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The Führer’s Proclamation to the German People
People of
Germany,
National
Socialists,
After months of
grave care, throughout which I was constrained to silence, the hour has now come
in which I can at last speak frankly.
When on 3 September
1939 the German Reich received Britain’s declaration of war, this was a further
repetition of Britain’s earlier attempts to frustrate at the very outset any
plan of consolidation and therefore of progress in Europe by a war directed
against whatever State was the most powerful on the Continent at the time.
Thus it was that
Britain ruined Spain at one time in many wars.
That was how she
waged her wars on Holland.
Thus she
subsequently fought France with the help of the whole of Europe.
And thus, at the
beginning of the century, she commenced the encirclement of the German Reich of
that time, and, in 1914, the Great War.
Only through
internal dissension did Germany succumb in 1918.
The consequences
were terrible.
After they had
declared, as true hypocrites, that they had only fought the Kaiser and his
regime, they set about tire systematic destruction of Germany as soon as the
German Army had laid down its arms. While the prophecies of a French statesman
that there were 20 million Germans too many, i. e. that this number would have
to be exterminated by hunger, disease or emigration, were apparently being
fulfilled to the letter, the National Socialist movement began its work of
unifying the German people and preparing for the resurrection of the Reich.
Our people rose
again from distress, misery and shame and their recovery bore every sign of
internal renascence.
Britain,
especially, was not in any way affected or threatened thereby.
Nevertheless, the
new policy of the encirclement of Germany, born, as it was, of hatred,
recommenced immediately. Internally and externally there resulted that plot,
familiar to all of us, between Jews and democrats, Bolsheviks and reactionaries,
with the sole aim of preventing the establishment of the new German national
people’s state, of plunging the Reich once more into powerlessness and misery.
Apart from us, the
hatred of this international conspiracy was directed against those peoples,
which, not favoured by Fortune, were obliged to earn their daily bread in the
hardest of struggles for existence. Above all, the right of Italy and Japan to
share in the goods of this world was contested just as much as that of Germany;
in fact, it was formally denied. The coalition of these nations was, therefore,
only an act of self-protection in the face of the threat of an egoistic world
combination of wealth and power.
As early as 1936,
Mr Churchill, according to the statements of the American General Wood before a
committee of the American House of Representatives, declared that Germany was
once more becoming too powerful and would, therefore, have to be destroyed.
In the summer of
1939, the time appeared to have come when Britain could embark upon the
destruction of Germany by means of a repetition of a comprehensive policy of
encirclement.
The plan of the
campaign of lies staged for this purpose consisted in declaring that other
peoples were threatened, in tricking them with British promises of guarantees
and assistance and of making them take action against Germany just as during the
Great War. In this way, Britain, from May to August 1939, succeeded in
broadcasting to the world that Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Bessarabia,
and also the Ukraine, were being directly threatened by Germany.
A number of these
states allowed themselves to be misled into accepting the promise of a guarantee
proffered with these assertions, thus joining the new encirclement front
directed against Germany.
In these
circumstances, I considered myself entitled to assume the responsibility before
my own conscience, and before the history of the German people, not only of
assuring these countries or their governments of the falseness of. the British
assertions, but also of setting the strongest Power in the east at rest as to
the limits of our interests by especially solemn declarations.
National
Socialists,
At that time, you
probably all felt that it was a bitter and difficult step for me to take. Never
did the German people harbour hostile feelings for the peoples of Russia. Yet
for over 20 years the Jewish-Bolshevist rulers in Moscow endeavoured to set not
only Germany, but the whole of Europe, aflame. At no time did Germany attempt to
carry her National Socialist ideals and conceptions into Russia, yet the
Jewish-Bolshevist rulers in Moscow unswervingly endeavoured to force their
domination upon us and upon other European peoples, not only by ideological
means but, above all, with military force.
The consequences of
the activity of this regime were nothing but chaos, misery and starvation in all
countries. I, on the other hand, have been striving for twenty years, with a
minimum of intervention and’ without destroying our production, to arrive at a
new socialist order in Germany, which would not only eliminate unemployment but
would also permit the workers to receive an ever greater share of the fruits of
their labour.
The success of this
policy of economic and social reconstruction of our nation, which aims finally
at a true people’s community by systematically eliminating differences of rank
and class, are unique in the entire world.
It was, therefore,
only with extreme difficulty that I brought myself, in August 1939, to send my
Foreign Minister to Moscow in an endeavour there to oppose the British
encirclement policy against Germany. I did this only from a sense of
responsibility towards the German people, but certainly in the hope after all of
achieving a permanent detente and of being able to reduce the sacrifices which
might otherwise have been demanded of us.
While Germany
solemnly affirmed in Moscow that the territories and countries mentioned – with
the exception of Lithuania – lay beyond all German political interests, a
special agreement was concluded in case Britain were to succeed in inciting
Poland actually to go to war with Germany. In this case too, the German claims
were subject to a limitation entirely out of proportion to the capabilities of
the German forces.
National
Socialists,
The consequences of
this treaty, which I myself had desired and which had been concluded in the
interests of the German nation, were very severe indeed, particularly for the
Germans living in the countries concerned.
More than 500 000
German men and women – all of them small farmers, artisans and workmen – were
forced to leave their former homeland practically overnight, in order to escape
from a new regime which from the very first threatened them with boundless
misery and, sooner or later, with complete extermination. Nevertheless,
thousands of Germans disappeared. It was impossible ever to determine their
fate, let alone their whereabouts. Amongst them there were no less than 160 men
of German citizenship.
To all this I
remained silent because I was obliged to. For after all it was my one desire to
achieve a final relief of the tension, and, if possible, a permanent settlement
with that State.
However, even
during our advance in Poland, the Soviet rulers suddenly, contrary to the
treaty, claimed Lithuania also.
The German Reich
never had the intention of occupying Lithuania, and not only did not present any
such demand to the Lithuanian Government but, on the contrary, even refused the
request of the Government then in power in Lithuania that German troops should
be sent there for that purpose, as inconsistent with the aims of German policy.
In spite of all
this, I complied with this fresh Russian demand. However, this was only the
beginning of continually renewed extortions.
The victory in
Poland, which was won by German troops alone, caused me to address yet another
offer of peace to the Western Powers. It was refused, owing to the efforts of
the international and Jewish warmongers.
Even at that
time the reason for such a refusal was to be found in the fact that Britain
still had hopes of being able to mobilize a European coalition against Germany,
which was to include the Balkans and Soviet Russia.
Therefore, the
British Government decided to send Sir Stafford Cripps as ambassador to Moscow.
Fie received clear instructions under all circumstances to resume relations
between Britain and Soviet Russia and to develop them in ä pro-British
direction. The British Press reported on the progress of this mission so long as
tactical reasons did not impose silence upon them.
In the autumn of
1939 and in the spring of 1940 the first results actually made themselves felt.
When Russia undertook to subjugate by armed force not only Finland, but also the
Baltic States, she suddenly saw fit to motivate this action by the assertion,
which was as ridiculous as it was false, that she had to protect these countries
from an outside menace or forestall such an event. This could only be meant to
apply to Germany. For no other Power could ever gain entrance into the Baltic
area, let alone go to war there. Still I had to be silent. However, those in
power in the Kremlin immediately went further.
Whereas, in the
spring of 1940 Germany, in accordance with the so-called Pact of Friendship, had
withdrawn her forces a long way from the eastern frontier and had in fact to a
great extent cleared these territories entirely of German troops, the
concentration of Russian forces at that time was already beginning in a measure
which could only be regarded as a deliberate threat to Germany.
According to a
statement which Mr. Molotov personally made at that time, there were 22 Russian
divisions in the Baltic States alone, as early as the spring of 1940.
Since the Russian
Government themselves always maintained that they were called in by the local
population, the purpose of their presence in that area could therefore only be a
demonstration against Germany.
While our soldiers,
from 10 May 1940 onwards, had been breaking the power of France and Britain in
the West, the Russian military deployment on our eastern frontier was being
continued to a more and more menacing extent.
From August 1940
onwards I therefore considered it to be in the interest of the Reich no longer
to permit our eastern provinces, which moreover had already been laid waste so
often, to remain unprotected in the face of this tremendous concentration of
Bolshevik divisions.
Thus, there was
produced the effect which was the object of British and Soviet Russian
cooperation, namely: the compulsory maintenance of such powerful German
forces in the East that a radical conclusion of the war in the West particularly
as regards aircraft, could no longer be vouched for by the German High Command.
This, however, was
in line with the objects not only of British but also of Soviet-Russian policy;
for both Britain and Soviet Russia intend to let this war go on for as long as
possible in order to weaken the whole of Europe and render it still more
helpless.
Russia’s
threatening attack on Rumania was also primarily for the purpose of gaining
possession of an important centre, not only of Germany’s, but also of Europe’s,
economic life, or, alternatively, at least of destroying it. The Reich,
especially, since 1933 had sought with unending patience to gain the states in
the south-east of Europe as trading partners. We therefore had the greatest
interest in witnessing their internal constitutional consolidation and
organization, Russia’s advance into Rumania and Greece’s connexion with Great
Britain threatened to turn these regions too, within a short time, into a
general theatre of war.
Contrary to our
principles and customs, and at the urgent request of the then Rumanian
Government, who were themselves responsible for this development, I advised
acquiescence to the Soviet Russian demands for the sake of peace, intimating
that Bessarabia should be ceded.
The Rumanian
Government believed, however, that they could not answer for this before their
own people unless Germany and Italy in compensation would at least guarantee the
integrity of what still remained of Rumania.
I did so with a
heavy heart. Principally because, if the German Reich gives a guarantee, then
that means that it abides by it. We are neither Britons nor Jews.
I still believed at
this late hour that I had served the cause of peace in that region, if only by
myself assuming a serious obligation. In order, however, finally to solve these
problems and to achieve clarity concerning the Russian attitude towards Germany,
under the influence also of the continually increasing mobilization on our
eastern frontier, I invited M, Molotov to come to Berlin.
The Soviet Minister
for Foreign Affairs then requested Germany’s clarification of or agreement to
the following four questions:
1. Mr. Molotov’s
question:
Was the German
guarantee for Rumania also directed against Soviet Russia in the case of an
attack by Soviet Russia on Rumania?
My answer:
The German
guarantee is a general one and is unconditionally binding upon us. Russia,
however, had declared to us that she had no other interests in Rumania beyond
Bessarabia. The occupation of Northern Bukovina had already been a violation of
this assurance. I did not, therefore, think that Russia could now suddenly have
more far- reaching intentions against Rumania.
2. Mr. Molotov’s
question:
Russia again felt
menaced by Finland. Russia was determined not to tolerate this. Was Germany
prepared not to give any aid to Finland and, above all, to withdraw the German
relief troops marching through to Kirkenes?
My answer:
Germany continued
to have absolutely no political interests in Finland. A fresh war waged by
Russia against the small Finnish people could not, however, be regarded any
longer by the German Government as tolerable, all the more so as we could never
believe Russia to be threatened by Finland. But we had no desire that another
theatre of war should arise in the Baltic.
3. Mr. Molotov’s
question:
Was Germany
prepared to agree that Russia should give a guarantee to Bulgaria and should
send Soviet Russian troops to Bulgaria for this purpose, whereas he – Molotov –
wished to state that they did not intend on that account, for example, to depose
the King?
My answer:
Bulgaria was a
sovereign state and I had no knowledge that Bulgaria had asked Soviet Russia for
any kind of guarantee as Rumania had asked Germany. Moreover, I would have to
discuss the matter with my allies.
4. Mr. Molotov’s
question:
Soviet Russia
required a free passage through the Dardanelles under all circumstances and for
her protection also demanded the occupation of a number of important bases on
the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Was Germany in agreement with this or riot?
My answer:
Germany was
prepared at all times to agree to an alteration in the Statute of Montreux in
favour of the Black Sea States. Germany was not prepared to agree to Russia’s
possession of bases on the Straits.
National
Socialists,
Here I adopted the
only attitude which I could adopt as the responsible Leader of the Reich, but
also as a conscious representative of European culture and civilization.
The consequence was
an increase in the Soviet Russian activity directed against the Reich, above
all, however, the immediate commencement of the undermining of the new Rumanian
State from within and the attempt to remove the Bulgarian Government by
propaganda.
With the help ofs
confused and immature leaders of the Rumanian Legion a coup d’état was staged in
Rumania, the aim of which was to overthrow the Chief of State, General Antonescu,
and to produce chaos in the country, so as to remove all legal power of
government, and thus the sine qua non for the implementing of the German
guarantee.
I nevertheless
still believed it best to remain silent.
Immediately after
the failure of this undertaking, a renewed reinforcement of the concentrations
of Russian troops on Germany’s eastern frontier took place. Tank units and
parachutists were transferred in continually increasing numbers to a dangerous
proximity to the German frontier. The German Armed Forces and the German nation
know that, until a few weeks ago, not a single German tank or mechanized
division was stationed on our eastern frontier.
Had any final proof
been required for the coalition which had meanwhile been formed between Great
Britain and Soviet Russia in spite of all diversions and camouflage, then it was
provided by the Yugoslav conflict.
Whilst I made every
effort to undertake a final attempt to pacify the Balkans and, in close
cooperation with the Duce, invited Yugoslavia to join the Tripartite Pact,
Britain and the Soviet Union, in joint conspiracy, organized that coup d’état
which removed in one night the Government of the time, who had been ready to
come to an agreement. For we can today inform the German nation that the Serbian
putsch against Germany did not take place merely under British, but primarily
under Soviet-Russian auspices. As we remained silent on this matter also, the
Soviet leaders now went still one step further. They not only organized the
putsch, but a few days later also concluded that well-known friendly agreement
with their new subservient vassals which was intended to strengthen the Serbs in
their desire to resist the pacification of the Balkans and to incite them
against Germany. And this was no platonic intention:
Moscow demanded
the mobilization of the Serbian Army.
Since even now I
still believed it to be better not to speak, those in power in the Kremlin went
still another step further:
The Government
of the German Reich today possess documentary evidence which proves that Russia,
in order finally to bring Serbia into the war against Germany gave her a promise
to supply her via Salonika with arms, aircraft, munitions and other war
material.
And this happened
almost at the very moment when I myself advised the Japanese Foreign Minister,
Dr Matsuoka, to ease the tension with Russia, hoping as I did thus to serve the
cause of peace.
Only the rapid
advance of our incomparable divisions to Skopje, as well as the capture of
Salonika itself, frustrated the aims of this Soviet-Russian-Anglo-Saxon plot.
The officers of the Serbian Air Force, however, fled to Russia and were there
immediately received as allies. It was the victory of the Axis Powers in the
Balkans alone which in the first instance thwarted the plan to involve Germany
in fighting in South-Eastern Europe lasting for months throughout the summer,
while in the meantime steadily completing the concentration of the Soviet
Russian Armies, and increasing their readiness for war, in order, finally,
together with Britain and supported by the American supplies anticipated, to
throttle and crush the German Reich and Italy.
Thus Moscow not
only broke, but miserably betrayed, the stipulations of our friendly agreement.
All this was done whilst the rulers in the Kremlin, exactly as they had done in
the case of Finland and Rumania, up to the last moment put up a show of peace
and friendship and drew up ostensibly innocent démentis.
Although up till
now I have been forced by circumstances to keep silent again and again, the
moment has now come when to continue as a mere observer would not only be a sin
of omission, but a crime against the German people, and even against the Whole
of Europe.
Today something
like 160 Russian divisions are facing our frontiers.
For weeks constant violations of this frontier have been taking place, not only
into our country, hut from the far North down to Rumania. Russian airmen
consider it a sport simply and nonchalantly to overlook these frontiers,
presumably in order to prove to us that they already feel themselves masters of
these territories. In the night from 17 to 18 June, Russian reconnaissance
parties again penetrated into Reich territory and could only be driven back
after prolonged firing. This has brought us to the hour when it is necessary for
us to take steps against this plot devised by Jewish-Anglo-Saxon warmongers and
the equally Jewish rulers of the Bolshevik headquarters in Moscow.
German People,
At this very
hour a movement of troops is taking place which in its extent and magnitude is
the greatest that the world has ever seen. United with their Finnish comrades,
the soldiers who gained the victory at Narvik are manning the shores of the
Arctic Ocean. German divisions commanded by the conqueror of Norway, together
with the champions of Finnish liberty, commanded by their Marshal, are
protecting Finnish territory. From East Prussia down to the Carpathians there
stretch the formations of the German eastern front. Along the shores of the
Pruth, along the lower reaches of the Danube down to the shores of the Black
Sea, German and Rumanian soldiers are united under, the Rumanian Chief of State,
General Antonescu.
The task of this
front is thus no longer the protection of individual countries, but the safety
of Europe and the salvation of us all!
I have therefore
decided today to entrust the fate and the future of the German Reich and of our
people once more to the hands of our soldiers.
May God our Lord
aid us in this of all struggles!
22 June 1941.
signed) Adolf
Hitler.
Note
addressed by the German Foreign Office
to the Soviet Government
The Note of the German Foreign Office.
