By John Wear
Published: 2019-01-14
Great
Britain’s Blank Check to Poland
On March 21,
1939, while hosting French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier, British Prime
Minister Neville Chamberlain discussed a joint front with France, Russia and
Poland to act together against German aggression. France agreed at once, and
the Russians agreed on the condition that both France and Poland sign first.
However, Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck vetoed the agreement on March 24,
1939.[1] Polish statesmen feared Russia more than they
did Germany. Polish Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz told the French ambassador,
“With the Germans we risk losing our liberty; with the Russians we lose our
soul.”[2]
Another complication arose in European diplomacy when a movement among the
residents of Memel in Lithuania sought to join Germany. The Allied victors in
the Versailles Treaty had detached Memel from East Prussia and placed it in a
separate League of Nations protectorate. Lithuania then proceeded to seize
Memel from the League of Nations shortly after World War I. Memel was
historically a German city which in the seven centuries of its history had
never separated from its East Prussian homeland. Germany was so weak after
World War I that it could not prevent the tiny new-born nation of Lithuania
from seizing Memel.[3]
Germany’s occupation of Prague in March 1939 had generated uncontrollable
excitement among the mostly German population of Memel. The population of Memel
was clamoring to return to Germany and could no longer be restrained. The
Lithuanian foreign minister traveled to Berlin on March 22, 1939, where he
agreed to the immediate transfer of Memel to Germany. The annexation of Memel
into Germany went through the next day. The question of Memel exploded of
itself without any deliberate German plan of annexation.[4]
Polish leaders agreed that the return of Memel to Germany from Lithuania would
not constitute an issue of conflict between Germany and Poland.[5]
What did cause conflict between Germany and Poland was the so-called Free
City of Danzig. Danzig was founded in the early 14th century and was
historically the key port at the mouth of the great Vistula River. From the
beginning Danzig was inhabited almost exclusively by Germans, with the Polish
minority in 1922 constituting less than 3% of the city’s 365,000 inhabitants.
The Treaty of Versailles converted Danzig from a German provincial capital into
a League of Nations protectorate subject to numerous strictures established for
the benefit of Poland. The great preponderance of the citizens of Danzig had
never wanted to leave Germany, and they were eager to return to Germany in
1939. Their eagerness to join Germany was exacerbated by the fact that
Germany’s economy was healthy while Poland’s economy was still mired in
depression.[6]
Many of the German citizens of Danzig had consistently demonstrated their
unwavering loyalty to National Socialism and its principles. They had even
elected a National Socialist parliamentary majority before this result had been
achieved in Germany. It was widely known that Poland was constantly seeking to
increase her control over Danzig despite the wishes of Danzig’s German
majority. Hitler was not opposed to Poland’s further economic aspirations at
Danzig, but Hitler was resolved never to permit the establishment of a Polish
political regime at Danzig. Such a renunciation of Danzig by Hitler would have
been a repudiation of the loyalty of Danzig citizens to the Third Reich and
their spirit of self-determination.[7]
Germany presented a proposal for a comprehensive settlement of the Danzig
question with Poland on October 24, 1938. Hitler’s plan would allow Germany to
annex Danzig and construct a superhighway and a railroad to East Prussia. In
return Poland would be granted a permanent free port in Danzig and the right to
build her own highway and railroad to the port. The entire Danzig area would also
become a permanent free market for Polish goods on which no German customs
duties would be levied. Germany would take the unprecedented step of
recognizing and guaranteeing the existing German-Polish frontier, including the
boundary in Upper Silesia established in 1922. This later provision was
extremely important since the Versailles Treaty had given Poland much
additional territory which Germany proposed to renounce. Hitler’s offer to
guarantee Poland’s frontiers also carried with it a degree of military security
that no other non-Communist nation could match.[8]
Germany’s proposed settlement with Poland was far less favorable to Germany
than the Thirteenth Point of Wilson’s program at Versailles. The Versailles
Treaty gave Poland large slices of territory in regions such as West Prussia
and Western Posen which were overwhelmingly German. The richest industrial
section of Upper Silesia was also later given to Poland despite the fact that
Poland had lost the plebiscite there.[9] Germany was
willing to renounce these territories in the interest of German-Polish
cooperation. This concession of Hitler’s was more than adequate to compensate
for the German annexation of Danzig and construction of a superhighway and a
railroad in the Corridor. The Polish diplomats themselves believed that
Germany’s proposal was a sincere and realistic basis for a permanent agreement.[10]
On March 26, 1939, the Polish Ambassador to Berlin, Joseph Lipski, formally
rejected Germany’s settlement proposals. The Poles had waited over five months
to reject Germany’s proposals, and they refused to countenance any change in
existing conditions. Lipski stated to German Foreign Minister Joachim von
Ribbentrop that “it was his painful duty to draw attention to the fact that any
further pursuance of these German plans, especially where the return of Danzig
to the Reich was concerned, meant war with Poland.”[11]
Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck accepted an offer from Great Britain on
March 30, 1939, to give an unconditional guarantee of Poland’s independence.
