Saturday, 17 September 2022

Hitler’s Olive Branches - A Run-down of Germany’s Attempts to Make Peace

by Karl Haemers

 

Most people in the US, Germany and swaths of the rest of the world conceive of Adolf Hitler, Chancellor of Germany 1933-1945, as a psychopathic war-monger, flinging his military might in every direction in a sadistic orgy of violence and blood, seeking domination of the entire world. The truth is stranger than fiction, and yet makes perfect sense.

 

We will look primarily at the slim but dense book compiled by Dr. Friedrich Stieve, What the World Rejected: Hitler’s Peace Offers 1933-1940, which presents this truth in cogent form.

 

Just three and a half weeks after he took office on January 30 1933, Chancellor Adolf Hitler gave a speech to the Reichstag German Parliament on May 17 1933. In this speech the new Chancellor addressed his resolve to establish arms reduction terms with “neighbouring countries”, “armed nations” and “the rest of the world”.

 

“Germany will be perfectly ready to disband her entire military establishment and destroy the small amount of arms remaining to her, if the neighbouring countries will do the same thing with equal thoroughness.

 ...Germany is entirely ready to renounce aggressive weapons of every sort if the armed nations, on their part, will destroy their aggressive weapons within a specified period, and if their use is forbidden by an international convention.

 ...Germany is at all times prepared to renounce aggressive weapons if the rest of the world does the same. Germany is prepared to agree to any solemn pact of non-aggression because she does not think of attacking anybody but only of acquiring security.”

 

This speech proposed a total elimination of all military capacity, which might be considered a strategic move on Germany’s part, since Germany was limited by the Treaty of Versailles to no air force, and an army of only 100,000 men devoted to domestic activities only. Hitler’s previous political campaigns and those of the National Socialist German Labour Party, stated openly their rejection of the Versailles Treaty, and thus felt free to develop a stronger military if required by threats from surrounding nations. Hitler was prepared to expand the German military beyond Versailles’s limits, but proposed total disarmament.

 

Short of this, he proposed elimination of “aggressive weapons” such as long-range bombers, poison gas and large artillery, capable of striking civilian targets. Adolf Hitler was a soldier of the prevailing ethos of the time, largely applied during World War 1, of Civilized Warfare that among other provisions spared civilians the effects of war as much as possible.1

 

The Response: No other nation offered a formal reply, but some such as Britain and France continued to increase their war munitions and troop strength. The League of Nations, from Germany’s perspective primarily established to enforce the Treaty of Versailles diktat, declared Germany must pass through a “probation period” before talk of disarmament of other nations could proceed.2 Germany had already complied with the Versailles diktat for fourteen years since 1919.

 

Five months later on October 14 1933, Hitler withdrew Germany from the League of Nations. “This step on October 19 1933, was a response to the Simon disarmament plan of October 14th which denied Germany equality...”3

 

Two months later, on December 18, Hitler offered his second proposal for peace and disarmament in Europe. It contained six points, the first of which granted Germany “full equality of rights”, a provision Hitler considered necessary to ensure peace. A balance of military powers would deter aggression, while a weak Germany would encourage it. The second point imposed a freeze on all arms increases, and the third granted Germany freedom to restore a balance in her arms with neighbours. The fourth required “conducting war on humane principles” and again called for elimination of weapons that could harm civilians. The fifth provided for a monitoring system to ensure compliance, and the sixth stated: “The European nations guarantee one another the unconditional maintenance of peace by the conclusion of non-aggression pacts, to be renewed after ten years.”

 

Soon after, Hitler requested approval to increase the German army to 300,000 men, in order to conduct a minimum defence according to the length of her perimeter (which featured few natural defences such as mountains, ice sheets, deserts, multiple wide rivers or oceans) and the strength of her neighbours’ armies.

 

The response: a correspondence of official letters seeming to consider the proposal, leading to a clear “no” from France, accompanied by “tremendous increases” in the armaments in France, Britain and the USSR.4

 

By March 16 1935 Hitler felt the need to bring back conscription in Germany. Soon afterward however, he gave a speech on May 21 1935 which once again focused on eliminating weaponry that could harm “non-combatant women and children”. He referred to the Geneva Red Cross Convention and proposed expanding it to eliminate aerial bombing altogether: “...there might be prohibition of the dropping of gas, incendiary and explosive bombs outside the real battle zone. This limitation could then be extended to complete international outlawry of all bombing.”