I.
When, in the summer
of 1939, the Reich Government, impelled by the desire to achieve an adjustment
of interests between Germany and the U.S.S.R., approached the Soviet Government,
they were aware of the fact that it would be no easy matter to reach an
understanding with a State which, on the one hand, claimed to belong to the
community of individual nations with the rights and duties resulting therefrom,
yet, on the other hand, was ruled by a party which, as a section of the
Comintern, was striving to bring about the World Revolution – in other words the
very dissolution of these individual nations. The German Government, putting
aside their serious misgivings, occasioned by this fundamental difference
between the political aims of Germany and of Soviet Russia, and by the sharp
contrast between the diametrically opposed conceptions of National Socialism and
Bolshevism, made the attempt. They were guided by the idea that the elimination
of the possibility of war, which would result from an understanding between
Germany and Russia, and the safeguarding of the vital necessities of the two
peoples, between whom friendly relations had always existed, would offer the
best guarantee against the further spreading of the Communist doctrines of
International Jewry over Europe. This belief was strengthened by the fact that
certain happenings in Russia herself, and certain measures of international
scope undertaken by the Russian Government, allowed it to be assumed that a
departure from these doctrines and from the former methods of causing
disintegration among foreign nations appeared possible. The reception accorded
in Moscow to the German demarche, and the readiness of the Soviet Government to
conclude a pact of friendship with Germany appeared to confirm this change of
attitude. Thus, on 23 August 1939, a Non-Aggression Pact was concluded, while on
28 September 1939 a Frontier and Friendship Agreement was signed by the two
States. The essence of these agreements consisted in
(1) a reciprocal
engagement on the part of both States not to attack one another and to live on
peaceful and neighbourly terms, and
(2) a delimitation
of the spheres of interest – the German Reich renouncing all influence in
Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Bessarabia, while the territories of the
former Polish State as far as the line formed by the Narew, the Bug and the San
were to be incorporated in Russia according to the desire of the Soviets.
The Reich
Government, in fact, immediately following, the conclusion of the Non-Aggression
Pact with Russia, did effect a fundamental change in their policy towards the
U.S.S.R. and from that day onwards adopted a friendly attitude towards the
Soviet Union. The German Government faithfully adhered, both in the letter and
in the spirit, to the treaties concluded with the Soviet Union. In addition to
this, they had, through the conquest of Poland, i. e., by the shedding of German
blood, gained for the Soviet Union the greatest success in foreign politics
which it had achieved since coming into existence. This was only possible by
reason of Germany’s friendly policy towards Russia and the overwhelming
victories of the German forces.
Not unreasonably,
the Reich Government therefore felt entitled to expect that the attitude of the
Soviet Union towards the German Reich would be of the same nature, especially
since during the negotiations which were conducted in Moscow by Herr von
Ribbentrop, the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, and also on other occasions,
the Soviet Government had repeatedly expressed the view that these treaties
would form the basis for a permanent adjustment of German and Soviet Russian
interests, and that the two peoples, each respecting the regime of the other and
prepared to abstain from any interference in the internal affairs of the other
partner, would reach permanent good-neighbourly relations. Unfortunately, it
was soon to become evident that the German Government had been quite mistaken in
this assumption.
II.
In actual fact the
Comintern resumed its activities in every sphere very soon after the conclusion
of the German-Russian treaties. This was true not. only of Germany herself, but
also applied to states friendly to Germany, to neutral states, and to such
European territory as was occupied by German troops. In order to avoid openly
infringing the treaties, the methods were changed and the camouflage applied
more painstakingly and with greater cunning. It was obviously thought necessary
in Moscow to counteract the effect of the conclusion of the pact with National
Socialist Germany by continually pillorying Germany’s alleged „imperialistic
war.” The strict and effective preventive measures adopted by the German police
compelled the Comintern to seek to conduct their subversive activities and their
intelligence work in Germany by devious routes, making use of centres
established for that purpose in neighbouring countries. For this purpose, former
German Communist agents were employed to foment sedition and to arrange for acts
of sabotage in Germany. The GPU Commissar, Krylov, was in charge of systematic
courses of training with this object in view. Apart from this, intensive
subversive activities were carried on in the territories occupied by Germany,
more particularly in the Protectorate and Occupied France, but also in Norway,
Holland, Belgium etc. ...
Soviet Russian
representations, notably the Consulate General in Prague, rendered valuable
assistance in this connexion. An assiduous intelligence service was maintained
by means of wireless transmitters and receiving stations, affording absolute
proof of the activities of the Comintern directed against the German Reich.
There is also comprehensive documentary evidence consisting of witnesses’
statements and correspondence concerning all other subversive activity and
reconnoitring carried on by the Comintern. In addition to this, sabotage groups
were formed, which maintained their own laboratories for the manufacture of
incendiary and high-explosive bombs for the purpose of committing acts of
sabotage. Attempts of this kind were made, for example, against no less than
sixteen German ships.
Espionage was
another field of activity. Thus, the repatriation of the Germans from Soviet
Russia was utilized for the purpose of gaining the services of these Germans for
the ends of the GPU by the most reprehensible means. Not only men, but women
too, were the victims of shameless extortion and forced to enter the service of
the GPU. Even the Soviet Russian Embassy in Berlin, headed by Mr. Kobulov,
Counsellor to the Embassy, did not shrink from unscrupulous abuse of the rights
of exterritoriality for espionage purposes. Mr. Mokhov, a member of the Russian
Consulate in Prague, was at the head of another Russian espionage organization
which had ramifications throughout the Protectorate. Further instances in which
the police were able to take action in good time, provided clear and unequivocal
evidence of these extensive Soviet Russian machinations, The whole of the
evidence proves irrefutably that Soviet Russia was engaged against Germany in
political, military and economic spheres, on large-scale subversive activities,
acts of sabotage and terror, and espionage in preparation for war.
As to the
activities of Russia in European countries outside Germany, they extended to
almost all the European States which were friendly to, or occupied by, Germany.
Thus, in Rumania, for example, Communist propaganda, in the form of pamphlets of
Russian origin, represented Germany as being responsible for all local troubles,
in order to create an anti-German atmosphere. The same thing has been evident in
Yugoslavia since the summer of 1940. The pamphlets there incited the people to
protest against the Cvetković regime which was „hob-nobbing with the
imperialistic governments in Berlin and Rome.” At a meeting of Communist Party
functionaries in Zagreb, the whole of South-Eastern Europe from Slovakia to
Bulgaria was described as a Russian protectorate which would come into being
after Germany’s hoped-for military decline. In the Soviet Legation in Belgrade
German troops discovered documentary evidence of the Soviet Russian origin of
this propaganda. Whereas Communist propaganda in Yugoslavia sought to make use
of nationalist catchwords, in Hungary it was effective chiefly amongst the
Ruthenian population to whom it held out hopes of coming liberation through
Soviet Russia. The anti-German campaign was particularly active in Slovakia
where propaganda was openly carried on in favour of the annexation of the
country by Soviet Russia.
In Finland the
notorious „Association for Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union” actively
cooperated with the Petroskoi broadcasting station in attempting to bring about
the disintegration of this country, and at the same time carried on activities
of a marked anti-German nature.
In France, Belgium
and Holland agitation was directed against the German armies of occupation. A
similar campaign was conducted in the Government General, cloaked by national
and panslavistic propaganda. Scarcely had Greece been occupied by German and
Italian troops, than Soviet Russian propaganda commenced there too. All this is
evidence of a campaign systematically carried out in every country by the
U.S.S.R. against Germany’s endeavour to establish a sound order in Europe.
Parallel with this
there was the direct propaganda designed to counteract measures of German
policy, taking the form of a denunciation of these measures as anti-Russian and
attempting to win over the various countries to side with Soviet Russia against
Germany. In Bulgaria there was agitation against adherence to the Tripartite
Pact and in favour of a guarantee pact with Russia. In Rumania attempts were
made at infiltration in the Iron Guard and at suborning its leaders, including
Groza, the Rumanian who staged the putsch on 23 January 1941, behind whom the
Bolshevist agents of Moscow stood as wirepullers. Indisputable proofs of this
are held by the Reich Government.
In regard to
Yugoslavia, the Reich Government has come into possession of documents according
to which a Yugoslav delegate named Georgević had gained the impression from a
conversation with Mr. Molotov in Moscow as early as May 1940 that Germany was
being regarded there as the „mighty foe of tomorrow.” Soviet Russia’s attitude
to the requests for arms made by Serbian military circles left even less doubt.
In November 1940 the Chief of the Soviet Russian General Staff declared to the
Yugoslav Military Attaché: „We will give you everything you ask for
immediately,” The prices to be paid and the mode of payment were left to the
discretion of the Belgrade Government, and only one condition was made: secrecy
as far as Germany was concerned. When the Cvetković Government subsequently
approached the Axis Powers, Moscow began to delay the deliveries of munitions;
this was briefly communicated to the Yugoslav Military Attaché in the Soviet
Russian War Ministry. The staging of the Belgrade putsch on 27 March of
this year formed the climax of these conspiracies against the Reich by Serbian
plotters and Anglo-Russian agents. The Serbian leader of this putsch and head of
the „Black Hand,” Mr. Simić, is still today in Moscow, and is displaying there
great activity against the Reich in closest cooperation with Soviet Russian
propaganda offices.
The foregoing
examples provide only a glimpse of the enormously varied propaganda activities
which the U.S.S.R. are conducting against Germany throughout Europe. In order to
furnish the outside world with a comprehensive survey of the activities of the
Soviet Russian authorities in this direction since the conclusion of the pacts
between Germany and Russia, and to enable the public to judge for themselves,
the Reich Government will publish the extensive material at their disposal. In
general, the Reich Government note the following:
At the conclusion
of the pacts with Germany, the Soviet Government had repeatedly made the
unequivocal declaration that they did not intend to interfere, either directly
or indirectly, in, German affairs. On the conclusion of the Pact of Friendship,
they had solemnly stated that they would collaborate with Germany in order to
bring to an end, in accordance with the true interests of all peoples, the state
of war existing between Germany on the one hand and Great Britain and France on
the other hand, and to achieve this aim as soon as possible. In the light of the
above-mentioned facts, which have continually become more apparent during the
further course of the war, these Soviet Russian agreements and declarations were
revealed as being intentionally misleading and deceptive. Nor did the advantages
accruing from Germany’s friendly attitude cause the Soviet Government to adopt a
loyal attitude towards Germany. On the contrary, the Reich Government have been
forced to observe that the conclusion, of the pacts in 1939 was yet another
instance of the application of Lenin’s thesis, as expressly reaffirmed in
October 1939 in the „Instructions for the Communist Party in Slovakia,” stating
that „pacts may be concluded with certain other countries, if they further the
interests of the Soviet Government and help to render the opponent innocuous.“
The conclusion of these pacts of friendship was, accordingly, for the Soviet
Government only a tactical manoeuvre. Their real aim was to reach agreements
which were advantageous to Russia, thus simultaneously preparing for future
action. The leading idea remained the weakening of the non-Bolshevist states, in
order to be in a position to undermine them more easily and, when the time came,
to break them up. In a Russian document discovered after the capture of Belgrade
in the Soviet Legation there this object is expressed with stark brutality in
the following words: „The U.S.S.R, will not react until the opportune moment
occurs. The Axis Powers have further dissipated their forces, and the U.S.S.R.
will consequently strike a sudden blow against Germany.” The Soviet Government
have not heeded the voice of the Russian people, who sincerely wished to live in
peace and friendship with the German people, but have continued with the old
Bolshevist policy of duplicity and by so doing have assumed a heavy burden of
responsibility.
III.
If the Soviet
Union’s subversive propaganda, carried out in Germany and in the rest of Europe,
leaves no room for doubt as to its attitude towards Germany, then the policy of
the Soviet Government towards Germany in the military sphere and in the field of
foreign politics even since the conclusion of the pacts between Germany and
Russia makes matters even clearer. In Moscow, on the occasion of the
delimitation of the spheres of interest, the Soviet Government declared to the
German Minister for Foreign Affairs that they did not intend to occupy, to
bolshevize or to annex any states situated within their sphere of interest,
other than the territories of the former Polish State, which were at that time
in a state of disintegration. In actual fact, however, as the course of events
has shown, the policy of the Soviet Union during the whole time was exclusively
directed towards one object, namely, that of extending Moscow’s military power
wherever the possibility offered in the area between the Arctic Ocean and the
Black Sea, and of furthering Bolshevism in Europe.
The development of
this policy is marked by the following stages:–
(1) It was
initiated by the conclusion of so-called Pacts of Assistance with Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania in October and November 1939, and by the establishment of
military bases in those countries.
(2) The next Soviet
Russian move was against Finland. When the Soviet Russian demands, the
acceptance of which would have meant the end of the sovereignty of an
independent Finnish State, were rejected by the Finnish Government, the Soviet
Government were responsible for the formation of the Kusinen Communist
puppet-government, and when the Finnish people refused to recognize this
government, an ultimatum was presented to Finland, the Red Army subsequently
marching in at the end of November 1939. By the Russo-Finnish Peace concluded in
March, Finland was obliged to surrender a part of her south-eastern provinces,
which were immediately bolshevized.
(3) A few months
later, i.e., in July 1940, the Soviet Union took action against the Baltic
States. Under the terms of the first Moscow Pact, Lithuania belonged to the
German sphere of interest. In the second pact, at the desire of the Soviet
Union, the German Government relinquished their interests in the greater part of
Lithuania in favour of the Soviet Union, for the sake of peace, although they
did so with a heavy heart. A strip of this territory still remained within the
German sphere of interest. Following upon an ultimatum delivered on 15 June, the
whole of Lithuania, i.e. including that part of Lithuania which had remained
within the German sphere of interest, was occupied by the Soviet Union without
notification of the German Government so that the U.S.S.R. now extended right up
to the entire eastern frontier of East Prussia. When subsequently, Germany was
approached on this question, the German Government, after difficult negotiations
and in order to make a further effort towards reaching a friendly settlement,
ceded this part of Lithuania also to the Soviet Union.
A short time
afterwards, Latvia and Estonia were likewise occupied by military force, a
procedure which constituted gross abuse of the pacts of assistance concluded
with these States. Contrary to the express assurances given by Moscow, all the
Baltic States were then bolshevized and summarily annexed by the Soviet
Government a few weeks after their occupation. Simultaneously with the
annexation, the Red Army was for the first time concentrated in force throughout
the whole of the northern sector of the Soviet Russian vantage-ground directed
towards Europe.
It goes almost
without saying that the economic pacts between Germany and these States, which,
according to the Moscow Agreements, were not to be affected, were unilaterally
cancelled by the Soviet Government.
(4) In the Pacts of
Moscow it had been expressly agreed, in connexion with the delimitation of
interests in the former Polish territories, that no kind of political agitation
was to take place beyond the frontiers marking these zones of interest, but that
the activity of the occupation authorities on either side was to be restricted
exclusively to the peaceful development of these territories. The German
Government possess irrefutable proof that, in spite of these agreements, the
Soviet Union very soon after the occupation of this territory not only permitted
anti-German propaganda for consumption in the Government General of Poland, but,
in point of fact, sponsored it parallel with Bolshevist propaganda in the same
region.
Strong Russian
garrisons were also transferred to these territories immediately after the
occupation.
(5) Whilst the
German army was still fighting in the west against France and Great Britain, the
Soviet Union advanced in the Balkans. Although the Soviet Government had
declared during the Moscow negotiations that they would never make. the first
move towards achieving a settlement of the Bessarabian question, the German
Government were informed on 24 June 1940 by the Soviet Government that they were
now resolved to settle the Bessarabian question by force. It was stated at the
same time that the Soviet claims also extended to the Bukovina, that is to say
to a territory which was ancient Austrian crown-land, had never belonged to
Russia and had, moreover, not even been mentioned at the time of the Moscow
negotiations. The German Ambassador in Moscow declared to the Soviet Government
that their decision had come as a complete surprise to the German Government and
that it would seriously affect Germany’s economic interests in Rumania and lead
to a disruption of the life of the large German settlement there, as well as of
the German element in the Bukovina. Mr. Molotov replied that the matter was one
of extreme urgency and that the Soviet Union expected to be apprised of the
German Government’s attitude with regard to this question within twenty-four
hours. In spite of this brusque action against Rumania, the German Government
once more intervened in favour of the Soviet Union in order to preserve peace
and maintain their friendship with that country.
They advised the
Rumanian Government, who had appealed to Germany for help, to yield, and
recommended them to surrender Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to Soviet Russia.
The affirmative answer of the Rumanian Government was communicated to the Soviet
Government by Germany together with the Rumanian Government’s request to be
granted sufficient time for the evacuation of these large areas and the
safeguarding of the lives and property of the inhabitants. Once more, however,
the Soviet Government presented an ultimatum to Rumania, and, before its expiry,
began to occupy parts of the Bukovina on 28 June and, immediately after, the
whole of Bessarabia as far as the Danube. These territories were also
immediately annexed by the Soviet Union, bolshevized and thus literally reduced
to ruin.
