

 

As the lead element, our company was to move up to the edge of Rainecourt, lay down effective fire on the enemy force suspected there, and open a way into the city for the motorcycle troops.

 

When Dr. Bäke saw the first muzzle flash from an antitank gun concealed behind a low wall, he ordered us to spread out and open fire on the enemy position.

 

We advanced about 100 meters and watched as Dr. Bäke and the commander of the lst Platoon destroyed the two antitank guns and opened fire on a machine gun, which was firing on the two tanks. The first round silenced the machine gun. Other machine guns concentrated their fire on the motorcycle troops. All of the company’s tanks now joined the fight. Gunfire was heard from every direction. Thunderous explosions and the roaring engines of the advancing platoons turned the world into a madhouse.

 

First Lieutenant Kreis’s men stormed past us towards the outskirts of the city. Suddenly half a dozen machine guns opened up on the motorcycle troops. We were taking aim at the machine guns when the voice of our company commander rang out: “2nd Platoon: Silence the machine guns! lst Platoon: Close up and advance. Position yourselves in front of the motorcycle troops!”

 

The 2nd Platoon opened fire. The eight tanks fired three brief salvoes and silenced the enemy guns. The tanks of the 1st Platoon rolled at high speed diagonally across the terrain. They screened the infantry and led them forward, sparing them further heavy losses.

 

The French fire became weaker. The tanks of the 1st Platoon now blocked our field of fire directly ahead.

 

“Commander to the 1st Platoon: Move past us on the left, move ahead as far as the stand of trees, and lay down flanking fire on the enemy from there!”

 

We roared off. One of our vehicles suddenly halted. We heard the voice of its commander: “Transmission failure!”

 

“Commander to all: Blanket the enemy with fire. To disabled tank: I’ll send a recovery vehicle!”

 

These actions by our commander saved the 1st Company of the 6th Motorcycle Battalion, whose ranks had already been thinned considerably by the heavy enemy fire.

 

We later learned that 1st Lieutenant Kreis, commander of the motorcycle company, had been wounded and Lieutenant Hans-Joachim Wissemann had taken over command of the company. He had led the last attack, supported by us.

 

Quickly assessing the situation, Dr. Bäke had drawn the enemy fire on himself and given cover to the motorcycle troops. It was then that Lieutenant Wissemann came to the fore: “I’m taking command of the company!” he shouted through the din. He then ran through the hail of fire to Bäke’s tank and discussed the final assault into the heart of the enemy position. The conversation was a brief one.

 

“If you support us and advance on both flanks, sir, we can do it!”

 

“All right, Wissemann! We’ll roll up to the city in two attack columns. Stay close behind and cover the area behind us until you’re close enough for your assault.”

 

“Commander to all: Advance in a V formation. Objective is the outskirts of the city. Stay together and clear a path for our motorcycle troops!” Bäke ordered by radio.

 

The tanks moved out. Anything that appeared in their path was fired on. The V made good progress. While one side halted, the other advanced and the platoon following in the middle supported the flank, which had halted to fire. The tanks fired in the direction of the muzzle flashes and rolled into the gardens, smashing down a low wall and crushing fences. Three small garden sheds were knocked down to provide a better field of fire.

 

The heavy machine-gun fire being directed at the motorcycle troops slackened. Lieutenant Wissemann followed the tanks on the right side of the V. After the machine guns firing from the windows had been silenced, he led his men forward and cleared the first two houses. Dr. Bäke rolled into the city with the 1st Platoon. An antitank gun firing down a city street struck the tank with a grazing round, then was blown up by a direct hit. Dr. Bäke summoned all of the tanks forward. They rolled into the city, turned down the side streets and flushed out the desperately defending enemy.

 

Rainecourt was in German hands. The history of the 6th Panzer Division described the action:

 

Lieutenant Wissemann, who had taken over command of the company from the wounded 1st Lieutenant Kreis at the beginning of the operation, distinguished himself in the fighting. The fighting in and around Rainecourt received particularly effective support from 1st Lieutenant Bäke’s company of the 65th Panzer Battalion. Once again Bäke distinguished himself in action.

 

Lieutenant Wissemann and 1st Lieutenant Bäke were awarded the Iron Cross, First Class, for their exploits. (On 8 February 1943, Hans-Joachim Wissemann, by then holding the rank of captain and commander of the 6th Motorcycle Battalion’s 2nd Company, was awarded the Knight’s Cross for his actions in the Stalingrad battle zone. He did not live to receive the decoration, as he was killed in action in the pocket on 30 December 1942.)

 

At 2330 hours on that eventful day, Major General Kempf issued the division’s orders for the coming day: “The 6th Panzer Division will take the fortress of Epinal. Also taking part in this operation is the 20th Motorized Infantry Division, which will advance to the right of 6th Panzer Division. The division staff and command echelon will accompany Battle Group von Esebeck.”

 

General Guderian had deployed the XXXXI Army Corps in the direction of Epinal on his own initiative, even though General von Leeb’s 1st Army had also set out towards the same objective. The first attempt to take Epinal in a coup de main had failed. This time the tanks of the 11th Panzer Regiment’s 2nd Battalion led Battle Group von Esebeck towards the fortress. The 660th Assault Gun Battery assisted by providing supporting fire. The battery, which had been formed in Jüterbog in April, had demonstrated its effectiveness in the early stages of the campaign. While attached to the 3rd Infantry Division during the Meuse crossing, and later in operations with the 8th Panzer Division, the battery had been an outstanding success, helping to prove Erich von Manstein’s idea of an assault-gun force a stroke of genius. Now, during the assault across the Aisne in the second phase of the campaign against France, it was attached to the 6th Panzer Division. The battery was again to prove a success while taking part in the operations at Epinal.

 

The 1st Battalion of the 4th Rifle Regiment under Major Zollenkopf received orders to push through Epinal and take possession of the fortress. The assault guns were assigned to provide support. They advanced ahead of the infantry, shooting up nests of resistance. Epinal fell to Battle Group von Esebeck, but the citadel held out. Once again, the 65th Panzer Battalion was sent into action. The task fell to the 1st Company to silence the citadel’s armored cupolas. Bäke directed his company into position and gave the order to open fire. Two of the cupolas were put out of action, but the defenders held on with the courage of desperation.

 

When the call for a perfect French-speaking parlementaire reached Dr. Bäke, he sent “his Alsatian, a hard-drinking genius, but otherwise very useful,” with Captain Schemmel and 1st Lieutenant Hauschildt to act as interpreter. Following several negotiations it was agreed that the fort would be surrendered at noon the next day with full military honors. The garrison of Fort Longchamps marched out past an honor guard of the 6th Panzer Division. The French flag was hauled down and the German war flag was raised over the fortress. That same evening, 22 June 1940, a cease-fire was signed in the forest of Compiegne. At 0135 hours on 25 June the following signal was sent to all German armed forces from the Channel coast to Switzerland: “Stand down!”

 

On 26 June the 6th Panzer Division held a large field parade. That evening, as the bugler sounded taps, 1st Lieutenant Erich Oeckel, commander of the 4th Rifle Regiment’s 5th Company, received the Knight’s Cross that had been awarded him on 24 June. (Oeckel was killed on 13 July 1943, at which time he was a battalion commander holding the rank of captain.) Casualties suffered by the 6th Panzer Division during the French Campaign totaled 2,140 soldiers killed, wounded, or lost for medical reasons. Included in this total were 108 officers. Considering these heavy losses, the fighting in France could scarcely be considered an “easy campaign.” On 3 July the division moved into its peacetime garrison. Colonel von Ravenstein received an enthusiastic reception in Iserlohn.

 

 

THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

 

Reorganization and Refitting

 

The reorganization of the 6th Panzer Division began on 1 August 1940. Associated with this was the release of a substantial number of troops to the 16th Motorized Infantry Division, which was to later become the 16th Panzer Grenadiers Division and then end the war as the 116th Panzer Division Windhund. The 11th Panzer Regiment and the 65th Panzer Battalion remained with the 6th Panzer Division, however. In September 1940, the 6th Panzer Division was transferred to West Prussia, where it became part of the XVI Army Corps of the 18th Army. Brigadier General Landgraf became the division’s new commanding officer. Landgraf had commanded the 4th Panzer Division in the French Campaign and had been awarded the Knight’s Cross on 16 June for his exploits.

 

The 6th Panzer Division carried out its first large-scale exercises at the training area with its newly delivered tanks. In the place of Colonel von Ravenstein, Colonel Edward Raus now commanded the 4th Rifle Regiment. The armor commanders within the division had also changed significantly. Colonel Koll continued to lead the 11th Panzer Regiment; however, Major Löwe had assumed command of the regiment’s 1st Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Sieber became the commander of the 2nd Battalion. The 65th Panzer Battalion also received a new commander, Major Schenk.

 

The division was still equipped with the obsolescent Czech-built Panzer 38(t), whose 2.5-cm frontal armor was incapable of withstanding the fire of a heavy tank, particularly the very heavy Soviet KV tanks and the T-34, which appeared later. It was planned to reequip the division with the heavier Panzer IV. The lighter Skoda tank did possess one advantage over the next generation of German tanks. It would be light enough to cross the few available bridges in the northern sector of the Russian front without collapsing them.

 

One of the officers leading the training of the division’s new soldiers was Dr. Bäke. After the French Campaign, he was promoted to reserve captain.

 

The Attack Begins!

 

On the morning of 22 June 1941, the 6th Panzer Division set out in the general direction of Leningrad in two battle groups. The division overcame several well-defended trench positions to reach the day’s objective. On the afternoon of the following day, the leading elements of the division reached Rossienie. Major Schliemann, commander of the 6th Motorcycle Battalion, was killed in the attack on the city.

 

On the evening of 23 June, the Dubyssa bridgehead, which was being held by Battle Group von Seckendorff, was attacked by powerful Soviet tank forces. The bridgehead was lost and the battle group suffered heavy casualties. It was there that the first of the new Soviet heavy tanks appeared, whose frontal armor was impervious to the rounds of the German 3.7-cm antitank gun. The Kliment Voroshilov (KV) tanks weighed between fifty and sixty-two tons. Their frontal armor was 85 millimeters thick. Seven of these monsters rolled through the antitank positions of the 6th Panzer Division into the division’s rear, where the tanks of the 11th Panzer Regiment were positioned. The rounds fired by the division’s tanks were unable to penetrate the armor of the Soviet tanks. Lieutenant Eckhardt, commander of the 6th Company of the 114th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, succeeded in destroying one with a demolition charge fashioned from several Teller mines. The division commander called for 8.8-cm Paks and these arrived on the battlefield in time to destroy another of the Soviet giants, averting a very dangerous situation.

 

Captain Bäke took little part in the first phase of the Russian Campaign. No longer in command of his tank company, he was now in charge of the tank recovery section of the regiment. The few times Bäke saw action during this period were when his recovery teams were forced to defend themselves against Soviet troops. His job was to recover damaged tanks, tow them back to the maintenance facilities and see to it that the necessary repairs were carried out. Bäke carried out this assignment with great success. Colonel Koll, commander of the 11th Panzer Regiment, soon took this knowledgeable and circumspect officer onto his staff as an executive officer. In this capacity Captain Bäke experienced armored warfare from the command level. Bäke’s chance to return to action came on 1 December 1941 when Major Löwe, who was commanding the 11th Panzer Regiment’s 1st Company, left temporarily to take command of the regiment.

 

Captain Bäke led the last operational company of the 11th Panzer Regiment into action in the bitter cold of December, when temperatures fell to twenty degrees Celsius below zero. On 2 December the last of the company’s Skoda tanks and Panzer IVs were disabled. The division was halted only sixty kilometers from Moscow.

 

With the few tanks that could be put back into service, Captain Bäke managed to reach the area of Kolowo. The 6th Panzer Division – or better, what was left of it – was serving as rearguard for the 3rd Panzer Army. The rifle companies were down to about thirty men each. On 9 December Dr. Bäke lost his last tank. The tank was unserviceable and had to be destroyed when Elisorowo was abandoned. The division was scheduled to return to Germany to refit.

 

Transport to Germany and Reconstitution

 

On 15 January 1942 the 6th Panzer Division was forced to report the following to the LVI Panzer Corps: “The division is no longer capable of operations. Reconstitution, not refitting, is required. However, this is not possible in the present area.” On 12 February 1942 the Army High Command ordered the disbanding of the 65th Panzer Battalion. Its remaining elements joined the 11th Panzer Regiment, ensuring adequate personnel for two battalions. As a result, this famous battalion, in which Franz Bäke had played a decisive role, disappeared forever. It was to be several more weeks before the rest of the 6th “Foot Division” received travel orders to move west. With a touch of bitter gallows humor, the men had dubbed their once proud panzer division this demeaning term on account of its total lack of tanks.

 

In the meantime Bäke had returned to the division and assumed command of a small force consisting of a repaired Panzer IV, three Panzer 38(t)s, and several armored personnel carriers. With this small “fire brigade” Dr. Bäke was able to destroy five attacking T-34s in the fighting for Cholminka. Two of these were accounted for by Bäke, who led the force in the sole Panzer IV. That same evening Battle Groups Bäke and Römhild were released by Army Group Center for transport to Germany.

