My assignment to the guard
regiment “Grossdeutschland” in Berlin was actually a form of rest and
recreation — my first leave from the front — after my many wounds and in
recognition of my combat decorations, including the Knight’s Cross with Oak
Leaves and the Close Combat Badge in Silver (48 days of close combat). Later I
would be wounded again. In all I was to command the guard regiment for only
four months, since I felt obligated to be back with my comrades at the front.
My mission as commander of the guard regiment “Grossdeutschland,” which I
took over at the end of May 1944, was, aside from purely ceremonial duties, to
safeguard the Reich government and the Reich capital. Since there were more
than a million foreign workers in Berlin and its immediate vicinity, the
possibility of internal unrest had to be taken into account. Around noon on
July 20, 1944, First Lieutenant Dr. Hans Hagen, who had been severely wounded
at the front, concluded his lecture on cultural history before the officers and
NCOs of the regiment. He was attached to my regiment only administratively and
in no way as a National Socialist political officer, as has often been
reported. I was the regiment’s sole leader, politically as well as militarily.
I had invited Hagen to lunch afterward in my quarters at the Rathenow barracks,
together with my adjutant, First Lieutenant Siebert. Siebert, who had lost an
eye in combat, was a pastor of the Confessional Church [a branch of the German
Protestant Church that opposed Hitler]. He attended services every Sunday at
the Garrison Church, with my express permission, although I myself had left the
church. Among us personal freedom was the rule. Nor did it bother me that,
after having been an SA stormtrooper and a member of the party during the years
of struggle before Hitler came to power, he had resigned from both
organizations to protest defamatory remarks by his local party leader
concerning the ancestry of Jesus Christ. Lt. Siebert suffered no adverse
consequences due to his resignation.
In those days that sort of thing was entirely possible, with no
repercussions. Indeed, before I chose Siebert, due to his character, as my
adjutant, he confided to me that while still a stormtrooper he had broken into
a Gestapo office in order to obtain documents incriminating colleagues in the
Confessional Church. For me Siebert’s frank admissions were just a further
evidence of the personal élan that recommended him as a trustworthy adjutant
That’s the way it was in the Third Reich, so widely demonized nowadays. Neither
in my unit nor in the officer corps as a whole did there prevail the stubborn
narrowmindedness, not to mention the sort of terror against dissenting
opinions, that is carried on against nationalists in Germany today by the
“Office for Constitutional Protection.” Nor have I ever heard that Pastor
Siebert considered himself to be a “resistance fighter” or that he later
pretended to have been one.
During the early afternoon of July 20, 1944, my regiment, like all units of
the Replacement Army, was alerted by the codeword “Valkyrie.” “Valkyrie”
provided for the mobilization of the Replacement Army in case of internal
unrest. While my regiment automatically implemented the prescribed measures, I
was summoned from the swimming pool. In compliance with my orders I drove
immediately to my designated post, the Berlin City Command Center, directly
across from the “Eternal Watch” honor guard. While the other unit commanders
waited in the anteroom, I alone was admitted to the city commander, Major General
von Hase, and given the following briefing on the situation and my assignment:
The Führer has had a fatal
accident! Civil disorder has broken out. The Army has assumed executive
authority! The guard regiment is ordered to concentrate a strong force, reinforced
for counterattack, to seal off the government quarter so that nobody, not even
a general or a government minister, can enter or leave! To support you in
sealing off the streets and subways, I’m seconding Lieutenant Colonel Wolters
to your command!
As these orders were being issued, I was struck by the circumstance that a
younger officer of the general staff, Major Hayessen, assisted, while the
former and senior general staff officer, whom I knew personally, stood about,
idle and noticeably nervous.
I was naturally very shocked by the general’s words, since I felt that with
Hitler’s death the possibility of a favorable turn in the war had almost
disappeared. Immediately I asked:
Is the Führer really dead? Was
it an accident or has he been assassinated? Where have civil disturbances
occurred? I saw nothing unusual while driving here through Berlin. Why is
executive authority passing to the Army and not to the Wehrmacht [Armed
Forces]? Who is the Führer’s successor? According to Hitler’s testament, Hermann
Goering is automatically his successor. Has he issued any orders or
proclamations?