By occupying and
bolshevizing the entire spheres of interest in Eastern Europe and in the Balkans
accorded to the U.S.S.R. by the Reich Government during the Moscow negotiations,
the Soviet Government plainly and irrefutably acted contrary to the Moscow
agreements. In spite of this, the Reich Government continued to maintain an.
absolutely loyal attitude towards the U.S.S.R. They refrained from intervention
in the Finnish war and in the Baltic question, they supported the attitude of
the Soviet Government against the Rumanian Government in the Bessarabian
question and reconciled themselves, albeit with a heavy heart, to the state of
affairs created by the Soviet Government.
Furthermore, in
order to eliminate as far as possible any divergencies between the two States
from the very outset, the Reich Government set to work on a large-scale
resettlement scheme whereby all the Germans in the areas occupied by the U.S.S.R.
were brought back to Germany. The Reich Government feel that more convincing
proof of their desire to come to a lasting peace with the U.S.S.R. could
scarcely be given.
IV.
As the result of
Russia’s advance towards the Balkans, the territorial problems in this region
came up for discussion. In the summer of 1940, Rumania and Hungary appealed to
Germany to effect a settlement of their territorial disputes after these
divergencies, fostered by British agents, had resulted in a serious crisis at
the end of August, War was imminent between Rumania and Hungary. Germany, who
had repeatedly been requested by Hungary and Rumania to mediate in their
quarrel, desired to maintain peace in the Balkans, and together with Italy
invited the two States to a conference in Vienna, where, at their request, she
proclaimed the Vienna Arbitration Award on 30 August 1940. This defined the new.
frontier between Hungary and Rumania, and, in order to enable the Rumanian
Government to justify before their people the territorial sacrifices which they
had made, and to eliminate any quarrels in this area for the future, Germany and
Italy undertook to guarantee the remaining Rumanian State. As the Russian
aspirations in this area had been satisfied, this guarantee could never be taken
as directed against Russia. The Soviet Union nevertheless complained and stated,
contrary to its former declarations, according to which its aspirations in the
Balkans had been satisfied by the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina,
that it had further interests in Balkan questions, though for the time being
these were not further defined.
Soviet Russia’s
anti-German policy began from that time to become steadily more apparent. The
Reich Government kept on receiving more and more definite news, according to
which the negotiations which had been carried on for some time in Moscow by the
British Ambassador, Cripps, were developing favourably. The Reich Government at
the same time came into possession of proof of the Soviet Union’s intensive
military preparations in every sphere. These proofs are, among other things,
confirmed by a report, recently found in Belgrade, by the Yugoslav Military
Attaché in Moscow, dated 17 December 1940, which reads literally: „According to
information received from Soviet sources, the rearmament of the Air Force, tank
units and artillery, in accordance with the experiences of the present war, is
in full progress and will, in the main, have been completed by August 1941.
This probably also constitutes the time-limit before which no appreciable
changes in the Soviets’ Foreign policy can be expected.”
Despite the
unfriendly attitude of the U.S.S.R. over the Balkan question, Germany made a
fresh effort to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union: the Reich
Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a letter to Mr. Stalin, gave a comprehensive
survey of the policy of the Reich Government since the negotiations in Moscow.
The letter referred in particular to the following points:– when the Tripartite
Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan was concluded, it was unanimously agreed
that this Pact was in no sense directed against the Soviet Union, but that the
friendly relations of. the three Powers and their treaties with the U.S.S.R.
should remain completely unaffected by this Pact. This was also placed on record
in the Tripartite Pact of Berlin. At the same time, the letter expressed the
desire and the hope that it might prove possible jointly to clarify still
further the friendly relations with the U.S.S.R, desired by the signatories to
the Tripartite Pact, and to give such relations concrete form. In order to
discuss these questions more fully, the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs
invited Mr. Molotov to visit Berlin.
During Mr.
Molotov’s visit to Berlin, the Reich Government was forced to the conclusion
that the U.S.S.R. was only inclined towards genuinely friendly cooperation with
the signatories to the Tripartite Pact, and with Germany in particular, provided
the latter were prepared to pay the price demanded by the Soviet Union. This
price was to take the form of further penetration by the Soviet Union into the
North and South-East of Europe. The following demands were made by Mr. Molotov
in Berlin and in subsequent diplomatic conversations with the German Ambassador
in Moscow:–
(1) The Soviet
Union desired to give a guarantee to Bulgaria and, over and above this, to
conclude with her a Pact of Assistance on the same lines as those concluded with
the Baltic States, i.e., providing for military bases; at the same time Mr.
Molotov declared that he did not wish to interfere with the internal regime in
Bulgaria. The visit of the Russian Commissar, Sobolev, to Sofia at that time was
likewise undertaken with the object of realizing this intention.
(2) The Soviet
Union demanded an agreement in the form of a treaty with Turkey for the purpose
of providing, on the basis of a long-term lease, a base for Soviet land and
naval forces on the Bosphorus and in the Dardanelles. In case Turkey should not
agree to this proposal, Germany and Italy were to cooperate with Russia in
diplomatic steps to be undertaken to enforce compliance with this demand. These
demands aimed at the domination of the Balkans by the U.S.S.R.
(3) The Soviet
Union declared that once more it felt itself threatened by Finland, and
therefore demanded complete abandonment of Finland by Germany, which, in actual
fact, would have amounted to the occupation of this State and the extermination,
of the Finnish people.
Germany naturally
was unable to accept these Russian demands, designated by the Soviet Government
as the primary condition for cooperation with the signatories to the Tripartite
Pact. Thus, the latter’s efforts to come to an understanding with the Soviet
Union failed. The consequence of the attitude adopted by Germany was that the
U.S.S.R. now intensified a policy more and more openly, directed against
Germany, and that its increasingly close cooperation with Britain was clearly
revealed. In January 1941 this antagonistic attitude on the part of Russia first
showed in the diplomatic sphere. When, in that month, Germany adopted certain
measures in Bulgaria against the landing of British troops in Greece, the
Russian Ambassador in Berlin pointed out in an official demarche that the Soviet
Union regarded Bulgarian territory and the two Straits as a „security zone” for
the U.S.S.R., and that it could not remain a passive spectator of the events
taking place in these territories, which amounted to a menace for the interests
of such security. For this reason the Soviet Government issued a warning with
regard to the appearance of German troops on Bulgarian territory or on that of
either of the Straits.
Thereupon the Reich
Government furnished the Soviet Government with exhaustive information about the
causes and aims of their military measures in the Balkans. They made it clear
that Germany would prevent with every means in her power any attempt on the part
of Britain to gain a foothold in Greece, but that she had no intention of
occupying the Straits, and would respect Turkish sovereign territory. The
passage of German troops through Bulgaria could not be regarded as an
encroachment on the Soviet Union’s security interests; on the contrary, the
Reich Government believed that they were serving Soviet interests by these
operations. After carrying through her operations in the Balkans, Germany would
withdraw her troops from there.
Despite this
declaration on the part of the Reich Government, the Soviet Government for their
part published a declaration addressed to Bulgaria directly after the entry of
German troops into that country, which manifested a character clearly hostile to
the German Reich, and was to the effect that the presence of German troops in
Bulgaria was not conducive to peace in the Balkans, but rather to war. The
explanation of this attitude was found by the Reich Government in information
received, steadily increasing in volume, about growing collaboration between
Soviet Russia and Britain. Even in the face of these facts, Germany remained
silent.
Along the same
lines was the promise given in March 1941 that Russia would support Turkey in
the event of the latter’s joining in the war in the Balkans. This, according to
information in the possession of the Reich Government, was the result of
Anglo-Russian negotiations during the visit of the British Foreign Secretary to
Ankara, who thereby aimed at drawing Russia closer and closer to the British
camp.
V.
The aggressive
policy of the Soviet Government towards the German Reich, which has been
steadily becoming more pronounced ever since this time, as well as the hitherto
somewhat discreet political cooperation between the Soviet Union and Britain
became, however, patent to the whole world on the outbreak of the Balkan crisis
at the beginning of April. It is today fully established that the putsch
instigated by Britain in Belgrade after Yugoslavia had joined the Tripartite
Pact was staged with the connivance of Soviet Russia. For some time, in fact
since 14 November 1940, Russia had secretly assisted Yugoslavia in arming
against the Axis Powers. Documents which fell into the hands of the Reich
Government after the occupation of Belgrade, revealing every phase of these
Russian deliveries of arms to Yugoslavia, give decisive proof of this. Once the
Belgrade putsch had succeeded, Russia on 5 April concluded a friendly
agreement with the illegal Serbian Government of General Simović, which was
to lend moral support to the putschists, and with its weight assist the joint
Anglo- Yugoslav-Greek front. Evident satisfaction was expressed on this occasion
by the American Under-Secretary of State, Mr Sumner Welles, when he
stated on 6 April 1941, after having had several conversations with the Soviet
Ambassador in Washington, that „the Russo-Yugoslav Pact might under certain
circumstances be of the greatest importance; it was attracting interest in many
quarters, and there were grounds for assuming that it will be more than a mere
pact of friendship and non-aggression.”
Thus, at the same
time, when German troops were being concentrated on Rumanian and Bulgarian
territory against the increasingly frequent landings of British troops in
Greece, the Soviet Union, now obviously in concerted action with Britain, was
attempting to stab Germany in the back, by
(1) giving
Yugoslavia open political and secret military support,
(2) attempting to
move Turkey to adopt an aggressive attitude towards Bulgaria and Germany by
offering her support, and to concentrate her army in a very unfavourable
strategic position in Thrace,
(3) itself
concentrating a strong force on the Rumanian frontier in Bessarabia and on the
Moldava, and
(4) the sudden
attempt, early in April, of Mr. Vyshinskii, the Deputy People’s Commissar in the
Foreign Commissariat, in his conversations with Mr. Gafencu, Rumanian Minister
in Moscow, to inaugurate a policy of rapid rapprochement with Rumania, in
order to persuade that country to break away from Germany. British diplomacy,
through the intermediary of the Americans, was making efforts in the same
direction in Bucharest.
According to the
Anglo-Russian plan, the German troops concentrated in Rumania and Bulgaria were
to have been attacked from three sides, namely, from Bessarabia, from Thrace and
from the Serbo-Greek front. It was solely due to the loyalty of General
Antonescu, to the realistic policy followed by the Turkish Government and, above
all, to the rapid German initiative and the decisive victories of the German
Army, that this Anglo-Russian plan was frustrated. According to information, in
the hands of the Reich Government, nearly 200 Yugoslav aircraft, carrying Soviet
Russian and British agents, as well as Serbian putschists, led by Mr.
Simić, were flown partly to Russia, where these officers are today serving in
the Russian Army, partly to Egypt, This fact alone throws a particularly
characteristic light upon the close collaboration between Britain, Russia and
Yugoslavia. .
In vain the Soviet
Government tried on various occasions to veil the real intentions underlying
their policy. Besides maintaining their economic relations with Germany even
during the last stage, they adopted a succession of measures to deceive the
world into thinking that they were maintaining normal and even friendly
relations with Germany. Instances of this, for example, are the requests to
leave they addressed a few weeks ago to the diplomatic representatives of
Norway, Belgium, Greece and Yugoslavia; the silence observed by the British
press about German-Russian relations, acting under the instructions of Sir
Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador, who was in agreement with the Russian
Government and finally, the démenti
recently published by the TASS agency, in which the relations between Germany
and the Soviet Union were described as completely correct. These attempts at
camouflage, which stand in such flagrant contrast to the real policy of the
Soviet Government, naturally did not succeed in deceiving the Reich Government.
VI.
The anti-German
policy of the Soviet Government was accompanied in the military sphere by a
steadily increasing concentration of all the available Russian armed forces on a
long front extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
Already at the time
when Germany was heavily engaged in the west in her French campaign, and when
only a few German detachments were stationed in the east, the Russian High
Command began systematically to transfer large bodies of troops to the eastern
frontiers with the Reich, marked mass movements being noticed along the East
Prussian frontier and that of the Government General, as also in the Bukovina
and Bessarabia opposite Rumania. The Russian garrisons facing Finland were
continually being reinforced. The constant transfers of more and more fresh
Russian divisions from the Far East and the Caucasus to Western Russia were
further measures of a similar kind. After the Soviet Government had declared
originally that the Baltic area, for instance, would only be occupied by very
few troops, they proceeded to concentrate in this area, after military
occupation had been completed, masses of additional troops, their number today
being estimated at 22 divisions. It was obvious that the Russian troops were
advancing ever closer to the German frontier, although no military measures had
been adopted on the German side which might justify such action on the part of
the U.S.S.R. It was this action on the part of the Soviet, Union which first
compelled the German armed forces to adopt counter-measures. The various units
of the Russian Army and Air Force were concentrated closer in the direction of
the frontier, and strong detachments of the Air Force were posted on the
aerodromes along the German frontiers. Since the beginning of April, more and
more frontier violations have also taken place and a steadily growing number of
incursions over Reich territory by Russian aircraft have been observed,
According to reports from the Rumanian Government, similar occurrences have been
observed in the Rumanian frontier area in Bukovina and along the Moldava and
Danube.
Since the beginning
of the current year, the German High Command has repeatedly attracted the
attention of the German Foreign Office to the steadily increasing menace which
the Russian Army represents for Reich territory, emphasizing at the same time
that only aggressive intentions could account for this concentration of troops.
The communications received from the German High Command will be published in
full detail.
If the slightest
doubts about the aggressive intentions of this Russian concentration could still
be entertained, they have been completely dispelled by the news which has
reached the German High Command during the past few days. Now that the Russian
general mobilization is complete, no less than 160 divisions are concentrated
facing Germany. Observations made during the past few days have shown that the
grouping of the Russian troops, and especially of the motorized and armoured
units, has been carried out in such a way as to allow the Russian High Command
at any moment to make an aggressive advance on the German frontier at various
points. Reports about increased reconnaissance and patrol activity, as well as
accounts received daily of incidents on the frontier and outpost skirmishes
between the two armies, complete the picture of an extremely strained military
situation which may at any moment reach the breaking point. News received today
from England about the negotiations of Sir Stafford Cripps, the British
Ambassador, with a view to establishing still closer collaboration between the
political and military leaders of Britain and of the U.S.S.R., together with the
appeal made by Lord Beaverbrook, one-time enemy of the Soviet regime, to support
Russia in her coming conflict by every available means, and his exhortation to
the United States to do the same, show unambiguously what kind of fate it is
desired to prepare for the German nation.
Summarizing the
foregoing points, the Reich Government wish, therefore, to make the following
declaration:–
Contrary to all the
engagements which they have undertaken, and in absolute contradiction to their
solemn declarations, the Soviet Government have turned against Germany:
they have
(1) not only
continued, but even, since the outbreak of war, intensified, their subversive
activities against Germany and Europe; they have
(2) in a
continually increasing measure developed their foreign policy in a direction
hostile to Germany, and they have
(3) massed their
entire forces on the German frontier ready for action.
The Soviet
Government have thus violated their treaties and. broken their agreements with
Germany. Bolshevist Moscow’s hatred of National Socialism was stronger than its
political sagacity. Bolshevism is opposed to National Socialism in deadly
enmity. Bolshevist Moscow is about to stab National Socialist Germany in the
back while she is engaged in a struggle for her existence.
Germany has no
intention of remaining inactive in the fact of this grave threat to her eastern
frontier. The Führer has, therefore, ordered the German forces to oppose this
menace with all the might at their disposal. In the coming struggle, the German
people are fully aware that they are called upon not only to defend their native
land, but to save the entire civilized world from the deadly dangers of
Bolshevism, and to clear the way for true social progress in Europe.
Berlin, 21 June
1941
Report
by the German Foreign Office
on the propaganda and political agitation
of the Soviet Government
I
The German Foreign
Office is in possession of comprehensive proofs that subversive and
revolutionary propaganda on a large scale with a pronounced anti-German tendency
has been launched from Moscow into other countries. The old idea of a world
revolution is being pursued as before. Even after the conclusion of the
German-Soviet friendly agreement, Germany was placed on a par with Britain and
France and continued to be regarded as a capitalistic State which must be
annihilated. Pacts with Germany are merely being used as a tactical means for
making the best use of a favourable political situation.
These tendencies
are revealing themselves consistently in every country in the propaganda carried
on by the U.S.S.R. They are particularly clearly defined in the „Directions for
a campaign of organization and ideology within the Communist Party in Slovakia,”
issued in October 1939. These directions are based on a statement made by Mr.
Lenin, according to which pacts may be concluded with individual capitalist
countries, provided they serve the interests of the Soviet Union and create a
possibility of rendering the opponent innocuous. Tactical collaboration with
Germany, the directions continue, fully corresponds with these words of Lenin.
The aim of the Soviet policy is outlined in the following words: „The Soviet
Union and its Red Army can thereby avoid losses and hold themselves ready to
attack the weakened enemy at an opportune moment in an opportune place.”