 

By 23 April 1942 all of the first eight transport trains carrying the 6th Panzer Division had arrived in France. The ninth and last train did not leave Nowo Dugino until 2 May 1942, however. The 6th Panzer Division, now commanded by Brigadier General Raus, was to be reformed by 31 July.

 

In France Bäke initially took over a cadre company comprised of personnel from each of the regiment’s battalions and the remaining regimental units. Major Löwe, now recovered from his wounds, temporarily took command of the 11th Panzer Regiment in place of Colonel Koll, who had gone on leave. At first the only tanks available to the regiment were captured French models; its total complement was two Somua tanks and three platoons with six Hotchkiss tanks each.

 

On 22 June the two battalions of 11th Panzer Regiment received the first of their new tanks: fifteen Panzer IIs and twenty-six Panzer IIIs armed with the long 5-cm gun. On 2 July Col. Walther von Hünersdorff took command of the regiment. Colonel Koll was transferred to the officer reserves where he held staff positions. (In January 1945 he was promoted to major general in the Inspectorate of Artillery.)

 

The regiment’s 2nd Battalion conducted large-scale maneuvers on 10 September. Its new commanding officer was Major Franz Bäke. While leading this battalion he was to become one of the greatest armor commanders and tacticians. Part of the field training consisted of giving a demonstration to senior officers. Dr. Bäke carried out the subject of the demonstration – actions on encountering an in-depth antitank obstacle while acting as advance guard – with great skill and elan.

 

With the arrival of the last of its tanks on 14 September, the division was once again fully equipped. It now possessed more than 150 Panzer IIIs, each armed with either the long 5-cm main gun or the short 7.5-cm infantry-support weapon. In addition, it also had a number of the more powerful Panzer IVs with the long 7.5-cm gun, which made them a match for any of the Soviet tanks.

 

On 3 November 1942 Hitler ordered the 6th Panzer Division and two infantry divisions transferred to the East, where they were to assemble to the rear of Army Group B behind the Rumanian Third and Italian Eighth Armies. There the three divisions were to be held in reserve. The first trains carrying the 6th Panzer Division left France on 14 November 1942. They were bound for the southern sector of the Eastern Front. It was planned to detrain the division in Belgorod on 25 November. There, however, the division was sent onwards to the south. A battle was raging in the area of operations of the 6th Army at Stalingrad. That was the division’s destination.

 

Panzers in action.

 

Operation “Winter Storm”

 

The 6th Panzer Division was then called upon to take part in a decisive action which would demand its utmost. It was to be part of a force whose objective was to free the 6th Army under General Paulus, which was surrounded in the Stalingrad area. A total of twelve divisions was to be committed to the relief effort. Considering the situation, it is quite likely that such a force could have fought its way into the pocket; however, the reality was to be quite different. On arriving in the assembly area, the 6th Panzer Division found itself quite alone. Operation “Winter Storm,” which was to be commanded by General Hoth – a raid across 100 kilometers of enemy-held territory to the edge of the Stalingrad pocket – became a battle in which all three divisions which eventually took part were bloodied.

 

Within the LVII Panzer Corps, the 6th, 17th, and 23rd Panzer Divisions were supposed to take part in the operation. Elements of the 23rd Panzer Division were the first to arrive. The 17th Panzer Division was farther away and, in any case, was halted on orders of the Führer. On the morning of 24 November the first of the formations of the 6th Panzer Division – the 4th Panzer Grenadier Regiment – arrived in Kotelnikowo. The regiment came under fire from Soviet tanks while it was still detraining. Its 8th Company was unloaded under fire and immediately engaged the enemy. As a result, all of the following trains had to be unloaded at a station farther down the line.

 

On the morning of 29 November Brigadier General Raus took command of the division. On 1 December the 6th Panzer Division was placed under the command of the LVII Panzer Corps under General of Armored Troops Kirchner. That same day saw the arrival of the 1st and 5th Companies of the 11th Panzer Regiment. By then, Field Marshal von Manstein was supposed to have had twelve divisions at his disposal to carry out the relief attack. In reality, the numbers were far less.

 

Two days later, the 6th Panzer Division saw its first major action with Army Group Don under Field Marshal von Manstein. A force of enemy tanks had set out towards Kudinoff. Under cover of heavy, blowing snow, they reached Pochlebin. A platoon of antitank guns positioned there destroyed seven of them, but the 3rd Company, 114th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, was forced to pull back towards Safranoff.

 Major Bäke then received instructions to send the 5th Company, 11th Panzer Regiment, a company from his battalion, to the location of the 1st Company of the 11th Panzer Regiment. Both companies were then to move to Kotelnikowo with the 114th Panzer Grenadier Regiment’s 2nd Battalion (Battle Group Küper) and assemble there for an attack.

 

When about twenty enemy tanks were spotted advancing towards Kotelnikowo along both sides of the road from Pochlebin, Brigadier General Raus dispatched the 1st Company of the 6th Antitank Battalion to deal with the threat. The antitank guns shot up the Soviet armored spearhead, but were then forced to pull back.

 

“All tank companies to the front!” Brigadier General Raus gave the order to the 11th Panzer Regiment. “Battle Group Küper has been stopped by the enemy. The enemy forces at Pochlebin must be destroyed.”

 

Colonel von Hünersdorff then suggested sending Bäke’s battalion to Maiorski. There it would be placed under the command of Colonel Zollenkopf, the commander of the 114th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, for the attack on Pochlebin. During the night patrols reported that the enemy was reinforcing his formations at Pochlebin in preparation for an attack against Kotelnikowo. General Raus assembled all his tanks for the attack. Colonel von Hünersdorff had more than ninety tanks at his disposal. He summoned the battalion commanders and briefed them on the plan of attack.

 

When the attack began, the 11th Panzer Regiment’s 2nd Battalion under Major Bäke rolled directly towards the high ground at Pochlebin. When the tanks were in range, well-camouflaged Soviet tanks and antitank guns opened fire. One after another, three of tanks of the 8th Company were hit and disabled. One took several more hits and blew up. Several tanks of both battalions that had mounted fuel tanks on their rear decks to increase their range were hit and went up in flames. The crews managed to scramble to safety, but the tanks were total losses. One tank lost in this way was that of Captain Hagemeister, the company commander of the regiment’s 2nd Company. He and his crew were forced to abandon their tank and the Captain was seriously wounded. The 1st Company, which had been ordered to set out towards Pochlebin from the northwest, became involved in an engagement with enemy forces, during the course of which it was forced farther and farther to the north.

 

Colonel von Hünersdorff issued orders by radio for the tanks to immediately turn and proceed straight towards Pochlebin. This was the only way to provide relief for Bäke’s battalion, which was heavily engaged. The tanks of the 1st Company then rolled towards Pochlebin from the north. This sudden change in direction confused the enemy. He was forced to divide his forces, which noticeably reduced the pressure on Dr. Bäke’s battalion.

 

Dr. Bäke acted at once. He instructed his heavy company and the entire battalion: “Attack! We have to break through now.” The tanks rumbled toward Pochlebin at high speed. The heavy company led the way, with the remaining companies widely dispersed behind it. The Panzer IVs took the center, striking devastating blows at the enemy with their 7.5-cm guns. Four Soviet tanks came out to face the tanks; all were destroyed. Soviet cavalry units appeared on the flank. High-explosive rounds halted them. Dr. Bäke’s tank accounted for two Soviet tanks.

 

Franz Bäke breathed a sigh of relief as the tanks rolled into Pochlebin. Unfortunately, there was still a wide gap between his battalion and the other tank battalion, through which the enemy, some on horseback, escaped. Nevertheless, victory had been achieved and that evening ten enemy tanks were counted that had been destroyed by the 2nd Battalion. In addition, fourteen guns had been captured and 2,000 prisoners taken. Among the booty taken the next day were 800 horses and camels. The war diary of the 6th Panzer Division: “The 2nd Battalion under Major Bäke played a major role in the success. Especially deserving of recognition is 1st Lieutenant Ranzinger, the commander of the 8th Company.”

 

Statements by prisoners revealed that the Soviet units involved had been the 81st Cavalry Division and the 85th Tank Brigade of the Red Army. The Soviet build-up for an attack on the important jumping-off point of Kotelnikowo had been smashed. General Hoth voiced his appreciation in a radio message: “Bravo, 6th Panzer Division!”

 

On 5 December the LVII Panzer Corps released Corps Order Number 1: “Preparations for Operation Winter Storm.”

 

In the meantime, patrols from the 6th Panzer Division had discovered the approach of powerful enemy tank forces at Werchne Kumskij. Statements from prisoners indicated that these were the 300 tanks of the Soviet Fourth and Thirteenth Tank Corps. These units would have to be eliminated before the breakthrough to Stalingrad could begin.

 

During a conference of organizational commanders, Colonel von Hünersdorff suggested that “this encounter of armored forces will be the decisive battle in the freeing of the Stalingrad pocket. All of the tanks available to the corps will be thrown into the battle. We can open the way to Stalingrad and save the 6th Army only if we succeed in striking a devastating blow against the enemy armor.”

 

General Hermann Hoth.

 

In a discussion between General Hoth and General of Armored Troops Kirchner in Simwoniki on 7 December, Hermann Hoth argued that the operation “should not be a battle in open terrain, but a concentrated breakthrough to the 6th Army.”

 

In the meantime, it had become clear that the LVII Panzer Corps would have to undertake the attack alone, because the other corps assigned to the attack, the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps under General of Armored Troops von Knobelsdorff, was being forced to defend its own bridgehead at Chirskaja from powerful Soviet forces. Meanwhile, the first elements of the 23rd Panzer Division had arrived.

 

The attack by the LVII Panzer Corps began on the morning of 12 December 1942. General Kirchner’s force consisted of the 6th Panzer Division with 134 tanks – including sixty-three Panzer IIIs, twenty-three Panzer IVs, and seven command vehicles – and elements of the 23rd Panzer Division with forty-six Panzer IIIs and eleven Panzer IVs. This force amounted to the strength of exactly one and a half armor divisions. This was all that was left of the promised twelve divisions. The only chance of saving the 6th Army had been squandered. Such a task was too great for the weak forces, which began the operation, despite the bravery and self-sacrifice demonstrated by the troops. One hundred seventy nine combat aircraft of the IV Air Corps were to provide air support to the attack force. But these, too, were not to remain with the attack force, as the course of events will show.

 

Horst Scheibert, a participant in the desperate struggle, gave the following initial overview in his well-respected book, 48 Kilometer nach Stalingrad: “The 6th Panzer Division had assembled in four battle groups: Three weaker mechanized infantry groups led by Colonel Zollenkopf, Colonel Unrein and Major Quentin and the stronger armored group under Colonel von Hünersdorff.”

 

The attack began. The war diary of the 11th Panzer Regiment contains the following entry:

 

The most powerful wedge rolled forward, with the 1st Battalion on the right, the 2nd Battalion on the left, and between them the assault guns and self-propelled guns. Behind them on a wide front came elements of the 114th Panzer Grenadier Regiment’s 2nd Battalion in armored personnel carriers. The day’s objective, to cross the Aksai, could not be reached, as crossing two icy ravines delayed the advance considerably.

 

The advance was resumed on the morning of 13 December and the crossing was made at 0800.

 

The 1st Battalion of the 11th Panzer Regiment rolled across the bridge unopposed. Afterwards, as Colonel von Hünersdorff’s command vehicle was moving across, a section of the bridge gave way and the vehicle blocked the crossing.

 

Colonel von Hünersdorff requested Stuka support. The dive-bombers arrived and began to bomb enemy-held Werchne Kumskij. Von Hünersdorff ordered the 1st Battalion to attack. As soon as the last bomb had fallen, the battalion rolled straight into Werchne Kumskij. The village was taken. The 23rd Panzer Division, which was supposed to join the battle at that point, had not yet arrived. When large-scale tank movements were reported from Nishne Jablotschnij, General Raus requested Stuka support. The Stuka attacks continued until darkness fell, destroying some of the enemy tanks concentrating in the town. General Hoth expressed his “full appreciation to commanders and troops alike.”

 

On 14 December the 11th Panzer Regiment, together with all of its attached armored units, moved to Werchne Kumskij. In doing so it was moving out to face the enemy’s armored forces instead of drawing them towards it. An armored engagement began and lasted until 17 December. The fighting cost Battle Group von Hünersdorff no less than 90 of its 120 tanks and assault guns. This was the decisive error of Operation “Winter Storm.” To use General Hoth’s expression, it had “battled instead of breaking through.”

 

The fighting on 14 December was likewise successful and General Raus ordered the “destruction of the enemy” for 15 December. On 15 December all of the 11th Panzer Regiment was at Werchne Kumskij. When enemy tank forces were reported, Colonel von Hünersdorff ordered Major Bäke to move around Werchne Kumskij to the south and destroy the enemy forces between the village and Sagotskot.