Since I received neither detailed information nor clear answers to my
questions, the situation became even murkier, and I felt a certain sense of
mistrust even from the beginning. When I tried to get a brief glimpse of the
papers which lay before me on the table, above all to see who had signed the
orders, Major Hayessen ostentatiously gathered them up and put them in a
folder. As I returned to my regiment I kept thinking: “Hitler’s dead. Now
confusion reigns, and various people will probably try to seize power.” I
contemplated the future struggles for succession.
I decided that, in any case, I would not allow myself to be misused in my
capacity as commander of the only elite unit on active duty in Berlin. My
regiment was made up entirely of picked, proven combat soldiers with high
decorations for bravery. Every officer sported the Knights Cross. I was also
mindful of the events of 1918, after which the Berlin guard units had been
reproached for their hesitancy, which contributed to the success of the
revolution. I had no desire to expose myself to a similar reproach before
History.
When I returned to my troops, I gathered my officers and informed them of
the situation and our orders. The alleged death of Adolf Hitler sent officers
and men into shock. Never in my life, even at Germany’s final defeat, have I
witnessed such despondency. Despite the numerous stories which flourish today,
that is the absolute truth: I vouch for it.
I made no secret to my officers that there was a lot that was still
unclear, indeed mysterious to me, and that I would in no way allow myself or my
unit to be exploited. I expressly demanded unconditional confidence and
absolute obedience, just as at the front, from every one of my officers. This
somewhat unusual demand was due to a telephone call I received during the
briefing from a general I didn’t recognize — it was probably Major General
Friedrich Olbricht — at the High Command of the Replacement Army,
requisitioning a company from my unit for a special assignment. This demand I
explicitly rejected, pointing out that I had been entrusted with a clearly
defined mission and that dispersing my forces didn’t seem advisable.
After the briefing I received two reports which further disturbed me. The
first was from First Lieutenant Dr. Hagen, a member of my staff, who informed
me that while on the way to the barracks he had seen Field Marshal Brauchitsch,
in full uniform, driving his car on the streets of Berlin. This was strange,
for Brauchitsch was retired. Given the circumstances, his appearance in uniform
seemed remarkable. It later turned out that the officer seen by Dr. Hagen could
not have been Brauchitsch. Probably it was one of the conspirators.
The second disconcerting report was from Lt. Colonel Wolters, who had been
attached to my regiment as a liaison officer by the Command Center. He told me
that I musn’t believe he was there to keep tabs on me as an informer. Such a
remark was completely uncalled for. Not only was it incongruous and annoying,
it awoke precisely the suspicion it was designed to allay: somebody had
something up his sleeve. As it turned out, the briefing I gave my officers
caused the colonel misgivings. In order to avoid responsibility, he simply went
home — an unthinkable course of action for an officer on active duty.
I had my doubts that Major General von Hase’s description of the situation
matched the facts. I also doubted another version of the story, according to
which Hitler had been murdered by the SS. Those doubts convinced me that I had
to determine the facts for myself. I decided to telephone every command post I
could. That was just basic reconnaissance, a matter of course for every
commander before committing his troops. Needless to say, this type of thinking
and acting is quite at odds with the notorious corpse-like obedience that
denigrators of the Third Reich’s army attribute to it.
Among other things I decided to send First Lt. Dr. Hagen, who had eagerly
volunteered, to the Reich Defense Commissioner for Berlin, Dr. Joseph Goebbels.
Dr. Hagen had earlier worked under Dr. Goebbels in the Propaganda Ministry, and
I believed that by dispatching him to Dr. Goebbels I would be informed not only
about the military but also the political situation. Dr. Goebbels was not only
Reich Propaganda Minister. He was also Gauleiter and Defense
Commissioner for Berlin. As a consequence of those two latter positions, he was
patron of the “Grossssdeutschland” Division, which was made up of soldiers from
all the provinces of the Reich.
About an hour and a half after the “Valkyrie” order was given, my regiment,
by then combat-ready, moved into the areas to be sealed off in accordance with
its orders. The normal guard units, such as those at the War Memorial and the
Bendlerblock, the headquarters of the Commander of the Replacement Army and of
the Defense Production Office, remained at their posts. At about 4:15 p.m. Lt.