The British Empire agreed to go to war as an ally of Poland if the Poles
decided that war was necessary. In words drafted by British Foreign Secretary
Lord Halifax, Chamberlain spoke in the House of Commons on March 31, 1939:
I now have to inform the
House…that in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish
independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to
resist with their national forces, His Majesty’s Government would feel
themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their
power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to that effect.[12]
Great Britain for the first time in history had left the decision whether
or not to fight a war outside of her own country to another nation. Britain’s
guarantee to Poland was binding without commitments from the Polish side. The
British public was astonished by this move. Despite its unprecedented nature,
Halifax encountered little difficulty in persuading the British Conservative,
Liberal and Labor parties to accept Great Britain’s unconditional guarantee to
Poland.[13]
Numerous British historians and diplomats have criticized Britain’s
unilateral guarantee of Poland. For example, British diplomat Roy Denman called
the war guarantee to Poland “the most reckless undertaking ever given by a
British government. It placed the decision on peace or war in Europe in the
hands of a reckless, intransigent, swashbuckling military dictatorship.”[14] British historian Niall Ferguson states that the war
guarantee to Poland tied Britain’s “destiny to that of a regime that was every
bit as undemocratic and anti-Semitic as that of Germany.”[15]
English military historian Liddell Hart stated that the Polish guarantee
“placed Britain’s destiny in the hands of Poland’s rulers, men of very dubious
and unstable judgment. Moreover, the guarantee was impossible to fulfill except
with Russia’s help.…”[16]
American historian Richard M. Watt writes concerning Britain’s unilateral
guarantee to Poland: “This enormously broad guarantee virtually left to the
Poles the decision whether or not Britain would go to war. For Britain to give
such a blank check to a Central European nation, particularly to Poland—a
nation that Britain had generally regarded as irresponsible and greedy—was
mind-boggling.”[17]
When the Belgian Minister to Germany, Vicomte Jacques Davignon, received
the text of the British guarantee to Poland, he exclaimed that “blank check”
was the only possible description of the British pledge. Davignon was extremely
alarmed in view of the proverbial recklessness of the Poles. German State
Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker attempted to reassure Davignon by claiming that
the situation between Germany and Poland was not tragic. However, Davignon correctly
feared that the British move would produce war in a very short time.[18]
Weizsäcker later exclaimed scornfully that “the British guarantee to Poland
was like offering sugar to an untrained child before it had learned to listen
to reason!”[19]
The
Deterioration of German-Polish Relations
German-Polish relationships had become strained by the increasing harshness
with which the Polish authorities handled the German minority. The Polish
government in the 1930s began to confiscate the land of its German minority at
bargain prices through public expropriation. The German government resented the
fact that German landowners received only one-eighth of the value of their
holdings from the Polish government. Since the Polish public was aware of the
German situation and desired to exploit it, the German minority in Poland could
not sell the land in advance of expropriation. Furthermore, Polish law forbade
Germans from privately selling large areas of land.