The same ideas
recur in pamphlets which have been spread over the most varying countries in
Europe. Thus, in a pamphlet printed in Switzerland, the present Soviet policy is
described in another statement made by Mr. Lenin: „As soon as we are strong
enough to strike down the whole of capitalism, we shall immediately grip it by
the throat.”
Papers and
periodicals appearing in Moscow again and again provide world revolution slogans
for the Communists in every country. Significant, for example, is a leading
article in the periodical „Internatsionalnyi Maiak” (1941, No. I),
entitled „Lenin’s cause will be victorious throughout the world,“ which runs as
follows: „Led by our comrade Stalin, the great follower of Lenin, our country is
progressing boldly and convincedly towards Communism. The international
proletariat, the suppressed and impoverished masses throughout the world are
repeating with convinced hopefulness the prophetic words of Lenin: ‘Let the
bourgeoisie rage a little longer, let them calmly murder thousands of
workmen, victory is ours and the victory of the Communist world revolution is
assured.’”
Further: „Under
this militant revolutionary banner, the banner of the Communist
Internationale, are united the proletarians and the workers of the whole
world for the last and decisive blow against capitalism, for the victory of the
socialist revolution, for Communism.’’ (Vol. 41, No, 4.) The same tone is
observed by leading personalities in Moscow, who emphasize again and again the
international mission of the Soviet Union. Thus Mr. Molotov stated in a speech,
held in December 1939: „For the international Communist movement, Mr. Stalin is
not only the leader of Bolshevism and the leader of the U.S.S.R., but also the
natural leader of world Communism“; and in an article which appeared in March
1940: „We shall remain true to the end to the trust bequeathed to us, namely,
that Communism must always remain international.” Stalin also said in a speech
in January 1940 „We have been, victorious under Lenin’s flag in our battle for
the October Revolution. Under the same flag we shall be victorious in the
proletarian revolution throughout the world.“
Hand in hand with
this incitement to world revolution, we find war and armament propaganda in the
Soviet Union itself, intended for home use and steadily increasing in violence.
In countless speeches and proclamations, the Russian people are being summoned
to military preparedness and joyfully to stake their all. Sufficient in this
connection is a manifesto issued by Marshal Budyonny at the turn of the year
1940/41, in which the youth of the country is called upon never to forget „that
at a moment when almost the whole globe is involved in war, Stalin’s injunctions
must be loyally fulfilled: the whole country must be kept in a state of tireless
and constant militant and mobilized preparedness.
Daily and hourly we
must occupy ourselves with the science of war, thus preparing ourselves to carry
out the order to fight. We must constantly bear in mind that only a soldier who
is deeply versed in the science of war can deal a death blow to the enemy.” At
the end of May 1941, the District Commissar Batonov wrote in the Pravda
that it was necessary „for the Soviet Union to. prepare for war day by day.”
Again and again the whole Soviet Press echoes the same words: „Our Red Army is
an army of world revolution and the world proletariat.”
These general
ideas, propagated everywhere in Europe, concerning continuous work for a world
revolution and military preparation for this purpose within the Soviet Union,
are, in consequence of the military successes of the Axis Powers, being directed
increasingly against Germany, and in individual countries are being supplemented
by- a concrete, steadily growing, agitation against the Reich. All difficulties
experienced by the Various European States in their home and foreign policy are
being used as arguments for this virulent campaign. In
Rumania the agitation carried on by
the Communists did not even decline during the first months after the conclusion
of the German-Russian Friendship Pact. An official Rumanian source declared to
the German Minister on 15 February 1940 that the Rumanian Communists were
strongly anti-National Socialist and anti-German in their utterances and
circular letters. They were not influenced in the least by the official policy
followed by Moscow and Berlin. In complete accord with this statement, Communist
propaganda in Rumania declared that only Germany was responsible for the
difficulties experienced by that country in its bonne policy and for its serious
economic situation. The national passions inflamed by the solution found for the
Transylvanian question were exploited for agitation against the Vienna
Arbitration Award, in other words, against the Reich Government. After Rumania
had signed the Tripartite Pact, attempts, although fruitless, were made to-stir
up the population against the German troops. All this was done with the
assistance of pamphlets and leaflets the lay-out and mode of printing of which
betrayed the fact they came from abroad, and which, according to information
supplied by competent Rumanian authorities, had been brought to Bucharest by
couriers of the Soviet Legation.
In
Yugoslavia, from the late summer of
1940 onwards, an anti-German orientation in Communist propaganda was also to be
observed. In a circular letter sent by the administrative bodies of the Drave
Banat in Ljubljana to subordinate bodies on 5 August 1940, it is stated that
according to information available, the Communist propaganda, in contrast to
previously, was aiming at „organizing future hostile manifestations against
Germany and Italy.” This assertion made by the Serbian authorities was confirmed
by Communist leaflets distributed particularly in Carniola. Thus, in the leaflet
distributed on 23 August 1940 in connexion with the anniversary of the signing
of the German-Russian Treaty, the Yugoslav Government were attacked because they
had carried on a policy of rapprochement towards Rome and Berlin, and had
attempted to make use of Yugoslavia to serve the imperialistic ends of Germany
and Italy. This propaganda demanded that Yugoslavia’s foreign policy should work
towards rapprochement with Russia. A Communist leaflet distributed in
Zagreb in November similarly attacks Mr. Maček because he had „attempted to sell
the country to the Fascist Imperialists in Berlin and Rome.” In a leaflet
circulated in Carniola on the anniversary of the Russian revolution on 7
November 1940, a protest was demanded against the policy of trafficking with the
imperialist Governments of Berlin and Rome that the Cvetković regime was
carrying on. The same purpose was served by the mass demonstrations staged by
the Soviets. During one of these demonstrations, when arrests happened to be
made by the Yugoslav police, it was discovered that employees of the Belgrade
Soviet Legation were included amongst the arrested persons.
From time to time
Russian intentions to conquer the Balkans and German occupied areas were openly
proclaimed in Communist circles. Thus the German Legation in Belgrade reported
on 13 September 1940 that, a few weeks before, at a meeting of Communist Party
functionaries in Zagreb, one of those present declared „that according to
information received from Russia, the territories of Slovakia, Hungary,
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Rumania, as well as those portions of the Polish area
now occupied by German troops, were to be described as a Russian protectorate.
This new measure, however, could only be carried out after Germany, as was
expected, had been weakened in the military sphere.”
That such
statements about Russia’s future intentions against Germany were really
communicated to Serbian Communists and sympathizers with the Soviets by the
Russians themselves, is shown by a document found, after Belgrade had been
occupied, in the Soviet Legation there. The document summarizes in what way
Russophile Serbian groups were informed by the Russians of the attitude of the
Soviet Union after Rumania had linked up with the Axis Powers. This document in
the Russian language, which according to its contents dates from the autumn of
1940, reads as follows:
„The U.S.S.R. will
not react until the opportune moment occurs. The Axis Powers have further
dissipated their forces and the U.S.S.R. will consequently strike a sudden blow
against Germany. When they- do so, the U.S.S.R. will cross the Carpathians,
which will be the signal for a revolution in Hungary; after having passed
through Hungary, the troops will proceed to Yugoslavia and press forward to the
Adriatic and will then separate the Balkans and the Near East from Germany. When
will this happen? At the moment which the Soviets consider most suitable for the
success of this undertaking. At the same time, a revolution will break out in
France.
In Yugoslavia, as
the present economic situation becomes steadily worse, the masses will be more
and more radicalized. If shortage of food is as great during the coming winter
as the cold, Yugoslavia in the spring will be like a powder barrel needing
nothing but a match.”
In
Bulgaria the German-Soviet Friendship
Pact was interpreted by Communist propaganda as a complete capitulation on the
part of Germany before the strength of Russia and, whilst Germany was reviled in
the most shameful manner, the people were incited to continue their struggle
against Fascism and German-Italian aggression. In Bulgarian official quarters a
general intensification of Bolshevist propaganda in the South-Eastern European
States was noted during the summer of 1940. In Bulgaria, too, Bolshevist
propaganda attempted to use nationalist slogans. Thus in the question of the
Dobruja, the moderate and responsible policy of the Bulgarian Government was
branded as weak, and the support of the Soviet Union for a more drastic action
was foreshadowed.
In
Hungary Bolshevist propaganda could
scarcely find any support, as the recollection of the reign of terror of Bela
Kun was still too vivid there. All the more ruthlessly, therefore, did the
Soviet Union pursue its secret propaganda in the regions with a Ruthenian
minority given back to Hungary in March 1939, and allied this propaganda with
annexationist aims. Thus the Amsterdam Newspaper Algemeen Handelsblad
reported on 30 December 1939 that Soviet stars and hammers and sickles were to
be seen everywhere on the walls of those districts. Leaflets were being
distributed continuously and voluminously, most probably smuggled in from
Russia. These leaflets stated that Little Father Stalin, the Father of all the
Russians and kindred national groups, and Brother Voroshilov, would liberate the
poor suppressed Ruthenian people from their Hungarian overlords. That the’
Soviet Union was actually harbouring aggressive intentions against Hungary is
revealed in a report from the Greek Minister in Ankara, dated 3 February 1941
and found in Athens. According to this, the Soviet Minister declared to his
Greek colleague „that Hungary as yet had nothing to fear from Russia,” but that
he „by no means excluded such a possibility for the future.”
In
Slovakia propaganda was entirely based
on the directions referred to above, which contained detailed instructions for
the work of the Communist Party. The struggle against the Government in power
was to be propagated by infiltration in the Hlinka Guard and the State trade
unions. Actually, an extremely lively agitation by means of leaflets,
inscriptions on walls, handbills and Communist symbols was carried on, the
sharply anti-German tendency being paired with efforts openly aiming at
annexation of the country by the Soviet Union. The fact that the propaganda was
being directed by the Soviet Legation in Bratislava is in this case particularly
clearly displayed; as the Havas Agency testified in March 1940, the
subversive material was being printed on the premises of the Legation.
Particularly intensive were the Soviet Russian machinations in Eastern Slovakia,
where the confused national conditions gave an excuse for nationalist and
panslav slogans.
In
Sweden, the Communist Party is indeed
not particularly large numerically; but it has special importance in regard to
the international activity of the Comintern. As Sweden is the only country in
Europe in which Communism is not forbidden, a portion of the Communist activity
previously carried on in the German Ostmark, in the former Czecho-Slovakia, as
well as in Switzerland and in. France, has been transferred to Sweden. Thus; for
instance, the official organ of the Comintern, Die Rundschau, formerly
published in Bale, is now printed in Stockholm. The main propagandist organ of
the Swedish Communists is the daily paper, Ny Dag, which is of particular
importance for the Soviet Union, as it is now probably the only legally and
regularly published Communist daily paper appearing in a neutral country in
Europe. The attitude of this paper, which is financially supported by Soviet
Russia, is becoming increasingly anti-German; great care is, moreover, being
taken that the anti-German articles in Ny Dag are spread throughout tire
world. Thus, at the end of April 1941, this paper published an alleged manifesto
of German Communist youth, in which the German measures against Yugoslavia were
most violently condemned. How careful they were that this anti-German article
should be read internationally, is described in the following, report from the
correspondent of the New York Times in Stockholm, dated 29 April 1941: „Today’s
issue of the Communist Swedish paper was sent to the British and American
newspaper correspondents in a closed envelope. The manifesto to which I have
referred was marked with blue pencil, as though the Swedish Section of the
Communist Internationale attached particular value to its publication abroad.
This unusual document, with its violent attack upon Hitler and his policy,
contains a clear call to revolt and defeatism. It threatens disapproval on the
part of Moscow. The document is generally believed here to have come from the
Comintern in Moscow. Observers in Stockholm regard the manifesto as a new and
impressive sign of the rapid deterioration in the relations between the U.S.S.R.
and Germany.” .
In
Finland, Bolshevist propaganda came to
a standstill during the Russo-Finnish War. After peace had been signed, the
Soviet Legation in Helsingfors immediately proceeded to reconstruct the
Communist Party, which at first was organized in small cells.
For actual
propaganda purposes the „Association for Peace and Friendship with the Soviet
Union“ was founded, amongst the members of which – according to sentences
pronounced in the Finnish Court – numerous criminal elements were found. The
broadcasting station Petroskoi was erected by the Russian State Broadcasting
Company in the neighbourhood of the Finnish frontier for propaganda purposes. In
numerous agitatory transmissions it attempted to disturb the home political
situation in Finland and to keep the Finnish Government under constant pressure.
Here, too, the aim was to impair friendly relations between Finland and the
Reich.
In
France, the efforts of French
politicians, who after the defeat of the Third Republic had endeavoured to
enlist the sympathy of the French, people for a policy of collaboration with
Germany and for European solidarity, were systematically obstructed by Moscow.
The members of the Petain Government were described as corrupt traitors and
hirelings of small capitalistic groups. The economic and social difficulties
experienced by France after her defeat were exclusively attributed to the
occupation of the country by Germany. Almost every leaflet and illegal newspaper
ended with a call for a Bolshevist revolution and for cooperation with Soviet
Russia, which would bring about an end of all present distress.
In
Belgium and
Holland, too, anti-German Communist agitation with the same end in
view is extremely active.
In the
Government General, Soviet propaganda
started directly after the demarcation of the German and Russian spheres of
interest. Here it appeals in particular with panslav ideals to Polish
nationalism, and attempts to represent the Soviet Union to these circles as the
future liberator from German domination. On the other hand, the Russians
naturally have not the slightest scruple about using Jews to falsify passports
and carry news. Recently vain efforts have been made to approach German troops
with agitatory subversive propaganda.
Even in
Greece, according to reports from the
Plenipotentiary of the Reich there, the Bolshevists have already attempted in
the few weeks which have elapsed since the German entry into that country to
incite afresh the Greek people, who had been left in the lurch by Britain,
against Germany and Italy. As everywhere in the occupied territories, here, too,
a revolution is being prepared in the event of a Russo-German war, and linking
up with the Soviet Union is proclaimed as a panacea for overcoming difficulties.
Thus Russian
propaganda in every country in Europe is trying to make use of the difficulties
and upheavals which the war has brought with it, in order to assist its
world-revolutionary machinations. This revolutionary agitation is being bound up
with steadily increasing incitement against the Reich and its attempts to create
a new and stable order in Europe.
II.
The other means of
political agitation employed by the Soviet Union in the above-mentioned
countries are in exact accordance with the underground propaganda outlined in
the foregoing. Moscow has thus attempted again and again to obstruct Germany in
her role of mediator in settling territorial differences between Rumania,
Hungary and Bulgaria, and to prevent the Balkan States from joining the
Tripartite Pact. The German-Italian guarantee for the new Rumanian frontiers was
falsely represented by Communist agitation as an aggressive anti-Russian
measure. Particularly active work was done by Moscow to prevent Bulgaria from
joining the Tripartite Pact. A special delegate from the Soviet Union was sent
to King Boris at the end of November 1940 to frustrate a rapprochement
between Bulgaria and the Axis Powers, and at the same time to draw Bulgaria into
the Soviet net by offering her a guarantee pact. The Russians attempted to
support this mission by mobilizing the Bulgarian Communists, who had to stage
mass petitions to the Government. When, a few months later, Bulgaria consented
to allow German troops to enter the country, the Soviet Government, although
they had received detailed information beforehand from the Reich Government
about the aims and intentions of the German measures in the Balkans, converted
themselves into a tool for British propaganda by asserting in an intentionally
hostile public proclamation that the Bulgarian attitude would result in drawing
that country into the war – an assertion which has since been sufficiently
contradicted by actual facts.
In Rumania, Russian
efforts since the autumn of 1940 have aimed at increasing the domestic political
difficulties of the new regime in every respect, and preparing for civil war by
instigating unrest. As early as November 1940, Communists and paid agents were
smuggled into the Legionary Movement, and attempted to utilize internal Rumanian
conflicts for the turbid aims of Moscow. The summit of the Communist agitation
which had already made its appearance in November 1940 in local putsch schemes,
especially in the oil regions, was reached in the attempted revolt of the
extremist Legionaries on 23 and 24 January 1941, which, as has been
incontrovertibly proved, was to a large extent due to Bolshevist agents and
local Communist leaders. After the putsch had failed, some leaders of the revolt
took refuge in the Soviet Legation in order thus to escape arrest. The German
Minister in Bucharest reported, on 11 February 1941, on the background of the
attempted putsch as follows: „The revolt was planned by Russian elements who
attempted by this means to bridge the way to Bulgaria via Rumania, as well as by
agents of the British Secret Service. Both immediately recognized the situation
and made full use of it. Anybody familiar with their methods is quite certain
that they have had a hand in it, Their plan was to create confusion at all costs
in order to bring about disorder in Rumania, a territory of economic and
military importance for Germany.“
Equally clear are
the Russian intrigues with regard to Moscow’s attitude in Yugoslavia, French
documents which have been found have informed the Reich Government about remarks
made in May 1940 by the Russian Foreign Commissar Molotov to the Yugoslav
Delegate Georgevič, which clearly show that Molotov in his talks with Yugoslavia
attempted from the very first to show an anti-German attitude, whereas in
talking about France and Britain he used terms „which exhibited no ill-will.” In
so doing, Molotov, as Georgevič stated, openly indicated the possibility that
Russia would oppose every Italian and German action in the Danube area. Beyond
this, the Soviet Government on this occasion urged Yugoslavia to hasten her
armament programme and stated that they were prepared to support this programme
by supplies of arms on credit.