Arends, the duty officer in the Bendlerblock, reported to me that he had been ordered
to seal off all entrances to the building. A Colonel Mertz von Quirnheim, whom
Lt. Arends didn’t know, had given him this assignment. Lt. Arends had further
been instructed by General Olbricht to open fire on any SS units that might
approach.
After personally inspecting my troops in their new positions, at about 5:00
p.m. I returned once more to the City Commander, General von Hase, to inform
him that I had carried out his orders. At that time I was asked to establish my
command post there in the City Command Center, opposite the War Memorial. I had
already set up a message center, commanded by Lt. Gees, in the Rathenow
Barracks, with which I maintained telephone contact. Then von Hase gave me an
additional assignment: to very tightly seal off a block of buildings north of
the Anhalt Rail Station (he showed me where on the map).
As I began carrying out these orders, I ascertained that the designated
block housed the Main Office of Reich Security. The unclearness, not to mention
the deception, of this misleading order, only strengthened my suspicions. Why
wasn’t I given explicit orders to place the Main Office of Reich Security under
guard? It goes without saying that I would have carried out even that order.
Thus, on my third visit to General von Hase, I asked him directly “Herr
General, why am I receiving orders formulated so obscurely? Why wasn’t I simply
told to pay special attention to the Main Office of Reich Security?” Von Hase
was quite nervous and excited. He didn’t even respond to my question. If one
wonders today how a young officer like me could allow himself such liberties
with a general, it should be borne in mind that we young commanders saw
ourselves as battle-hardened, proven combat leaders, and we had scant regard
for the chairborne warriors of the home front.
In this connection I should like to point out something based on my long
experience at the front. Just as in the First World War, it was the veteran
commanders of the shock companies who epitomized the front experience, so also
in the Second World War it was the young commanders, come of age on the front,
who had forged with their troops a sworn fellowship of combat. These men not
only could fight, they wanted to fight, particularly since they believed in
Germany’s victory.
While in General von Hase’s office I overheard from a conversation between
the General and his First General Staff Officer that Goebbels was now to be
arrested, and that this assignment was to be mine. Since I found this an
unpleasant duty in light of my attempt to contact Goebbels, I jumped in and
told General von Hase:
Herr General, I consider
myself unsuited for this assignment As you know, I’ve been with the
“Grossssdeutschland” Division, I’ve worn its stripe for years. This mission
would be very unchivalrous for me, for as you are doubtless aware, Dr.
Goebbels, in his capacity as Gauleiter of Berlin, is at the same time the
patron of the “Grossdeutschland.” Only two weeks ago I paid Goebbels my first
call as new commander of the guard regiment. On these grounds I consider it
inappropriate that I, in particular, be ordered to arrest my patron.
Possibly von Hase sympathized with my arguments. For whatever reason, he
now ordered the military police to take Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels into
custody.
Around 5:30 p.m. Lt. Dr. Hagen finally met with Dr. Goebbels in his private
residence, at 20 Hermann-Goering-Strasse beside the Brandenburg Gate, after
having tried in vain to see him at the Propaganda Ministry. The Reich Minister
had no idea of the danger he was in. It was only after Hagen, in order to
emphasize how serious the situation was, pointed out vehicles from the guard
regiment as they drove by, that Goebbels took fright. He cried, “This is
impossible! What shall we do?” To that Hagen suggested, “The best thing would
be for you to summon my commander here.” Goebbels asked curtly: “Can your
commander be trusted?” “I’d lay down my life for him!” replied Hagen.
As I was going down the corridor just after leaving the City Commander’s
office, I finally found my bearings as a result of Hagen’s contacting Goebbels.
Hagen had driven back to the barracks, gave Gees his instructions, and then
drove to my new command post at the Command Center, which was heavily guarded.
To avoid any hindrance, he did not enter the building, but informed my
adjutant, Lt. Siebert, and my orderly, Lt. Buck, of the situation, asking them
to inform me without delay. They reported as follows:
There’s a completely new
situation! This is probably a military putsch! Nothing further is known! The
Reich Defense Commissioner requests that you come to him as quickly as
possible! If you’re not there within twenty minutes, he will assume that you
are being forcibly restrained. In that case he will be compelled to alert the
Waffen-SS. To avoid civil war, he has until then ordered the Leibstandarte
[Hitler's personal bodyguard, the 1st Division of the Waffen-SS] to stay where
it is.