German diplomats insisted that the November 1937 Minorities Pact with
Poland for the equal treatment of German and Polish landowners be observed in
1939. Despite Polish assurances of fairness and equal treatment, German
diplomats learned on February 15, 1939, that the latest expropriations of land
in Poland were predominantly of German holdings. These expropriations virtually
eliminated substantial German landholdings in Poland at a time when most of the
larger Polish landholdings were still intact. It became evident that nothing
could be done diplomatically to help the German minority in Poland.[20]
Poland threatened Germany with a partial mobilization of her forces on
March 23, 1939. Hundreds of thousands of Polish Army reservists were mobilized,
and Hitler was warned that Poland would fight to prevent the return of Danzig
to Germany. The Poles were surprised to discover that Germany did not take this
challenge seriously. Hitler, who deeply desired friendship with Poland,
refrained from responding to the Polish threat of war. Germany did not threaten
Poland and took no precautionary military measures in response to the Polish
partial mobilization.[21]
Hitler regarded a German-Polish agreement as a highly welcome alternative
to a German-Polish war. However, no further negotiations for a German-Polish
agreement occurred after the British guarantee to Poland because Józef Beck
refused to negotiate. Beck ignored repeated German suggestions for further
negotiations because Beck knew that Halifax hoped to accomplish the complete
destruction of Germany. Halifax had considered an Anglo-German war inevitable
since 1936, and Britain’s anti-German policy was made public with a speech by
Neville Chamberlain on March 17, 1939. Halifax discouraged German-Polish
negotiations because he was counting on Poland to provide the pretext for a
British pre-emptive war against Germany.[22]
The situation between Germany and Poland deteriorated rapidly during the
six weeks from the Polish partial mobilization of March 23, 1939, to a speech
delivered by Józef Beck on May 5, 1939. Beck’s primary purpose in delivering
his speech before the Sejm, the lower house of the Polish parliament, was to
convince the Polish public and the world that he was able and willing to
challenge Hitler. Beck knew that Halifax had succeeded in creating a warlike
atmosphere in Great Britain, and that he could go as far as he wanted without
displeasing the British. Beck took an uncompromising attitude in his speech
that effectively closed the door to further negotiations with Germany.
Beck made numerous false and hypocritical statements in his speech. One of
the most astonishing claims in his speech was that there was nothing
extraordinary about the British guarantee to Poland. He described it as a
normal step in the pursuit of friendly relations with a neighboring country.
This was in sharp contrast to British diplomat Sir Alexander Cadogan’s
statement to Joseph Kennedy that Britain’s guarantee to Poland was without
precedent in the entire history of British foreign policy.[23]
Beck ended his speech with a stirring climax that produced wild excitement
in the Polish Sejm. Someone in the audience screamed loudly, “We do not need
peace!” and pandemonium followed. Beck had made many Poles in the audience
determined to fight Germany. This feeling resulted from their ignorance which
made it impossible for them to criticize the numerous falsehoods and
misstatements in Beck’s speech. Beck made the audience feel that Hitler had
insulted the honor of Poland with what were actually quite reasonable peace
proposals. Beck had effectively made Germany the deadly enemy of Poland.[24]
More than 1 million ethnic Germans resided in Poland at the time of Beck’s
speech, and these Germans were the principal victims of the German-Polish
crisis in the coming weeks. The Germans in Poland were subjected to increasing
doses of violence from the dominant Poles. The British public was told
repeatedly that the grievances of the German minority in Poland were largely
imaginary. The average British citizen was completely unaware of the terror and
fear of death that stalked these Germans in Poland. Ultimately, many thousands
of Germans in Poland died in consequence of the crisis. They were among the
first victims of British Foreign Secretary Halifax’s war policy against
Germany.[25]
The immediate responsibility for security measures involving the German minority
in Poland rested with Interior Department Ministerial Director Waclaw Zyborski.
Zyborski consented to discuss the situation on June 23, 1939, with Walther
Kohnert, one of the leaders of the German minority at Bromberg. Zyborski
admitted to Kohnert that the Germans of Poland were in an unenviable situation,
but he was not sympathetic to their plight. Zyborski ended their lengthy
conversation by stating frankly that his policy required a severe treatment of
the German minority in Poland. He made it clear that it was impossible for the
Germans of Poland to alleviate their hard fate. The Germans in Poland were the
helpless hostages of the Polish community and the Polish state.[26]
Other leaders of the German minority in Poland repeatedly appealed to the
Polish government for help during this period. Sen. Hans Hasbach, the leader of
the conservative German minority faction, and Dr. Rudolf Wiesner, the leader of
the Young German Party, each made multiple appeals to Poland’s government to
end the violence. In a futile appeal on July 6, 1939, to Premier
Sławoj-Składkowski, head of Poland’s Department of Interior, Wiesner referred
to the waves of public violence against the Germans at Tomaszów near Lódz, May
13-15th, at Konstantynów, May 21-22nd, and at Pabianice,
June 22-23, 1939. The appeal of Wiesner produced no results. The leaders of the
German political groups eventually recognized that they had no influence with
Polish authorities despite their loyal attitudes toward Poland. It was “open
season” on the Germans of Poland with the approval of the Polish government.[27]
Polish anti-German incidents also occurred against the German majority in
the Free City of Danzig. On May 21, 1939, Zygmunt Morawski, a former Polish
soldier, murdered a German at Kalthof on Danzig territory. The incident itself
would not have been so unusual except for the fact that Polish officials acted
as if Poland and not the League of Nations had sovereign power over Danzig.