 

Major Bäke set out at once. A low ridge was crossed. At that point, the battalion commander was presented with a sight which he could not have imagined in his wildest dreams. About 1,000 meters away was a group of about 40 tanks, all painted white, as were the German tanks.

 

“Move closer! Be prepared to engage. Don’t fire until we’re sure they’re enemy tanks.”

 

Franz Bäke still thought it might be the tanks of the 23rd Panzer Division, which had been reported from this direction. In the tanks, the gunners selected their targets. Slowly, the battalion’s tanks rolled towards the dense mass of tanks. When they were 600 meters away, two tanks separated from the main body in the shallow valley. Bäke realized that they were the enemy. “Net call! It’s Russians! Fire at will!” Bäke’s gunner fired at the tank moving on the right. At least six other tanks had taken aim at the same tank and all fired virtually at once. The two Soviet tanks were struck by a series of direct hits and blown apart and left as burning hulks.

 

Dr. Bäke led the attack against the thirty-eight remaining tanks. He assigned each of his companies a sector to attack. In the staccato of tank gunfire and the few answering shots from the enemy, more and more Soviet tanks were put out of action. Several turned on broken tracks and fired wildly in all directions until they, too, were destroyed. Bäke’s gunner scored two more direct hits. One of the enemy tanks was left burning. When the last of the Soviet tanks had escaped beyond the range of the long 7.5-cm guns of the Panzer IVs, thirty-two enemy tanks were shot-up and burning on the battlefield. Bäke’s battalion had scored a dramatic success. The Soviets were no longer in a position to destroy the German armored forces.

 

“Resume the order of march! Continue the advance to the north!” ordered the battalion commander, after reports indicated that his battalion still had sufficient fuel and armor-piercing ammunition to continue the fight. The battalion’s tanks moved off in the direction of Sotskot. The unit’s light platoon, which had been sent ahead to reconnoiter, was in trouble there and fighting for its survival. Bäke’s tanks were met by fire from Sotskot from the Soviet tanks that had fled there.

 

“Attack! Move in!” ordered Bäke.

 

Following a brief exchange of fire, during which three or four more Soviet tanks were destroyed, the enemy pulled out of Sotskot. On their own initiative, Colonel von Hünersdorff and Major Bäke continued to pursue the Soviet tanks that day. The battalion commander’s command tank was hit and disabled. He climbed into a Panzer IV whose commander had been wounded. Bäke destroyed two more Soviet tanks during an attack against a small enemy armored unit that was moving towards Werchne Kumskij. Several of his battalion’s tanks were knocked out and had to be abandoned. The surviving crew members squeezed into other tanks.

 

When darkness fell, the 2nd Battalion was guided to Werchne Kumskij by flares fired by its sister battalion, where the regiment’s commander was located. That day the 6th Panzer Division destroyed a total of forty-two enemy tanks. This was the highest total of the campaign so far. Only two companies had been left behind in Werchne Kumskij that day. They were under the command of Major Löwe, the commander of the 1st Battalion. That afternoon, when 300 enemy tanks appeared in the vicinity of the village and the previously described fighting involving the 2nd Battalion took place, a large number of Soviet tanks turned towards Werchne Kumskij. Major Bäke noticed this movement and reported it to the regimental commander:

 

“The Russians are moving towards Werchne Kumskij, sir!”

 

Peering through his field glasses, he saw dense masses of tanks stream past his position, but he was unable to do anything about it, as his mission was not yet complete. He saw tanks and antitank guns in enormous quantities.

 

A short time later a radio message from Major Löwe reached the regimental commander: “About thirty tanks just outside Werchne Kumskij. Our armor-piercing rounds are almost gone. Request relief!”

 

Colonel von Hünersdorff radioed back: “Hold on, we’re coming!”

 

The next message from Werchne Kumskij came in half an hour later: “Situation extremely critical! Enemy in the village! When is Bäke coming?”

 

Colonel von Hünersdorff spoke with Major Bäke. Then Bäke instructed his tank commanders: “Move to Werchne Kumskij at maximum speed!”

 

Major Bäke led the mass of tanks towards Werchne Kumskij. Two companies that still had adequate quantities of armor-piercing ammunition led the way. The three remaining companies trailed. The tanks raced wildly into Werchne Kumskij. Three enemy tanks that turned to face them were shattered by a dozen rounds. Several Soviet tanks pulled back. Firing on the move, or halting briefly and firing, the tanks knocked out the Soviet tanks that had begun to flee. Bäke’s gunner hit an enemy tank, which then rolled away burning to one side, rammed the wall of a house and remained immobile beneath the rubble.

 

Bäke’s tanks reached the center of the village. The headquarters staff of the 1st Battalion appeared and waved the tanks in. All of the officers had been wounded. Burning tanks indicated the bitterness of the fighting these men had been through. Captain Wils, the commander of the 4th Company, and the rest of the 6th Company moved to the outskirts of the village and recovered the wounded. Three Soviet tanks that were still there were destroyed. Afterwards, the tanks led by Colonel von Hünersdorff moved south from Werchne Kumskij and reached Saliwskij. The enemy had knocked out nineteen German tanks. Five others had broken down with mechanical problems. The enemy lost twenty-three tanks in that engagement.

 

Finally, on 17 December, the first elements of the 17th Panzer Division arrived. The division had reached the battlefield ten days too late. At that point, together with the 6th and 23rd Panzer Divisions, it was to recapture Werchne Kumskij. It was intended for the attack to begin at 0850 hours on 17 December. Working day and night, the maintenance facilities had managed to have 60 unserviceable tanks ready for action again by the evening of 16 December. This was an outstanding feat, which was acknowledged by the division commander.

 

Panzer Group von Hünersdorff, consisting of the operational tanks of the 6th Panzer Division, the 201st Panzer Regiment (of the 23rd Panzer Division), and the 1st Armored Personnel Carrier Battalion of the 126th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, was to take the Shestakow bridgehead as well as Werchne Kumskij. The fighting for Shestakow took a dramatic form. Twelve enemy tanks were destroyed in quick succession, however, the ice-covered Neklinska Gorge proved impassable.

 

“Eleventh Panzer Regiment: Move towards Werchne Kumskij as soon as the Stuka attack ends,” Colonel von Hünersdorff ordered his two battalion commanders.

 

The Stukas appeared overhead and flew directly towards Werchne Kumskij. Sirens howling, they plunged down through a curtain of antiaircraft fire towards the village where Major Löwe and his men had fought their heroic battle. Standing in their open hatches, the tank commanders watched as the dive-bombers pulled up sharply. Seconds later, the sound of exploding bombs rang out through the day. Thick clouds of smoke rose from Werchne Kumskij.

 

“Move out!” Bäke ordered his battalion. The tanks set themselves in motion and rolled towards the south side of the village. There a Soviet antitank belt stopped them. Three tanks were hit and disabled. The rest continued to move forward, firing on visible targets, but then were forced to pull back. The enemy was too strong at that point.

 

Once again Stukas were called in. They arrived and dived almost vertically towards the ground. Again bombs fell and explosions rocked the area. But this second attack from the east also failed to break through. The 1st Battalion, which had made up the first wave, suffered heavy losses. Colonel von Hünersdorff cancelled the attack altogether to avoid the destruction of the entire regiment.

 

At 2100 hours the division ordered the 11th Panzer Regiment recalled to its jumping-off positions. On the evening of 17 December, the 4th Panzer Army, commanded by General Hoth, ordered the 6th Panzer Division to take the Mishkowa River sector near Gromoslawka. From there to the outer defensive perimeter of the Stalingrad pocket was exactly 48 kilometers. If the 6th Army could cover that distance, then the breakthrough and breakout would succeed. In the fighting the following day the 6th Panzer Division lost more tanks. By the evening of 18 December it had fifty-one tanks left and six command vehicles that lacked main guns.

 

The 6th Panzer Division, led by the 11th Panzer Regiment, set out at 1320 hours on 19 December. Vasilewska, the first objective, was taken in a wild race. But, as Wolfgang Paul stated, this was “no longer the beginning of the decisive attack against the encircling ring, but the last gasp of the completely exhausted XVII Panzer Corps.” (See also Manfred Kehrig: Stalingrad, Analyse und Dokumentation einer Schlacht.)

 

Following this last measure, Panzer Group von Hünersdorff had only twenty tanks left. Nevertheless, the night movement across thirty kilometers of terrain, some of it enemy-held, was one of the bright spots of Operation “Winter Storm,” even though it no longer made any contribution towards achieving the operation’s objective. The objective was reached at about midnight. The enemy was greatly surprised when the German tanks suddenly rolled across the bridge spanning the Mishkowa and secured it. They had imagined the Germans were far away. From there it was only forty-eight kilometers to Stalingrad, but the 23rd Panzer Division was twenty kilometers farther behind and the forces were exhausted.

 

At 1800 hours on 19 December, Field Marshal von Manstein requested that the 6th Army begin its breakout towards the 4th Army and, therefore, towards the 6th Panzer Division. Battle Groups von Hünersdorff and Zollenkopf continued to hold Vasilewska, in order to meet the forces breaking out of the pocket. Hitler would not permit General Paulus to break out, and Paulus was not the general to defy an order from the Führer, even if it was for the good of his army.

 

The Soviets launched powerful attacks on Vasilewska. On 21 December the Soviet 3rd Guards Rifle Division attempted to reduce the German bridgehead. The enemy struck the northeast corner with about thirty tanks, in an effort to open a path for the infantry. Major Dr. Bäke’s forces repelled the attack. Bäke destroyed one of the attacking Soviet tanks himself, while his battalion knocked out seven before the enemy withdrew.

 

Early on the morning of 22 December, another powerful Soviet attack was repulsed by Battle Groups Zollenkopf and Unrein, the latter having just arrived to reinforce the bridgehead. Everyone was waiting for the 6th Army. When would they come? Didn’t they know in Stalingrad that the situation at Vasilewska was becoming perilous? The night before, Soviet tanks had got to within fifteen meters of Colonel von Hünersdorff’s command post.

 

On the morning of 22 December, the Soviets launched an attack against the 11th Panzer Regiment’s 2nd Company with fifteen tanks. It was 0600 hours when the report reached Dr. Bäke. He immediately jumped into the nearest tank and led the 8th Company in a counterattack. When the tanks came upon the enemy, the Soviet tanks were about to overrun the forward German machine-gun positions. “Net call: Fire at will!”

 

Bäke’s gunner targeted the first enemy tank, which was turning over a German trench, trying to collapse the walls with its grinding tracks and bury the soldiers inside. The first round, fired from a range of 600 meters, was a direct hit that penetrated the armor of the Russian tank. It stopped in mid-turn and soon began to burn. The Soviet crew scrambled clear, but were cut down by machine gun fire from the mechanized infantry. This time there was no quarter.

 

In the further course of the brief, but violent engagement, the battalion commander’s tank destroyed another Soviet tank, while the remaining tanks knocked out four more T-34s. Only a handful of the attacking Soviet tanks managed to withdraw, and one of these was hit by the 7.5-cm gun of a Panzer IV from a distance of 1,400 meters. The enemy tank was not destroyed, but it disappeared trailing smoke.

 

In this situation, in the midst of a counteroffensive by the Second Guards Army under Marshall Vassilewski, General Kirchner ordered the 6th Panzer Division to reach the Werchne Zarinskij sector, even though it was already known that Hitler was going to leave the 6th Army in Stalingrad. This met with unanimous opposition from Colonel von Hünersdorff and his two battalion commanders. The regimental commander radioed corps: “A further attack is impossible! The corps headquarters should come and see for itself.”

 

Instead of General Kirchner, General Raus arrived on the morning of 23 December with his operations officer. However, General Kirchner did arrive soon afterwards, as he wished to see the situation for himself. After listening to Colonel von Hünersdorff’s report and seeing that the 6th Panzer Division was down to about two dozen tanks, while the enemy had positioned an entire Guards army between the division and the 6th Army, General Kirchner also became convinced that there could be no further attacks at that location. The only result of this would be to destroy the 6th Panzer Division for no gain in return.

 

General Kirchner gave in: “You are right, Hünersdorff! It’s all over here.”

 

Ninety minutes later, after General Kirchner had spoken with the division commander, General Raus gave his regimental commander, who had assumed command in the Vasilewska bridgehead, orders to abandon the bridgehead. In the meantime, the situation on the Donets and in the great Don Basin had so deteriorated that the entire southern front was threatening to collapse. General Hermann Hoth later said: “I had to make the most difficult decision in my career as a soldier.” On orders from Field Marshal von Manstein, the chief of staff of the 4th Panzer Army had an armor division pulled out of the line that night. The formation pulled out was the 6th Panzer Division. Operation “Winter Storm” was over. The 6th Panzer Division was withdrawn. Thanks to the efforts of the maintenance facilities, it had forty-one operational tanks.