Georgevič gained
the impression in Moscow that Germany was regarded there as the adversary of
tomorrow. „Germany is already the mighty foe against which Moscow is preparing
itself.” The Yugoslav delegate also thought himself entitled to say that Russia
„was trying to delay, rather than to hasten, the deliveries promised to Germany,
with every means in her power.” Military quarters in Belgrade expressed a
similar opinion about the Russian attitude. In one note of 24 June 1940, found
in the documents of the Yugoslav General Staff, it is stated that „the foreign
policy of the U.S.S.R. is wholly independent of that of Germany, consequently
surprises, even for Germany, are not out of the question.”
Russia’s
fundamental attitude is shown with special clarity in the matter of Russian
armament supplies to Serbia, on which light is thrown by the Serbian War Office
records found in Belgrade.
At the suggestion
of the Soviet Government, the Serbian Minister in Moscow handed a specification
of the war material required by Serbia to the assistant of Mr. Vishinskii, the
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on 14 November 1940, Only a week later, on 21
November, the Serbian Military Attaché received the answer from the Russian
General Staff, „We will give you everything requested and that immediately!” The
Russians became still more accommodating; still more material could be supplied
and Yugoslavia could determine the prices and method of payment herself. The
Yugoslav Military Attaché was in a position to report that the Russians for
their part were willing „to provide war material on a large scale.“ The only
condition made by the Russians was absolute secrecy; in particular, care should
be taken to prevent Germany, Bulgaria and Rumania from learning anything of the
consignment of materials. The Yugoslav Military Attaché in Moscow repeatedly
expressed the desire that these negotiations should be carried out exclusively
through military channels, as otherwise a leakage was to be feared. The military
authorities were above all afraid of the Axis Powers getting to know of the
intended purchases.
From this it is
obvious that Yugoslav military circles realized that rearmament carried out at
the instigation of Russia was a measure directed against the Axis. Russian
insistence on a rapid conclusion of the negotiations was further demonstrated by
the demand made by the General Staff on the following day (22 November) that
detailed particulars of the type of arms required should be given by the next
day. In this connexion the Russians emphasized that it was in Yugoslavia’s own
interest to reply, at once, „Any delay would be extremely dangerous.” Thereupon,
the Yugoslavs sent the required specifications on 23 November. However, during
weeks that followed the negotiations were held up by the Russians. At first,
technical difficulties were given as the reason, but later political arguments
were openly put forward. Obviously, the armaments deal was to be employed in
order to bring pressure to bear against, the rapprochement then beginning
between the Cvetković Government and the Axis Powers. After some weeks had
passed in an attempt to remove, the technical difficulties put forward as a
pretext by Russia, the Yugoslav Military Attaché in Moscow submitted a report on
4 February 1941 which reads as follows: „On 4 February the Russian War Office
informed me that the negotiations concerning the supply of war materials had
been delayed by the signing of our Pact with Hungary and the Commercial Treaty
with Germany. These treaties are interpreted as an estrangement from Russia.
This proves just as clearly as the emphatic statement that price was of no
importance, that they are trying to exploit our requirements for political
ends.” Evidently no conclusion of these negotiations was reached under the
Cvetković Government.
As is well known,
the Belgrade coup d’état and the Simo- vi6 Government were hailed with
delight by the Russian wireless and the Russian press. There is no doubt that
the putschists were already encouraged in making their plans before the
overthrow by hopes of Russian help. The expectations of the Simović group seemed
to be fulfilled when on 5 April 1940 the Russian-Yugoslav Friendship and
Nonaggression Pact was signed in Moscow. This pact, viewed in the light of the
attendant circumstances, can only be regarded as a direct provocation of Germany
and an encouragement of the Simović Government’s anti-German attitude. At the
time it awoke a corresponding echo in the press throughout the world. The
incompatibility of this treaty with the German-Russian agreements was stressed
everywhere. It was looked upon as a decisive turning-point in German Soviet
relations; there was even talk of the possibility of the Soviet Union entering
the war against Germany! Mr Sumner Welles, American Under-Secretary of State,
after several conversations with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, commented
on the Russian step as follows: „The Yugoslav-Russian Friendship Pact can under
certain circumstances be of the greatest importance. The pact will arouse
interest in „many quarters. There are reasons for supposing that it is more than
merely a Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact.” That the conclusion of the Treaty
was regarded by the Simović Government, too, as a challenge to enter the lists
against the Reich is incontestably proved by a statement, of which documentary
evidence exists, by Mr. Ninčić, the Minister, brother of the Foreign Minister in
the coup d’état Government. The fact that after the outbreak of
hostilities a large number of Yugoslav military planes flew to Russia to escape
destruction, is further evidence of the close connexion between Simović and
Soviet Russia. Furthermore, according to reliable reports, Yugoslav officers
were offered employment in the service of the Soviet Union.
Moreover,
documentary evidence is available that Soviet Russia supplied the Yugoslav and
Greek General Staffs with information concerning the position and movements of
German and Italian troops. Finally, it became known from an absolutely reliable
source that on 10 April the Soviet Government proposed to the Yugoslav Minister
that war material could be shipped via the Black Sea. The war material was first
to be brought to Piraeus. This report shows that the Soviet Government intended
to support the Yugoslav action against the Reich at any rate by means of
armament supplies and thereby to stab the Reich in the back during its struggle
for existence.
This entire policy
is manifestly based on the political and military cooperation of the Soviet
Union with Britain, and, more recently, with America too. A further indication
of this cooperation is, for instance, provided by the order issued on 18 March
by Mikoian, the Commissar for Foreign Trade, prohibiting the transport of war
material through Soviet territory. It is quite obvious that this regulation,
directed in the first place against Germany’s imports from East Asia, was made
exclusively in favour of Germany’s adversaries. It was quite openly commented on
and welcomed as such in the British and American Press.
About this time the
diplomatic support given to the British Government by Russia in the Balkans also
came to light. As is well known, the journey of Mr Eden, the British Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, to Istanbul was made with the object of building
up a Balkan front in which Turkey was to be included, and if possible of
bringing the Soviet Union into the ring as well. The way for this step was to
have been paved by Mr Eden’s visit to Moscow. Even if this journey came to
nothing because the Soviet Union did not consider that the time was ripe
formally to take sides with Germany’s adversaries, Moscow was still determined
to proceed in close cooperation with Britain, This was achieved by the trip to
Ankara of Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador, in a Russian military
plane, and by the intermediary of the Soviet Ambassador there. The result of
this discussion was the statement made public on 25 March 1941, in which the
Soviet Union, referring to the existing Non-Aggression Pact, assured Turkey of
its complete neutrality in the event of possible conflicts. The Associated Press
correspondent in Ankara summed up the Soviet Union’s aim in so doing as follows:
„By eliminating the possibility of counter-action by Russia in the event of
Turkey’s entering the war on the side of Britain, Moscow is, for the first time,
working openly and with weight against German diplomacy.” Although the British
plans for extending the war failed at that time owing to Turkey’s realistic
attitude, that did not alter the fact that Russia countenanced Britain’s
intentions. Moscow pursued the same policy with more success in the case of
Yugoslavia, when, in full accord with Britain, it incited the Belgrade
putschists to a coup d’état and encouraged them in their will to
fight by the conclusion of the Friendship Pact. Since then the relations between
the Soviet Union and Britain in the political and military spheres have become
ever closer, as has been made particularly evident by the news recently received
of the journey of Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador in Moscow, to
London,
Finally, there is
documentary evidence proving that negotiations between Moscow and Washington are
also proceeding, with the object of establishing a closer political connexion
between these two States. A confidential circular, which the Soviet Minister in
Bucharest addressed to a number of diplomats with whom he had close political
connexions, triumphantly describes such an alliance as the greatest military and
economic force in the world.
Reports
of the German High Command to the German
Government concerning the Soviet Russian
concentration of troops against Germany
High Command of the
Armed Forces
WFST/Abt. L (1 Op)
No. 00110 a/41 g.
Kdos.
Führer’s H. Q., 13.
1. 1941
VERY SECRET
Re Soviet Russian
frontier violations
To the
Foreign Office
For the attention
of Ambassador Ritter
After Soviet planes
had, on various occasions, during the autumn of last year flown over the
demarcation line in a westerly direction at a great altitude, the High Command
of the Armed Forces now reports that a foreign machine again flew far into
German territory near Wojciechowice on 10. 1. 1941. Altitude approximately 3,900
feet; outline and markings allowed it to be established beyond doubt that it was
a Soviet plane. The High Command of the Armed Forces will not for the time being
adopt counter-measures, but has issued instructions that all further violations
of the frontier are to be reported regularly.
The Foreign Office
will be duly informed by the undersigned.
The Chief of the
High Command
of the Armed Forces
By Order
Warlimont
High Command of the
Armed Forces
WFST / Abt. L (1
Op)
No. 00 369 a/41 g.
Kdos.
Führer’s H. Q., 1.
3. 1941
VERY SECRET
Re Soviet Russian
frontier violations
To the
Foreign Office
For the attention
of Ambassador Ritter
The High Command of
the Armed Forces reports that in the months of January and February, not
including the cases mentioned in the communication of the 13th Jan., Soviet
Russian planes have again flown over the demarcation line at many places.
Reports have been received more particularly from the area east of Chelm and
from Ostrolenka.
As the
German-Russian demarcation line in this region is especially clearly marked by
the Bug, and it is consequently very easy to take bearings from the air, the
High Command of the Armed Forces has now come to the conclusion that these
violations of the frontier constitute deliberate acts of provocation.
In this connexion,
attention is drawn to the statements by Soviet Russian officers, familiar to the
Foreign Office, concerning tension between Germany and Russia, which, filled
with hatred as they are, aid the anti-German propaganda conducted not only in
the Russian Army but also among the Russian people.
The High Command of
the Armed Forces wishes to draw attention to the seriousness of the consequences
which might possibly ensue therefrom.
As hitherto the
German Air Force has been instructed to refrain from any form of action
whatsoever.
The Chief of the
High Command
of the Armed Forces
By Order
Jodl
High Command of the
Armed Forces
WFST / Abt. L (1
Op)
No. 00 731 a/41 g.
Kdos.
Führer’s H. Q., 23,
4. 1941
VERY SECRET
Re Soviet Russian
frontier violations
To the
Foreign Office
For the attention
of Ambassador Ritter
Reports received
almost daily concerning further violations of the frontier by Soviet Russian
planes confirm the opinion of the High Command of the Armed Forces, as expressed
in the communication of 1 March, that it is a question of deliberate acts of
provocation on the Soviet Russian side.
On the 11th inst.,
two two-engined planes of the SB 2 type flew over the town of Belz at a great
altitude. On the 11th inst., one plane was seen at each of the places Malldnia
and Ostrow–Mazowike. A Soviet Russian plane was also reported over Langszorgen
on the 14th inst. On the 15th inst., several planes flew over the demarcation
line in the region Dynow–Lodzina–S.Losko. On the 17th inst, no less than 8
planes were sighted over German territory, i. e., four at both Deumenrode and
Swiddern; on the 19th inst., two planes were seen over Malkinia and another
flying at 600 feet (!) over Ostrowice.
A number of other
planes have also been reported, the nationality of which could not, however, be
established for certain on account of the altitude. There is, however, no doubt,
judging by the direction of flight and by the observations made by German units
stationed there, that these violations of the frontier were also made by Soviet
Russian planes.
The High Command of
the Armed Forces now feels obliged to state that the flights over the frontier,
which are continually increasing, henceforward will have to be looked upon in
the light of systematic activity of the Soviet Russian Air Force over the
territory of the Reich. Since it has become necessary in the meantime to bring
up more German units as reserves on account of the reinforcements of troops
beyond the German eastern frontier, the increased danger of serious frontier
incidents must be envisaged.
The instructions of
the High Command of the Armed Forces that no action whatsoever should be taken
are, however, still in force.
The Chief of the
High Command
of the Armed Forces
By Order
Jodl
High Command of the
Armed Forces
WFST / Abt. L, (1
Op)
No. 00 805 / 41 g.
Kdos.
Führer’s H, Q., 6.
5. 1941
VERY SECRET
Re Soviet Russian
frontier violations
To the
Foreign Office
For the attention
of Ambassador Ritter
Further to the
communication of 23 April, the High Command of the Armed Forces reports that
violations of the frontier by Soviet Russian soldiers are now also increasing to
an alarming extent.
(1) As early as the
beginning of December 1940, armed officers and soldiers, who were obviously
subjecting the German-Russian frontier area to systematic observation, were
sighted at various points between Jaroslaw and Sokal. In some cases photographs
were taken. It was not always possible to find out for certain whether they were
members of the Soviet Russian Army or officials of the Russian Customs Guard. In
each case the Russians were successful in escaping in the thick undergrowth at
the approach of the German frontier guards.
(2) Similar
observations were recently made at Smalodarsen, Kamienczyk, Terespol and Cabuce.
In the last three cases, Soviet Russian officers and soldiers crossed to the
German bank of the Bug in a motor boat and afterwards examined the German
frontier region with field glasses for a considerable time,
(3) With reference
to the sniping experienced by Lieutenant Dallinger of the Divisional Staff, 291
Division (as already reported by telewriter), the High Command of the Armed
Forces here quotes the detailed report of the High Command, 1.8th Army:
„Lieutenant Dallinger in charge of the Topographical Section of the 291st
Infantry Division, with Lance-Corporal Giessen of the Divisional Topographical
Section, had been ordered to find out and to determine exactly the area visible
to the Russians from the ground and from the observation towers.”
„In carrying out
this work in the vicinity of the frontier trench, Lieutenant Dallinger, at 16.30
hrs on 25 April 1941, was fired upon by a Russian sentry in the region to the
north-east of Ramutten. Lieutenant Dallinger and Lance- Corporal Giessen
immediately took cover, noted the time and the exact place and then continued
their reconnaissance, at a distance, however, of more than 100 yards from the
frontier. Lieutenant Dallinger immediately reported the incident to a member of
the frontier patrol in the vicinity who had noticed the incident, having heard
the shot.”
„Lieutenant
Dallinger, who was intimately acquainted with the course of the frontier, was
indisputably on German territory.”
„An exact sketch of
the spot is attached.”
The High Command of
the Armed Forces is forced to con- elude from these facts, together with the
numerous flights across the frontier, which are continually increasing in
numbers, that the Soviet Russian Army Command is systematically employing every
means of reconnaissance at its disposal.
Although the orders
of the High Command of the Armed Forces’ that no action whatsoever should be
taken continue to be in force, the High Command of the Armed Forces nevertheless
feels obliged to stress the fact that, from the degree of tension actually
existing, armed clashes, possibly on a large scale, might develop.
The Chief of the
High Command
of the Armed Forces
By Order
Jodl
The Chief
of the High Command
of the Armed Forces
WFST / Abt. L (1
Op)
No. 00 886 / 41 g.
Kdos.
Führer’s H. Q., 11,
5. 1941
VERY SECRET
To the
Reich Minister for
Foreign Affairs
Sir,
The High Command of
the Armed Forces has, for some months past, and with continually growing
anxiety, observed that the concentrations of Russian forces along the German
eastern frontier are increasing.
According to the
reports available here, there were, at the outbreak of the war in 1939, about 77
Russian infantry divisions in European Russia, of which only little more than
half were stationed in the Russian frontier zone in the west. After the
conclusion of the Polish campaign, this number increased to 114. Although the
High Command of the Armed Forces considered this as justified, to a certain
extent, by the Russian occupation of eastern Poland, even though it took place
almost without fighting, the further increase of this number to 121 after the
regular conclusion of these operations was regarded with all the more surprise.
Since the beginning
of this year, however, reports have been coming in almost daily to the High
Command of the Armed Forces from all parts of the frontier, which, when examined
as a whole, made it apparent that the Russians are carrying out extensive
concentrations of troops on the German eastern frontier. As the result of the
wholesale withdrawal of infantry, mechanized and tank divisions from Asia and
the Caucasus, in particular after the Russo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact on 1
May 1941, the number of infantry divisions alone in European Russia rose to 143.
Of these, 119 divisions were stationed in the German-Russian frontier zone.
In the case of the
tank brigades and tank divisions this increasing concentration is even more
pronounced. Since the beginning of the year, almost all the mechanized and tank
divisions observed at all, are in western Russia. To these must be added 20
cavalry divisions and several battalions of parachutists.
A similar
development can also be observed in the Russian Air Force. With the continually
increasing concentration of light aircraft units to support the army, the rapid
progress in the extension of the ground organization in the neighbourhood of the
frontier points to the preparation of extensive bombing attacks on the Reich by
large bomber units.