 

Hitler left the possibilities for full disarmament open: “(Germany) gives further assurance that it will agree to any international limitations or abolition of arms whatsoever for a uniform space of time.”

 

The response: France signed an alliance with the Soviet Union, furthering the encirclement policy of aggressor nations around Germany.5

 

As so often in history, action begets reaction begets counter-reaction. Far too much history assessing Germany and its Chancellor fails to mention this causal chain of provocation, focusing exclusively on Germany’s actions as if they occurred in the isolation of mindless war-mongering mania.

 

Hitler’s orders to re-occupy the Rhineland lying between Germany and France and occupied by French forces at times since Versailles was a direct result of France’s rejection of Hitler’s proposals, and France’s alliance with the Soviets. The Rhineland was a key corridor of attack by France into Germany, and Hitler knew he had to take back this region that had traditionally belonged to Germany and contained predominantly German people.

 

The Wehrmacht crossed into the Rhineland with no opposition – and with joyous citizen approval – on March 3, 1936. By March 31, Hitler was offering his fourth peace plan in three years. Its goal was “the peace of Europe” and “the social happiness and economic prosperity of the nations”.

 

This peace plan was the most extensive yet, a number of its nineteen points addressing the presence of German troops in the Rhineland in an attempt to reassure France. It called for a Commission presided by Britain and Italy to oversee peace terms among Germany, France and Belgium, and inviting the Netherlands to participate. Germany was willing to “agree to any military limitations on the German western frontier”. A twenty-five year “non-aggression or security pact” between France and Belgium, and Germany, was proposed.

 

Point 15 needs special focus:

 

“In order to stamp this peace-pact... as the reconciliatory conclusion of a centuries-old dispute, Germany and France pledge themselves to take steps to see that in the education of the young, as well as in the press and publications of both nations, everything shall be avoided which might be calculated to poison the relationship between the two peoples, whether it be a derogatory or contemptuous attitude, or improper interference in the internal affairs of the other country.”

 

In Point 18 Hitler also declared his willingness to re-join Germany to the League of Nations, provided it addressed: “...the question of colonial equality of rights and that of the separation of the Covenant of the League of Nations from its foundations in the Versailles Treaty...” Chancellor Hitler, his party the NSDAP and most of the German people saw confiscation of German colonies given to other European nations as a gross injustice, more so since Germany lacked key resources as it increased its industrial output. They viewed the League of Nations as an enforcement structure for limitations on Germany through the appalling Versailles Treaty. Hitler said he would re-join Germany to the League if it “cleared up” these injustices.

 

Point 19 proposed establishing an “International Court of Arbitration” to ensure compliance with the peace plan. Once again, Hitler proposed arms reduction treaties, prohibiting gas and incendiary bombs, bombing of civilian towns or villages, and abolishing heavy tank and large artillery production.

 

Hitler then focused on prospects for economic growth and well-being:

 

“The German Government believes that if even a first step is made on the road to disarmament, this will be of enormous importance to the relationship between the nations, and to the recovery of confidence, trade and prosperity.
“In accordance with the general desire for the restoration of favourable economic conditions, the German government is prepared

... to enter into an exchange of opinions on economic problems

... to do all in its power to improve the economic situation in Europe, and the world...”6

 

Hitler closed with hope:

 

“The German Government believes that... it has made its contribution to the reconstruction of a new Europe on the basis of reciprocal respect and confidence between sovereign states. Many opportunities for such a pacification of Europe, for which Germany has so often in the last few years made her proposals, have been neglected. May this attempt to achieve European understanding succeed at last!”

 

The response: Britain alone sent a dismissive insincere questionnaire, and then established itself as France’s Protector, beginning joint military staff discussions, as before World War 1.7

 

War propaganda against National Socialist Germany to this day maintains that Germany’s economy boomed at the time exclusively from arms production, but repeatedly we see within these peace proposals of Chancellor Hitler the view that peacetime economies among the nations of Europe generate prosperity. It is commonly said that the US economy did not revive from the Great Depression until war production increased, and immense Soviet war production long before its entry into World War 2 destroyed living conditions for the Russian people.8 Hitler had another view and promoted it in his proposals: peace prosperity.