 

When the last of the tanks of the 2nd Battalion left the battlefield, every tank crewman knew that the 6th Army was lost. All their efforts, the heavy losses, the deaths of so many good comrades: All of it had been in vain. The 6th Army stayed in Stalingrad. The last survivors of those taken prisoner there did not return to Germany until 1955. The tanks of the 2nd Battalion were ready to move out. Bäke stood in his open turret hatch gazing towards the north. Only forty-eight kilometers away was Stalingrad. Silently, he raised his hand and saluted. Afterwards he ducked inside. The hatch was slammed shut and he ordered: “Move out!”

 

The Fighting at Morosowskaja

 

On the evening of 25 December the mechanized elements of the 6th Panzer Division reached Morosowskaja. The job then at hand was to halt the enemy forces advancing towards Rostow. The Soviets had pierced the front held by the Rumanian Third and Italian Eighth Armies and were attempting to cut off all of Army Group Don.

 

The day before, the Red Army had taken the airfield at Tatsinskaja, which was one of the two main bases for the aerial supply of Stalingrad. It had destroyed some of the seventy serviceable Ju-52 transports on the ground there. Now this corps (the 25th Tank Corps of the First Guards Army) wanted to take the second supply base, Morosowskaja, in order to starve the Sixth Army to death or force it to surrender.

 

On 24 December the 11th Panzer Division had thrown itself against this avalanche of tanks, recaptured Skossyrskaja and established a bridgehead. In addition, by 24 December the battered elements of the 306th Infantry Division had withdrawn into the Morosowskaja area, permitting the establishment of a weak line of security.

 

When the 6th Panzer Division arrived in Morosowskaja the leading elements of the First Guards Army were within ten kilometers of the base. The first of the division’s units sent into action was the 6th Reconnaissance Battalion. Its assignment was to secure the supply road and rail line to Morosowskaja. The mechanized infantry secured the Chikow area. The forty-eight tanks of the 11th Panzer Regiment arrived in Morosowskaja at dawn on 26 December, following a road march of 150 kilometers. Colonel von Hünersdorff assembled his tactical operations staff in Romanow. Almost immediately, Bäke had to take the 5th Company into the area east of Morosowskaja to bolster the defenses. The 228th Assault Gun Battalion, which had been attached to the division, together with the main body of the 4th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, was sent to strengthen Battle Group Unrein.

 

On 27 December Battle Group von Hünersdorff attacked Tatsinskaja. The Soviets held, although the 228th Assault Gun Battalion managed to destroy twelve enemy tanks, as well as three Soviet 7.62-cm all-purpose guns, the so-called Ratschbums. Under the command of the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, Battle Group von Hünersdorf – consisting not only of the 11th Panzer Regiment, but also of panzer grenadiers, antitank units, and elements of the 76 Artillery Regiment, as well as attached units of the 23rd Panzer Division – attacked early on the morning of 29 December after assembling in Werchne Verbowka. The 11th Panzer Regiment’s 1st Battalion suffered heavy losses in the attack. First Lieutenant Ranzinger, who was acting commander of the battalion, was killed at the outset. Among the others who fell were 1st Lieutenant Sander and 1st Lieutenant Beuth, both company commanders.

 

During the night of 27–28 December, Colonel Martin Unrein’s forces entered Tatsinskaja. Once again it was the assault guns which led the way. A letter from Unrein to the author following the war described the horrible scene that greeted him and his soldiers in Tatsinskaja:

 

I received a report that the bodies of a large number of German soldiers were in a trench at the Russian position at the edge of the village. I set out at once to investigate. They had obviously been tortured. There were about thirty German soldiers there who had been shot by the Russians and simply thrown into the trench. Some had been shot through the back of the neck. Others were riddled with bullets, and some showed signs of mistreatment.

 

In the town Battle Group Unrein found a huge supply dump belonging to the Soviet 25th Tank Corps.

 

On 29 December Colonel von Hünersdorff led an attack with only ten tanks in the direction of Chernykow-Sswiwoloboff, in an effort to relieve the pressure. Four Soviet tanks and five antitank guns were destroyed, six very heavy mortars were overrun and a number of prisoners taken. The enemy attacks in the Urjupin area, which continued until year’s end, were repulsed by the 6th Panzer Division. On New Year’s Eve night a strong enemy force with tanks and infantry broke through the weak German defenses under cover of dense fog and entered Nowo Marjewka at dawn on 1 January 1943.

 

This was a challenge to the 2nd Battalion, because this was where Major Bäke had set up the battalion command post, positioning his companies for all-round defense. Thirty Soviet tanks raced into Nowo Marjewka with supporting infantry, some riding on the tanks and others following on foot. The Soviet tanks rammed the trains vehicles and rumbled in the direction of Bäke’s command post. Bäke had got up with the first alarm call and rushed outside, where he alerted his few tanks.

 

“Form battle groups. All trains personnel and the combat-engineer platoon report to me!” he ordered.

 

When the Soviet tanks appeared, they were greeted by a barrage from Bäke’s nine tanks. Three T-34s went up in flames. Bäke then led four tanks into the mass of enemy tanks. Combat took place at ranges of 100 meters and less. Bäke quickly destroyed two more enemy tanks. Two Soviet battalions pushed past the tanks into the town to the left and right. They took cover in some houses, but were soon driven out again by a force of personnel from the trains, who charged the Soviet positions with loud shouts of hurrah! Bäke’s tanks supported the combat engineers, who blasted the Soviets out of the houses with Teller mines.

 

“It was as if we were drunk, although we had had nothing to drink,” Staff Sergeant Günther Holtz told the author. “When we saw how our old man – the Panzer doctor – joined in with us and took in the fighting, then everything went like clockwork. Tanks fired to our left and right, and behind us as well, while shells burst all around.”

 

Bäke called his tank commanders: “All vehicles advance to the western part of town.”

 

The German tanks continued to pound the enemy. The Soviets backed up towards the west, not stopping until they reached the edge of town. Bäke alerted his gunner to the presence of an enemy tank, which he had spotted through a house window. “He’s going to show up at eleven o’clock behind that shot-up house, Brümmer!”

 

The gunner aimed at a position three meters beyond the left corner of the house. The long gun barrel appeared first, then the tank’s front slope and, finally, the whole length of the T-34 was exposed in front of the German tank. The T-34’s turret began to turn, but before it could rotate the required 80 to 90 degrees, Bäke’s gunner fired. The impact dislodged the tank’s turret from its turret ring. The Soviet driver engaged reverse and began to back up, but before it had gone more than a few meters it was hit again. The T-34’s turret hatch flipped open and a jet of flame shot up into the night sky. Then the tank’s ammunition supply went up, completely destroying the T-34.

 

Bäke ordered his forces to withdraw into the center of the town and establish a defensive position. The battalion adjutant had already sent a radio message to the regiment and reported to Bäke that Colonel Hünersdorff was going to launch a flanking attack from the south as soon as the division gave the go-ahead.

 

Bäke called his commanding officer: “I hope they don’t decide too late, sir. There are strong enemy tank forces in the west and northwest ready to attack.”

 

“We’ll take care of them, Bäke!”

 

“I hope so, sir!” said Bäke with a smile. “But you must send me two or three tanks and break through from the south along the main road.”

 

“That will be no problem, Bäke!”

 

An hour after daybreak Colonel von Hünersdorff received approval from division for the proposed attack. He dispatched the 2nd Company of the 6th Reconnaissance Battalion from the south towards Nowo Marjewka in a flanking move, and sent a company of the 114th Panzer Grenadier Regiment along the main road toward the small attacking unit. By the time the attacking forces reached the eastern outskirts of Marjewka, it had become clear that a new Soviet threat from the flank would not allow a further attack.

 

Nevertheless, Bäke’s battalion continued to hold on that morning, destroying another seven tanks and raising its total to twenty-seven. Had the Soviets managed to break through the German defensive position there, it would have had dire consequences for the entire front. The important thing at that point was to beat back the approaching enemy to create some breathing room and hinder the Soviet attack.

 

“Bäke, set out at about noon with everything you have. The spearhead which is advancing between the 114th Panzer Grenadier Regiment’s 2nd Battalion in Werchne Obliwiskij and yourself in Nowo Marjewka must be destroyed at all costs, otherwise the situation tonight will be desperate.”

 

“I will attack, sir!” Dr. Bäke replied. He spoke with the confidence of a seasoned veteran.

 

It was 1230 hours when Bäke’s armored battle group went to the attack once more. Moving in a sweeping arc from the south, the companies rolled towards the enemy in wedge formation. The 11th Panzer Regiment’s 5th Company was the first to make contact with the enemy. Everyone was ordered to battle readiness. The tanks were ready to fire. A minute later, the 5th Company engaged the enemy. Dr. Bäke saw a line of enemy tanks roll past the Company, which was embroiled in a firefight, and turn towards its flank. He immediately led the 7th Company forward to counter the threat. Ignoring the rounds bursting all around them, the tanks raced forward until they were on the left flank of the enemy formation.

 

“Fire at will!”

 

Six tanks fired as one. Five direct hits were registered. After the second salvo, three enemy tanks were on fire. Another turned helplessly with one track shot away until it, too, was destroyed.

 

“Eighth Company: Advance on the left flank, turn in behind Werchne Obliwiskij and attack the enemy from the rear. Fire signal flares as soon as attack position is reached.”

 

The 8th Company moved out to the right and rolled toward the designated position at high speed, while Bäke led the rest of the tanks onwards. The tank fighting raged along the entire width of the attack sector. There were frequent flashes from direct hits. Concealed antitank guns knocked out two German tanks. Bäke’s tank was disabled with track damage. He summoned one of the Panzer IVs and took command of it, while the tank’s commander oversaw the track repairs to Bäke’s vehicle.

 

In the next thirty minutes the fighting increased greatly in intensity. Bäke led his shrunken groups of tanks into one engagement after another. Bäke raced forward in a rapid advance towards the enemy tanks three times, before halting at a range of 800 meters and firing. Three Soviet tanks were destroyed in this manner. The wave of Soviet tanks was attempting to withdraw when the 8th Company reached its assigned position. The expected signal flares rose into the sky.

 

“Net call: Attack the turning enemy!”

 

The tanks rolled forward. Far ahead they saw 7.5-cm rounds fired by the 8th Company plowing into the mass of enemy tanks. Then they also opened fire. The Soviets were trapped. In a two-hour running battle, the group of enemy tanks was completely destroyed.

 

By the time darkness fell, the assault force of Soviet tanks had been smashed. Again acting on his own initiative, Bäke ordered his tanks to pursue the fleeing enemy in order to destroy the damaged tanks, which could be easily repaired, and strike at the Soviet infantry. Expending the last of their ammunition, the tanks destroyed another three tanks, two heavy antitank guns and a number of vehicles.

 

Not only had the attack by the Soviet 25th Tank Corps towards Nowo Marjewka failed, but the entire corps had been completely destroyed. This defensive success removed the danger of another Soviet breakthrough towards the important rail line west of Morosowskaja, which brought in the supplies for air delivery to the Stalingrad pocket.

 

At 1600 hours, when the results of the day’s fighting were tallied, it was revealed that the Soviets had lost thirty-two tanks, including twenty T-34s. German losses were eight tanks, seventeen killed, and forty-one wounded. In addition, seven 7.62-cm antitank guns had been destroyed, as well as a large number of infantry weapons.

 

Colonel von Hünersdorff reported to the division that Bäke had been assigned no command responsibilities relative to the attack and he had carried out the counterattack that had smashed the Soviet 25th Tank Corps on his own initiative. As a result of this information, General Raus recommended Major Bäke for the Knight’s Cross, the second time he had been recommended for this high decoration. Bäke received the Knight’s Cross on 11 January 1943.

 

In the meantime the division was involved in further heavy fighting. On 2 January 1943, the Soviets began a bombardment of the German positions with artillery, mortars and multiple rocket launchers – the so-called “Stalin Organs.” This was followed by an attack by a force consisting of several companies of T-34 tanks (each Soviet tank company was issued ten of these tanks, while the third company of each tank regiment was equipped with T-70 tanks). A Soviet breakthrough seemed certain, but once again the decimated companies and battle groups of the 6th Panzer Division held firm. Once again Bäke was on the scene when the call went out: “Send tanks forward to repel enemy attack!”

 

Bäke led two companies of his battalion against the attacking Soviet tanks. Committing both companies, Bäke rolled straight into a group of enemy infantry, escaping a salvo from a “Stalin Organ” by a hair’s breadth. He rolled to one side at high speed and blasted a path through the Soviet infantry. When the engagement was over, twenty knocked-out enemy tanks littered the battlefield, two of which had been destroyed by Bäke’s vehicle.

 

Effective 28 December, Tatsinskaja had again been the main departure point for supply flights into the Stalingrad pocket. The 6th Panzer Division had successfully completed its assignment of recapturing the village and its airfield and securing the vital Tatsinskaja-Morosowskaja rail line. The air units under Colonel Kühl had been able to resume their flights. However, on 3 January 1943, in an effort to minimize losses to his transport fleet, Colonel Kühl ordered his units back to Nowocherkassk in the face of a threatening build-up of Soviet forces. It seemed likely that the Soviets were about to make another attempt to capture Tatsinskaja. The first surprise attack on the airfield and its capture by the Red Army had resulted in the loss of seventy transport aircraft on the ground, as well as a large amount of ground equipment. (See Franz Kurowski: Luftbrücke Stalingrad.)