The High Command of
the Armed Forces furthermore refers to the repeated statements made by high
Soviet Russian officers, who at tactical exercises and manoeuvres have openly
spoken of an impending Russian offensive in the near future.
The High Command of
the Armed Forces, in considering these facts together with the frontier
violations by Soviet Russian planes and soldiers, which have been continually
reported to the Foreign Office, have come to the conclusion that the extent of
the Russian troop concentrations on the German eastern frontier, which is
practically the same as a mobilization, can only be interpreted as preparation
for a Russian offensive on the largest scale. The danger of an armed conflict is
becoming imminent.
The concentration
of their armed forces, which has now been practically concluded, enables the
Soviet Russian Government to have the free choice of when to begin the
offensive. Corresponding German counter-measures are now imperative.
Heil Hitler!
Keitel
VERY SECRET
High Command of the
Armed Forces
WFST / Abt. L (1
Op)
No. 001 096 a/41 g.
Kdos.
Führer’s H. Q., 8.
6, 1941
Re Soviet Russian
frontier violations
To the
Foreign Office
For the attention
of Ambassador Ritter
The High Command of
the Armed Forces herewith encloses a detailed list of the frontier violations by
Russian planes and soldiers since the beginning of the year. It should be noted
that this list is restricted to cases where the facts have been confirmed from
various quarters. Mention was already made in the communication dated 23 April
that a number of further frontier violations had also occurred.
Attention is,
therefore, once more and with the utmost insistence drawn to the dangerous
consequences of the situation on the German eastern frontier, as indicated in
the communication dated 6 May.
The Chief of the
High Command
of the Armed Forces
By Order
Jodl
1 enclosure
VERY SECRET
Berlin, 11 June
1941
High Command
Foreign, Nr.
212/41, secret,
for Dept. Chiefs
For Department
Chiefs,
to be passed on by
officers only.
To the Reich
Government,
by the intermediary
of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs
The High Command
has continually kept the Reich Government informed as to the extent to which
Soviet Russia’s military attitude has assumed an increasingly threatening
character. Whereas the political attitude of the Soviet Union was inclined to
vary, and the execution of contracts in the economic sphere afforded in general
no grounds for complaint, it has become clear that the military measures taken
by the Soviet Union: tend towards the preparation of an attack on Germany.
This development,
which has led to a large-scale deployment of the Red Army from the Black Sea to
the Baltic, can be outlined as follows:
At the close of
1939 and the beginning of 1940 there was no cause for anxiety in regard to
Germany’s eastern frontier. When Poland was liquidated the Soviet Union
outwardly showed a friendly attitude. But early in 1940 it was observed with
surprise that the Soviet Union had not only begun strongly to fortify their
western frontier, and was preparing the now familiar „no-man’s” zone along the
frontier, while transferring all industry to the interior, but had also
proceeded to reinforce the frontier troops in an ever-increasing measure.
On 1 September 1939
the following forces were stationed in the region west of the line
Archangel–Kalinin–Poltava – western extremity of the Crimea:
44 infantry
divisions,
20 cavalry
divisions, and
3 mechanized and
tank brigades.
In connexion with
the Polish campaign, the Soviet Union on 28 November 1939 reinforced these
troops by 47 divisions and mechanized and tank brigades to a total of:
76 infantry
divisions,
21 cavalry
divisions, and
17 mechanized and
tank brigades.
In spite of the
conclusion of the Polish campaign, these reinforcements were continued on a
large scale. Up till 12 March 1940, at least another 16, more probably 25,
divisions and mechanized brigades were added. The total strength of the Soviet
Russian forces in the region of the western frontier in the middle of March 1940
was accordingly:
86–95 infantry
divisions,
22 cavalry
divisions, and
22 mechanized and
tank brigades.
While, in the
beginning, cooperation between the German and Soviet Russian authorities on the
new frontier in former Poland apparently proceeded satisfactorily and smoothly,
serious incidents occurred more and more frequently in the winter of 1939/40
(appendix 1). The incidents revealed a pronounced aversion and anti-German
attitude on the part of the Soviet Russian frontier troops. This behaviour was
entirely unaccountable, as the Germans openly displayed their peaceful
intentions and strove to establish peaceful neighbourly relations along the
frontier. Whereas violations of the frontier on the part of the Germans were
mostly of minor importance and could always be proved to have been
unintentional, the violations by the Soviet Russian troops were much more
numerous, incomparably graver and often led to fatal results on German
territory. Not until the Reich Government made strong representations did the
number of frontier violations on the part of the Russians diminish, at least for
a certain time.
When the Baltic
States were occupied by Soviet Russia, certain agreements were reached,
according to which the troops of occupation should not exceed a total strength
of 70,000 men. At first, this figure was not even reached. Thus, on 28 January
1939, the strength of the army of occupation was 53,000 men and on 1 February
1940, 57,500 men. The occupation met with no resistance; even as time went on,
conditions never obtained in the occupied territories which would have made it
necessary on military grounds to increase the strength of the Soviet Russian
army of occupation. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, after having completely
incorporated the three countries, proceeded to station in these territories an
exceedingly powerful force embracing all branches of the services. In the early
summer of 1940 this force had attained a total strength of approximately 250,000
men; at the present time it is estimated that 650,000 men are stationed on the
territory of the former Baltic States. The concentration of powerful Russian
forces on the Russian- Rumanian ‘frontier commencing in October 1940 represented
a further grave menace to Germany. When, in September 1940, at the request of
the then Rumanian Government, the sending of a German military mission to
Rumania was considered, and at a later date put into effect, the Government of
the U.S.S.R. took advantage of this circumstance as an occasion for
concentrating a number of units of the Army and the Air Force in Bessarabia and
in the Bukovina on the Rumanian frontier, subsequently stationing them there
permanently. The object of this step was at first to weaken German influence in
the Balkans by exerting pressure on the Balkan States, and to frustrate
Germany’s plans in the Balkans, which she intended to carry out peacefully.
Since the moment when increasingly powerful British forces began to appear in
Greece, however, the object of the Russian forces concentrated on the Rumanian
frontier, manifestly was to intervene in the armed conflict which became
inevitable after the coup d’état in Belgrade on 27 March 1941, and,
advancing towards the west, to establish contact with the Yugoslav forces and to
cut off tire lines of communication serving the German forces in the Balkans.
The necessary preliminaries for an attack were attended to; aerodromes were laid
out near the frontier, bases were established, tank units were brought up,
communications to the rear were improved, and numerous lines of advance were
prepared through the mountains to the frontier, These plans were only baulked by
the rapid and decisive German successes.
The years 1940 and
1941 were marked by an uninterrupted series of violations of the German frontier
by the Soviet Russian Air Force. In the month of May 1941, alone, the German
frontier was crossed 27 times by Soviet Russian aircraft. Violations of the
frontier by Soviet Russian soldiers also recommenced in the beginning of 1941
and are gradually assuming intolerable proportions.
An impressive idea
of the extraordinary Soviet Russian troop concentrations on the western frontier
is afforded by the following summary taken from appendix 2.
1 September 1939:
44 infantry
divisions,
20 cavalry
divisions,
3 mechanized and
tank brigades,
total, about 65
divisions.
28 November 1939:
76 infantry
divisions,
21 cavalry
divisions,
17 mechanized and
tank brigades,
total, about 106
divisions.
1 May 1941:
118 infantry
divisions,
20 cavalry
divisions,
40 mechanized and
tank brigades,
total, about 158
divisions.
In view of these
reinforcements of the Red Army, the High Command was obliged gradually to
transfer considerable forces to the German eastern frontier. This redistribution
was directly and exclusively necessitated by the threatening concentration of
Soviet Russian troops.
The menace which
this concentration of the Russian Army constituted for Germany corresponds to
their intense anti-German spirit, which was continuously stirred up and
maintained by hostile propaganda. Innumerable reports from friendly and neutral
observers confirm this.
From Appendix 2,
section VI, it will be seen that the concentration of the Red Army must in
general be regarded as complete. For of a total of
170 infantry
divisions,
33
½ cavalry
divisions,
46 mechanized and
tank brigades,
the following are
stationed in the western frontier territory:
118 infantry
divisions,
20 cavalry
divisions,
40 mechanized and
tank brigades.
In the remainder of
Russia in Europe only
27 infantry
divisions,
5½
cavalry divisions,
1 mechanized and
tank brigade,
and in the Far East
no more than
25 infantry
divisions,
8 cavalry
divisions,
5 mechanized and
tank brigades
remain.
From these figures
it is evident that the Russian forces have been concentrated nearer and nearer
to the frontier. The various units of the Army and the Air Force have closed up
towards the front; aerodromes along the frontier have been occupied by powerful
Air Force units. Reconnaissance activity has increased in a marked measure, very
high officers with large staffs occasionally taking an active part.
All these facts,
combined with the hostile and destructive feelings towards Germany with which
the Russian forces are imbued, inevitably lead to the conclusion that the Soviet
Union is preparing to deliver an attack on the Reich at the moment which appears
to them to be propitious.
The Chief of the
High Command
(signed) Keitel
Summary
of frontier violations by Russian aircraft and Russian soldiers
New Page 2
|
No. |
Date |
Place |
Remarks |
|
1 |
10th
Jan. |
Wojciechowice |
Presumably Russian, 1 100 yards into German territory
|
|
2 |
4th Apl. |
Belz |
|
|
3 |
4th
Apl. |
Beiz |
10,000 – 13,000 ft altitude, 2-engine, presumably type S B2 |
|
4 |
11th
Apl. |
Malkinia |
Remained
½
hour over German territory |
|
5 |
11th Apl. |
Ostrów-Mazowike |
10,000
ft altitude |
|
6 |
14th Apl. |
Langszorgen |
2-engined
Russian plane |
|
7 |
15th Apl. |
Dynów–Lod- zina – S. of
Losko |
Several aircraft passed over frontier |
|
8 |
17th Apl. |
Deumenrode |
4 aircraft |
|
9 |
17 th Apl. |
Swidderrt |
4
single-engined monoplanes, circling over Swiddern at altitude of
3300 ft |
|
10 |
19th Apl. |
Malkinia |
Type I 16 Rada; wide sweep over Bug bridge |
|
11 |
19th Apl. |
Malkinia |
Over Malkinia, from east to west |
|
12 |
19th Apl. |
Ostrowice |
650 ft altitude, heading for Baczi, no markings |
|
13 |
26th Apl. |
Suwalki |
5 Russians with vehicle; 1 second lieutenant, 1 sergeant, 2 N.C.O.S,
1
man, armed with submachineguns |
|
14 |
16th Apl. |
Kamienczyk |
Motor boat with 6 persons; it is presumed that photographs were
taken |
|
15 |
26th Apl. |
Smalodarsen |
2 armed Russian soldiers who observed ground |
|
16 |
27th Apl. |
Terespol |
Motor boat with 7 men; officers searched German frontier territory |
|
17 |
27th Apl. |
Cabuce |
Motor boat moored on German bank of the Bug |
|
18 |
7th May |
Turan |
Single-engined monoplane |
|
19 |
9th May |
Lyck |
Two-engined plane |
|
20 |
9th May |
Korzew |
Marking could not be made out distinctly |
|
21 |
9th May |
Saranaki |
Russian biplane at altitude of 100 ft |
|
22 |
9th May |
Radeby |
1¾–2½
miles over German territory |
|
23 |
10th May |
Saranaki |
Circled 15 minutes over German territory, photographs probably taken |
|
24 |
10th May |
Granne |
3 planes, altitude 5000 ft |
|
25 |
10th May |
Wieska |
Flight over German territory from easterly direction |
|
26 |
10th May |
Mogielnica |
1 plane of Russian nationality |
|
27 |
19th May |
Drugen |
2 single-engined planes, circled twice over Labour Service-Camp |
|
28 |
21st May |
Grajewo |
Single-engined low-wing monoplane at altitude of 3300 ft |
|
29 |
24th May |
Ugniewo
(3 m. E. of
Ostrów |
3 biplanes |
|
30 |
24th
May |
Gezjmki-
Pozewo |
1 Russian reconnaissance plane (4000 to 5000 ft altitude)
|
|
31 |
24th May |
Ostrów-Mez |
probably same machine as No. 30 |
|
32 |
26th May |
Ostrów-Maz
Zamość |
2 Russian planes, single-engined low- wing monoplanes, with distinct
Soviet nationality marking |
|
33 |
26th May |
Zamość |
1 Russian monoplane |
|
34 |
26th May |
Wojciechowice
Ostrolenka
Zamość |
1 land plane (monoplane) altitude about 2600 ft, the Soviet Russian
nationality marking, the Red Star, was observed |
|
35
|
26th May |
Narew-Baw
(11.40Hrs) |
1 Russian single-seater fighter (I 16) at altitude of 6500 ft, flew
over barracks, Woyiece, Kowo, Ostrolenka railway station |
|
36 |
26th May |
Rozan |
1 single-engined plane at altitude of 5000 ft |
|
37 |
26th May |
Lubicjewo
(12.01hrs) |
1 Russian single-seater fighter (I 16) at low altitude in direction
of Komorewo camp probably same machine as in No.
34 |
|
38 |
2nd
June |
Wiszniz |
1 plane (about 13 000 ft altitude), south-east of Biata – Podlaski –
Eomazy |
|
39 |
2nd June |
Nittfcen
(9½
miles S. E, of Larys) |
1 plane at altitude of about 26,000 to 30,000 ft |
|
40 |
5th June |
Sarnaki
|
1
Russian plane coming from north crossed the Bug at great altitude in
direction of Sarnaki (14 miles N.E. of Biala – Podlaski) |
|
41 |
6th June |
Goworowo |
2 Russian biplanes, probably R
5
or K Z at 1650 ft altitude over Goworowo – Ostro
–
Maz – Ukliewo |
High
Command
Berlin, 20 June 1941
W F St/Abt L (I Op)
No. 001161/41 g.K.
VERY SECRET
Re Soviet Russian
frontier violations
To the
Foreign Office
For the attention
of Ambassador Ritter
On 17 June, at 8.25
hrs., armed Russian soldiers crossed the Russian frontier in the sector occupied
by the VI German Army Corps east of the Rominten Moors, near Ejszeryszki (9½
miles west of Kalwaria), and proceeded cautiously on German territory. When
German sentries fired on the Russian soldiers, they took cover. After a brief
exchange of shots the Russians then withdrew to their own territory.
This occurrence, in
conjunction with the concentration of Soviet Russian forces, which is
particularly strong opposite East Prussia, is a further indication of Soviet
Russia’s provocative intentions.
Since 11 June, 20
infantry divisions, 2 tank divisions and 5 tank brigades have been definitely
ascertained opposite the section of the frontier from Suwalld–Memel alone.
In the curve round
Bialystok, which projects far to the west, 19 infantry divisions, 7 cavalry
divisions, 1 tank division and 5 tank brigades are concentrated.
Behind there, round
Baranowiczy, a reserve army of 10 infantry divisions and 2 tank brigades is
assembled.
From this it is
clear that at any moment a tremendous Soviet Russian force which is divided into
4 armies and embraces
49 infantry
divisions, including numerous mechanized divisions,
3 tank divisions, -
12 tank brigades
and
7 cavalry
divisions, .
can commence to
move, from the east and south-east, towards East Prussia and the country round
the mouths of the Bug and the Narew north of Warsaw.
Such an attack can,
according to the information available in regard to the aircraft stationed on
the Soviet Russian aerodromes north of the Pripet Marshes, be supported by
nearly 2000 planes.
It was explained in
detail to the German Foreign Office as early as 11 May that Soviet Russian
forces were similarly concentrated on all the rest of the Eastern front, though
not to such a pronounced degree. In the last few weeks the situation regarding
the concentration of Soviet troops has only changed inasmuch as in South
Bessarabia exclusively mobile forces (tank divisions and brigades as well as
mechanized and cavalry divisions) are assembled, which definitely points to
aggressive intentions.
In conclusion, the
High Command must observe that military measures of such a kind adopted towards
a State with which a Friendship Pact exists must be characterized as extremely
remarkable.
There can be no
doubt but that for months Soviet Russia has regarded this pact simply as a
safeguard enabling her to carry out with as little disturbance as possible the
greatest military concentration in her history directed against Germany in
Britain’s interests.
The security of the
Reich renders it necessary to remove this threat without delay.
The Chief of the
High Command
By Order
(signed)
Jodl
Appendix 1
Frontier incidents — winter 1939/40
|
25 Dec.
1939: |
near
Mrzygkid: shots fired on German frontier customs guard when a
Russian, liable to military service, was arrested. |
|
9 Jan.
1940: |
Kuzawka:
German customs official fired on. |
|
15 Jan.
1940: |
Gluchów:
fugitive who was on German territory shot. |
|
26 Jan.
1940: |
Danilowo: German customs patrol fired on. |
|
30 Dec.
1939: |
Wolka-Nadbutzna: woman coming from U.S.S.R. shot on German
territory. |
|
19 Dec.
1939: |
Sokolów:
fugitives fired on by Russian sentries with tracer bullets falling
on German territory 330 yards from frontier. |
|
6 Jan.
1940: |
Rayskle-San:
a Ukrainian fired on 120 yards from frontier. |
|
8 Jan.
1940: |
Koytniky-San: 1 fugitive shot on German territory.