 

Between Hitler’s arms reduction proposal of May 1935 and France’s alliance with the Soviet Union, Hitler signed a Naval Agreement with Great Britain on June 18 1935. Hitler knew Germany’s naval strength, particularly its U-boat fleet, was a reason for the outbreak of World War 1 with Great Britain, and sought to soothe any British concerns by limiting Germany’s naval fleet to 35% of the British fleet.9

 

Turning to Poland, as early as January 26, 1934 Hitler and the Polish leader Pilsudski formed a non-aggression pact, and consented “to settle directly all questions of whatever sort which concern their mutual relations”.10 Major issues existed between the two central European nations, primarily the large populations of Germans now living in the “Polish Corridor”, formerly West Prussia, and the city of Danzig, formally a “Free City” under the League of Nations, but de facto dominated by the Polish authorities.11 Ethnic Germans now forced to live in Poland – Volksdeutschen – suffered brutal persecution and even massacres under these arrangements.12 They wanted to be brought back into the Reich, and while Hitler too wanted to reunite all of the German family, he knew he needed alliance with Poland and was cautious of making demands.13

 

After Pilsudski’s death in May 1935, Polish attitudes toward Germany worsened. Persecution of the Volksdeutchen became intolerable. Still, Hitler made numerous peace offers, economic treaties and alliance proposals.14 He knew Poland was a critical ally and buffer state against the inevitable aggression of Stalin and the Soviet Union.
The response: Britain and then France offered Poland an unconditional guarantee of protection against any outside aggression. This was clearly intended against Germany. The Roosevelt administration in the US stocked with Communist Jews urged Britain into this arrangement.15 This was a key development which led directly to the real start of World War 2. The German-Polish conflict could have remained local as Hitler stated, if not for the guarantee Britain and France offered Poland, and which Poland accepted.

 

Still another peace agreement Hitler participated in was the Munich Agreement of September 28 1938, at which Britain, France, Italy and Germany agreed to the peaceful dissolution of the artificial state of Czechoslovakia, and the return of the Sudetenland which held millions of ethnic Germans, back to Germany. The Czech portion of the region, with the largest ethnic population, invited the German military in as a peace-keeping force.16 Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, returned declaring he had maintained peace in Europe, but privately knew he had only arranged more time to prepare for war against Germany.17

 

Immediately after, on the 30th, Hitler and Chamberlain signed an agreement, which contained the statements: “...the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.”, and “...contribute to assure the peace of Europe.”18

 

The response: Chamberlain increased British arms production, and now that the Czech area had been lost as part of the encirclement plan against Germany, began new plans for encirclement.19

 

On December 6 1938, Hitler through his Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop signed a peace agreement with France. It stated: “...peaceful and good neighbourly relations between Germany and France constitute one of the most essential elements for the consolidation of the situation in Europe and the maintenance of general peace.” They both agreed the borders between the two nations were undisputed, and agreed to consult over future issues.

 

Slightly earlier, on October 24, Hitler presented a proposal to Poland on generous terms for the return of Danzig to Germany, and construction of an autobahn and railroad through the Polish Corridor (West Prussia) to connect Germany with its severed East Prussia region. Hitler offered to allow the Poles to use this transportation avenue as well at no cost, strengthening economic activities between the two nations. The proposal contained a twenty-five year nonaggression pact as well. No ultimatums were issues in this proposal, and no deadlines declared.20

 

The response: The Poles refused. They threatened to claim Danzig for Poland and prepared for military action against Germany.21

 

The certainty of conflict with Poland necessitated a German nonaggression agreement with the Soviet Union. By August 23 1939 the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was signed, declaring “spheres of influence” for the USSR and Germany, and ensuring neither nation would attack the other. While this is considered another of Hitler’s peace measures – or at least avoidance of war – it is understood that both sides planned to break the agreement, Stalin at the time when European nations had exhausted themselves fighting each other, and Hitler when it was necessary to pre-empt the Soviet invasion.22