 

On the afternoon of 6 January the 6th Panzer Division received orders for Operation Snowball. The objective of the operation was to prevent an enemy breakthrough in the Bystraja-Kalitowo area. Just prior to this, however, Bäke’s battalion was once again forced to intervene, when the 114th Panzer Grenadier Regiment’s 2nd Battalion at Werchne Obliwiskij was attacked by strong Soviet forces. During the night the battalion was attacked from all sides. Nonessential vehicles were set on fire to provide illumination. When the battalion’s call for help reached the division, the 11th Panzer Regiment was ordered to go to the aid of the surrounded unit.

 

Hünersdorff asked Bäke, who was billeted in a neighboring village, to carry out the attack. Bäke set out at once. Just outside the village, Bäke’s unit ran into Soviet tanks and antitank guns. In the subsequent engagement, two of Bäke’s tanks were knocked out. The gunner of one of the tanks was killed, but the rest of the two crews was picked up by other vehicles. The attempt to drive the Soviet forces out of the village failed. Nevertheless, Bäke’s tanks fought their way through to the surrounded panzer grenadiers, who were able to break through and reach friendly territory.

 

Reports reached division headquarters that the formation on its left had begun to pull back slowly, as the Soviets had discovered the gap in the front there. On receipt of this news, the corps ordered the division to send the last of its tanks to Masloff. The next morning a call for help was sent out from Bystraja-Kalitowo by a replacement battalion that was under attack.

 

Colonel von Hünersdorff led thirteen Panzer IIIs against the attackers. In the replacement battalion’s sector he came upon Soviet heavy tanks, which had already broken through the front. Three of Hünersdorff’s tanks were knocked out by the giants, which seemed invulnerable to damage. Two 5-cm antitank guns that were moved forward suffered the same fate after firing several rounds at the approaching tanks without any visible effect.

 

Von Hünersdorff’s force withdrew to Karlowo-Obrywskij. There it received thirteen Panzer IVs armed with the long 7.5-cm gun. They had just been unloaded at the Tatsinskaja station. They had been intended for the division anyway, and their arrival was most opportune for Battle Group von Hünersdorff.

 

Further tanks were unloaded on the evening of 9 January 1943. Designated Panzer Company Walzer, these moved out to join Battle Group von Hünersdorff. Bäke’s armored group, which was down to fourteen tanks, was held in reserve as a mobile strike force. Under its commander, the Bäke group intervened wherever the situation became threatening. Two more enemy tanks were added to Bäke’s score during the fighting. Bäke insisted that the kills were achieved “with little input on my part,” and that the credit was due his gunner and driver, in short, his entire crew.

 

On 17 January the 6th Panzer Division was moved behind the Donets River as part of a mobile defense, occupying the Puzelujew-Kamensk sector. On 18 January a report reached the 11th Panzer Regiment in Werchne Jassenowski that Major Bäke had been awarded the Knight’s Cross on the evening of 11 January. There was great joy at the news, and all of Bäke’s friends and comrades who could do so came for the great celebration prepared by General Raus. At the same time, it was announced that Captain Metzler, who was in Münster, was to take over the 1st Battalion in place of the wounded Major Löwe.

 

In its new positions on the far side of the Donets, the 11th Panzer Regiment had thirty-nine tanks available. In the days that followed, another thirty tanks arrived, some of them repaired vehicles returning from the maintenance facilities. Early on the morning of 20 January, forward outposts on the bank of the Donets reported an enemy attack across an ice bridge.

 

Bäke was soon on the scene. He led a dozen of his tanks against the enemy force, and destroyed three T-70 light tanks that were leading the attack. Close behind the tanks came trucks towing antitank guns. Five were destroyed from close range as they tried to move into position to fire on the tanks. Bäke’s tanks then shot up troop-carrying trucks as they rolled across the ice. Fires blazed and there were loud explosions as the trucks’ fuel tanks went up. The enemy was thrown back across the river and made no further attempts to cross there. Once again Bäke had arrived on the scene just in time and had “ironed out” a dangerous situation.

 

On 22 January 1943 the 11th Panzer Division submitted the following status report: “The Panzer III is in no way equal to the demands of the war in the East. Its armor is too thin, and the caliber of its gun is inadequate. In contrast, the assault gun has proved an outstanding success in the steppe war, even though it lacks a movable turret. The reason for this success lays in its considerably heavier armor and more powerful gun.”

 

As a result of this report, the 6th Panzer Division was sent a number of assault guns, which were employed by the individual battle groups of the 11th Panzer Regiment. Major Dr. Bäke’s battalion received an assault gun company and a platoon of armored combat engineers. Acting in the role of a mobile fire-brigade, the battle group was sent to the attack against Kamenew as part of Panzer Group von Hünersdorff on 31 January 1943.

 

The powerful Soviet antitank defenses on the opposite bank of the Donets destroyed or disabled ten German tanks. Fortunately, all were recovered by the tank recovery platoons or driven back under their own power following immediate battlefield repairs.

 

While the division command was informed on 1 February that it was to become the army group reserve, Panzer Group von Hünersdorff still had combat responsibilities to fulfil north of Krassnodon, as did Battle Group Bäke in the Donets sector.

 

On 9 February 1943 Colonel von Hünersdorff was given command of the 6th Panzer Division. General Raus had received orders to take over XI Army Corps. (While commanding this corps and later becoming a General of Armored Troops, he became the 280th member of the German armed forces to receive the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross.) The division was now under the command of the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps. The corps’ assignment was to safeguard Army Group A as it withdrew from the Caucasus.

 

Hitler had arrived at the headquarters of Army Group Don in Zaporozhje on 17 February. On 19 February 1943, he issued the following order:

 

Soldiers of Army Group South and airmen of 4th Air Force!

 

The outcome of a battle of decisive importance depends on you. Germany’s fate, present and future, will be decided a thousand kilometers from the borders of the Reich.

 

The entire German homeland has therefore been mobilized. Everyone, to the last man and the last woman, is being called into service to support your battle.

 

The country’s youth is defending German cities and work places in the Flak arm. New divisions are being raised. New, innovative weapons are on their way to your front.

 

I have therefore flown to you in order to employ all means to ease your defensive battle and, in the end, transform it into victory. If every one of you helps me, we will – as before – succeed with the help of the almighty.

 

From the headquarters in Stalino, Colonel von Hünersdorff directed the division as it went into action on 21 February in heavy, blowing snow. Orders had been given to retake Kharkov. German forces were on the march again. Battle Group Zollenkopf was already committed. The 11th Panzer Regiment, now under the command of Colonel Hermann von Oppeln-Bronikowski, had orders to start out somewhat later.

 

The advance of the 6th Panzer Division went quickly. The German operation between the Don and Dniepr Rivers was a success, and the danger facing Army Group Don – by then renamed Army Group South – of being cut off was averted. When the 6th Panzer Division linked up with the southern part of Army Group Lanz, the Soviet Army Group Popov was completely cut off.

 

The group of armored forces under von Oppeln-Bronikowski, of which the 11th Panzer Regiment was the core, reached the western part of Bereka on 1 March, completing the encirclement of Popov’s Army Group. When Waffen-SS divisions reached the outskirts of Kharkov, the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps was turned west and sent towards Kharkov from the west and southwest.

 

Hermann von Oppeln-Bronikowski, Bäke’s regimental commander.

 

The Battle of Kharkov was a German success. While the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, including the 6th Panzer Division, tied down the enemy forces and foiled their attempts to break out, the divisions of the II SS-Panzer Corps entered Kharkov on 11 March. By 14 March the city was in German hands. It was at this time, much to the joy of all the tankers, that new tanks arrived. The division received fifteen flamethrower tanks and several of the latest Panzer IV models with the long 7.5-cm gun. New larger caliber antitank guns also arrived, including twenty-four self-propelled models.

 

The 6th Panzer Division then had ninety tanks at its disposal. Soon two more arrived from the maintenance facilities. Colonel von Hünersdorff notified the 1st Battalion of the the 11th Panzer Regiment that it was to be transported back to Germany to serve as a replacement training battalion. However, he categorically rejected the release of surplus personnel, as there was a shortage of fully trained tank commanders in Germany.

 

Following the capture of Kharkov, the II SS-Panzer Corps under SS-Major General Hausser pressed on and captured Belgorod on 18 March. The way to Kursk was open. Contact was reestablished between Army Group South and Army Group Center. German industry again had access to the Donets coal-mining region. The 6th Panzer Division had played a significant role in the German success.

 

On 30 March the 6th Panzer Division was pulled out of the line prior to taking over a sector on the Donets east of Kharkov. Based in Tarnowaja, the 11th Panzer Regiment was designated the corps mobile reserve. Its strength was now down to thirty-seven tanks. On 8 April 1943, the regiment’s 1st Battalion entrained in Kharkov for transport back to Germany. All of the unit’s tanks and other vehicles were handed over to the 2nd Battalion under Major Bäke. This brought the battalion up to strength and made it one hundred percent combat ready, especially since many of its tanks were the heavier Panzer IV variety with the long 7.5-cm gun. The 1st Battalion was not to return to its parent regiment until December 1944. When it returned to Germany, it was outfitted with the new Panther tank. By the time it eventually returned, the division was to have faced some of the heaviest fighting of the entire eastern campaign.

  

Near Prokhorovka, July 1943: XXXXVIII Panzer Corps is ready to attack.

 

On 20 April it was announced that Colonel von Hünersdorff had been promoted to the rank of brigadier general. Major Bäke instructed his company commanders to submit reports to division on their experiences in the second phase of the Russian campaign. One of the reports discussed the battle for Werchne Kumskij, where General Hoth had warned against “battling” the Soviets. The officer who submitted the report, Lieutenant Bonke, wrote:

 

During the tank fighting at Werchne Kumskij we noticed a previously unknown tactic by the Russians. They lured us out with several tanks, which then withdrew after a few rounds were fired by our advancing vehicles. We chased after them and ran into a well-prepared antitank defensive belt. Individual companies were deployed to outflank this antitank front, but the attempt failed. The Russians had simply placed a mobile tank force at each end of the stationary antitank front, which countered each outflanking attempt.

 

I also saw how they pulled antitank guns out of the line with fast American Jeeps and moved them to the threatened flank.

 

On 12 May 1943 the 6th Panzer Division was placed under the command of the III Panzer Corps under General of Armored Troops Breith. The division headquarters moved to Kharkov. On 22 May Brigadier General von Hünersdorff convened a briefing of his commanders at an army recreation center in Kharkov administered by his wife, Oda von Hünersdorff.

 

The division commander stated plainly that the upcoming Operation Citadel contravened all the basic principles of strategic command. The offensive was planned for the precise areas where the Soviets were massing their forces. The enemy would be awaiting the attack. He had established heavily fortified positions to a depth of fifty kilometers or more. “Our forces will not be sufficient to break the enemy’s resistance and force a breakthrough. But if we do break through this in-depth front with our attack forces, we will be too weak to extend the breakthrough and cut off and surround the enemy. He, however, will still be in a position to throw his unused strategic reserve into the battle.”

 

When Operation Citadel began, the 6th Panzer Division possessed a combat strength of 16,261 soldiers of all ranks. The 11th Panzer Regiment numbered 48 officers and 1,601 noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel. This new area of operations was to see Major Bäke achieve further success, in a battle whose drama was unsurpassed, culminating in the greatest armored engagement in history at Prokhorowka.

 

Operation Citadel

 

At the beginning of Operation Citadel the 6th Panzer Division was under the command of General of Panzer Troops Breith’s III Panzer Corps. The corps itself was under the command of Army Detachment Kempf. Part of the Citadel’s southern pincer, Army Detachment Kempf, together with the XI Army Corps under General of Armored Troops Raus and the III Panzer Corps under General of Panzer Troops Breith, was to cover the flank of the 4th Panzer Army on the right bank of the Korotscha.

 

The attack on the southern flank began on 5 July 1943. Together with the XI Army Corps, the first elements of Army Detachment Kempf crossed the Donets. The III Panzer Corps was ordered to establish contact on the right wing of the II SS-Panzer Corps under General of the Waffen-SS Hausser. Kempf’s units faced the Voronezh Front with the 5th Guards Tank Army under General Rotmistrov and other powerful armored units. The first fighting between major armored formations resulted in heavy losses to both sides. These engagements would later lead to the great tank battle of Prokhorowka.

 

The 6th Panzer Division, under the command of Brigadier General von Hünersdorff, was at full strength, including the 11th Panzer Regiment. When the attack began, the division advanced to the southern part of Stary Gorod along a narrow lane through the kilometer-deep Soviet mine belt, which had been cleared by combat engineers. The advance was slow, even after further tanks and assault guns were brought across the fifty-ton bridge of the 19th Panzer Division.