1
severely wounded. |
|
7 Jan.
1940: |
Ostrów-San:
2 Chinese pedlars shot |
|
27 Jan.
1940: |
Kankowo:
1. 2
Russian frontier guards fired on and killed an unknown frontier
inhabitant, who was on German territory.
2. A
Russian frontier guard crossed the frontier line
and
carried off a young frontier inhabitant. |
|
1 Feb.
1940: |
Ugniewo:
customs office reported German customs guards fired on by Russian
frontier troops. |
|
2 Feb.
1940: |
Sokal:
Russian frontier guard shot a fugitive on German territory, also a
woman (Swiatawski). |
|
23 Feb.
1940: |
Przemyśl;
on illegally crossing the frontier a woman was shot at from the
Russian aide. 10 shots were fired and she was wounded in the upper
thigh. |
|
13 Feb.
1940: |
Sokal:
Jew shot on German territory by Russian frontier guard. |
|
8 March
1940: |
Sokal:
2 frontier inhabitants shot at on German territory. 1 killed. |
Report
by the Reich Minister of the Interior and the Reich
Chief of the SS and Chief of the German Police
to the Reich Government
concerning the subversive activities of the
U.S.S.R. directed against Germany and National
Socialism
The Reich Minister
of the Interior
Berlin, 20 June
1941
We submit herewith
a report by the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service dated 10
June 1941 concerning subversive activities by the U.S.S.R. directed against
Germany and National Socialism.
|
The
Reich Minister of the
Interior
(signed) Frick
|
|
The
Reich Chief of the
SS and
Chief of the
German
Police
(signed) Himmler
|
To the
Reich Government
through the
intermediary of
the Reich Minister
for Foreign Affairs
Berlin
The Chief of the
Security Police
Berlin, 10 June 1941
and the Security
Service
IV E L 17/41 gRS
Secret Reich Communication
Report to the Reich
Chief of the SS and Chief of the German Police.
The subversive
activity carried on by the Communist Internationale against the Axis
Powers and especially against National Socialist Germany up to the conclusion of
the German-Soviet Consultation and Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939 is a
matter of common knowledge.
The hope that after
the conclusion of this Pact Soviet Russia would act in good faith in accordance
with the terms of the agreement and cease her inflammatory activities against
the German Reich, was unfounded. On the contrary, Communist subversive
activities, attempted acts, of sabotage and terror and a maximum speeding up in
the development of their military, economic and political Intelligence Service
were the fixed, but recognizable, aims of the Soviet Russian leaders.
The only thing they
altered was their method, which, owing to its ever-changing style and subtle
camouflage, continually presented our police with fresh problems.
I. Construction
and Aims of the Comintern.
The Communist
Internationale (Comintern) is a Soviet Russian organization (having its
headquarters in Moscow), the aim of which is (§ 1 of the Statute): „to unite the
Communist Parties of all countries in a universal party and to fight for the
conversion of the working classes and for the principles of Communism and the
dictatorship of the proletariat.” (Even today, Stalin, as First Secretary of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a member of the Board of the Executive
Committee of the Comintern. The same applies to Molotov, to Pieck, a German
emigrant and representative of the German section of the Communist
Internationale, Thorez, the French Communist Leader, and Dimitrov, the Bulgarian
terrorist, who gained notoriety as being implicated in the Reichstag fire and
who is their Chairman.)
In official circles
in the Soviet Union the Comintern represents an independent and unofficial, that
is to say, a nonstate machine, which can be used for the purpose of carrying out
any subversive activity on an international scale. Apart from special
intelligence services and espionage the Comintern is, however, utilized for the
accomplishment of special tasks abroad, thus rendering exact differentiation in
counteracting its activities extremely difficult.
Especially since
the outbreak of tire war the disruptive work of the Comintern has been
intensified by the employment of huge numbers of men and vast sums of money. All
Europe was flooded with proclamations and instructions issued to the various
national sections with the object of inciting adherents to the Communist
ideology to devote their entire energy to unremitting subversive activity
against „Germany’s Imperialistic War,“ one of the main objects being to
neutralize by this increased activity the detrimental effects which the
conclusion of the pact with National Socialist Germany was assumed to have on
the Soviet Union.
II. The new
Method employed in carrying out illegal
subversive
Activities.
1. Against the Reich.
Owing to the
relentless struggle against, and the extermination of, the Communist Party from
1933 onwards, which was a necessary consequence of the uncompromising attitude
of the National Socialist Party, not only had the most strenuous efforts of the
Comintern working abroad been in vain, but the controlled activities of small
residuary sections of the Communist Party and its AM and BB groups (AM =
Military Political Section, and BB = Industrial Espionage), had also proved
useless during the period preceding the conclusion of the pact.
The Comintern
replied to the increased pressure exerted by the Police Preventive Authorities
by issuing methodical instructions concerning more subtle tactics with regard to
subversive activities. Following the example of the Trojan Horse, more was to be
done from within, as in the typical case of the Spanish Civil War. Through the
conclusion of the pact on 23 August 1939, this procedure was deprived of any
propaganda value, a fact which the Executive Committee of the Comintern wished
to counterbalance by increased activity with a view to rebuilding comprehensive
AM and BB machinery. Whereas the work of the Comintern proved easier in the
occupied territories owing to the fact that efficient collecting centres of the
Communist Parties themselves were still in existence, its efforts directed
against the Reich never got beyond the preliminary stage, thanks to timely
intervention.
It was established
on the grounds of continued observation that the liaison centres of the
Comintern had once again been systematically extended throughout the countries
of Europe with the sole object of intensifying subversive activity and
intelligence service within Germany.
Thus, one of the
main liaison centres is that of the Swedish Communist Party in Stockholm. It is
one of the Comintern’s busiest and most dangerous centres of activity. The
methods adopted by it against the Reich will be described in greater detail
below on the basis of the abundant material available.
Activity directed
against the Reich was mainly entrusted to former leading German Communist agents
who had been trained for many years in Moscow and in other European cities.
Their infiltration into the Reich began in the year 1939. One of the most wily
of these succeeded in establishing contact on a far-reaching scale with
fellow-partisans with whom he had formerly been acquainted and by dint of
systematic effort he re-established Communist cells in large factories in Berlin
in which work of military importance was being executed. The unswerving object
of this activity was not only to spread sedition amongst the employees but also
to encourage them to perform acts of sabotage and at the same time to carry out
industrial espionage. By skilfully planned courier routes material, instructions
and money were continually received from the Comintern instructors in Stockholm
and Copenhagen. A member of the Swedish Riksdag, of the name of Linderoth, who
is the Stockholm representative of the European Office of the Comintern, played
a leading part in planning this organization, which assumed dangerous
proportions,
He executed special
commissions with which he was entrusted by the Executive Committee of the
Communist Internationale for the various countries. From Stockholm, Linderoth
enlisted the services of direct agents of the Comintern in Copenhagen to work
against the Reich. They were also financed by him. In order that leading agents
(such as Arthur Emmerlich, born 20 Sept. 1907 in Niederwiesa; Willy Gall, born 3
Oct. 1908 in Falkenstein/Vogtland; Rudolf Hallmeyer, born 3 Feb. 1908 in Plauen,
and Heinrich Schmeer, born 20 March 1906) might be protected as far as possible
against intervention on the part of the Security Service (SD), they received
instructions from Linderoth’s agents on the methods which, it was assumed, would
be used by the Police. This course of instruction was arranged by Dmitri
Fedoseevich Krylov, an OGPU commissar, who is very well known here. (Since 3
Feb. 1941 the OGPU has become a section of the United People’s Commissariat for
Internal Affairs under the style of „The People’s Commissariat for National
Security’’).
The organization
developed by the above-mentioned leading agents operated through a courier
centre which had in the meantime been duly established in Hamburg, and which
communicated with Moscow via Copenhagen and Stockholm, its purpose being to
supply, in return for money and in accordance with instructions, vital
information concerning the rate of manufacture and production of the newest
kinds of armaments in Germany.
Apart from these
tasks it was the duty of the organization to arrange for the continuous issue of
seditious leaflets. The last instructions to reach Emmerlich from the Comintern
in Moscow (dated end of May 1941) provided striking proof that plans had been
made and were actually being carried out for the sending of a large number of
additional instructors during the next two months to be distributed throughout
the various districts of the Reich.
Since, owing to the
size of the organization, those whose duty it was to observe its activities were
no longer in a position to prevent actual damage from being done, they
intervened at the end of May 1941 and arrested all those concerned.
2. Against the territories occupied
by Germany.
The technique of
subversive activity carried out by the Comintern in the territories occupied by
Germany took a form similar to that described above:–
a) In the Protectorate
Even before the
occupation of the former Czechoslovak territory the Communist Party was very
active, but it was particularly after the establishment of the Protectorate that
its illegal activities attained their full height. In recent years Communist
agents were continually being summoned from that country to attend the Lenin
School in Moscow, where they received a course of military and political
training in the theory and practice of civil war and terrorism.
These qualified
agents were employed after the. establishment of the Protectorate. They at once
began with the construction and development of the illegal German Communist
Party.
Contact with the
Comintern was maintained and the supervision and organization of Party
activities were carried out through the Consulate General of the U.S.S.R. in
Prague. Kurt Beer, a Jew, TASS correspondent and press reporter at the Soviet
Russian Consulate General, acted as liaison officer for the Soviet Russian
Consulate General In the execution of his duties he received from the diplomatic
representatives Russian newspapers and Communist propaganda material, which he,
in accordance with his instructions, handed over to the chief agents of the
German Communist Party, lie also handed out large sums of money to be expended
for the carrying on of illegal activity by the Party.
In addition to this
means of communication through the Soviet Russian Consulate General, the
Comintern in the Protectorate had direct wireless communication with Moscow. The
agents who were entrusted with the management of the Comintern’s secret
broadcasting station in Prague had also received a special course of training at
the school of wireless telegraphy in Moscow. (This school is supervised by the
Comintern and watched over by the Red Army.) The courses are organized on a very
broad basis and are designated as „OMS”, i. e., Organizatsiia Mezhdunarodnogo
Soedineniia (Organization of International Connexions).
The wireless system
in Prague, which was functioning until a few days ago, consisted of a big
transmitting and receiving apparatus.
By means of
wireless, reports were sent from Prague concerning the general political
situation within the country, the conduct and success of the activities carried
out by the Party, the meetings of all those in charge in this centre and the
resolutions passed at such meetings, and also the situation, morale and activity
of the Party. Similarly, orders and instructions were received from the
Executive Committee of the Comintern in Moscow. The wireless transmissions from
both sides which we have secured provide incontrovertible proof of the
unyielding revolutionary aims of the Comintern directed at destroying National
Socialism.
b) In the occupied territory in France.
The Comintern also
paid particular attention to the French Communist Party, especially as in
Lenin’s opinion France was destined to become the Bolshevist bulwark in Western
Europe. In view of the present internal weakness and disintegration of France
the Communist Internationale, which, before the war, had a large number
of adherents, hoped to score a success.
Here, too, we have
obtained irrefutable evidence that the Communists in France were provided with
money and means of propaganda in every form by the diplomatic representatives of
the Soviet Union.
Here, too, the pact
of 23 August 1939 played no part, or at least only in so far as from that time
onwards the anti-German activity of French Communists was intensified by
indirect means. The most striking and at the same time the most direct proof of
this is supplied by a document found in Paris in the course of a search
conducted at the
Sûreté Nationale
(the French Secret Police) concerning the French daily newspaper L’Ordre.
Authentic documents of the French police provide evidence that, apart from
Vutsević who was in charge of the press department of the Yugoslav Legation and
Jaques Ebstein, who was the lover of Lady Stanley, Lord Derby’s sister, a Czech
Jew named Otto Katz, alias Karl Simon, who was in the pay of Soviet Russia, was
in November 1939 actively concerned in putting this paper on a sound financial
basis. In November 1939 Mr. Surits, the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, accompanied
by the former Spanish Communist Minister,
Señor
Negrin, and in January and February 1940 by Mr. Biriukov, Secretary to the
Embassy, had visited the chief editor of the newspaper, Mr. Bure, at his villa
in Saint Cloud. On this occasion it was decided that a certain Etevenont should
be employed as official agent of the Soviet Russian Embassy on the managerial
staff of the newspaper L’Ordre. The sum granted for this purpose was
increased at the end of March to 800,000 francs per month. After the dissolution
of their Party in France, the Communist Leaders were given express orders to
instruct their followers to read L’Ordre as a reliable anti-German paper.
c) In the other occupied territories.
In Norway, too, the
Soviet Legation in Oslo was the centre of the Comintern’s disruptive propaganda.
Here we succeeded in surprising members of the Legation in the very act of
carrying out this work.
In Holland, Belgium
and in the former Yugoslav State, proof was obtained that the same methods were
used as against the German Reich,
We should far
exceed the limits of this short report if we were to deal at full length with
the abundant documentary evidence consisting, of witnesses’ statements and
written proof available concerning the subversive activities and espionage
carried out by the Comintern.
It is important to
stress the fact, which is constantly, confirmed, that the attitude of the Soviet
Union towards the Reich and the territories occupied by it was insincere and
that since 1940 the subversive activity of the Comintern has increased with
feverish zeal.
III. Sabotage by
the Comintern.
Some ten years
before the outbreak of war the Comintern began to order seasoned Communists of
all sections to Soviet Russia, and to instruct them in various training centres,
sabotage and the science of explosives forming the main subjects. Since 1930 the
so-called politico-military training courses in Moscow were resumed with
particular intensity and have been continued ever since. As the Comintern always
reckoned on the possibility of military conflict occurring in the realization of
their efforts to attain world power, they issued instructions at their World
Congresses, which plainly incited their supporters to perform acts of
terrorization and sabotage and which represented such acts of violence as a
political necessity.
The large number of
terrorist and sabotage groups discovered by the Security Police (S.D.) in the
Reich, which had been established at the orders of the Comintern, is
characteristic of the attitude adopted by the Soviet Union towards the Reich.
Acts of sabotage on objects of military importance suck as bridges, the
blowing-up of important main railway lines and the destruction and crippling of
important industrial works were the means chosen by these purely Communist
groups, which did not hesitate to destroy human life in carrying out their
actions. Besides orders to carry out acts of sabotage, the perpetrators also
received instructions regarding attempts to be made on the life of prominent
persons in the Reich.
Although it might
have been presumed that the series of crimes of violence carried out, or still
in the course of preparation, by the Comintern would come to an end with the
conclusion of the Consultation and Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and
Russia on 23 August 1939, detailed investigations, which were also carried out
in the territories occupied by Germany, have provided proof that the Comintern
had no intention of ceasing their criminal activities against the Reich.
Besides the groups
formed on the instructions of the British Secret Service for carrying out acts
of sabotage on shipping, whose aim already in peace-time had been the
destruction. of German vessels, there existed another terrorist organization of
the Comintern with far wider ramifications, the principal task of which was the
destruction of the ships of those States which used to form the Anti-Comintern
bloc.
Proof exists that
members of this organization were active until the end of 1940 and were
attempting from Denmark to resume their operations in the Reich. The leader of
this organization was the German émigré.
Ernst
Wollweber,
who in 1931 had
been a prominent figure in the Red German Trade Union Opposition and who had
been elected to the Reichstag in November 1932 as a deputy of the German
Communist Party. After emigrating to Copenhagen in 1933, Wollweber assumed
leadership of the Seamen’s and Dockers’ International, which professional
international organization is responsible for the acts of sabotage ordered by
the Comintern, especially against German vessels. The organization and active
employment of the sabotage groups formed on instructions from Moscow in Germany,
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France and the former Baltic States
was chiefly his work. He exercised a far-reaching control over the supply and
transport of explosives and other materials for the purpose of sabotage, and had
at his disposal the, large sums of money provided by the Comintern for financing
the organization and paying the agents. When the German troops entered Oslo in
May 1940, Wollweber fled to Sweden where he is still under arrest in Stockholm.
The Soviet Government has approached the Swedish Government to secure his
extradition to Soviet Russia, particularly since he has in the meantime been
awarded Soviet Russian nationality for his successful work for the Comintern.
Successive acts of
sabotage on 16 German, 3 Italian, and 2- Japanese vessels, resulting in two
cases in the total loss of valuable ships, were due to the activities of this
group of Communist terrorists, which had spread over the whole of Europe. Whilst
the terrorists at first attempted to destroy the ships by setting fire to them,
they recently, when this method in most cases did not result in the total loss
of the ships, began to carry out attacks by means of explosives upon the ships
plying in the Baltic and the North Sea. Their chief centres were situated in the
ports of Hamburg, Bremen, Danzig, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Oslo, Revel,
and Riga.