Polish officials refused to apologize for the incident, and they treated with
contempt the effort of Danzig authorities to bring Morawski to trial. The Poles
in Danzig considered themselves above the law.[28]
Tension steadily mounted at Danzig after the Morawski murder. The German
citizens of Danzig were convinced that Poland would show them no mercy if
Poland gained the upper hand. The Poles were furious when they learned that
Danzig was defying Poland by organizing its own militia for home defense. The
Poles blamed Hitler for this situation. The Polish government protested to
German Ambassador Hans von Moltke on July 1, 1939, about the Danzig
government’s military-defense measures. Józef Beck told French Ambassador Léon
Noël on July 6, 1939, that the Polish government had decided that additional
measures were necessary to meet the alleged threat from Danzig.[29]
On July 29, 1939, the Danzig government presented two protest notes to the
Poles concerning illegal activities of Polish custom inspectors and frontier
officials. The Polish government responded by terminating the export of
duty-free herring and margarine from Danzig to Poland. Polish officials next
announced in the early hours of August 5, 1939, that the frontiers of Danzig
would be closed to the importation of all foreign food products unless the Danzig
government promised by the end of the day never to interfere with the
activities of Polish customs inspectors. This threat was formidable since
Danzig produced only a relatively small portion of its own food. All Polish
customs inspectors would also bear arms while performing their duty after
August 5, 1939. The Polish ultimatum made it obvious that Poland intended to
replace the League of Nations as the sovereign power at Danzig.[30]
Hitler concluded that Poland was seeking to provoke an immediate conflict
with Germany. The Danzig government submitted to the Polish ultimatum in
accordance with Hitler’s recommendation.[31]
Józef Beck explained to British Ambassador Kennard that the Polish
government was prepared to take military measures against Danzig if it failed
to accept Poland’s terms. The citizens of Danzig were convinced that Poland
would have executed a full military occupation of Danzig had the Polish
ultimatum been rejected. It was apparent to the German government that the
British and French were either unable or unwilling to restrain the Polish
government from arbitrary steps that could result in war.[32]
On August 7, 1939, the Polish censors permitted the newspaper Illustrowany
Kuryer Codzienny in Kraków to feature an article of unprecedented
candor. The article stated that Polish units were constantly crossing the
German frontier to destroy German military installations and to carry captured
German military materiel into Poland. The Polish government failed to prevent
the newspaper, which had the largest circulation in Poland, from telling the
world that Poland was instigating a series of violations of Germany’s frontier
with Poland.[33]
Polish Ambassador Jerzy Potocki unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Józef
Beck to seek an agreement with Germany. Potocki later succinctly explained the
situation in Poland by stating “Poland prefers Danzig to peace.”[34]
President Roosevelt knew that Poland had caused the crisis which began at
Danzig, and he was worried that the American public might learn the truth about
the situation. This could be a decisive factor in discouraging Roosevelt’s plan
for American military intervention in Europe. Roosevelt instructed U.S.
Ambassador Biddle to urge the Poles to be more careful in making it appear that
German moves were responsible for any inevitable explosion at Danzig. Biddle
reported to Roosevelt on August 11, 1939, that Beck expressed no interest in
engaging in a series of elaborate but empty maneuvers designed to deceive the
American public. Beck stated that at the moment he was content to have full
British support for his policy.[35]
Roosevelt also feared that American politicians might discover the facts
about the hopeless dilemma which Poland’s provocative policy created for
Germany. When American Democratic Party Campaign Manager and Post-Master
General James Farley visited Berlin, Roosevelt instructed the American Embassy
in Berlin to prevent unsupervised contact between Farley and the German
leaders. The German Foreign Office concluded on August 10, 1939 that it was
impossible to penetrate the wall of security around Farley. The Germans knew
that President Roosevelt was determined to prevent them from freely
communicating with visiting American leaders.[36]
Polish
Atrocities Force War
On August 14, 1939, the Polish authorities in East Upper Silesia launched a
campaign of mass arrests against the German minority. The Poles then proceeded
to close and confiscate the remaining German businesses, clubs and welfare
installations. The arrested Germans were forced to march toward the interior of
Poland in prisoner columns. The various German groups in Poland were frantic by
this time; they feared the Poles would attempt the total extermination of the
German minority in the event of war. Thousands of Germans were seeking to
escape arrest by crossing the border into Germany. Some of the worst recent
Polish atrocities included the mutilation of several Germans. The Polish public
was urged not to regard their German minority as helpless hostages who could be
butchered with impunity.[37]
Rudolf Wiesner, who was the most prominent of the German minority leaders
in Poland, spoke of a disaster “of inconceivable magnitude” since the early
months of 1939. Wiesner claimed that the last Germans had been dismissed from
their jobs without the benefit of unemployment relief, and that hunger and
privation were stamped on the faces of the Germans in Poland. German welfare
agencies, cooperatives and trade associations had been closed by Polish
authorities. Exceptional martial-law conditions of the earlier frontier zone
had been extended to include more than one-third of the territory of Poland.