When I learned these things from my adjutant, I decided to see General von
Hase one more time. That I still trusted the Major General, even then, is shown
by my having Lt. Buck repeat to me once again, in the presence of von Hase, the
message from Goebbels. I didn’t want to seem an intriguer; as a veteran combat
officer it was my practice to lay all my cards on the table. Von Hase bluntly
rejected my request to comply with the Reich Defense Commissioner’s summons so
that I might clarify the situation in the interest of all concerned.
After leaving the Command Center without interference, I deliberated,
together with my adjutant, Lt. Siebert — today a pastor in Nuremberg — about
what I should do. My key role in this difficult and obscure situation, which I
had not caused, was increasingly clear to me. By now I felt that my head was on
the line too. After evaluating the situation as carefully as I could at that
time, I decided that in spite of von Hase’s order to the contrary I would go to
Goebbels. My reasons were as follows:
First, under no circumstances did I want to be deprived of my freedom of
action, as often happened at the front. Often there was a very thin line
between being awarded a high decoration, or being sentenced to death by a court
martial.
Second, I felt myself still bound by my oath. The report of the Führer’s
death was still at least doubtful. Thus, I had to act in keeping with the oath
I swore on the flag.
Third, at the front I had many times made responsible decisions on my own,
decisions the correctness of which were confirmed by my being awarded high
decorations. Many a situation can only be mastered by decisive action. I felt
as one with my comrades at the front, who wouldn’t understand if I were to
stand idly by out of a lack of civic courage. I could not allow myself the
responsibility of letting things come to a fatal head. I thought of 1918.
Fourth, I was under compulsion, since Goebbels had plans to alert the
Waffen-SS, raising the possibility that a fraternal war between two forces,
each proven in combat, might break out. As the commander of the only elite unit
in Berlin on active duty I was responsible for the lives of the men entrusted
to me. To employ them in a totally confused affair was not my duty.
Nevertheless, I didn’t entirely trust Goebbels either, for I still assumed
that Hitler was dead, and believed that a struggle for succession was possible.
I was far from wanting to let myself and my unit be thrust into a latterday
Diadochian struggle. Inasmuch as Goebbels’ role remained unclear, I took along
Lt. Buck and a platoon of soldiers. Their orders were to come and get me if I
didn’t emerge from Goebbels’ residence in 15 minutes.
Then, after releasing the safety catch of my pistol, I entered the Reich
Minister’s office, where I had been eagerly awaited, and asked Goebbels to
orient me. With that Goebbels asked me to tell him everything I knew. I did so,
although I didn’t reveal that von Hase intended to arrest him, since I was
still unclear as to Goebbels’ role in all this. When he asked me what I
intended to do, I told him that I would stick to my military orders and that I
was determined to carry them out. Even if the Führer were no longer alive, I
felt bound by my oath and could only act in accord with my conscience as an
officer. At that Goebbels looked at me in amazement and cried: “What are you
talking about? The Führer is alive! I’ve spoken with him by telephone. The
assassination failed! You’ve been tricked.”
This information came as a complete surprise. When I heard that the Führer
was still alive, I was greatly relieved. But I was still suspicious. Therefore
I asked Goebbels to assure me, on his word of honor, that what he said was true
and and that he stood unconditionally behind the Führer. Goebbels hesitated at
first, because he didn’t understand the reason for my request. It was only
after I repeated that as an officer I needed his word of honor in order to see
my way clear that he obliged.
My wish to telephone the Führer’s headquarters coincided with his. Within
seconds I was connected to the Wolf’s Lair at Rastenburg in East Prussia. To my
great surprise Hitler himself came on the line. Geobbels quickly explained the
situation to the Führer and then handed me the receiver.
Adolf Hitler said to me, approximately, the following: “Major Remer, can
you hear me? Do you recognize my voice? Do you understand me?” I replied
affirmatively, but I was nevertheless uncertain. It flashed through my mind
that someone could possibly be imitating the Führer’s voice. To be sure I had
become personally acquainted with the Führer’s voice during the previous year,
when, after he had awarded me the Oak Leaf to the Knight’s Cross, I had been
able to speak with him alone and completely frankly for an hour about the cares
and miseries of the front. It was only as he continued speaking over the
telephone that I became convinced that I was indeed speaking with Hitler. He
went on:
As you can tell I’m alive. The
assassination has failed. Providence didn’t intend it. A small clique of
ambitious, disloyal, and traitorous officers wanted to kill me. Now we’ve got
these saboteurs of the front. We’ll make short work of this treacherous plague,
by brute force if necessary.