The Communist
sabotage groups formed in Holland, Belgium and France were led by the Dutch
Communist
Josef Rimbertus
Schaap,
who was the leader
of the Inter-Club in Rotterdam and was closely connected with the principal
officials of the head organization in Scandinavia. His second-in-command was the
former Organization Chief of the Red Ex-Service-Men’s Association in Hamburg
Karl
Bargstädt,
who was responsible
to the head organization for the technical details of the sabotage acts with
explosives. The necessary explosives came from ore mines in Northern Scandinavia
and were conveyed to the Communist sabotage groups in Holland, Belgium and
France by Dutch sailors via the Norwegian ore harbour of Narvik and the Swedish
ore harbour of Luleå. One of the most prominent conveyors of explosives, the
Dutch Communist
Willem van
Vreeswijk,
was arrested in
Rotterdam.
Both the Dutch and
Belgian groups had a number of laboratories in which they manufactured,
incendiary and explosive bombs. The acts of sabotage carried out on the Italian
steamer „Boccaccio” and the Japanese steamer „Kasij Maru” must be attributed to
the activities of these groups. Acts of sabotage planned against German ships in
the harbours of Amsterdam and Rotterdam were discovered in due time and
prevented.
During the course
of further investigations, the Security Police (S.D.) were able to arrest 24
Communist terrorists, among whom were the leader of the Dutch sabotage group
Achille
Beguin,
and the leader of
the Belgian sabotage group
Alfons
Fictels.
The Danish police
were able to arrest Schaap himself in Copenhagen on 1 July 1940, while he was
preparing to get the shipping sabotage organization already existing in Denmark
under way again.
To what extent the
Comintern is striving to annihilate German shipping in the Baltic by means of
sabotage is apparent from the fact that in the months between February and April
1941, the Security Police (S.D.) in collaboration with the Danish police,
succeeded in arresting prominent officials of the Communist Party in Denmark who
had been aiding Communist sabotage groups and taking an active part themselves.
They include
Richard
Jensen,
a member of the
Executive Committee, of the Communist Party in Denmark, and General Secretary of
the Seamen’s and Dockers’ International.
Thöger
Thögersen,
the editor of the
Danish Communist paper „Arbejderbladet” in Copenhagen, and
Otto
Melchior,
a half-Jew and a
member of the Committee of the Danish Union of the Friends of Soviet Russia.
The Communist
sabotage group in Denmark is directly responsible for the attempts made on the
German steamer „Saar” in the harbour of Revel and the German cargo-boat „Phila”
in the harbour of Königsberg, where in the latter case a violent explosion
caused a large hole forward on a level with the water-line. The chemical
time-explosive was put on board at Riga.
Chemical and
mechanical incendiary explosives and fuses used by the Danish Communist
organization came from Sweden, and were always taken to Copenhagen by special,
messenger from a men’s outfitter’s business in Malmö where they were stored.
Highly important
indications regarding the work of the Comintern against Germany have been
gathered from the statements made by other Communist terrorists in Denmark.
The Comintern, it
appears, made particular efforts to procure Scandinavian seamen as
collaborators, as it was thought that only the Scandinavian States would remain
neutral in a coming war and that only nationals of those states would, then be
able to carry out acts of terrorization in German ports and on German ships.
Urgent instructions were, moreover, given that the cargoes of their own ships
should be destroyed by fire and explosions if this served the interests of the
Soviet Union. Wollweber himself had instructed the various sabotage groups in
the Baltic States and in the German North Sea ports to make sure of at least one
reliable collaborator on all ships in those waters, who was to be carefully
trained for his future work for the cause of the Third Internationale.
It was also due to
his instructions that an attempt was made to establish a sabotage group in
Danzig.
Leading officials
of the Seamen’s and Dockers’ International belonging to these groups, among them
the Norwegian national from Oslo
Arthur
Samsing,
who lived for a
considerable time in the Soviet Union, have meanwhile been arrested and have
made detailed statements concerning their sabotage acts directed against the
Reich on Wollweber’s orders.
On the instructions
of the Comintern, Wollweber also established bases on the Baltic islands of Dagö
and Ösel. The collaborators procured on these islands were not, however, to act
unless these islands were occupied by German troops or by the German Navy in the
course of a war between Germany and the Soviet Union.
The sabotage acts
were then to be directed primarily against submarine bases, aerodromes and oil
storage depots.
To what extent
Bolshevism also attempted to display activity, in the Reich is apparent from the
fact that since March 1941 the Security Police (S.D.) in Upper Silesia and in
the Government General have ascertained that Communist elements were being
increasingly employed as leaders of Polish sabotage and terrorist organizations.
Here, too, the organization of crimes of violence committed recently has been
found to be characterized by Communist methods of operation as issued by the
Comintern to all sections when the „War Theses” were drawn up at the VI and VII
World Congresses in Moscow.
IV. Soviet
Russian Espionage (Economic, Military and Political Intelligence Service)
against the Reich.
1. OGPU methods
against repatriated Germans.
When Russia, as a
result of the frontier treaty between Germany and Russia on 29 September 1939,
profited from the fruits of the German victory over Poland by a considerable
increase of territory, she made use of the demarcation of the German and Russian
spheres of interest in order to employ the re-established contiguity of
frontiers with Germany for despatching innumerable espionage agents to the
territory of her partner in the Non-Aggression Pact.
The magnanimous
action of the Führer towards repatriation of Germans living on Russian territory
was exploited in a despicable manner for these purposes.
When the Germans,
in answer to the Führer’s call, reported in large numbers for repatriation, the
notorious OGPU, which since 3 February 1941 has become a part of the united
People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, with the title of „People’s
Commissariat for State Security,” made its appearance for the purpose of
engaging many of these Germans by means of the most objectionable methods for
espionage activity against the country to which, inspired by patriotic feelings,
they were preparing to return. Although the OGPU scarcely achieved any practical
success, because most of the people thus coerced for espionage work immediately
reported this on reaching Germany, the fact nevertheless brands the methods of
the OGPU and those in power in Soviet Russia.
In many cases the
German candidates for repatriation were summoned by the OGPU, questioned for
hours on end and threatened with exclusion from repatriation if they did not
yield to the demands of the OGPU. Another favourite method was to inform the
intending re-settlers that relatives remaining behind would be treated as
hostages if they did not carry out the obligations which they had assumed under
compulsion, or if they dared report the facts in Germany. Threats were made to
them that the long arm of the OGPU would also reach them in Germany, a threat
which did not fail to have its effect upon the individual re-settler in a small
way. Not only men, but women too, were pressed in this shameless manner to
assume obligations. From the hundreds of cases, a few are here cited which
provide typical examples of the treatment meted out to Germans.
(a) During the
course of the repatriation of the Germans from Bessarabia to the Reich, Frau
Maria Baumann, of Czernowitz appeared, who stated that the Russian Secret
Service had tried to press her for espionage purposes in Germany, as
corroborated by the oaths of other witnesses. She had repeatedly been summoned
to appear at superior offices of the OGPU, where every means was tried to
persuade her to yield to the demands that she should undertake espionage work.
Being the mother of
five children who were unprovided for (she is a widow), she was promised large
sums of money and was told that even sums of 10,000 marks and more were of no
consequence. She was to be entrusted with espionage work in Prague. She had
already been provided with material and documents showing the extent of the
specialized training.
(b) Elisabeth
Kreutel, a married woman whose husband had a bandage business in Czernowitz, was
also approached by the OGPU when her passport was examined. She was to carry on
Russian espionage work in Saxony. She, too, brought important and instructive
material to the knowledge of the German preventive authorities.
These proved
individual cases might be supplemented by hundreds of others, for it has been
ascertained that, according to a conservative estimate, the OGPU. approached
approximately 50 Vo of the re-settlers in order to force them to cooperate,
either by coercive threats or by promises of large sums of money.
But the OGPU not
only attempted, by using the most despicable means, to make these Germans
traitors to their country; their agents even stooped in many cases to robbing
these people, and to stealing their identification papers, money and valuables.
In 16 cases proof is available that the theft of identification papers occurred
in order to provide Russian espionage agents with them.
In six further
cases there are strong suspicions that the OGPU murdered Germans for the purpose
of employing their papers to smuggle agents unobtrusively into the Reich.
2. Soviet
Russian diplomatic offices as centres of the economic, political and military
intelligence service against the Reich, with the plain object of preparing for
war.
Since the
conclusion of the Pact, the Russian specialized espionage service has worked in
a manner almost equivalent to open provocation. Surpassing its already familiar
ruthless methods, it now proceeded to make extensive use of the Russian
diplomatic representations in the Reich and principally of the Russian Embassy
in Berlin for the purposes of its reconnoitring activities. When some time ago
the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, Shkvartsev, was recalled and replaced by
Ambassador Dekanozov, this change was the signal for a further intensification
of espionage in the shape of political, economic and military intelligence
activity. Dekanozov, one of Stalin’s confidants, was the leader of the
Intelligence Department of the N. K.V. D. (Russian People’s Commissariat for
Home Affairs), to which the OGPU is attached as a special espionage division.
The task allotted to him by Moscow was that of obtaining admission to the
authorities of the Reich by building up a network of trusted persons, and above
all of obtaining reports upon the military strength and the plans of operation
of the Reich. His faithful assistant was the member of the OGPU and so-called
„Counsellor” Kobulov, who ruthlessly exploited his exterritorial status to carry
on intense activity in the sphere of espionage. Apart from gaining purely
military information, the object of Russian espionage in the Reich was to find
out the political plans of the Reich and by the establishment of a number of
secret broadcasting stations in many places in Germany to prepare centres for
issuing reports which were to pass on all information important to Russia by
means of an intricate code system. Since 1940, therefore, large-scale
preparations for mobilization in the field of espionage have been in progress,
set in motion at a tremendous financial cost. (The German preventive service was
able to intervene in time.)
The realization
that the increasing pressure of Russian espionage was making itself felt
principally in the eastern provinces of Germany – more particularly in the
Government General and in the Protectorate – caused special attention to be paid
to these territories which represented a source of danger. It was thus
ascertained that Leonid Mokhov, a member of the Russian Consulate General in
Prague, was in charge of a network of Russian espionage spread by the OGPU
throughout the Protectorate. Former members of the Czech Legion, who had fought
on the Polish side during the war against Poland and were for the most part
supporters of the former Communist Party in Czechoslovakia and who had been in
Russian captivity after the collapse of Poland, were coerced into joining the
Russian espionage service and trained above all in operating secret wireless
transmitters. These people were sent into the Protectorate armed with forged
identification papers where they began their activities under the direction of
the above- mentioned Russian consular official, Mokhov. When the raid was
carried out, more than 60 people belonging to this Russian espionage service
were arrested and a dozen secret wireless transmitters, which were already
functioning, were confiscated. (Note: This service worked completely
independently of the illegal system established by the Comintern in the
Protectorate. Vide No. II, 2.)
The Russian
Secretary to the Embassy and OGPU official, Kobulov, had meanwhile not been
inactive in Berlin. It is not without interest to quote here , the declaration
of a former Yugoslav diplomat who could not be accused of pro-German sympathies,
namely, the Yugoslav Military Attaché in Berlin, Colonel Vauhnik, who stated
with regard to the assistant of the Russian Military Attaché in Berlin, Colonel
Komiakov, that he concerned himself exclusively with the Intelligence Service
and disbursed whatever money was necessary. It was the object of Kobulov, as the
organizer, in collaboration with the Russian Military Attaché, Tupikov, and his
assistant, Skorniakov, to establish secret transmitters for the communication of
intelligence not only in the capital of the Reich but also in all the important
towns throughout Greater Germany.
Only the two
following instances will be quoted from the extensive material available
concerning the activity of these gentlemen and of their collaborators:
a) Wietold Pakulat,
a master baker in Mariampol in Lithuania, who was a member of the German
Cultural Union in Lithuania and had relatives in the Reich, especially in
Berlin, was one day summoned before the OGPU in Kovno. He was threatened with a
charge of espionage. The fact that he was a member of the Cultural Union and had
travelled from Lithuania to Germany on a number of occasions in order to visit
his brother in Memel was sufficient reason for the OGPU to bring a charge of
espionage against him. The frightened man was promised immunity from punishment
only on condition that he declared himself prepared to be repatriated under the
guise of a German refugee to Berlin and there to work for Russia according to
definite instructions. He was sent into the Reich, whilst his wife and child
were detained by the OGPU as hostages. On his departure, he was also threatened
with the long arm of the OGPU and told that if he turned traitor it would surely
reach him in Berlin. In spite of this’ threat and „although he was obliged to
leave relatives behind in the power of the OGPU, this German realized where his
duty lay and got into touch with the Security Police (SD). It was thus possible
to thwart all the intentions of the Russians by means of this counter-stroke of
which they remained in ignorance and, from the very outset, to keep a watch on
their activities. In Berlin, Pakulat continually received instructions and
orders from the Russian Embassy through an OGPU go-between. He was obliged to
rent an apartment in which the OGPU set up a large secret transmitter. He was
also obliged, acting on Russian orders, to take over a small hotel with a public
bar, so as to have rooms ready and at the disposal of Russian agents and
couriers passing through, He continually received instructions to make the
acquaintance of skilled workmen in the armament industry in order to obtain
inside information. The Russian espionage service deliberately aimed at
preparation for war which included the marking down not only of objectives for
future attacks from the air, but also of inconspicuous hiding-places in public
squares and parks where secret material and objects required for acts of
sabotage could be placed in readiness at an opportune moment.
In this connexion
alone, the OGPU disbursed approximately RM 100,000 in order to get all the
preparations under way of which only a short summary has been given above. With
Pakulat’s assistance the Russian Intelligence Service obtained the services of a
German wireless operator from the firm of Siemens whom the Security Police (SD)
placed at their disposal in order, to thwart their plans The Russian
Intelligence Service counted with certainty on Pakulat’s having meanwhile built
up a reliable organization consisting of 60 Germans, who were not only to carry
out extensive espionage but also to engage in subversive activity. The network,
in accordance with the German counter-plot, was even allowed to spread as far as
Königsberg, where a beginning was about to be made by marking on-a map of the
town factories executing orders of national importance.
b) Another case of
despicable coercion of a German national has come to light in Berlin. This
German national, who was born in Leningrad and whose name cannot for obvious
reasons be divulged at present, finally returned to settle permanently in Berlin
in 1936 after having previously paid a number of visits to Germany. He had
married in Russia under Russian law. There was one daughter by the marriage. As
his wife, according to Russian law, remained a Russian subject, he was not
allowed to bring her with him to Germany. In Berlin, he made continual efforts
with, the support of the German Foreign Office to obtain the necessary personal
papers in order to have the Russian marriage recognized under German law. As he
suffers from pulmonary consumption, and for this reason was particularly anxious
to be reunited as soon as possible with his family, he saw no alternative but to
return once more to Leningrad in order to take steps there to procure the
documents and at last to get his wife and child to Germany. For this purpose he
applied to the Russian Travel Bureau, „Intourist“ and asked for the necessary
permit to enter Russia. When the manager of this office, a Russian of the name
of Shakhanov, discovered from his statements that this invalid was extremely
anxious about his family, he began to play a game of despicable baseness with
him. Shakhanov promised the sick man permission to travel to Leningrad on
condition that he, a German, was prepared to betray his country. Shakhanov
continued to harass the desperate man who was thereby almost driven to suicide.
Shakhanov continued to play off his wife and child against him and let fall
hints to the effect that they were hostages in the hands of the OGPU. The German
national in question eventually made a declaration to the German preventive
service, Acting on their instructions, he pretended to comply with the wishes of
the OGPU agent, Shakhanov, and at his orders rented a large apartment which was
likewise prepared for the installation of a secret wireless transmitter. In
conclusion, it will suffice to mention the fact that Shakhanov and „Counsellor”
Kobulov acted in close cooperation.
c) As the result of
unremitting observation of the actions of the wireless specialist at the Russian
Embassy in Berlin, who made his appearance in Danzig on various occasions, it
was possible here, too, in the interests of preventive measures to arrange for
the installation of a secret transmitter together with the necessary political
and economic staff of confidential agents. Here, too, the timely declaration
made by the Danzig citizens, the brothers Formella, who were to be pressed into
the service of the OGPU, made it possible to frustrate the Russian espionage
plans. This series of examples could be added to indefinitely, since the Russian
Intelligence Service worked in the same way in all German towns which were
considered of importance.
V. Frontier
incidents.
In conclusion, it
must also be stated that frontier incidents, which were a nightmare for the
German population on the eastern frontiers, had continually been provoked by the
Soviets, and they had increased since February 1941. The criminal shooting of
German nationals and the continual firing of shots from the Russian side into
German territory form the links in a continuous chain of evidence.
VI. Conclusion.
The whole of the
activity of the Soviet Union directed against National Socialist Germany as.
illustrated by the examples quoted, which are culled from the abundant material
available, shows to what extent subversive activity, sabotage, terrorism and
espionage preparatory to war were carried on in the military, economic and
political spheres.
These hostile
activities did not decrease after the conclusion of the Consultation and
Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939 but, on the contrary, increased in scope
and intensity.
(signed) Heydrich.