The mass arrests, deportations, mutilations and beatings of the last few weeks
in Poland surpassed anything that had happened before. Wiesner insisted that
the German minority leaders merely desired the restoration of peace, the
banishment of the specter of war, and the right to live and work in peace.
Wiesner was arrested by the Poles on August 16, 1939 on suspicion of conducting
espionage for Germany in Poland.[38]
The German press devoted increasing space to detailed accounts of
atrocities against the Germans in Poland. The Völkischer Beobachter
reported that more than 80,000 German refugees from Poland had succeeded in
reaching German territory by August 20, 1939. The German Foreign Office had
received a huge file of specific reports of excesses against national and
ethnic Germans in Poland. More than 1,500 documented reports had been received
since March 1939, and more than 10 detailed reports were arriving in the German
Foreign Office each day. The reports presented a staggering picture of
brutality and human misery.[39]
W. L. White, an American journalist, later recalled that there was no doubt
among well-informed people by this time that horrible atrocities were being
inflicted every day on the Germans of Poland.[40]
Donald Day, a Chicago Tribune correspondent, reported on the
atrocious treatment the Poles had meted out to the ethnic Germans in Poland:
…I traveled up to the Polish
corridor where the German authorities permitted me to interview the German
refugees from many Polish cities and towns. The story was the same. Mass
arrests and long marches along roads toward the interior of Poland. The
railroads were crowded with troop movements. Those who fell by the wayside were
shot. The Polish authorities seemed to have gone mad. I have been questioning
people all my life and I think I know how to make deductions from the
exaggerated stories told by people who have passed through harrowing personal
experiences. But even with generous allowance, the situation was plenty bad. To
me the war seemed only a question of hours.[41]
British Ambassador Nevile Henderson in Berlin was concentrating on
obtaining recognition from Halifax of the cruel fate of the German minority in
Poland. Henderson emphatically warned Halifax on August 24, 1939, that German
complaints about the treatment of the German minority in Poland were fully
supported by the facts. Henderson knew that the Germans were prepared to
negotiate, and he stated to Halifax that war between Poland and Germany was
inevitable unless negotiations were resumed between the two countries.
Henderson pleaded with Halifax that it would be contrary to Polish interests to
attempt a full military occupation of Danzig, and he added a scathingly
effective denunciation of Polish policy. What Henderson failed to realize is
that Halifax was pursuing war for its own sake as an instrument of policy.
Halifax desired the complete destruction of Germany.[42]
On August 25, 1939, Ambassador Henderson reported to Halifax the latest
Polish atrocity at Bielitz, Upper Silesia. Henderson never relied on official
German statements concerning these incidents, but instead based his reports on
information he received from neutral sources. The Poles continued to forcibly
deport the Germans of that area, and compelled them to march into the interior
of Poland. Eight Germans were murdered and many more were injured during one of
these actions.
Hitler was faced with a terrible dilemma. If Hitler did nothing, the
Germans of Poland and Danzig would be abandoned to the cruelty and violence of
a hostile Poland. If Hitler took effective action against the Poles, the
British and French might declare war against Germany. Henderson feared that the
Bielitz atrocity would be the final straw to prompt Hitler to invade Poland.
Henderson, who strongly desired peace with Germany, deplored the failure of the
British government to exercise restraint over the Polish authorities.[43]
On August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union entered into the
Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. This non-aggression pact contained a secret
protocol which recognized a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.