 

The attack on Stary Gorod was called off and the units there were withdrawn during the night. At that point, the 6th Panzer Division was to cross the Donets using the bridge designated for the 7th Panzer Division and assembled in the area of Krutoj Rog-Generalowka-Solomino. The tanks of the 11th Panzer Regiment under Colonel Oppeln-Bronikowski were attached to the 7th Panzer Division to help ensure the success of the armored Battle Group Schulz (the 25th Panzer Regiment) and, quoting from Hasso von Manteuffel, “advance as far as the area southeast of Jastrebowo.”

 

Battle Group Oppeln-Bronikowski, with the attached Tiger company in the lead, rolled across the sixty-ton bridge of the 7th Panzer Division. It was followed by the 11th Panzer Regiment’s 2nd Battalion. On the far side the tanks formed up and set out towards Generalowka.

 

Von Oppeln-Bronikowski described the engagements that followed to the author:

 

When I moved onto the military bridge built for the 19th Panzer Division with the first of my tanks, it collapsed under the load. Any further advance at this point was stopped even before we made contact with the enemy. We were directed farther south and sent across the bridge over the Donets designated for the 7th Panzer Division. There we were attached to the 7th Panzer Division.

 

Together with Lieutenant Colonel Adalbert Schulz, I led a tank attack on a broad front. It was the largest attack I had participated in up to that time.

 

With 240 tanks we broke through the two deep Russian positions in front of the Penna River. The guns of the tanks flashed like a tremendous lightning storm. This concentrated fire eliminated the Russian bunkers. Several quick salvoes destroyed the enemy antitank guns. Several of our tanks ran over mines and were disabled, while antitank guns knocked others out.

 

Nevertheless, the enemy’s deep defensive front was broken. Then, however, the Red Army committed a large part of its strategic armored reserve: The 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 3rd Mechanized Corps. In particular it was the 6th and 8th Companies of the 11th Panzer Regiment under the veteran Major Dr. Bäke, supported by the Tigers of the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion, which established contact with the 7th Panzer Regiment advancing on our right. Seven enemy tanks and ten antitank guns, as well as a number of field guns, were destroyed. I learned that Bäke had destroyed another T-34.

 

The next morning my armored group set out again. Battle Group Unrein, with the 2nd Battalion of the 114th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, joined us and drove the enemy from the villages on the far side of the Rasuronaja, which had been crossed in the meantime.

 

The eighth of July saw the entire 6th Panzer Division move out at first light. Following a two-hour advance, the division’s leading elements were halted by a Soviet antitank ditch. The enemy had laid a deep minefield behind the ditch, which was covered by artillery and antitank guns.

 

Brigadier General von Hünersdorff placed von Oppeln-Bronikowski’s armored group under the command of the 19th Panzer Division, so that the two groups could set out towards Melichowo together. The attack got under way, with Bäke’s battalion in the center. It encountered strong enemy infantry forces, which tried to halt the German armored wedge. These were wiped out by high-explosive rounds. Then Soviet tanks approached. Once again, Dr. Bäke led his battalion into battle with great skill. He and three other tanks led the way in the center of the tank formation. The fighting began and soon the enemy began to fall back. Bäke’s tank destroyed two Soviet tanks. In total the two armored assault groups of the 6th and 19th Panzer Divisions destroyed twenty-six Soviet tanks. The objective for that day was reached. The advance by Bäke’s battalion had opened the way for the 19th Panzer Division. It crossed the antitank ditches that had halted its progress and, by the evening of 8 July, had reached Melichowo.

 

The tank situation within the 6th Panzer Division early on the morning of 10 July was as follows: five Panzer IIs, seventeen Panzer IIIs (50-mm main gun), five Panzer IIIs (37-mm main gun), ten Panzer IVs, two command tanks, three flamethrower tanks, and four captured T-34s. The regrouping of 10 July, with the objective of deploying the main forces towards Prokhorowka in order to overrun the Soviet forces there, brought, in the words of Marshall of the Soviet Union Zhukov, “a dangerous crisis for the sector of the Voronezh Front.”

 

This crisis arose because the armored spearheads of the III Panzer Corps had advanced twenty kilometers. The attack had been directed towards Olkhowatka. The attack hesitated at first due to the unfavorable weather situation. The 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion under Captain Clemens Graf Kageneck was attached to Battle Group Oppeln-Bronikowski. Major Bäke had divided his battalion into two companies, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Spiekermann and 1st Lieutenant Reutemann. Leading the attack, which began at 0330 hours on 11 July, were the nineteen Tigers of the 503rd, followed by the two companies of the 11th Panzer Regiment.

 

The attack began to gain momentum. “Eighth Company: Advance into Schlachowoje!” Bäke ordered. At the same time, he led the 7th Company in the direction of Olkhowatka. The advance continued towards Kasatschje and the Soviet antitank ditches there. On the way Bäke learned by radio that his other company had taken Schlachowoje and was advancing towards Werchne Oljchanez.

 

After reaching the antitank ditches, Colonel von Oppeln-Bronikowski received orders to take Rshvets in a surprise night attack and establish a bridgehead across the Ssewernyi-Donets. Hermann von Oppeln-Bronikowski described the raid in his personal diary: “I greeted the commanders as they arrived at a provisional command post outside Kasatschje: ‘Gentlemen, we will carry out our mission by night. The terrain lends itself to such an attack. Bäke, you and the 2nd Battalion take the lead. I will join you in my command vehicle.’”

 

Major Bäke nodded in agreement and noted something on his map board. The battle group commander continued: “We will try to pass the Russian truck columns moving along the same road in the same direction unrecognized.”

 

The nocturnal advance began. Now and then the tanks and the Soviet truck columns were only meters apart. Everything appeared to be going as planned. Leading the way were two captured T-34s under Lieutenant Huchtmann. It was hoped that these would fool the enemy into believing that this was a Soviet column.

 

Suddenly, however, a Soviet armored column with mounted infantry was spotted coming the other way. The Germans kept their nerve and tried to pass unnoticed, but then one of the captured T-34s developed a mechanical problem and pulled off to the side. There was momentary confusion among the approaching group of Soviet T-34s, but then they opened fire, having recognized the German ruse. This action has been reconstructed from entries in Bäke’s war diary:

 

Leading the way was a captured T-34. I had ordered radio silence and no firing. Silently, we passed the first enemy barricade, moving by the deadly antitank guns which remained silent, believing us to be one of their own units.

 

When the T-34 broke down with engine trouble, a Panzer IV was forced to assume the lead. Rshvets appeared in front of us. At the edge of the town was a row of T-34s. They readily made way for what they obviously believed to be their own tanks returning from the front. Then a column of tanks appeared heading in the opposite direction.

 

Lieutenant Huchtmann in the lead tank reported twenty-two T-34s. These passed my unit, almost track to track. But then six or seven pulled out of the column, turned, rolled back and pulled in behind us.

 

I ordered the rest to continue and placed my command tank, which was equipped only with a dummy gun, across the road in order to force the enemy tanks to halt. Seven T-34s rolled up and formed a semicircle around me.

 

I instructed my operations officer to break out the hollow charges. Then the two of us left the tank. We slid out of the field of view of the T-34 to our right. Reaching the tanks, we placed the hollow charges on two T-34s and jumped into cover.

 

The detonations rang through the night. Two T-34s were put out of action. We fetched two more hollow charges and put them in place. Two more T-34s were blown up.

 

The fifth T-34 was destroyed by one of my tanks.

 

Colonel von Oppeln-Bronikowski moved into the rest of the Soviet tank column. The enemy tanks finally withdrew across the bridge and blew it up behind them.

 

As the bridge was no longer passable, the panzer grenadiers of the 114th Panzer Grenadier Regiment’s 2nd Battalion waded across the river and established an initial bridgehead, which was secured by machine-gun positions. The III Panzer Corps now had a chance to advance to Prokhorowka, link up with the II SS-Panzer Corps there and continue the attack.

 

On the morning of 12 July, Soviet Marshall Zhukov was forced to throw the entire 5th Guards Tank Army and the 5th Guards Army into the battle in an effort to stop this dangerous advance. The 5th Guards Tank Army possessed 800 T-34s and heavy self-propelled guns. The stage was set for the epic tank battle of Prokhorowka. Marshall Zhukov: “Stalin called me that day and ordered me to fly at once into the Prokhorowka area in order to take the necessary measures to bring the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts into line.”

 

On that same 12 July, the Red Army opened the counteroffensive it had long been preparing. Its initial objective was to retake Orel. That same day General Model, commander of the northern pincer, received directions from the Führer Headquarters to pull back from the territory already won and intervene in the battle for Orel, which had just broken out. This ended the participation of the 9th Army in Operation Citadel. Early on the morning of 13 July, the III Panzer Corps received a report that Brigadier General von Hünersdorff had been slightly wounded by shrapnel.

 

The German Air Attack on the 6th Panzer Division

 

German bombers and Stukas were attacking the Soviet troop concentrations in the Rshvets area. The headquarters staff of the 6th Panzer Division hurried outside to watch the attack. The Stukas bombed the forward Russian lines, while the following He-111 bombers dropped heavy bombs on the troop concentrations in the rear. At the end of the attack one He-111 approached the area, straggling far behind the rest. It dropped its bombs when directly over the headquarters of the 6th Panzer Division. All of the officers and commanders standing in the open were either killed or wounded.

 

On the move.

 

Those who died were: Major Rogalla von Bieberstein, commander of the 114th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, who had been recommended for the Knight’s Cross (awarded posthumously on 27 July 1943); Captain Erich Oeckel, commander of the 114th’s 1st Battalion; 1st Lieutenant Wagemann, battery commander in the 228th Assault Gun Battalion, which was attached to the division; and 1st Lieutenant Engel and Lieutenant Rauscher. Wounded were Colonel von Oppeln-Bronikowski, Major Dr. Bäke, Captain Meckauer, Captain Jahn, 1st Lieutenant Guckel, 1st Lieutenant Forwick, 1st Lieutenant Schröder and 1st Lieutenant Eberlein. A large portion of the division’s command staff had been put out of action. Total casualties from the disaster were fifteen dead and forty-nine wounded. This was more than the division could bear. Nevertheless, the battle had to go on.

 

Major Bäke had his wounds dressed on the spot and took over command of the 11th Panzer Regiment, as von Oppeln-Bronikowski’s wounds were of a more serious nature. He handed over the 2nd Battalion to Captain Scheibert, one of the most dependable of the younger generation of armor officers. Battle Group Bäke was to have attacked at 1800 hours that evening, but the other participating unit, the 7th Panzer Division, did not show up in time, because its attack toward Krasnoje Anarnja had been turned back by the Soviets. Finally, on 14 July, the 7th Panzer Division managed to take the village. After destroying a number of Soviet tanks, it was able to cover the left flank of the 6th Panzer Division.

 

At 0700 hours, following a brief artillery barrage, Major Bäke attacked Alexandrowka. A number of assault guns and Tiger tanks had been assigned to his battle group. All of his tanks were concentrated in a single company, enabling him to maintain strict control of the operation. Battle Group Bäke covered Alexandrowka with fire and enabled the 114th Panzer Grenadier Regiment’s 2nd Battalion to take the village. The battle group then stormed three hills. A tank-versus-tank engagement ensued, in which Bäke’s forces destroyed twenty-five tanks, thirty-one antitank guns, and twelve artillery pieces. Bäke accounted for two tanks and one gun.

 

The victory was not without high cost, however. Brigadier General von Hünersdorff, the division commander, accompanied Bäke as he led the attack. Von Hünersdorff was hit in the head by sniper fire. Pieces of the steel helmet he was wearing were driven into his brain. The German brain specialist Colonel Professor Tönnis was flown in at once. The doctor operated on the general, but it was already too late.

 

“Only an immediate operation, right after he suffered the wound, could have saved him. Nevertheless, I tried the impossible, because there was a slim chance.”

 

Brigadier General von Hünersdorff died on 17 July 1943. On 14 July he had become the 259th German soldier to be awarded the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross. General Hoth delivered the eulogy. Field Marshal von Manstein and Generals Raus and Kempf paid their final respects to their dead comrade. Also at the graveside was Hünersdorff’s wife, Oda von Hünersdorff. Her final words to the men assembled there were: “Hold the name of Hünersdorff in respect!”

 

Heavy Battle Group Bäke to the Front!

 

On the evening of 14 July, Army Group South instructed the commanding general of the III Panzer Corps that the corps was to advance northward the next morning to link up with the II SS-Panzer Corps. The entire corps had only sixty-nine tanks left, including six Tigers, and twelve assault guns.

 

On 15 July Colonel Martin Unrein, who was the acting commander of the 6th Panzer Division, ordered Bäke’s armored battle group to assemble for an eventual counterattack as the reserve of the III Panzer Corps. When the newly-appointed division commander, Colonel Crisolli, arrived on the evening of 16 July, he found that the division had only six tanks! Bäke was sent to accelerate the repair of the damaged tanks. He handed over command of his battle group to Captain Scheibert. When the III Panzer Corps pulled back to a new main line of resistance on 20 July, the 6th Panzer Division had thirty-one tanks and three flamethrower tanks available. Those numbers were thanks to the tireless efforts of Bäke. Along this sector of the front the initiative had passed to the Red Army. Operation Citadel had bogged down in the deep Soviet defensive zones. The ordeal of the 6th Panzer Division was about to begin.