From this moment on, Major
Remer, I am giving you complete authority in Berlin. You are responsible to me
personally and exclusively for the immediate restoration of peace and security
in the Reich capital. You will remain under my personal command for this
purpose until Reichsführer Himmler arrives there and relieves you of
responsibility.
The Führer’s words were very calm, determined, and convincing. I could
breathe a sigh of relief, for the conversation had removed all my doubts. The
soldier’s oath which I had sworn to the Führer was still binding, and was the
guiding principle of my actions. Now my only concern was to eliminate
misunderstandings and to avoid unnecessary bloodshed by acting quickly and
decisively.
Goebbels asked me to inform him of the content of my conversation with
Hitler, and asked me what I intended to do next. He placed the downstairs rooms
of his house at my disposal, and I set up a new command post there. By this
time it was 6:30 p.m. About 15 minutes later, the first report of the bomb
attack in the Führer’s headquarters was broadcast over the Greater German Radio
Network.
Due to my visit to the Berlin City Command Center I had a rough idea, for
the most part, of the dispositions of the units advancing on Berlin. To let
their commanders know the real situation, I dispatched staff officers in all
directions to bring the word. Success was total. The question “The Führer —
with him or against him?” worked miracles. I would like to state unequivocally
that every one of these commanding officers, who like me were outraged at what
had happened, subordinated themselves unconditionally to my command, although
they all outranked me. Thus, they demonstrated that their soldier’s oaths were
binding for them as well. Difficulties, temporary in nature, arose here and
there, where personal briefings were not immediately possible.
Due to the prevailing uncertainty and because of misunderstanding — some
thought that the guard regiments sealing off its designated area meant that it
had mutinied — on two occasions my regiment came within a hair’s breadth of
being fired on by other units. At the Fehrbelliner Platz an armored brigade had
assembled at the order of the conspirators, but an order radioed by Lt. General
Guderian removed it from the conspirators’ control. Thereafter this unit undertook
reconnaissance and mistakenly concluded that the guard regiment
“Grossdeutschland” was on the side of the conspirators and had apprehended
Reich Minister Goebbels. Several of the brigade’s tanks advanced tentatively,
and bloodshed would have been a near thing had I not intervened personally to
clear up the confusion.
The same thing happened in front of the Bendlerblock, the headquarters of
the Commander of the Replacement Army, when a panzergrenadier company
tried to take over from my guard, which had been authorized by the Führer. The
energetic intervention of officers from my regiment made possible a
clarification at the last moment and prevented German soldiers from firing on
each other. Here too the question “Hitler — with him or against him?” proved
decisive. I had sent one of my company commanders, Captain Schlee, to the
Bendlerblock in order to clear things up. At this point I had no idea that the
leadership of the conspiracy had its Headquarters there. Schlee had orders to
withdraw our guards, because I wanted, as much as possible, to avoid bloodshed.
When he arrived he was ordered to see General Olbricht. He took the precaution
of telling the guard to bring him out by force in the event he didn’t return
promptly. In fact he was placed under arrest in the general’s waiting room by
Colonel Mertz von Quirnheim, who told him to stay there. When Mertz went into
Olbricht’s office, however, Schlee simply walked away.
When he returned to our guard, Lt. Arends informed him of a strange
occurrence. He’d heard shouts coming from an upper story of the building and
just then a typewriter and a telephone came flying through the window and into
the courtyard. Schlee did an about-face and led a patrol back up to find out
what was going on. He quickly identified the room from which the noise was
coming; it was locked, but not under guard, and the key was still in the lock.
Inside was General von Kortzfleisch, commanding general of the Berlin Military
District. It was he who had thrown the objects out the window. The general had
been summoned to the Bendlerblock to receive his orders. On his arrival, he
steadfastly refused to cooperate with the conspirators. He was arrested and
locked in, but left unguarded. Now that he was free, he gave us our first
information regarding the leadership of the conspiracy.