German recognition of this Soviet sphere of influence would not apply in the
event of a diplomatic settlement of the German-Polish dispute. Hitler had hoped
to recover the diplomatic initiative through the Molotov-Ribbentrop
nonaggression pact. However, Chamberlain warned Hitler in a letter dated August
23, 1939, that Great Britain would support Poland with military force
regardless of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. Józef Beck also continued to
refuse to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Germany.[44]
Germany made a new offer to Poland on August 29, 1939, for a last
diplomatic campaign to settle the German-Polish dispute. The terms of a new
German plan for a settlement, the so-called Marienwerder proposals, were less
important than the offer to negotiate as such. The terms of the Marienwerder
proposals were intended as nothing more than a tentative German plan for a
possible settlement. The German government emphasized that these terms were formulated
to offer a basis for unimpeded negotiations between equals rather than
constituting a series of demands which Poland would be required to accept.
There was nothing to prevent the Poles from offering an entirely new set of
proposals of their own.
The Germans, in offering to negotiate with Poland, were indicating that
they favored a diplomatic settlement over war with Poland. The willingness of
the Poles to negotiate would not in any way have implied a Polish retreat or
their readiness to recognize the German annexation of Danzig. The Poles could
have justified their acceptance to negotiate with the announcement that
Germany, and not Poland, had found it necessary to request new negotiations. In
refusing to negotiate, the Poles were announcing that they favored war. The
refusal of British Foreign Secretary Halifax to encourage the Poles to
negotiate indicated that he also favored war.[45]
French Prime Minister Daladier and British Prime Minister Chamberlain were
both privately critical of the Polish government. Daladier in private denounced
the “criminal folly” of the Poles. Chamberlain admitted to Ambassador Joseph
Kennedy that it was the Poles, and not the Germans, who were unreasonable.
Kennedy reported to President Roosevelt, “frankly he [Chamberlain] is more
worried about getting the Poles to be reasonable than the Germans.” However,
neither Daladier nor Chamberlain made any effort to influence the Poles to
negotiate with the Germans.[46]
On August 29, 1939, the Polish government decided upon the general
mobilization of its army. The Polish military plans stipulated that general
mobilization would be ordered only in the event of Poland’s decision for war.
Henderson informed Halifax of some of the verified Polish violations prior to
the war. The Poles blew up the Dirschau (Tczew) bridge across the Vistula River
even though the eastern approach to the bridge was in German territory (East
Prussia). The Poles also occupied a number of Danzig installations and engaged
in fighting with the citizens of Danzig on the same day. Henderson reported
that Hitler was not insisting on the total military defeat of Poland. Hitler
was prepared to terminate hostilities if the Poles indicated that they were
willing to negotiate a satisfactory settlement.[47]
Germany decided to invade Poland on September 1, 1939. All of the British
leaders claimed that the entire responsibility for starting the war was
Hitler’s. Prime Minister Chamberlain broadcast that evening on British radio
that “the responsibility for this terrible catastrophe (war in Poland) lies on
the shoulders of one man, the German Chancellor.” Chamberlain claimed that
Hitler had ordered Poland to come to Berlin with the unconditional obligation
of accepting without discussion the exact German terms. Chamberlain denied that
Germany had invited the Poles to engage in normal negotiations. Chamberlain’s
statements were unvarnished lies, but the Polish case was so weak that it was
impossible to defend it with the truth.
Halifax also delivered a cleverly hypocritical speech to the House of Lords
on the evening of September 1, 1939. Halifax claimed that the best proof of the
British will to peace was to have Chamberlain, the great appeasement leader,
carry Great Britain into war. Halifax concealed the fact that he had taken over
the direction of British foreign policy from Chamberlain in October 1938, and
that Great Britain would probably not be moving into war had this not happened.
He assured his audience that Hitler, before the bar of history, would have to
assume full responsibility for starting the war. Halifax insisted that the
English conscience was clear, and that, in looking back, he did not wish to
change a thing as far as British policy was concerned.[48]
On September 2, 1939, Italy and Germany agreed to hold a mediation
conference among themselves and Great Britain, France and Poland. Halifax
attempted to destroy the conference plan by insisting that Germany withdraw her
forces from Poland and Danzig before Great Britain and France would consider attending
the mediation conference. French Foreign Minister Bonnet knew that no nation
would accept such treatment, and that the attitude of Halifax was unreasonable
and unrealistic.
Ultimately, the mediation effort collapsed, and both Great Britain and France
declared war against Germany on September 3, 1939. When Hitler read the British
declaration of war against Germany, he paused and asked of no one in
particular: “What now?”[49] Germany was now in an
unnecessary war with three European nations.