 

Under the command of Major Bäke, the armored battle group covered the withdrawal of the division, which was to relieve the 19th Panzer Division in defensive line “C.” There the division was again joined by the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion. When a group of T-34s attacked, Bäke took command of six of the heavy tanks and attacked. Bursting out of a wooded area, the Tigers took the Soviets completely by surprise. Twenty-three T-34s were destroyed in this brief and one-sided battle; two of them were destroyed by Bäke’s tank.

 

On 23 July the Soviets attacked with an even larger armored force. Once again there was a large-scale armored engagement. Dr. Bäke led his forces with great skill, enabling his tanks to maintain the upper hand throughout. When the Soviets broke off the engagement, thirty-three T-34s were burning and smoldering on the plain. Once again Bäke accounted for two of the enemy tanks.

 

The next day the Tiger battalion left to assist the 19th Panzer Division. A large assembly of Soviet tanks was spotted in front of the 6th Panzer Division. A unit of Ju-87 and Ju-88 bombers managed to evade the Soviet fighter defenses and attacked. The dive-bombers roared down on the enemy tanks, and soon the assembly area was shrouded in smoke and flames.

 

On 25 July Bäke’s armored unit was made corps reserve. General Hermann Hoth arrived and had a long talk with Bäke. Hoth was very impressed with this officer. He said: “I decided to appoint this high quality officer as a regimental commander, and then, following a division commander’s course, to give him the opportunity to command an armor division.”

 

On 27 July Armored Battle Group Bäke returned to the division. In a regimental order of 29 July 1943, the commander of the 11th Panzer Regiment stated: “You have destroyed 111 enemy tanks, 140 antitank guns and other heavy weapons.” On 1 August 1943 the men of armored Battle Group Bäke learned that their commander had become the 262nd German soldier to receive the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross. The 2nd Battalion under Captain Scheibert assembled in formation in front of its commander. Three volleys signified once again the entire regiment’s great and sincere joy over his decoration.

 

A disabled Tiger burns near Prokhorovka.

 

Armored Battle Group Bäke continued to see action. Advancing out of the Gonki Forest on 3 August, the unit’s tanks destroyed nine more T-34s. The great success of Battle Group Bäke was due to the dashing, and yet prudent manner in which Bäke commanded his unit. He knew the strengths and weaknesses of his tanks and those of the enemy, and was well-versed in Soviet tactics. This assured his unit victory.

 

On 6 August Bäke and Colonel Unrein managed to head off a potentially disastrous situation. A group of grenadiers had panicked and were falling back in disarray. The two officers went forward with only two tanks and two command vehicles and stopped the unchecked withdrawal allowing that sector of the front to be held. On 7 August Bäke’s small force of tanks blocked the main road and halted a rapid enemy advance, permitting the German forces to carry out an orderly withdrawal.

 

Bäke’s tanks formed a steel barricade behind the 282nd Infantry Division, which had withdrawn from Kharkov as the result of a mistaken order. They halted the onrushing Soviet armor. Early the next morning, forty enemy tanks attacked but were stopped by a sharp attack from the flank delivered by Bäke’s armored battle group and several 88s. The former main line of resistance was restored. The following night the 6th Panzer Division marched into Kharkov.

 

The order issued by XXXXII Army Corps on the evening of 13 August stated: “The Führer has ordered: ‘Kharkov is to be held at all costs.’” The battle for Kharkov continued until 17 August. The enemy’s attempt to break through to the west had failed. On 19 August Major Bäke went to the rear area with his battalion, where they were to rest and oversee the training of new tank crews. One platoon under 1st Lieutenant Reutemann remained behind with the division. On 23 August, Kharkov was again evacuated. The 6th Panzer Division formed the German rearguard outside the city.

 

The 6th Panzer Division fought on until it was almost destroyed. By 27 August, the day the 6th Panzer Division took over a new defensive sector in the Tamowka area, several tanks had returned to the division. Bäke’s tanks were then employed as a mobile “fire-brigade.” Following an engagement at “Arrowhead Gorge” there were only two tanks left. There, on 2 September, Brigadier General Freiherr von Waldenfels arrived to take command of the division, a position he would hold until the end of the war.

 

The defensive fighting raged on until 13 September. On that day the 6th Panzer Division destroyed its 1,500th enemy tank. The 6th Panzer Division then pulled out of its positions near Tarnowka and Merefa and withdrew to the Udy. Once again, Bäke covered the withdrawal. That day his small force of tanks destroyed no less than sixteen tanks from a large pursuing force of T-34s and prevented the division from being outflanked. Bäke and his crew accounted for three of the Soviet tanks.

 

On 23 September 1943 Bäke was forced to leave the division. His orders to report to Erlangen concerned the introduction into service of the new Panther tank. First, however, he had to report to Hitler in the Führer Headquarters. Hitler presented him with the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross, which was the usual practice with this decoration. During the subsequent discussion, Hitler demonstrated that he was well informed about the events of the Battle of Kursk. He told the assembled Oak Leaves recipients that he had considered Field Marshal von Manstein’s suggestion to continue fighting in the south, but that the events near Orel and, above all, the Allied landings in Sicily, had led him to break off the battle. Hitler was as active as ever. He showed no sign of resignation and wanted total victory, while Field Marshal von Manstein at this time was toying with the idea of a negotiated end to the war, which was certainly possible, as was indicated by the secret discussions with Molotov behind the front.

 

In November 1943 Bäke returned to his division as a lieutenant colonel. On 14 November Colonel Oppeln-Bronikowski handed over command of the 11th Panzer Regiment to him. Bäke’s successor as commander of the 2nd Battalion was Maj. Hermann Sachenbacher. Sachenbacher was soon to be killed in action, however. On 27 November, the 6th Panzer Division was ordered to fight its way through an enemy position outside Cherkassy, which was holding up an advance by the panzer grenadiers. The 2nd Battalion was given the job. Major Sachenbacher set a personal example by leading the attack, and was killed as the battalion broke into the Soviet position.

 

A short time later the Soviets entered Cherkassy. Bäke sent four Panzer IVs there. He wanted to retake Cherkassy. Bäke recounted later:

 

I was not given an opportunity to carry out the attack, which would have surely succeeded. I received an order from the 6th Panzer Division in Snamenka, the starting point for the attack, to return to the Glinki area. In my opinion, this was a mistake that was to cost many thousands of German soldiers in Cherkassy their lives. But the order was unequivocal. As a result, in the following weeks, the enemy was able to complete the encirclement of Cherkassy. I will not try and conceal the fact that, naturally, the 6th Panzer Division was also needed in another area of operations. On 20 December the division foiled a Russian breakthrough attempt into the rear of our front near Kirowograd.

 

Armored Battle Group Bäke saw more heavy fighting in support of the grenadiers until the end of December. On 31 December 1943 the 6th Panzer Division was withdrawn from the Fedwar area and sent by train into the area of Kirowograd.

 

Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke in Action

 

At the beginning of January 1944, the First Ukrainian Front under General Vatutin split the 4th Panzer Army into several parts. The result of this was a series of major engagements which placed great demands on the German Army, particularly the armored units. The 6th Panzer Division recorded the developments as follows:

 

The rear area of the 1st Panzer Army was threatened as a result of the enemy breakthrough. The 6th Panzer Division was sent into action to eliminate this threat.

 

Panzer Group Bäke arrived in the new assembly area with twenty-six tanks on 2 January and took over the lead position. On the morning of 4 January the attack began toward Oratowka and Nowo Shiwotiw. The enemy holding there saw Bäke’s tanks coming towards them. The tanks drove the enemy out of Oratowka and, in the period that followed, were repeatedly involved in a series of small engagements against a well-camouflaged enemy who, on several occasions, was supported by tanks. Tank-killing squads destroyed Russian tanks.

 

Bäke experienced an enemy attack at the regimental command post in Frantiwka. The German defensive fire wiped out the attacking Soviet battalion. Marshall Zhukov wrote: “The enemy defended with tenacity against the First Ukrainian Front.”

 

On 13 January the 6th Panzer Division was again attached to the III Panzer Corps and, as a result, was under the command of the 1st Panzer Army. Panzer grenadiers of the neighboring 16th Panzer Division and some of the division’s own elements were surrounded by Soviet forces. On 21 January the 11th Panzer Regiment set out to relieve the encircled troops. Lieutenant Colonel Bäke was in charge of two battle groups. Under Bäke’s skillful leadership, both were completely successful. The enemy was driven back.

 

When Bäke returned to the command post following the successful mission, he found orders awaiting him for a special operation. In addition to the 11th Panzer Regiment, thirty-four Tigers of the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion, and forty-seven Panthers of the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Panzer Regiment had been placed under his command. These units combined to form Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke. Also placed at his disposal was the 1st Battalion of the 88th Artillery Regiment, which was equipped with Hummel 150-mm self-propelled artillery. Lieutenant Colonel Bäke commanded a fighting force that would be able to stand up to any Soviet attack.

 

Tigers of the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion prepare for action near Bagdukhov.

 

Bäke had to execute an armored attack that would have to be conducted without regard to its open flanks. The war diary of the 11th Panzer Regiment: “Through the advantageous composition of this heavy tank regiment, and the commitment and drive of its commander, it succeeded in destroying the enemy. It advanced relentlessly, as ordered.” This great triumph of leadership by Lieutenant Colonel Bäke was crowned by his own tank’s destruction of three enemy tanks. According to the war diary: “Once again Bäke demonstrated that he was an expert at achieving a major success while keeping his own losses low.” Following the attack, his regiment was made the mobile reserve of the XXXXVI Panzer Corps (General Gollnick).

 

An attack by the Soviet 3rd Tank Corps of General Bogdanov’s Second Soviet Army was then halted by Lieutenant Colonel Bäke and his heavy tank regiment. In a lengthy engagement, the Tigers and the fast and powerful Panthers destroyed 268 enemy tanks and assault guns. One hundred fifty-six guns were destroyed by gunfire or overrun by the tanks. Lieutenant Colonel Bäke withstood seven Soviet attacks in his Panther. Thanks to the speed and sureness of his crew, he was able to parry attacks by two concealed antitank guns and destroy them. Bäke emerged victorious from duels with Soviet tanks six times.

 

“If we had had this Panther in 1941, the Army would have rolled straight to Moscow,” Bäke declared when asked about the firepower, rate of fire and speed of the new tank. “I preferred the Panther to the Tiger, although it, too, was an outstanding combat vehicle.”

 

When a large armored force was assembled in the Proskurow area to counter a threatened Soviet breakthrough toward the west, the first unit to arrive was Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke. Lieutenant Colonel Bäke and his armor regiment were ordered to carry out a relief attack with the 17th Panzer Regiment. The objective of the attack was to free the three German army corps surrounded in the Cherkassy (Korsun) Pocket.

 

Eleven Tigers and fourteen Panthers were committed and attacked from the area northeast of Uman. Bäke’s reinforced regiment attacked from 4 to 8 February, but was unable to break through the ring of Soviet forces. Another attack from the Rubany-Most area, led by Bäke himself, was more successful. His reinforced regiment encountered a powerful Soviet force of tanks and assault guns. Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke fought the engagement using three armored assault groups. While the fast Panthers stormed forward to the left and right, the Tigers moved in the center, about 300 meters behind. As soon as an enemy tank opened fire from long range, the Tigers fired on the targets assigned by Bäke and destroyed them.

 

While the Tigers engaged the enemy tanks, the faster Panthers outflanked the enemy’s antitank front. The Tigers fired on the concealed antitank guns as soon as they were spotted. This was further proof that a tank such as the Tiger, which could knock out the heaviest enemy tank from a range of 2,000 meters, was a devastating weapon in the hands of a commander well-versed in armored tactics.

 

No fewer than eighty enemy tanks and assault guns were destroyed or immobilized in this first attack. However, due to the enemy’s tremendous numerical superiority, there was a high cost attached to this victory. When the fighting ended in Chishintsy on 13 February, Lieutenant Colonel Bäke was left with only four Panthers and twelve support vehicles.

 

On 15 February Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke was turned toward Lysyanka. It had been brought back up to strength with tanks sent back by the maintenance facilities. Field Marshal von Manstein sent a Teletype message congratulating Dr. Franz Bäke on his success: “Bravo! You have accomplished much, despite mud and the Russians. Now you must take the last step! Grit your teeth and have at them! This, too, will succeed!”

 

Bäke’s forces resumed the attack on 15 February, together with the 1st Panzer Division. This final effort brought the tanks to the outer perimeter of the pocket. At 0330 hours, early on the morning of 16 February, Lieutenant Colonel Bäke watched as the first surrounded elements left the pocket. The commander of the reinforced armored regiment guided the two freed battalions to Oktyabr and personally asked their commanders to stay and help defend against the Russians and hold open the corridor for their comrades still in the pocket.