 

Two days later, Chancellor Hitler made his final peace appeal to Great Britain, in which Germany would “safeguard the existence of the British Empire” and “guarantee German assistance for the British Empire...” It also once again offered arms limitations, and assured that Germany would attempt no revision of borders in Western Europe.23

 

The response: August 25, Britain and France affirmed their guarantee to defend Poland from aggression, formally signed on March 31 1939 by the three nations.24 Earlier in August 1939 the Poles increased their attacks on German nationals in Poland, and many Volksdeutschen attempted escape into Germany.25

 

After Poland was swiftly defeated, on October 6 Adolf Hitler gave a speech in the Reichstag, in which three main points were presented for “not only a belief in, but a sense of, European security”. The first recognized the Treaty of Versailles as “obsolete” and recommended the return of Germany’s colonies “based on political justice and sane economic principles”. The second called for a “reorganization of the international economic system” so that “unrestricted trade” could flourish. The third once more advocated arms reductions to protect civilian women and children. “It is only when this is achieved that peace can reign... a peace which, uncontaminated by suspicion and fear, will provide the only possible condition for real economic prosperity.”26

 

The response: No response emerged from any European nations. The following spring, Britain and France, having declared war on Germany, fielded an immense army pointed at Germany through Belgium. Belgium participated by supporting infrastructure to pass the army through to Germany. French Prime Minister Daladier publicly rejected the proposal against many in the Parliament who approved.27

 

After French and British armies were subdued within six weeks, Chancellor Hitler presented another Reichstag speech on July 19th 1940, translated into English and dropped as leaflets by Luftwaffe planes into British cities. Titled “A Last Appeal to Reason”, one if its main goals was “to direct, once again and for the last time, an appeal to general reason”. Hitler claimed “the National Socialist Movement has (delivered Germany) from the Jewish-capitalist shackles imposed by a plutocratic-democratic, dwindling class of exploiters...” and identified those responsible for the war as “Jews and Freemasons, international traders and stock-traders...”. He stated: “If Mr. Churchill or any other warmongers had but a fraction of the sense of responsibility I felt toward Europe, they could not have played so perfidious a game”. Hitler reminded that it was the goal of the NSDAP to be allies with Italy and Britain.

 

“It still saddens me today that, in spite of all my endeavours, I have not succeeded in obtaining this friendship with England which, I believe, should have been a blessing for both peoples; and especially because I was not able to do so despite my persistent, sincere efforts”.

 

He spoke of Germany’s alliance with Fascist Italy as “...the alliance which is destined to procure a new life for Europe.” In this speech, Hitler makes one of his most succinct and clear statements of his vision: “It was not my ambition to wage wars, but to build up a new social state of the highest culture. And every year of war takes me away from my work.”

 

With prospects for war against Great Britain continuing, and “warmonger” Churchill in power, Hitler said:

 

“I see no compelling reason which could force the continuation of this war... I know of the women and mothers at home whose hearts, despite their willingness to sacrifice to the (end), hang onto this last with all their might.”28

 

The response: Britain had been bombing German civilian cities since May 10th, and a month after Hitler’s speech Churchill ordered Germany’s capital Berlin bombed for the first time. Hitler responded in kind in September, four months after British civilian bombing campaigns had begun against Germany.

 

In the end, German Chancellor Adolf Hitler made one last Political Testament as the Red Army forces were advancing on his Berlin bunker from the East, and American and British forces were approaching from the West. On April 29 1945 he dictated his thoughts, which included the following statements:

 

“It is not true that I or anyone else in Germany wanted the war in 1939. It was desired and instigated exclusively by those international statesmen who were either of Jewish origin or who worked for Jewish interests.

 

“I have made too many offers for the control and limitation of armaments, which posterity will not be able to disregard forever – for the responsibility for the outbreak of this war to be laid on me. I have furthermore never wished that after the first disastrous world war a second should arise against England, much less against America.”

 

Here he identifies “...whom we have to thank for all this: International Jewry and its helpers!”

