August 22,
1939
I have called you together to give you a picture of the political situation,
in order that you might have some insight into the individual factors on which
I have based my decision to act and in order to strengthen your confidence.
After this we shall discuss military details.
It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later.
I had already made this decision in the spring, but I thought that I would
first turn against the West in a few years, and only after that against the
East. But the sequence of these things cannot be fixed. Nor should one close
one’s eyes to threatening situations. I wanted first of all to establish a
tolerable relationship with Poland in order to fight first against the West.
But this plan, which appealed to me, could not be executed, as fundamental
points had changed. It became clear to me that, in the event of a conflict with
the West, Poland would attack us. Poland is striving for access to the sea. The
further development appeared after the occupation of the Memel Territory and it
became clear to me that in certain circumstances a conflict with Poland might
come at an inopportune moment. I give as reasons for this conclusion: 1. First
of all two personal factors: My own personality and that of Mussolini.
Essentially all depends on me, on my existence, because of my political
talents. Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have the
confidence of the whole German people as I have. There will probably never
again in the future be a man with more authority than I have. My existence is
therefore a fact of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a
criminal or a lunatic.
The second personal factor is the Duce. His existence is absolutely
decisive.
If anything happens to him, Italy’s loyalty to the alliance will no longer
be certain. The Italian Court is fundamentally opposed to the Duce. Above all,
the Court regards the expansion of the empire as an encumbrance. The Duce is
the man with the strongest nerves in Italy.
The third personal factor in our favor is Franco. We can ask only for
benevolent neutrality from Spain. But this depends on Franco’s personality.
He guarantees a certain uniformity and stability in the present system in
Spain.
We must accept the fact that Spain does not yet have a Fascist party with
our internal unity.
The other side presents a negative picture as far as authoritative persons
are concerned. There is no outstanding personality in England and France.
It is easy for us to make decisions. We have nothing to lose; we have
everything to gain. Because of our restrictions (Einschrankungen) our
economic situation is such that we can only hold out for a few more years.
Goring can confirm this. We have no other choice, we must act. Our opponents
will be risking a great deal and can gain only little. Britain’s stake in a war
is inconceivably great. Our enemies have leaders who are below the average. No
masters, no men of action.
Besides the personal factors, the political situation is favorable for us:
In the Mediterranean, rivalry between Italy, France and England; in the Far
East, tension between Japan and England; in the Middle East, tension which
causes alarm in the Mohammedan world.
The English Empire did not emerge stronger from the last war. Nothing was
achieved from the maritime point of view. Strife between England and Ireland.
The Union of South Africa has become more independent.
Concessions have had to be made to India. England is in the utmost peril.
Unhealthy industrialization. A British statesman can only view the future
with concern.
France’s position has also deteriorated, above all in the Mediterranean.
Further factors in our favor are these: Since Albania, there has been a
balance of power in the Balkans. Yugoslavia is infected with the fatal germ of
decay because of her internal situation.
Rumania has not grown stronger. She is open to attack and vulnerable. She
is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since Kemal’s death, Turkey has been
ruled by petty minds, unsteady, weak men.
All these favorable circumstances will no longer prevail in two or three
years’ time. No one knows how much longer I shall live. Therefore, better a
conflict now.
The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement politically, but
militarily it was doubtful, since it was achieved by bluff on the part of the
political leaders. It is necessary to test the military [machine]. If at all
possible, not in a general reckoning, but by the accomplishment of individual
tasks.
The relationship with Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy
hitherto was contrary to the views of the people. My proposals to Poland
(Danzig and the Corridor) were frustrated by England’s intervention. Poland
changed her tone towards us. A permanent state of tension is intolerable. The
power of initiative cannot be allowed to pass to others. The present moment is
more favorable than in two or three years’ time. An attempt on my life or
Mussolini’s could change the situation to our disadvantage. One cannot forever
face one another with rifles cocked. One compromise solution suggested to us
was that we should change our convictions and make kind gestures. They talked
to us again in the language of Versailles. There was a danger of losing
prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will not intervene.
We must take the risk with ruthless determination. The politician must take a
risk just as much as the general. We are faced with the harsh alternatives of
striking or certain annihilation sooner or later.