Similar to the other British leaders, Nevile Henderson, the British
ambassador to Germany, later claimed that the entire responsibility for
starting the war was Hitler’s. Henderson wrote in his memoirs in 1940: “If
Hitler wanted peace he knew how to insure it; if he wanted war, he knew equally
well what would bring it about. The choice lay with him, and in the end the
entire responsibility for war was his.”[50] Henderson
forgot in this passage that he had repeatedly warned Halifax that the Polish
atrocities against the German minority in Poland were extreme. Hitler invaded
Poland in order to end these atrocities.
Polish
Atrocities Continue against German Minority
The Germans in Poland continued to experience an atmosphere of terror in
the early part of September 1939. Throughout the country the Germans had been
told, “If war comes to Poland you will all be hanged.” This prophecy was later
fulfilled in many cases.
The famous Bloody Sunday in Toruń on September 3, 1939, was accompanied by
similar massacres elsewhere in Poland. These massacres brought a tragic end to
the long suffering of many ethnic Germans. This catastrophe had been
anticipated by the Germans before the outbreak of war, as reflected by the
flight, or attempted escape, of large numbers of Germans from Poland. The
feelings of these Germans were revealed by the desperate slogan, “Away from
this hell, and back to the Reich!”[51]
Dr. Alfred-Maurice de Zayas writes concerning the ethnic Germans in Poland:
The first victims of the war
were Volksdeutsche, ethnic German civilians resident in and citizens of Poland.
Using lists prepared years earlier, in part by lower administrative offices,
Poland immediately deported 15,000 Germans to Eastern Poland. Fear and rage at
the quick German victories led to hysteria. German “spies” were seen
everywhere, suspected of forming a fifth column. More than 5,000 German
civilians were murdered in the first days of the war. They were hostages and
scapegoats at the same time. Gruesome scenes were played out in Bromberg on
September 3, as well as in several other places throughout the province of
Posen, in Pommerellen, wherever German minorities resided.[52]
Polish atrocities against ethnic Germans have been documented in the book Polish
Acts of Atrocity against the German Minority in Poland. Most of the outside
world dismissed this book as nothing more than propaganda used to justify
Hitler’s invasion of Poland. However, skeptics failed to notice that forensic
pathologists from the International Red Cross and medical and legal observers
from the United States verified the findings of these investigations of Polish
war crimes. These investigations were also conducted by German police and civil
administrations, and not the National Socialist Party or the German military.
Moreover, both anti-German and other university-trained researchers have
acknowledged that the charges in the book are based entirely on factual
evidence.[53]
The book Polish Acts of Atrocity against the German Minority in Poland stated:
When the first edition of this
collection of documents went to press on November 17, 1939, 5,437 cases of
murder committed by soldiers of the Polish army and by Polish civilians against
men, women and children of the German minority had been definitely ascertained.
It was known that the total when fully ascertained would be very much higher.
Between that date and February 1, 1940, the number of identified victims
mounted to 12,857. At the present stage investigations disclose that in
addition to these 12,857, more than 45,000 persons are still missing. Since
there is no trace of them, they must also be considered victims of the Polish
terror. Even the figure 58,000 is not final. There can be no doubt that the
inquiries now being carried out will result in the disclosure of additional
thousands dead and missing.[54]
Medical examinations of the dead showed that Germans of all ages, from four
months to 82 years of age, were murdered. The report concluded:
It was shown that the murders
were committed with the greatest brutality and that in many cases they were
purely sadistic acts—that gouging of eyes was established and that other forms
of mutilation, as supported by the depositions of witnesses, may be considered
as true.
The method by which the
individual murders were committed in many cases reveals studied physical and
mental torture; in this connection several cases of killing extended over many
hours and of slow death due to neglect had to be mentioned.
By far the most important
finding seems to be the proof that murder by such chance weapons as clubs or
knives was the exception, and that as a rule modern, highly-effective army
rifles and pistols were available to the murderers. It must be emphasized
further that it was possible to show, down to the minutest detail, that there
could have been no possibility of execution (under military law).[55]
The Polish atrocities were not acts of personal revenge, professional
jealously or class hatred; instead, they were a concerted political action.
They were organized mass murders caused by a psychosis of political animosity.