 

Hitler points to his “proposal to the British ambassador in Berlin (of) a solution to the German-Polish problem” as proof of his peaceful intentions.

 

Again he identifies “international conspirators in money and finance” and “the people that is really guilty of this murderous conflict... Jewry!”

 

Hitler closes his last Political Testament before his immanent death:

 

“Above all I enjoin the leaders of the nation and their followers to scrupulous observance of the laws of race, and to merciless resistance to the universal poisoner of all peoples, international Jewry.”29

 

What the World Rejected ends with two chapters, one Hermann Goring’s letter from the Nuremberg Trials to Winston Churchill, blaming Churchill for forcing war on Germany, allowing Europe to be overrun by “Asiatics” (Soviets and Jews?) and destruction of the British Empire. The final chapter addresses the diaries of James Forrestal, Secretary of the US Navy toward the end of the war and first US Secretary of Defence afterward, in which British PM Neville Chamberlain had stated: “America and the world Jews had forced England into the war.” Since America, especially the FDR administration, was largely under Jewish influence, this statement could be considered redundant.

 

Over eighty years of ongoing Jewish war propaganda depicting Adolf Hitler, National Socialist Chancellor of Germany, as a war-monger and lusting after bloody conflict are not only refuted, but inverted by the historical record presented in What the World Rejected. Adolf Hitler can more accurately be called Peace Maker. The fact that he did not succeed is no fault of his, but of those he so clearly accused of being the actual war-mongers of World War 2.

 

Hitler makes multiple viable offers of peace and all are rejected:

 

1st offer: May 17, 1933

2nd offer: December 18, 1933

3rd offer: May 21, 1935

4th offer: March 31, 1936

5th offer: September 30, 1938

6th offer: December 6, 1938

7th offer: In late 1939, Hitler offered Poland a peaceful settlement to the Danzig issue.

8th offer: Plan for world peace made on October 6, 1939, just over a month after Britain and France had declared war on Germany for invading Poland on September 1 (but not on the USSR, which also invaded Po- land on September 17).

Final offer: Hitler’s “Appeal for Peace and Sanity” speech, made before the Reichstag on July 19, 1940, following the fall of France. In that speech, Hitler once again offered unconditional peace to Britain. This speech was printed in English and dropped by the tens of thousands from German aircraft over Britain. Although nearly half the British cabinet wanted to take Hitler up on his offer, Churchill put an end to this final peace offer.


Endnotes:

 

1. FJP Veal, Advance to Barbarism, C C Nelson Publishing Co, Appleton Wisconsin, 1953

2. Dr. Friedrich Stieve, What the World Rejected: Hitler’s Peace Offers 1933-1940, Ostara Publications, first published 1940 ppg 4-6

3. David L Hoggan, The Forced War, When Peaceful Revision Failed, Catholic Resources, Chattanooga TN, 2020 p. 26

4. Stieve, p 6

5. Ibid, ppg 6-8

6. Ibid, p 14

7. Ibid, ppg 8-15

8. Viktor Suvorov, The Chief Culprit, Naval Institute Press, Anapolis MD, 2008

9. Stieve, p 15

10. Ibid, p 17

11. Hoggan, 37-50, 141,

12. Ibid, 134-7, 224-6

13. Ibid, p 32, 47-8

14. Ibid, ppg 67-8, 106, 121-124, 220-1, 278-9. 285-6,472-4, 477-81, 485-6

15. Herbert Hoover, Freedom Betrayed, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford CA, 2011, Chapter 4 “Infiltration of Members of the Communist Party into the Federal Government”, ppg 34-47

16. Walendy, ppg 127-9

17. Udo Walendy, Truth for Germany, Barnes Review, Washington DC, 2013, ppg 82-115.

18. Stieve, p 18

19. Ibid, p 20

20. Walendy, ppg 215-238

21. Stieve, p 20

22. Viktor Suvorov, Icebreaker, Hamish Hamilton, London England, 1990

23. Stieve, p 21

24. Hoggan, 296-8

25. Ibid, pp. 343, 399-400

26. Ibid, pp. 21-26

27. Ibid, pp. 46, footnote 17

28. Ibid, pp. 30-74

29. Ibid, pp. 75-80

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