Reference to previous hazardous undertakings.
I should have been stoned if I had not been proven right. The most
dangerous step was the entry into the neutral zone. Only a week before, I got a
warning through France. I have always taken a great risk in the conviction that
it would succeed.
Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.
The following special reasons fortify me in my view. England and France
have undertaken obligations which neither is in a position to fulfil. There is
no real rearmament in England, but only propaganda. A great deal of harm was
done by many Germans, who were not in agreement with me, saying and writing to
English people after the solution of the Czech question: The Fuhrer succeeded
because you lost your nerve, because you capitulated too soon. This explains
the present propaganda war. The English speak of a war of nerves. One factor in
this war of nerves is to boost the increase of armaments. But what are the real
facts about British rearmament? The naval construction program for 1938 has not
yet been completed. Only the reserve fleet has been mobilized.
Purchase of trawlers. No substantial strengthening of the Navy before 1941
or 1942.
Little has been done on land. England will be able to send at most three
divisions to the Continent. A little has been done for the Air Force, but only
a beginning. Anti-aircraft defense is in its initial stages. At the moment
England has only 150 anti-aircraft guns. The new anti-aircraft gun has been
ordered. It will take a long time before sufficient numbers have been produced.
There is a shortage of anti-aircraft warning devices. England is still
vulnerable from the air.
This can change in two or three years. At the moment the English Air Force
has only 130,000 men, France 72,000, Poland 15,000. England does not want the
conflict to break out for two or three years.
The following is typical for England. Poland wanted a loan from England for
her rearmament. England, however, only granted credits in order to make sure
that Poland buy in England, although England cannot make deliveries. This
suggests that England does not really want to support Poland. She is not
risking eight million pounds in Poland, although she poured five hundred
million into China. England’s position in the world is too precarious. She will
not take any risks.
France is short of men (decline in the birth rate). Little has been done
for rearmament. The artillery is obsolete. France did not want to embark on
this adventure. The West has only two possibilities for fighting against us:
1. Blockade: It will not be effective because of our autarky and because we
have sources of supply in Eastern Europe.
2. Attack in the West from the Maginot line: I consider this impossible.
Another possibility would be the violation of Dutch, Belgian and Swiss
neutrality. I have no doubt that all these States, as well as Scandinavia, will
defend their neutrality with all available means. England and France will not
violate the neutrality of these countries. Thus in actual fact England cannot help
Poland. There still remains an attack on Italy. Military intervention is out of
the question. No one is counting on a long war. If Herr von Brauchitsch had
told me that I would need four years to conquer Poland I would have replied:
“Then it cannot be done.” It is nonsense to say that England wants to wage a
long war. We will hold our position in the West until we have conquered Poland.
We must bear in mind our great production capacity. It is much greater than in
1914–1918.
The enemy had another hope, that Russia would become our enemy after the
conquest of Poland. The enemy did not reckon with my great strength of purpose.
Our enemies are little worms (kleine Wurmchen); I came to know them in
Munich. I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the English offer. Russia
has no interest in preserving Poland, and Stalin knows that it would mean the
end of his regime, no matter whether his soldiers emerged from a war victorious
or vanquished. Litvinov’s replacement was decisive. I brought about the change
towards Russia gradually. In connection with the commercial treaty we got into
political conversations. Proposal for a non-aggression pact. Then came a
comprehensive proposal from Russia. Four days ago I took a special step, which
led to Russia replying yesterday that she is prepared to sign. Personal contact
to Stalin is established. The day after tomorrow von Ribbentrop will conclude
the treaty.
Now Poland is in the position in which I wanted her.
We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain,
cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a mighty aim, which demands great efforts. I
am only afraid that at the last moment some cur (Schweinehund) or other
will yet submit to me a plan for mediation.
The political objective goes further. A start has been made on the
destruction of England’s hegemony. The way will be open for the soldiers after
I have made the political preparations.
Today’s announcement of the non-aggression pact with Russia came as a
bombshell. The consequences cannot be foreseen. Stalin also said that this
course will benefit both countries. The effect on Poland will be tremendous.
ReplyDeleteDie Wahrheit siegt aber sie kann nur siegen wenn sie gesagt wird
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