The hate-inspired urge to destroy everything German was driven by the Polish
press, radio, school and government propaganda. Britain’s blank check of
support had encouraged Poland to conduct inhuman atrocities against its German
minority.[56]
The book Polish Acts of Atrocity against the German Minority in Poland
explained why the Polish government encouraged such atrocities:
The guarantee of assistance
given Poland by the British Government was the agent which lent impetus to
Britain’s policy of encirclement. It was designed to exploit the problem of
Danzig and the Corridor to begin a war, desired and long-prepared by England,
for the annihilation of Greater Germany. In Warsaw moderation was no longer
considered necessary, and the opinion held was that matters could be safely
brought to a head. England was backing this diabolical game, having guaranteed
the “integrity” of the Polish state. The British assurance of assistance meant
that Poland was to be the battering ram of Germany’s enemies. Henceforth Poland
neglected no form of provocation of Germany and, in its blindness, dreamt of
“victorious battle at Berlin’s gates.” Had it not been for the encouragement of
the English war clique, which was stiffening Poland’s attitude toward the Reich
and whose promises led Warsaw to feel safe, the Polish Government would hardly
have let matters develop to the point where Polish soldiers and civilians would
eventually interpret the slogan to extirpate all German influence as an
incitement to the murder and bestial mutilation of human beings.[57]
ENDNOTES
[1] Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1961, p. 207.
[2] DeConde, Alexander, A History of American Foreign Policy, New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971, p. 576.
[3] Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed,
Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, pp. 25, 312.
[4] Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1961, p. 209.
[5] Hoggan, David L., The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed,
Costa Mesa, Cal: Institute for Historical Review, 1989, p. 50.
[6] Ibid., pp. 49-60.
[7] Ibid., pp. 328-329.
[8] Ibid., pp. 145-146.
[9] Ibid., p. 21.
[10] Ibid., pp. 21,
256-257.
[11] Ibid., p. 323.
[12] Barnett, Correlli, The
Collapse of British Power, New York: William Morrow, 1972, p. 560; see also
Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1961, p. 211.
[13] Hoggan, David L., The
Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for
Historical Review, 1989, pp. 333, 340.
[14] Denman, Roy, Missed
Chances: Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century, London: Indigo, 1997,
p. 121.
[15] Ferguson, Niall, The War
of the World: Twentieth Century Conflict and the Descent of the West, New
York: Penguin Press, 2006, p. 377.
[16] Hart, B. H. Liddell, History
of the Second World War, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1970, p. 11.
[17] Watt, Richard M., Bitter
Glory: Poland and Its Fate 1918 to 1939, New York: Simon and Schuster,
1979, p. 379.
[18] Hoggan, David L., The
Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal: Institute for
Historical Review, 1989, p. 342.
[19] Ibid., p. 391.
[20] Ibid., pp. 260-262.
[21] Ibid., pp. 311-312.
[22] Ibid., pp. 355, 357.
[23] Ibid., pp. 381, 383.
[24] Ibid., pp. 384, 387.
[25] Ibid., p. 387.
[26] Ibid., pp. 388-389.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid., pp. 392-393.
[29] Ibid., pp. 405-406.
[30] Ibid., p. 412.
[31] Ibid. p. 413.
[32] Ibid., pp. 413-415.
[33] Ibid. p. 419. In a
footnote, the author notes that a report of the same matters appeared in the New
York Times for August 8, 1939.
[34] Ibid., p. 419.
[35] Ibid., p. 414.
[36] Ibid., p. 417.
[37] Ibid., pp. 452-453.
[38] Ibid., p. 463.
[39] Ibid., p. 479.
[40] Ibid., p. 554.
[41] Day, Donald, Onward
Christian Soldiers, Newport Beach, Cal.: The Noontide Press, 2002, p. 56.
[42] Hoggan, David L., The
Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for
Historical Review, 1989, pp. 500-501, 550.
[43] Ibid., p. 509
[44] Ibid., pp. 470, 483,
538.
[45] Ibid., pp. 513-514.
[46] Ibid., pp. 441, 549.
[47] Ibid., pp. 537, 577.
[48] Ibid., pp. 578-579.
[49] Ibid., pp. 586, 593,
598.
[50] Henderson, Nevile, Failure
of a Mission, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1940, p. 227.
[51] Hoggan, David L., The
Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed, Costa Mesa, Cal.: Institute for
Historical Review, 1989, p. 390.
[52] De Zayas, Alfred-Maurice, A
Terrible Revenge: The Ethnic Cleansing of the East European Germans, 2nd
edition, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 27.
[53] Roland, Marc, “Poland’s
Censored Holocaust,” The Barnes Review in Review: 2008-2010, pp. 132-133.
[54] Shadewalt, Hans, Polish
Acts of Atrocity against the German Minority in Poland, Berlin and New
York: German Library of Information, 2nd edition, 1940, p. 19.
[55] Ibid., pp. 257-258.
[56] Ibid., pp. 88-89.
[57] Ibid., pp. 75-76.
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