 

When the Soviets launched their expected attack, the exhausted tankers wiped them out. Unfortunately, the two battalions that had been freed by Bäke withdrew, even though they were still combat capable. A total of 35,000 German soldiers were able to escape the Cherkassy Pocket. Much of the credit for regaining their freedom was due to Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke.

 

In the Battle of Stary Konstantinow, which the division had ordered held, Bäke’s reinforced regiment destroyed eleven T-34s and eight antitank guns. German losses were high, however: Thirteen tanks were knocked out by the enemy. Fortunately, only a portion of them were total losses.

 

At the northern edge of Kamenka, west of Stary Konstantinow, Sergeant First Class Bloos, a platoon leader in the 11th Panzer Regiment’s 8th Company, took charge of the defense with the small number of tanks left to the regiment. When the Soviets attacked, the first T-34s were destroyed as they approached. The defenders then laid in wait for the following fifteen T-34s. These fired into the first rows of houses and set them on fire. Ludwig Bloos had positioned two of his tanks in ambush positions farther back, while he waited for the enemy in his tank behind a row of houses. When the enemy tanks came into sight, Bloos destroyed five T-34s in quick succession. A sixth was hit. It turned away, smoking. At that point, the Soviets moved forward a heavy antitank gun. The platoon leader’s tank was hit and put out of action. Bloos was seriously wounded and had to be evacuated. On 6 April 1944 he received the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross for this action.

 

Panzer Group Bäke was formed on 6 March. It consisted of the 11th Panzer Regiment’s 2nd Battalion, the 1st Panzer Regiment’s 6th Company, and the 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion. A battalion of grenadiers was attached to the panzer group. The mission was to reopen the north-south road in the vicinity of Stary Konstantinow.

 

The Tiger battalion, under the command of Captain König, had arrived in Stary Konstantinow at 2300 hours on 5 March. Following several delays, it set out at 1000 hours the next morning on the right wing of the 11th Panzer Regiment. Advancing southwestward, the battalion reached the village of Kusmin at about midday against opposition from enemy tanks. Lieutenant Colonel Bäke then ordered 11th Panzer Regiment to veer northward and advance through Lagodinzy. The Manewzy-Rosslowzy road was reached as darkness fell. Seventeen enemy tanks had been destroyed against two losses. Dr. Bäke’s tank also played a role in the success, destroying two Soviet tanks.

 

A local attack by the Soviets with T-34s near Kusmin on 6 March was successfully defeated. The next day Panzer Group Bäke was sent to Swinnaja to defend against a threatened Soviet breakthrough east of Stary Constantinow. Stary Constantinow was abandoned and the three wooden bridges at the south outskirts of the city were blown up by the combat engineers of the 6th Panzer Division after the last tanks had crossed.

 

Swinnaja was secured on 8 March and, on the following day, the 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion advanced through Lashawa to the Ostropil-Babin-Pillawa road. When heavy enemy column movements were reported there, Bäke ordered: “Advance at once and stop the enemy!” The tanks fell on the enemy columns. Firing as they advanced, they destroyed 100 horse-drawn and motor vehicles. Also destroyed were two horse-drawn batteries. Panzer Group Bäke returned to its jumping-off positions without a single loss.

 

The Soviet Offensive Southeast of Vinnitsa

 

When, on 10 March, the Red Army launched a major offensive at the boundary between the 1st Panzer Army and the 8th Army southeast of Vinnitsa, the 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion was ordered to withdraw behind the Bozok River and hold there. The battalion was the last unit across the river, crossing on the evening of 12 March and destroying two T-34s in the process. Still attached to the 6th Panzer Division, its mission was to secure the major Proskurow-Vinnitsa road and the bridges over the Bug River at Sawniza-Triluchowzy.

 

In the meantime, the Red Army – the First Guards Army and the Third Tank Army – had launched an attack at the boundary between the 1st Panzer Army and the 4th Panzer Army. By the morning of 14 March, it had crossed the Ternopol-Proskurow rail line, which was the main supply line of the 1st Panzer Army. The lines of communications were severed between the 1st Panzer Army and the 4th Panzer Army. The entire 1st Panzer Army was threatened with encirclement. On 16 March, Panzer Group Bäke was withdrawn from its positions. At that point, it consisted of elements of the 11th Panzer Regiment, twelve Tigers of the 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion and the 1st Company of the 1st Panzer Regiment. It assembled at the eastern outskirts of Proskurow for an assault to the west. Dr. Bäke’s mission: “Reestablish contact with the 4th Panzer Army!”

 

That evening the armored group was reinforced by the arrival of the entire 1st Battalion, 1st Panzer Regiment, under Captain Graf Wedel. Lieutenant Colonel Bäke then carried the hopes of two entire panzer armies. Bäke’s armored group, once again bearing the designation Heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke, received further deliveries of tanks in order to be equal to the difficult task it had been given.

 

Early on the morning of 17 March 1944, the reinforced regiment set out – led by the Tigers – to break through to the developing Kamenets-Podolsk pocket. Advancing rapidly, the tanks crashed through the first enemy resistance near Klimkowtsy. By midday Bäke’s forces were already thirty kilometers west of Proskurow. In the Widwa-Medwedowka area they came upon units of the 1st SS-Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. Contact had been made with the 4th Panzer Army.

 

Following the arrival of additional Tigers on 18 March, Bäke’s reinforced regiment attacked Dselintsche and took the heavily defended village in spite of a determined Soviet defense. Twelve assault guns and forty-four tanks – including four KV-Is and KV-85s – thirty-three antitank guns, and a number of light artillery pieces were destroyed by the tanks. Dr. Bäke’s Panther destroyed three enemy tanks and two antitank guns, the latter from close range.

 

The next attack began on 19 March. Four Tigers, seven Panthers, seven assault guns, and ten armored personnel carriers crossed Hill 340 and reached Hill 349. There they were met by heavy antitank fire. In the ensuing engagement all of the Tigers and three Panthers were disabled. The attack had to be broken off. The entire regiment had been reduced to two Tigers, two Panthers, four assault guns, and four Panzer IVs, as well as ten armored personnel carriers. During an attack on the following day, the regimental commander’s tank was hit and disabled. Bäke climbed into a personnel carrier and carried on. The last of his tanks were knocked out or forced to withdraw with battle damage in a duel against overwhelming numbers of Soviet armor. The 11th Panzer Regiment had not a single operational tank left, but the enemy’s attempted breakthrough had been foiled.

 

On 19 March 1st Lieutenant König received orders to tow all of his disabled tanks to Proskurow. Bäke remained in Dselintsche with those tanks that had been restored to service – a total of six, including two Tigers – to cover the withdrawal. When the Soviets rashly pursued, they ran into a cleverly laid ambush by Bäke’s small number of tanks. Four of the onrushing T-34s were destroyed, and the entire Soviet armored force came to a halt. Bäke’s tanks fired into the mass of enemy tanks that had become bunched up near the destroyed T-34s. Firing from a concealed position behind a low rise, Bäke destroyed two T-34s that had managed to free themselves from the chaos. The Soviets attempted to advance no farther that day, allowing the main body of German forces to withdraw without contact.

 

By 23 March the Tigers which had moved or been towed to the maintenance facility at Jaromolintsy had been overhauled. Captain Burmester arrived to take command of the 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion. That same day, Lieutenant Colonel Franz Bäke also said farewell to his comrades. He was flown out of the pocket to receive the Swords to the Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves from Hitler’s hand in the Führer Headquarters. He had been awarded the decoration on 21 February for his actions in freeing some of the troops surrounded in the Cherkassy pocket. The decoration was also recognition of this officer’s outstanding career, during which he had been a comrade to every soldier and a father figure to his younger troops. Everyone knew that Franz Bäke was not going to return to the 6th Panzer Division, which had been his home for the entire war. It was a sure bet that this highly regarded armor leader would be given a more senior appointment.

 

At the Führer Headquarters, where Bäke described the fighting at the Cherkassy pocket and his regiment’s final actions, he learned from Hitler he was to command an armor division following completion of a division commander’s course.

 

THE END OF THE WAR

 

Following his visit to the Führer Headquarters, Bäke was given a long home leave. On 1 May 1944 he was promoted to colonel. Hitler had indicated that he had still another surprise in store. It was related to his promotion. Bäke was placed among the ranks of active line officers and his status as a reserve officer was removed, a rare occurrence in the German Army.

 

Part of the 1944 program to create thirteen panzer brigades was the formation of the 106th Panzer Brigade Feldherrnhalle. These brigades were a response to the demands of the war and represented a smaller, more mobile combat formation with a considerable amount of combat power but with a smaller logistical tail. On 13 July 1944 Colonel Bäke became the brigade’s first commanding officer. On 31 August he reported the brigade ready for action and was sent with his unit to the Western Front. The brigade’s Panther battalion possessed four companies, each with eleven Panthers, while its headquarters company also had eleven. The brigade’s total strength was 2,500 men.

 

Starting in mid-September, Dr. Bäke and his brigade saw action in the area south of Metz under the command of the XIII SS-Panzer Corps. Once again Bäke distinguished himself through the prudent and yet decisive leadership of his armored unit. On 4 October the brigade was placed under the command of the LXXXV Army Corps in the area west of Belfort.

 

During the course of the defensive fighting in the West, Bäke and his Panthers were constantly in action under various commands. Once again Bäke demonstrated his skill in mastering the most difficult situations. During the winter of 1944 he fought under the command of the XIII Army Corps and, later, with the 21st Panzer Division. His operations in the Mülhausen area of Alsace were classic examples of a commander getting the best from his men and equipment. Bäke accounted for further enemy tanks in his Panther, however, the exact number destroyed by him in this period is not known.

 

The heaviest fighting for the 106th Panzer Brigade came in the defense of the Alsace bridgehead, starting on 1 January 1945. The brigade was the heart of the German defense that held the bridgehead until 7 February. Bäke was succeeded as the commander of the brigade on 3 February by Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Drewes. Bäke had been summoned by the OKH to set up and take command of the 13th Panzer Division.

 

The 18th Panzer Division, which had largely been destroyed in the fighting to free Budapest, released its 4th Panzer Regiment to the new Panzer Division Feldherrnhalle 2, which Bäke eventually commanded. Creation of the new division was accelerated by detachments from other units and, soon afterward, the division was sent to Slovakia.

 

It was clear to Bäke that his division’s sole task was the safeguarding of the large numbers of German refugees fleeing the Red Army. Promoted to the rank of Brigadier general on 1 April, Bäke led his division in heavy fighting which saw it withdraw across the Carpathians to Moravia and eventually into the Budweis area. The division had achieved much, rescuing numerous columns of refugees and escorting them to the West.

 

At war’s end on 8 May 1945, Bäke attempted to surrender his division to the Americans to prevent it falling into Soviet hands. He was unable to convince the Americans, however, and his division, like many others, was delivered into the hands of the Soviets.

 

Brigadier General Bäke was forced to order his division to disband. He asked his officers to gather their men and try to slip through the American lines in small groups. Some of the small bands of soldiers managed to reach freedom in the West. One of them was led by Franz Bäke. However, many members of the division fell into Soviet hands and were taken to the Soviet Union, where they were employed as slave labor in the mines for ten long years. 

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IMPORTANT DATES IN THE LIFE OF BRIGADIER GENERAL DR. FRANZ BÄKE

 

·         28 February 1898: Born in Schwarzenfels (Franconia).

·         19 May 1915: Joined the 53rd Infantry Regiment as a volunteer at the age of seventeen. Decorations: Iron Cross, First and Second Class.

·         November 1918: Held the rank of vice staff sergeant and officer cadet in the 7th Foot Regiment.

·         January 1919: Released from service.

·         1 December 1937: Joined the Wehrmacht as a reserve lieutenant. Participated in the Polish Campaign as a platoon leader in the 6th Reconnaissance Battalion of the 1st Light Division.

·         1 November 1939: Promoted to reserve 1st lieutenant.

·         1940: Commander of the 1st Company of the 65th Panzer Battalion in the French Campaign.

·         1 February 1941: Appointed Assistant Operations Officer in 11th Panzer Regiment.

·         1 May 1941: Placed in charge of the regimental tank section and promoted to reserve captain.

·         1 October 1941: Assistant Operations Officer in 11th Panzer Regiment.

·         1 December 1941: Commander of the 1st Battalion, 11th Panzer Regiment.

·         1 April 1942: Commander of the 2nd Battalion, 11th Panzer Regiment.

·         1 August 1942: Promoted to reserve major.

·         1 January 1943: Awarded Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross.

·         14 July 1943: Commander of the 11th Panzer Regiment.

·         1 August 1943: Became the 262nd soldier to receive the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross.

·         21 February 1944: Became the 49th soldier to receive the Swords to the Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves.

·         13 July 1944: Appointed brigade commander of the 106th Panzer Brigade Feldherrnhalle.

·         9 March 1945: Commander of the 13th Panzer Division and its successor Panzer Division Feldherrnhalle 2.

·         1 April 1945: Promoted to rank of brigadier general.

·         12 December 1978: Died in Hagen, Westphalia, as the result of a traffic accident.