At 7:30 p.m. our guards were relieved, in keeping with orders. Olbricht had
to replace our guard detail with his own officers. The commander of the new
guard was Lt. Colonel Fritz von der Lancken. As he was moving out Schlee
learned from a captain in the communications center in the Benderblock that I
had been ordered by the Führer to put down the putsch. They had been able to
overhear my conversation with the Führer, and recognized that the telexes they
were to send out were the conspirators’ orders. Thus the men in the
communications center deliberately delayed sending the messages, or in some
cases didn’t dispatch them at all.
Truly a masterfully prepared plan: the conspirators had no accomplices!
Furthermore, telexes and telephone messages continued to come in from the
Führer Headquarters, making the actual state of affairs quite clear.
Countless orders were given that late afternoon of July 20th. Among other
measures I moved the replacement brigade of the “Grossdeutschland” from Cottbus
to the outskirts of Berlin as a combat reserve. The brigade, too, had been
given different orders earlier by the conspirators. Its tried and true
commander, Colonel Schulte-Neuhaus, who had lost an arm in combat and whom I
knew from the front, reported to my command post. I introduced him to Goebbels.
Meanwhile I concentrated my own troops more tightly around the Reich
Chancellory complex, and formed a strong combat reserve in the garden of
Goebbels’ official residence. Goebbels asked me to address the troops assembled
there, which I did. Their outrage at the traitorous goings-on was so great that
they would have torn every single conspirator to pieces, had they been there.
Then I sealed off the City Command Center, for I’d gotten the impression
that there was a number of questionable characters there. I also learned that
after my refusal to arrest Goebbels, the military police had been ordered to do
so. I waited in vain for them to appear. Later I heard that not a single unit
was ready to arrest Dr. Goebbels, so that it was left to von Hase himself. At
this point the City Commander was at the headquarters of the deputy commander,
to which he had driven in order to work out further measures with the general
who had been installed there by the conspirators. They had discussed things for
two hours without coming to a decision, which was typical behavior for these
combat-shy conspirators.
After General von Hase’s return to the City Command Center was reported to
me, I asked him over the telephone to come by my command post at Goebbels’
residence in order to clarify the situation. At first he refused my invitation,
and demanded that, since I was his subordinate, I should report to him at the
Command Center. I informed him that I had been ordered personally by the Führer
as his immediate subordinate, to restore peace and order, that von Hase was
therefore under my orders, and that I would come and get him if he didn’t
appear of his own free will. Only then did the general arrive. At this point I
was still under the impression that von Hase, who had often been my guest at
the officers’ club, who frequently expressed his solidarity with the soldiers
at the front, and who never omitted a “Sieg Heil!” to his beloved Führer from
any speech, had been deceived, just as I had been, and was unaware of the
facts. Therefore I apologized for my unusual behavior. On his arrival von Hase
was affability personified; he even praised me for my independence and
decisiveness, and for seeking out Goebbels, by which I had averted a good deal
of mischief.
Even with Goebbels von Hase played the innocent, and acted as if he had no
inkling of any conspiracy. He was asked to stand by for further information,
and a room was placed at his disposal. As von Hase left Goebbels’ office, there
was an embarrassing incident, which made me, as a German officer, blush for
shame. In these very tense circumstances, von Hase stated that he had been busy
the whole day and hadn’t had a thing to eat. Goebbels immediately offered to
have a sandwich prepared and asked him if he would like a glass of Mosel or
Rhine wine as well. As soon as von Hase had left the office, Goebbels sneered:
“My name is Hare [Hase], I
know nothing.” That’s the stuff our revolutionary putsch generals are
made of. With the irons still in the fire they want to be wined and dined, and
call their mommies on the telephone. In their place I’d see my tongue ripped
out before I’d make such contemptible requests.
Two events illustrate how little thought and planning went into the putsch.
My conversations and orders were routed through the same communications center
in the Bendlerblock, headquarters of the conspiracy, from which the plotters’
orders were being disseminated in all directions. The communications officers
could have delayed my orders or not transmitted them at all, or they could have
interrupted my telephone calls, none of which they did. I even received a
message from the Reich Broadcasting Service, asking what was going on. As a
result, I was able to give the order that under no circumstances was any
unscheduled transmission to be made. As a result, this important communications
medium was also denied to the plotters. What transpired at the Broadcasting
Center on the Masurenallee? Major Jacob had been ordered to occupy the
Broadcasting Center. Astonishingly enough he had been ordered neither to
broadcast any announcements nor to shut down the station. He attempted to
telephone the conspirators to report his occupation of the radio station and to
request additional orders. He had no luck, however. He wasn’t put through, as
happened at many offices. For front-line soldiers the loss of telephone
connections was a frequent occurrence. In such a case the normal procedure was
to establish radio communications or to send a courier. Major Jacob had a
teleprinter at his disposal as well, but he used none of those methods.
Stauffenberg, the General Staff officer who planned the putsch, gave no thought
to furnishing motorcycle couriers. Such trivial details were studiously overlooked.
Rudolf-Günther Wagner, the man who was to broadcast the conspirators’
proclamations, said later:
I had known for years that I
was to broadcast the proclamation on the day of the putsch. I awaited with
feverish excitement the arrival of the lieutenant who was to bring me the
proclamation. Unfortunately I waited in vain, until I heard from Goebbels’
loudspeakers that the assassination had failed.
As is now well known, General Lindemann, who had the text of the
proclamation, was nowhere to be found. General Beck was not willing to step in;
he ordered Hans-Bernd Gisevius, a conspirator with the Abwehr, to bring the
proclamation. First, however, Gisevius had to speedily draft a new statement,
while the conspirators Stauffenberg, Hoepner, Yorck, Schwerin, and Schulenburg
shouted suggestions at him. For this fiasco, too, Stauffenberg, the “manager”
of the conspiracy, bears responsibility. To keep a broadcasting station in
operation requires skilled and trustworthy personnel. A team had been ordered
to the City Command Center, but it waited there idly until it was arrested
during the counteraction. Hans Kasper, who was part of Operation Jacob, later
commented:
It was around that time that
the July 20 [attempted putsch] collapsed. From the perspective of a radio editor
it was tragic. Tragic because the way in which details were handled made it
obvious that this revolt had had very little chance of succeeding.
In the meantime Lt. Schlee had reported to me what was happening at the
Bendlerblock. I knew nothing of the inside story, nor that Lt. General Fromm,
Commander in Chief of the l Replacement Army, had withdrawn from the plot and
been arrested by the conspirators. Schlee was further ordered, after our guards
ad been relieved, to surround and seal off the Bendlerblock, without entering
the buildings. At about 7:00 p.m. I felt I had the situation in Berlin in hand.
The tension began to subside.
About the Author
Born in 1912, Otto Ernst Remer enlisted in the German army in 1930. During
the Second World War he served as a front line officer in Poland, the Balkans,
and in the campaign against the Soviet Union. He was wounded eight times, and
his courage and ability earned him the German Cross in Gold, the Iron Cross,
and other decorations. In May 1944 he was given command of the Guard Regiment
“Grossdeutschland” in Berlin.
Remer played a key role in putting down the attempt by Claus von
Stauffenberg and other conspirators to kill Hitler and seize control of the
German government on July 20, 1944. On that day, one of the conspirators, Paul
von Hase, ordered Remer and his troops to seal off the government buildings in
central Berlin and arrest Reich minister Dr. Goebbels. However, Goebbels put
Remer in direct telephone contact with Hitler, who ordered him to arrest the conspirators
in the German capital and put down the attempted coup. Remer did this quickly
and with no loss of life.
Promoted to Colonel, he took part in the Dec. 1944 Ardennes offensive. He
was promoted to Generalmajor on Jan. 30, 1945. In the final weeks of the war he
commanded a panzer division in Pomerania. After the war he helped found the
Socialist Reich Party (SRP), which was later banned. After a court sentenced
him to prison for “Holocaust denial,” he emigrated to Spain, where he died in
exile in Oct. 1997.
This essay is from The Journal of Historical Review, Spring 1988
(Vol. 8, No. 1), pages 41-53. It is translated by Mark Weber from a chapter of
Otto Ernst Remer’s memoir, Verschwörung und Verrat um Hitler
(“Conspiracy and Treason Around Hitler”). A review of this book appears in
the same Spring 1988 issue of the IHR Journal. This essay parallels
Remer’s address at the Eighth IHR Conference (1987).
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